Skip to main content
Internet Archive's 25th Anniversary Logo

Full text of "Science, technology, and American diplomacy : an extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy"

See other formats


Science, Technology, and 
American Diplomacy 

An extended study of the interactions of science 
and technology with United States foreign policy 

Volume I 


U.S. House of Representatives 


Science, Technology, and 
American Diplomacy 

An extended study of the interactions of science 
and technology with United States foreign policy 

Volume I 

1 tr 
! m 

j zr 


.. c. l. 


U.S. House of Representatives 

U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington: 1977 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 (3-Part Set ; Sold in Sets Only) 
Stock Number 052-070-04350-4 

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman 

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina 
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan 
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania 
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota 
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania 
LEO J. RYAN, California 
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey 
DON BONKER, Washington 
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts 
WYCHE FOWLER, Jr., Georgia 

JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama 
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas 
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania 
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California 

John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff 
George R. Berdes, Staff Consultant 

Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs 
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman 

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina 
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts 

LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas 

Ivo J. Spalatin, Subcommittee Staff Director 

William H. Fite, Minority Staff Consultant 

Forrest R. Frank, Subcommittee Staff Associate 

La Verne Still, Staff Assistant 



This publication of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 
represents the culmination of 7 years of research and brings together, 
in a current perspective, results previously published in a series of 15 
committee prints of this committee and its Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Security and Scientific Affairs. 

In the foreword to the first of the 15 committee prints — an anno- 
tated bibliography published in March 1970 (superseded by an exten- 
sive new bibliography in the present collection) — I noted that previ- 
ous work by the subcommittee had revealed many instances in which 
U.S. foreign policy had lagged behind technological innovations of 
worldwide importance. In asking the Congressional Research Service 
to undertake the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy re- 
search project, the subcommittee sought to move toward improving 
xVmerica's performance in this vital area. 

It seems appropriate here to recapture some of the thoughts ex- 
pressed in presenting other committee prints of the series. Collec- 
tively these brief excerpts suggest the broad sweep of the study, the 
depth and durability of the committee's concern, and why the subject 
is one of compelling urgency and significance for legislators, officials 
throughout the executive branch, industrial leaders, scholars, and the 
American people : 

With the detonation of the first atomic bomb at Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945 the 
United States and the world entered the nuclear age. The development of the 
bomb revolutionized world affairs and set off a strategic arms race. . . . (The 
Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age.) 

Put to destructive ends by the wrong hands, that discovery [nuclear fission] 
represents the potential unleashing of a force capable of destroying civilization. 
However, given wise and prudent management, it also represents the release and 
increase of human energy capable of opening a new phase in human history. 
(Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Interaction of American Diplomacy 
with a New Technology.) 

As our consciousness of the world as a "global village" intensifies, we are be- 
coming increasingly aware of the dangers and opportunities involved when tradi- 
tional values of time and space are no longer relevant. (The Politics of Global 

Although our times are often characterized as the Space Age . . ., they might 
also be characterized as the Sea Age because for the first time human beings 
have begun to explore below the waters of the world. . . . the seabed has become 
the object of intense economic, legal, and political interest. This interest is almost 



directly the result of the increasing capability of nations to exploit the natural 
resources which lie beneath the sea. (Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed.) 

Today, in many parts- of the earth, there is a food/people imbalance which 
causes the lives of millions to he a desperate search for sustenance. . . . 
In the helief that the food/population equation can he and should he brought 
into balance, modern man is applying scientific knowledge and technical skills. 
The United States, through its foreign aid programs, has been in the forefront. . . . 
(Beyond Malthus: The Food /People Equation.) 

In the minds of many today the idea of science and technology as oppressive 
and uncontrollable forces in society is becoming increasingly more prevalent. 
They see in the power of science and technology the means of destruction in war- 
fare, the source of environmental violation, and the stimulant behind man's grow- 
ing alienation. . . . [Often overlooked], however, is the corresponding alterna- 
tive these influences present for man's good — for his advancement, for the enrich- 
ment of his life, and for world peace. (The Mekong Project: Opportunities and 
Problems of Regionalism.) 

Science and technology are compelling determinants of the human condition. 
In September 1975 the United Nations General Assembly voted to convene an 
international conference on science and technology. The intent of this move was 
to allow the technologically sophisticated and dynamic elements of the U.N. family 
to focus the efforts of the 1979 General Assembly on a concerted program of 
global advance. The agenda of this program would include economic, social, polit- 
ical, and commercial concerns, but its backbone would be technical and mana- 
gerial. . . . Leaders of our diplomatic, technological, and national security 
affairs are not devoid of imagination or insensitive to the oppressive weight of 
danger and insecurity ahead. However, if these leaders propose to meet future 
threats with the same strength of purpose and creative initiative that have largely 
marked the first two centuries of American independence, they must seek new 
forms and find new applications in a world of growing interdependence. The prob- 
lem of how to manage our relationships in such a world resolves in large part into 
the problem of managing technological dynamism and directing it to humane ends. 
(Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence.) 

Our purpose was not just to describe and analyze a specialized set 
of diplomatic problems and opportunities ; it was also, and primarily, 
to examine America's capability for dealing with these problems and 
opportunities and to suggest legislative options for improving that 
capability- This aim was the particular focus of the last two studies 
of the project : Science and Technology in the Department of State, 
by Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, the project director, and Science, Tech- 
nology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence, a summary 
and analysis of the whole series co-authored by Dr. Huddle and the 
associate project director, Mr. Warren R. Johnston. 

To repeat a further thought expressed in presenting the summary 
report: It is my hope and expectation that these analytical contribu- 
tions of the Congressional Research Service will prove in a practical 
way to have yielded three separate sets of products: (1) specific legis- 
lative options and administrative initiatives to strengthen the conduct 
of ongoing diplomacy, with its increasingly important and inseparable 

technical component; (2) encouragement of a consensus toward 
stronger and longer-range planning of technical initiatives in sup- 
port of U.S. diplomacy, involving closer cooperation among all ele- 
ments of the Federal Government; and (3) a more far-reaching par- 
ticipation in the foreign policy process throughout government at all 
levels and involving also the academic and technical communities, 
private industry, and the public at large. 

The findings contained herein are the responsibility of the individual 
authors and of the Congressional Research Service and do not neces- 
sarily reflect the views of the membership of the Committee on Inter- 
national Relations. 

Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, 
Committee on International Relations. 

January 1978. 


(These documents are now out of print. They are incorporated, with some 
minor revisions, in the present volume. The documents are listed here in the 
order of their publication. An explanation of the different order followed in pre- 
senting them all together in this volume is given in Chapter Fifteen under the 
heading, Methodology of the Study.) 

A Selected, Annotated Bibliography of Articles, Books, Documents, Periodicals, 
and Reference Guides. (Superseded by Ms. Knezo's bibliography of January 
1976/July 1977, reproduced at end of volume III.) Compiled by Genevieve 
Knezo. (69 pages.) Issued March 1970. 

Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age. An introduction to the entire study 
by Franklin P. Huddle. (28 pages.) Issued April 1970. 

The Evolution of International Technology. A review of the emergence of tech- 
nology as a factor of change in international relations by Franklin P. Huddle. 
(70 pages.) Issued December 1970. 

The Politics of Global Health. A study of worldwide efforts to prevent epidemic 
disease by Freeman H. Quimby. (79 pages.) Issued May 1971. 

Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed. A survey of technical, economic, legal, 
and political considerations involved in using the natural wealth of land below 
the seas by George A. Doumani. (86 pages, plus appendixes.) Issued July 1971. 

Beyond Malthus: The Food/ People Equation. A study of the interrelation of food 
and population and the resulting impact on international affairs by Allan S. 
Xanes. (96 pages.) Issued October 1971. 

The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism. A case study 
of the accomplishments and failures of the massive Indochina works project 
by Franklin P. Huddle. (86 pages. ) Issued May 1972. 

The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age. A study of an early, 
serious attempt to bring atomic energy and weapons under international control 
by Leneice N. Wu. (67 pages.) Issued August 1972. 

Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe,: The Interaction of American Diplomacy 
With a New Technology. Analysis of the interaction during last 30 years 
between American diplomacy and the technological development of nuclear 
power in Europe by Warren H. Donnelly. (163 pages.) Issued December 1972. 

U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology 
Transfer, and Diplomacy. An assessment of the linkages in U.S.-Soviet relations 
among diplomacy, economics, and technology transfer by John P. Hardt and 
George D. Holliday. (105 pages.) Issued June 1973. 

The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. An analysis of atti- 
tudes, behavior patterns, and procedures followed in the IGY as a step toward 
detente by Harold Bullis. (64 pages.) Issued November 1973. 

U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for Nongovern- 
mental Scientific Exchange. A study of major Federal programs which send 
nongovernment U.S. scientists and technical personnel abroad by Genevieve J. 
Knezo. (163 pages.) Issued April 1974. 



Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility. 

Assessment of the costs and benefits of the migration of technically trained 
persons, especially from developing to developed countries, by Joseph G. 
Whelan. (272 pages. ) Issued September 1974. 

Science and Technology in the Department of State: Bringing Technical Content 
Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations. This concluding study of the series, by 
Franklin P. Huddle, analyzes the impact of science and technology on the 
Department of State, and describes departmental efforts and opportunities to 
relate science and technology to its mission. (180 pages.) Issued June 1975. 

Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence. A review of 
the entire series by Franklin P. Huddle and Warren R. Johnston, with 
analysis of implications for improved mechanisms and strengthened procedures 
in both executive and legislative branches. (360 pages, plus 132-page bibli- 
ography prepared by Genevieve J. Knezo. ) Issued June 1976. 

Contents — Volume I 


Foreword ni 

Documents in the Original Series vii 

Organization of the Study xi 

Letter of Submittal xin 

Acknowledgments xv 

Preface xvii 

Introduction to the Study as a Whole : 

Chapter 1 — Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age ■ 1 

Chapter 2 — The Global Context of Science, Technology, 

and Diplomacy . • 37 

Part 1 — Six Cases : 

Chapter 3 — The Baruch Plan : U.S. Diplomacy Enters the 
Nuclear Age 53 

Chapter 4 — Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The 
Interaction of American Diplomacy With a New Tech- 
nology 123 

Chapter 5 — The Political Legacy of the International 

Geophysical Year 293 

Chapter 6 — The Mekong Project : Opportunities and Prob- 
lems of Regionalism . 361 

Chapter 7 — Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed . . . 435 
Chapter 8 — United States-Soviet Commercial Relations: 
The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and 
Diplomacy 525 



Volume I 
Introduction to the Study as a Whole 

Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age 

The Global Context of Science, Technology, and Diplomacy 

Part 1 — Six Cases 

The Baruch Plan 

Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 

The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year 

The Mekong Project 

Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 

United States-Soviet Commercial Relations 

Volume II 
Part 2 — Six Issues 

The Evolution of International Technology 

The Politics of Global Health 

Beyond Malthus 

U.S. Scientists Abroad 

Brain Drain 

Science and Technology in the Department of State 

Volume III 

Introduction to the Analysis and Findings 

Recapitulation of Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the Study 

Part 3 — Analysis of the Cases and Issues 

Analysis of the Cases 
Analysis of the Issues 

Part 4 — Principal Policy Implications 

About the Essays to Follow 

Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy 

Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships 

High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-Technology Diplomacy 

Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions in International 

Independence Versus Interdependence 

Long-Range and Short-Range Planning 

Concluding Observations 




October 28, 1977. 

Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, 

Chairman, Committee on International Relations, and Chairman, 
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, 
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, B.C. 

Dear Mr. Chairman : In response to your request of April 6, 1977, 
I am pleased to submit in edited and updated form the entire set of 
reports produced for your subcommittee in the Science, Technology, 
and American Diplomacy project and published by the committee be- 
tween March 1970 and June 1976. 

These reports, as originally planned, now form an integrated whole. 
Parts 1 and 2 present the 12 individual case and issue studies in full. 
Parts 3 and 4 examine the cases and issues from a mid-1977 perspective 
to shed light on the capabilities and deficiencies of the Federal Govern- 
ment in dealing with technology-based diplomatic issues. 

This is the final study phase of the research project that you initiated 
with your request to this service in September 1969. Since then the 
project has been under the continuous direction of Dr. Franklin P. 
Huddle, senior specialist in science and technology, with Mr. Warren 
R. Johnston as associate project director. Mr. Johnston, who served as 
assistant chief of the Foreign Affairs Division and then as an assistant 
director of CRS before his recent retirement, has been responsible, in 
consultation with Dr. Huddle, for preparing this edited and updated 
version of the study. 

The study includes an extensive supplement of July 1977 to the 
January 1976 annotated bibliography. Both were prepared by 
Ms. Genevieve J. Knezo, Analyst in Science and Technology. In pre- 
paring the supplement Ms. Knezo was aided by Mrs. Elaine Carlson, 
research assistant to Dr. Huddle. 

Let me convey once again the thanks of all concerned for the oppor- 
tunity of taking part in this unique research undertaking. 

Gilbert Gude, Director. 



It seems fitting on the completion of a research undertaking of the 
magnitude of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy for the 
project director and associate director to claim the privilege of giving 
recognition to the significant contributions to the project. 

To begin at the beginning : We are indebted to the Honorable Clem- 
ent J. Zablocki, chairman of the Subcommittee on International Se- 
curity and Scientific Affairs, for his foresight in initiating the series 
and his dedicated efforts in seeing it through its completion. In addi- 
tion, two successive staff consultants of the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Security and Scientific Affairs, Dr. John H. Sullivan and Mr. 
George R. Berdes, are to be thanked for their constructive guidance 
during the past 7 years and for the unfailingly sympathetic support of 
an enterprise that proved more demanding, and extended over a longer 
period of time, than was originally foreseen. Mr. Ivo J. Spalatin, who 
has now succeeded them in the important role of subcommittee staff 
director, and his associates, are also due our thanks for their encour- 
agement and support in the final stages of this enterprise. 

Apart from the codirectors, there were 10 authors of studies, as iden- 
tified at the beginning of this volume under the heading Documents 
in the Original Study Series. They deserve recognition and gratitude, 
not merely for superior accomplishment but for their tolerance of 
strenuous conditions of competing work assignments, their thousands 
of hours of volunteered overtime, and their assistance in the review 
and updating of material in the final study. Genevieve J. Knezo pre-- 
pared both the original annotated bibliography for the series and 
the current bibliography to be found at the end of this volume. 
Dr. Huddle's assistant, Mrs. Elaine Carlson, performed many essential 
editorial and research support tasks. 

Dozens of others in CRS, over the years, contributed their time and 
skills in bibliographic, research, and clerical assistance, and in the re- 
view of studies in draft. CRS Coordinator of Research James W. 
Robinson reviewed the studies in their entirety and made many helpful 

In addition, many scholars and officials outside CRS were generous 
with their help in reviewing draft text and providing constructive 
criticism. Prof. Edgar S. Robinson of American University submitted 
extensive notes in review of Science and Technology in the Depart- 
ment of State which were of value in preparing the final study ; he 
also served as consultant in the preparation of the latter. To him and 
to the other scholars, too numerous to cite individually, appreciation 
and thanks are expressed for their assistance in collecting facts, offer- 
ing suggestions, and encouraging the ultimate completion of this 

A final important acknowledgment : gratitude beyond measure is 
due our wives, Clare Scott Huddle and Eunice C. Johnston, for years 
of indispensable support and forbearance. 

Franklin P. Huddle. 
Warren R. Johnston. 



The finding of this study is that U.S. diplomacy is neglecting two 
powerful instruments of policy formation and policy execution : tech- 
nological expertise and management skill. Most of the countries of the 
world look to the United States as the undoubted leader in both tech- 
nological achievement and in the skills of organization and administra- 
tion to apply technology effectively. But during the rise of the United 
States to technological preeminence, the Department of State has given 
slight attention to the implications of technology for foreign policy. 
Only meager resources have been spared to search for ways to turn 
technology to achievement of diplomatic goals. 

The emerging trend toward congressional participation in the diplo- 
matic process plays a significant role in this context. The opportunity 
is at hand for the Congress to examine the uses of technology made by 
the executive branch toward the purposes of foreign policy. 

More than that, the study suggests that the necessary teamwork of 
the legislative branch with the executive branch in the field of foreign 
policy requires that the Congress equip itself with its own resources of 
equal diplomatic expertise. The impressive array of technological 
implications for U.S. diplomacy further requires that these congres- 
sional resources of diplomatic expertise contain a strong technological 
element for both current oversight and long-range planning of future 

Technology has made intolerable the consequences of failure to at- 
tain the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy. But technology 
also offers many opportunities for the attainment of these objectives. 
No element of national policy and no component of national program 
warrants more respect in the short-range or the long-range future of 
the United States. 


96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 




Chapter 1 — Toward a New Diplomacy in a 

Scientific Age 



Introduction 5 

The Congressional Role 5 

Discussion of the Problem 8 

1. Purpose of the Study 8 

2. Description of the Problem 9 

3. Importance of the Problem for the Future 9 

4. Growing Recognition of the Importance of Science and Technology 

for American Diplomacy 10 

5. Impact of Nuclear and Rocket Technologies on World Outlook 12 

6. Further Contemporary Evaluations 14 

Definitions of Terms : 

1. Science and Technology 19 

2. Diplomacy 20 

The Context of the Study : 

1. The Structure of U.S. Foreign Policy Formulation 21 

2. Goals of American Foreign Policy 21 

3. The Growing Importance of Science and Technology in U.S. 

Culture 22 

4. Policy Formulation in Science and Technology 24 

5. Scientific and Technological Elements in International Relations. 25 
Formal Aspects of the Study : 

1. Scope and Limitations 27 

2. Methodology 27 

Plan of the Study 28 

1. Criteria for the Selection of Issues 29 

2. Format for the Exposition of Issues 29 

3. Illustrative Questions Researched 29 

4. Enumeration of the Issues 30 

5. Criteria for the Selection of Cases 31 

6. Format for the Presentation of Cases 31 

7. Illustrative Questions To Be Researched 32 

8. Enumeration of the Cases Researched 32 

9. Organization of the Total Study 33 





This study addresses the interaction of U.S. foreign policy and 
diplomacy with modern science and technology. 

The hypothesis of the study was that detailed examination of the 
dynamics of specific instances of these interactions would provide the 
Congress with insights into present arrangements for (a) the uses of 
foreign policy to support U.S. science and technology, and (b) the 
uses of science and technology to develop and support U.S. foreign 

From the beginning of the history of America as a nation, the 
Congress has had a shared responsibility for the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy. Congressional concern with science 
and technology has greatly intensified since World War II. Science 
and technology, exerting an ever-increasing influence on domestic 
public policy, also appear to have a growing effect on the content and 
conduct of American foreign policy. 

Arts of peace and war alike rest on an increasingly technological 
base. Science and technology contribute in a major way to many pro- 
grams of Government departments and agencies : For defense, space 
exploration, agriculture, industry, transportation, communications, 
medicine, meteorology, natural resource development and use, and 
management of information itself. Most of these programs have 
international as well as scientific aspects. The purposeful coordination 
of the international aspects of science and technology presents unusual 
difficulties because of their range, complexity, and specialized nature. 

The Congress of the United States has many reasons for devoting 
attention to the problems of science, technology, and American 
diplomacy. Apart from the special constitutional role of the Senate in 
giving advice and consent to appointment of principal presidential 
advisers and to formal agreements with foreign governments, the 
Congress authorizes programs to develop and use technology for inter- 
national purposes, funds international programs of the Chief Execu- 
tive, and conducts oversight of the executive branch in policy imple- 
mentation, program execution, and the observance of law. As science 
and technology have become important for American diplomacy, they 
have become of corresponding importance for the Congress. 

The Congressional Role 

The congressional response to the need for public action generated 
by such major innovations as atomic energy and artificial earth 
satellites was positive and vigorous. Also of importance has been the 


concurrent effort of the Congress to provide itself with the institutional 
means for examining important scientific and technological develop- 
ments to determine the needs of the public for their support, exploita- 
tion, and regulation. 

When the Congress in 1946 created the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission it also brought into being the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, a novel and uniquely equipped congressional institution, to 
oversee and guide developments in the emerging field of atomic 
power, nuclear weaponry, and supporting research and development. 
The Joint Committee played a significant role in atomic energy deci- 
sions: e.g., in support of President Eisenhower's peaceful atom 
initiative, in winning congressional approval for U.S. participation 
in the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also participated in the 
joint hearings held with the Foreign Relations Committee on the 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. However, the 95th Congress abolished the 
Joint Committee and reassigned its functions and authorities to other 
appropriate committees. 

The Russian Sputnik evoked a corresponding congressional re- 
sponse. The Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics was 
created on February 6, 1958, and the House Select Committee on 
Astronautics and Space Exploration was created on March 5. These 
undertook a vigorous program of policy formulation. One important 
product originated by the House committee was the House concurrent 
resolution on the peaceful uses of space, on which hearings were then 
held before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Another was the 
National Aeronautics and Space Act (NASA) of 1958, 1 approved 
July 29, which not only established the basic space policy of the Nation, 
but blueprinted the organizational form for its implementation as well. 

An important feature of the NASA Act, section 205, provided that : 

The Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the President, may 
engage in a program of international cooperation in work done pursuant to agree- 
ments made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 

On the executive side, the President instructed Ambassador Henry 
Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to request 
the inclusion on the agenda of the 13th General Assembly of a program 
for international cooperation in the field of outer space. The resolution 
initiated by the United States was introduced November 13, 1958, 
and was adopted by the General Assembly December 13 ; it established 
a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and instructed 
the committee to report on appropriate forms such cooperation 
should take. 

A permanent standing Committee on Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences was established under an amendment to the Standing 
Rules of the Senate. January 14, 1959. This committee was abolished 
in February 1977; its functions were transferred to the Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation Committee. In the House, action had 
already Ix-en taken, July 21, 1958, to establish the standing Com- 
mittee' on Science and Astronautics; to this committee was assigned 
the broader jurisdiction over astronautical research and development, 
the Bureau of Standards. NASA and the National Aeronaut ics and 
Space Council, the National Science Foundation, outer space, science 

1 72 Stat. 426 ; 42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq., as amended. 

scholarships, and scientific research and development. 2 (In January 
1975, the committee was renamed the Committee on Science and Tech- 
nology and was given additional jurisdiction over civil aviation 
research and development, environmental research and development, 
all energy research and development except nuclear research and 
development, and the National Weather Service. At this time, the 
committee was also given general and special oversight functions of 
reviewing and studying, on a continuing basis, all laws, programs, 
and Government activities dealing with or involving nonmilitary re- 
search and development.) 

Apart from the dramatic impacts of atomic energy and space explo- 
ration, science and technology subjects have been incorporated in the 
jurisdictions of many standing committees of both Houses of Congress. 
In her study of "Congressional Organization for Science and Tech- 
nology, 95th Congress," Mauree W. Ayton lists 10 Senate Committees, 
10 House Committees, and 2 Ad Hoc Committees with such concerns. 3 
Among those that apparently combine the concerns of science and 
technology with foreign affairs are the following : 


Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 

Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy 
Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 
Committee on Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Research and Development 
Committee on the Budget 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee on Environment and Public Works 
Committee on Foreign Relations 
Committee on Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal 
Committee on Human Resources 

Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research 


Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 
Committee on Armed Services 
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs 

Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary 

- Taking note of the scope given to the House committee, Speaker McCormack later 
observed that "The importance attached to science and technology by the House leader- 
ship in 1958 was signaled by the fact that as majority leader I was chairman of the select 
committee and the minority leader of that period was ranking minority member of this 
committee." (Statement of Hon. John W. McCormack, Speaker, U.S. House of Representa- 
tives In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. ' Applied 
Science and World Economy : Panel on Science and Technology, Ninth Meeting." Pro- 
ceedings before the * * * Jannarv 23, 24. and 25. 1968, 90th Congress, second session 
(Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), page 11.) 

3 Mauree W. Ayton, "Congressional Organization for Science and Technology, 95tn 
Congress : A listing of congressional committees and subcommittees having jurisdiction 
over scientific and technological activities." (Scheduled for publication in November 1977.) 


Committee on the Budget 
Committee on Government Operations 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 
Committee on International Relations 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 

Subcommittee on Oceanography 
Committee on Science and Technology 


Ad Hoc Committee on Energy 

Ad Hoc Select Committee on Outer Continental Shelf 

Advisory services on science and technology matters, including 
those of an international nature, are provided by a variety of institu- 
tional arrangements. These include staff assistants to individual Mem- 
bers of Congress; staffs of Congressional Committees; the National 
Security and International Affairs Section of the Congressional 
Budget Office; the Science Policy Research, Environment and Natural 
Resources, and Foreign Affaire and National Defense Divisions of the 
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; the Office 
of Technology Assessment; the International Division of the General 
Accounting Office; and the Commission on International Relations 
of the National Academy of Sciences. 

Discussion of the Problem 

1. Purpose of the Study 

This study is intended to provide Congress with background mate- 
rial useful in strengthening the resources that support the conduct of 
American diplomacy. The plan of the study is to describe and analyze 
the formulation and administration of American diplomatic policies 
having significant science and technology components. Specifically, 
the study examines a selected set of particular developments and events 
in recent diplomatic history in order to : 
— Characterize processes and problems involving the interaction of 

science and technology with diplomacy ; 
— Define organizational requirements for the effective formulation 
of important policies to direct and control activities involving 
this interaction; 
— Identify ways in which the capabilities of agencies serving at this 
interface can be strengthened legislatively or administratively; 
and more generally, to 
— Discover ways in which science and technology can better support 

foreign policy objectives of the United States ; and 
— Discover ways in which the conduct of diplomatic activities can 
better support the healthy growth of national and international 
science and technology. 


2. Description of the Problem 

The interaction of science and technology with diplomacy has wide 
ramifications and many challenges. Diplomacy is concerned with 
carrying out American foreign policies: The formulation of U.S. 
political, economic, and military interests and their representation 
in other nations and in international bodies. Traditionally, diplomacy 
has been recognized as requiring superior skills and — in the best 
sense — sophisticated attitudes in interpersonal relations, negotiation, 
persuasion, forensics, perception, cultural empathy, and adaptability 
to unfamiliar situations. Science represents generally a somewhat 
different environment, a cultural activity whose disciplinary walls are 
not easily passed over. It involves systematic understanding of the 
fundamentals of man and nature. Technology is still a third area of 
human activity, with its own special characteristics of materialistic, 
sometimes trial-and-error, evolution of hardware and systems. The 
impacts on society of the uses of technology are profound and many- 
sided. Accordingly, a study of the interactions of science and tech- 
nology with diplomacy presents three-dimensional problems of large 
scope, many kinds of specialization, and difficult analysis. 

Domestically, science policy has two distinct aspects : ( 1) The use of 
science and technology as an instrument to aid in the formulation and 
execution of public policy (called "science in policy") ; and (2) the 
formulation and execution of Government policy to aid in the exploi- 
tation of publicly beneficial science and technology (called "policy 
in science"). 

Public funds have to satisfy so many different needs that support 
for basic science encounters budgetary constraints ; the resultant search 
for criteria to assure an ordering of the priorities of basic science is 
the subject of considerable and unresolved controversy. Questions 
remain open as to the priority to be given basic research in fields 
with a high probability of opening up new opportunities for socially 
useful technology as against fields in which the scientific interest is 
high but the results offer no obvious promise of application. There are 
also unresolved questions as to the comparative economic and social 
costs and benefits of particular technologies (the supersonic transport, 
for example) and of competing technologies and their costs and bene- 
fits. Will a desalinization plant be socially more cost-effective than an 
urban rapid transit system, or a novel waste-disposal system? Clearly, 
the formulation of policies to harness science and technology effec- 
tively to national need presents many difficulties. 

Similar problem areas exist in the field of international science and 
technology. In the international field, too, there is "science in policy" 
and "policy in science." Moreover, the impacts of science and tech- 
nology have made diplomacy itself more difficult by introducing the 
factor of dynamic and rapid change, often of great magnitude. 

3. Importance of the Problem for the Future 

Nowhere are the changes wrought by science and technology more 
evident than in international affairs. In his study, "Science, Tech- 
nology, and American Foreign Policy," Eugene B. Skolnikoff observes 


that "* * * scientific and technological developments during and 
since World War II have altered former relationships among 
nations, overturned traditional measures of power and influence, and 
made the future a hostage to the scientific discoveries that are un- 
certain in form but sure to come.'" * 

Elsewhere, Skolnikoff observes that the relevance today of the 
"facts or expectations of science and technology to many foreign 
policy issues is not entirely without precedent." 

Quite a few foreign policy concerns in the past were heavily conditioned by 
technical considerations : fishery matters, treaties on the use of common water 
resources, international agreements on weights and measures, and others. 

However [he continues], gradually since 1900, and explosively since World 
War II, there has been a change in degree of dependence that is tantamount to 
a change in kind. Now, not only are many of the central issues of foreign policy — 
those that affect the fundamental international position and security of the 
Nation — intimately tied to scientific and technological variables, but whole new 
areas of policy concern based on science and technology have arisen that demand 
the time and attention of senior policy officials. 5 

Apart from the obvious instances of defense and space technology, 
he calls attention to the "* * * need to estimate the future, to examine 
the ways in which international relations and perhaps the interna- 
tional political system will be altered as science and technology con- 
tinue their explosive advance * * *." 6 

4. Growing Recognition, of the Importance of Science and Technology 
for American Diplomacy 
A quarter of a century ago, when the great expansion in scientific 
and technological effort in the United States was just getting under- 
way, Lloyd Berkner as consultant to the Secretary of State presented 
a report on "Science and Foreign Relations" in which he addressed 
the dichotomy of science-in-policy and policy-in-science in the inter- 
national sphere : 

First, how can the potentialities of scientific progress be integrated into the 
formulation of foreign policy, and the administration of foreign relations, so that 
the maximum advantage of scientific progress and development can be acquired 
by all the peoples? Second, how can foreign relations be conducted in such a 
manner as to create the atmosphere that is essential to effective progress of 
science and technology? 7 

A little more than a decade after the Berkner report had urged a 
strengthening of diplomatic resources of scientific and technological 
expertise, a similar recommendation was made to the Federal Council 
for Science and Technology by its International Committee, chaired by 
Walter G. Whitman: 

Science and its applications in technology are exerting a revolutionary influ- 
ence on the destinies of nations and mankind. Our domestic and foreign policies 
must lie attuned to this revolution and to its implications of change in the pattern 
of world relationships. 

4 Eugene I?. Skolnikoff. Science, Technology, and American Foreign Polio/. (Cambridge, 
Ma8BaChU8ett8, The M.I.T. Press. 1907), p. .'t. 

"Ibid., p. :'.s. r ,. Sec also: Eugene B. Skolnikoff. "Scientific Advice In the State Depart 

Dient." In William K. Nelson, <•<!. The Politics of Science: Headings in Science. Technology, 
and Gorernment. (New York, Oxford inlversity Press, 1968), pp. 884 396. 

8 Skolnikoff. Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. •'!!•-. 

7 Lloyd viel Berkner, "Science and Foreign Relations : International Plow of Scientific 
and Technological Information." (Washington, International Science Policy Survey 
Group, U.S. Department of state. I960), p. 2. (Department of state Publication 8860, 
General Foreign Policy Series, No. 30.) 


Not only does our domestic strength rely on a vigorous technological base; our 
nation's role as a leader in the international scene will increasingly be deter- 
mined by the accomplishments of our scientists and engineers in this country 
and by our contributions to the well being of other societies. 

[Science, the report continued] possesses an objectivity which transcends dif- 
ferences in political and social systems — its language, its methods and its ethics 
are universal. It can therefore be a powerful tool for building understanding 
among the peoples of the world and towards achieving eventual world 

These two potentials of science, which often lead to conflicting conclusions, are 
each significant factors in the formulation of policies to guide our international 
scientific and technological activities. 8 

Two months later, Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations, in a speech to a scientific group called attention to the 
lag of policy behind technological advance : 

Scientifically and technically [he said] the world has already become a single 
community, yet in our ethical response to this fact and in our political institu- 
tions we, governments and citizens, are lagging dangerously far behind you, the 

You have given us dangerous powers, but we have not yet learned to control 
them. You have given us tools to abolish poverty, but we have not yet mastered 
them. You have given us means to extend the span of human life, but this may 
prove a curse, not a blessing, unless we can assure food, survival, and then health 
and a good life for the bodies and minds of our exploding populations. You have 
made the world small and interdependent, but we have not built the new institu- 
tions to manage it — nor cast off the old institutions which scientific progress has 
made obsolete. 

Every great change wrought by science is foreshadowed years ahead in the 
laboratory and on the drawing board. But it is not until the new device is fully 
built and functioning, and has astonished the whole world, that we begin to think 
of its human and political implications. We are forever running today to catch up 
tomorrow with what you made necessary yesterday. 9 

Subsequently, Jerome B. Wiesner, in his capacity as Director of 
the Office of Science and Technology, told the Military Operations 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations in 
1962, the "Swift emergence of science and technology as vital instru- 
ments of national policy" involved "forces that will determine our 
future, will shape the balance of power among nations, influence our 
military security, facilitate our success in achieving foreign policy ob- 
jectives, provide the vigor for our domestic economy, and guarantee 
the health of our citizens.*' He went on : 

In an era of explosive growth and international tensions that evoke an unprec- 
edented demand on our total resources — physical and intellectual — there is need 
to make most effective use of our total technical resources. 

We are faced with two realities : The increasing role of science and technology 
in policy decision making, and the increasing federal support for research and 
development. These two aspects are sometimes contrasted as the role of science in 
government and the role of government in science. While they are clearly related, 
it is important to recognize that they often pose quite different problems. 10 

President John F. Kennedy, in a speech to the National Academy of 
Sciences, October 22, 1963, called "wholehearted understanding today 

8 U.S. Federal Council for Science and Technology. "International Scientific and Tech- 
nological Activities." A report to the Federal Council for Science and Technology by 
its International Committee, June 20, 1961. (For Authorized Committee Use, Mimeo, 
1961, p. 1.) 

9 Adlai E. Stevenson, "Science, Diplomacy, and Peace." Remarks by Adlai E. Stevenson. 
U.S. Representative to the United Nations. Made before the International Astronomical 
Union at Berkeley, California, August 15, 1961. Department of State Bulletin (Septem- 
ber 4. 1961), pp. 402-3. 

10 Jerome B. Wiesner. "The Federal Role in Science and Technology." Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists (November 1962), p. 42. 


of the importance of pure science" the distinguishing feature of the 
twentieth century in the United States. It Avas well established, he 
said, that progress in technology depended on progress in theory. 
Science had emerged from a peripheral concern of Government to 
active partnership. 

I would suggest that science is already moving to enlarge its influence in three 
general ways: in the interdisciplinary area, in the international area, and in the 
intercultural area. For science is the most powerful means we have for the unifi- 
cation of knowledge, and a main obligation of its future must be to deal with prob- 
lems which cut across boundaries, whether boundaries between the sciences, 
boundaries between nations, or boundaries between man's scientific and his hu- 
mane concerns. 

[Continued the President:] Every time you scientists make a major invention, 
we politicians have to invent a new institution to cope with it, and almost invari- 
ably these days, and happily, it must be an international institution. 11 

5. Impact of Nuclear and Rocket Technologies on World Outlook 

The two principal innovations that intensified awareness of the 
relevance of science and technology for diplomacy in the Twentieth 
Century were atomic energy and artificial earth satellites. The first led 
to creation of the Atomic Enerffv Commission, the Office of Naval Re- 
search and other military research agencies, and the National Science 
Foundation. The second produced the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the 
Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Department of Defense, 
and a much-expanded science organization in the Executive Office of 
the President; the emphasis resulting from these actions led in turn 
to the designation of a number of Assistant Secretaries for Science 
and Technology (or equivalent) in old-line departments. The litera- 
ture responding to the two notable scientific/ technological achieve- 
ments contains many references to their international impact, of which 
the following are representative : 

Bernard M. Baruch: 

My Fellow-Members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and my 
Fellow-Citizens of the World, 

We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. 

That is our business. 

Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hoi>e which, seized upon 
with faith, can work our salvation. Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect 
World Peace or World Destruction." 

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: 

The United Nations Charter now reflects serious inadequacies. One inade- 
quacy sprang from ignorance. When we were in San Francisco in the Spring of 
1945, none of us knew of the atomic bomb which was to fall on Hiroshima on 
August 6, 1945. The Charter is thus a pre-Atomic Age Charter. In this sense it 
was obsolete before it actually came into force. As one who was at San Francisco, 
I can say with confidence that if the delegates there bad known that the mysteri- 
ous and immeasurable power of the atom would be available as a means of mass 

11 U.S. President (John P. Kennedy). "Address at the Anniversary Convocation of the 
National Academy of Sciences." Speech given October 22, 196:5. in Public Papers of the 
Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1963. (Washington, r.s. Government Printing Office, 1964), 

PP. 802 •". 

« Opening salutation by Bernard M. Baruch to United Nations Atomic Energy Com- 
mission, June 14, 1040, before Introducing his plan for the International control of atomic 


destruction, the provisions of the Charter dealing with disarmament and the 
regulation of armaments would have been far more emphatic and realistic. 18 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk : 

Today the United States has operational weapons in its arsenal hundreds of 
times as destructive as that first atom bomb. The Polaris and Minuteman missiles 
are armed with warheads tens of times as powerful. The Soviets also have weap- 
ons of great destructive power. 

The hard fact is that a full-scale nuclear exchange could erase all that man has 
built over the centuries. War has devoured itself because it can devour the 
world. * * * 

No responsible man will deny we live in a world of vast and incalculable 
risks. Where decisions may be required in minutes, we must be constantly on 
guard against the accident or miscalculation that can lead where no one wants to 
go. A local conflict anywhere around the globe in which the interests of the great 
powers are engaged might suddenly pose the prospect of nuclear war. 14 

Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson : 

* * * We have lost an important battle in technology. That has been demon- 
strated by the satellites that are whistling above our heads. 13 

Unanimous statement by Senate Preparedness Subcommittee: 

We began with a simple — but revolutionary — fact. It was that for the first 
time in all history a manmade satellite was placed into orbit around the earth. 

There were many who realized that this was an inevitable development of the 
march of science. But the circumstances under which it happened were startling 
and brought into sharp focus facts which had been known previously but not 
fully appreciated. 

We had expected to be first with this achievement. In fact, we have yet to prove 
second. * * * 

From the beginning, however, it developed that there was much more at stake 
than the prestige of being "first". * * * 

[This achievement by the Soviet Union 1 has two important implications. 

First, it demonstrates beyond question that the Soviet Union has the propulsive 
force to hurl a missile from one continent to another. 

Second, the Soviet Union has gathered basic information about outer space. 
* * * It can now be said: 

* * * The Soviet Union has led the world into outer space. * * * 

We are engaged in a race for survival and we intend to win that race. But the 
truly worthwhile goal is a world of peace — the only world in which there will 
also be security. 

The immediate objective is to defend ourselves. But the equally important 
objective is to reach the hearts and minds of men everywhere so the day will come 

13 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the American Bar Asso- 
ciation, August 26, 1953. However, according to Bernhard G. Bechhoefer ["Postwar Nego- 
tiations for Arms Control," Brookings Institution, 1961, p. 28] : "Dulles' statement that 
the delegates at San Francisco knew nothing of the bomb is not literally correct." Among 
those present who knew were Secretary of State Stettinius, Assistant Secretary of War 
John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Artemus Gates, Assistant Secretary of 
State Clement Dunn, British Ambassador Lord Halifax, and perhaps others. 

14 "Statement of Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State." In U.S. Congress. Senate. Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings before the * * * on 
Executive M. 88th Congress, 1st Session. The treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on 
behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 
20, 21. 22, 23, 26, and 27, 1963. 88th Congress, first session. (Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1963), p. 12. 

15 Statement by Chairman Lyndon B. Johnson to Preparedness Investigating Subcom- 
mittee Nov. 25, 1957. (The Sputnik had been launched Oct. 4, 1957.) In U.S. Congress. 
Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs. Hear- 
ings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the * * * Part I. Novem- 
ber 25, 26, 27, December 13, 14, 16, and 17, 1957, January 10, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 
21 and 23, 1958. 85th Congress, first and second sessions. (Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1958), p. 3. 


when the ballistic missile will be merely a dusty relic in the museums of mankind 
and men everywhere will work together in understanding. 16 

House Concurrent Resolution 326 : 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the 
Congress of the United States believes that the nations of the world should join 
in the establishment of plans for the peaceful exploration of outer space, should 
ban the use of outer space for military aggrandizement, and should endeavor to 
broaden man's knowledge of space with the purpose of advancing the good of 
all mankind rather than for the benefit of one nation or group of nations. * * * a 

Representative John W. McCormack : 

Mr. McCormack. Mr. Speaker * * * This resolution represents the unanimous 
views of the members of the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Explo- 
ration. * * * The resolution * * * expresses the sense of the Congress that the 
United States should strive, through the United Nations or such other means 
as may best be appropriate, for international agreements designed to accomplish 
these purposes. * * * But it is impossible to analyze man's forthcoming explora- 
tion of space solely in terms of such technological benefits ; its scope and mean- 
ing for man and his development far transcend such calculations. Not least 
among the possibilities of this great adventure is the potentiality of a reemphasis 
in men's hearts of the common links that bind the members of the human race 
together and the development of a strengthened sense of community of interest 
which quite transcends national boundaries. It is my belief that in such a develop- 
ment lies our strongest hope of world peace and the security necessary to live in 
happiness and prosperity. * * * But * * * attempts to project nationalistic rival- 
ries beyond the earth's boundaries cannot but lead to a perpetuation of exist- 
ing world tensions and the increased likelihood of war. * * * Our country must 
cast the weight of its great influence and leadership firmly on the side of peaceful 
international cooperation * * *. 18 

Senator Lyndon B. Johnson : 

We should, certainly, make provisions for inviting together the scientists of 
other nations to work in concert on projects to extend the frontiers of man and to 
find solutions to the troubles of this earth. * * * It would be appropriate and 
fitting for our Nation to demonstrate its initiative before the United Nations by 
inviting all member nations to join in this adventure into outer space together. 

The dimensions of space dwarf our national differences on earth. 58 

6. Further Contemporary Evaluations 

The role of science as a medium of international communication was 
recognized by Representative George P. Miller, chairman of the House 
Committee on Science and Astronautics, in a statement to a seminar of 
the Foreign Service Institute, early in 1965. Said Chairman Miller : 

Now, let me proceed to a facet of Congressional relationship with science and 
technology that holds great promise to ourselves and is, no doubt, of immediate 
interest to you — that is, in the field of international relations. I believe that one of 

10 Unanimous statement by Preparedness Subcommittee ("Statement of the Senate 
preparedness Subcommittee Issued by Chairman Lyndon I?. Johnson and Ranking Minority 
Member Styles bridges at the Direction of the Subcommittee") January ".'(, 1958. in 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile 
Programs. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of tin- • * * 
Reports of Secretary of Defense on Accomplishments of Defense Department on Recom 
■ Herniations of the Preparedness Subcommittee dated January 23, 1 !>;">s. Tart III. Feb- 
ruary 26, April .'{, and July 24, 1958. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1958J, P- 2427. 

17 House Concurrent Resolution 320, which passed the House June 2, 19T>N, was favor- 
ably reported by unanimous vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. June 1<). 
1!»TiS, and was agreed to by the Senate on July 2'A, 1958. Ttl I'.S. Congress. Senate. Special 

Committee on space and Astronautics. Final Report of the * * * Pursuant to 8. Bee. 856 
uj tin H.'ith Congress. Senate Report NO. 100, March 11, 1959. 86th Congress, first session. 
(Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office; 1959), p. 17. 

'"John W. McCormack. "Relative to the Establishment of Plans for the Peaceful 
Exploration of Outer space." statement of the lion. John \v. McCormack on the floor 
Of the House, in support of House Concurrent Resolution '.W>, June 2, 1958. Congressional 
Record (June 2, 1958), p. 9912. 

' • Address by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson before a meeting of the Columbia Broad- 
casting System Affiliates, Shoreham Hotel. Washington, i>.c. January 14, 1958. At that 
time he was chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics. 


the most important characteristics of science is that it can be, and usually is, 
outside the realm of politics. It has provided us areas of peaceful dialogue and co- 
operation between ourselves, our friends and our potential enemies that have 
hardly been possible in any other field of activity. The International Geophysical 
Year programs were great testimony to this fact. 20 

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
who had been the first Presidential science adviser following the Sput- 
nik success of the Soviet Union, told the same Seminar that the inte- 
gration of science and technology into foreign policy was a practical 
imperative. There was a "diplomatic opportunity to grasp a powerful 
new lever to advance our national interest in the world arena." 

The United States [he continued] has exceptional technical resources that are 
understood all over the world, both by advanced peoples and by less-advanced 
peoples. This scientific and technological strength is among the most conspicuous, 
most admired, and most persuasive features on the American landscape * * *. 
In this technology and the education which supports it, lies a unique diplomatic 
opportunity, if we can but cultivate the complicated skills and understanding 
required to exploit it, and create the condition where this skill and understanding 
can be made really at home in agencies concerned with affairs abroad. The power 
of our science and technology to serve national goals at home and abroad also 
presents to the Department of State a compelling reason to pursue policies 
designed to maintain and augment this quality. 21 

However, Dr. Killian also took note of the fact that fewer than 150 
of the members of the Foreign Service have "majored in the sciences, 
engineering, or mathematics"; he called this number "disappointingly 

Scientists in the United States have become keenly aware of the 
expanding scope and reach of scientific inquiry. A report by the Com- 
mittee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, of the Ameri- 
can Association for the Advancement of Science, in 1965, warned 
that "The entire planet can now serve as a scientific laboratory." 22 

Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis- 
sion, in a speech in 1966, called attention to the essential international- 
ism of science, which he said "may ultimately be mankind's greatest 
blessing." He offered two reasons for this belief. 

The first, and more obvious, is that international cooperation in science will 
accelerate those advances of mankind which, if applied wisely and equally around 
the world, will help to eliminate the causes of political and economic strife. 

The second idea is that internationality in science extends the rational 
processes of science to other human activities in all countries, and that the 
ascendancy of scientists within their respective countries will influence national 
leaders and their people to deal with problems in a more rational and hence more 
peaceful and productive way * * *. If we view science in its broadest terms, that 
is, as a highly organized and penetrating pursuit of knowledge and truth, some 
good is going to come by having the attitudes and approaches of science applied 
to other areas. 

As an example of necessary international cooperation, he called 
attention to the growth of "big science," whose researches "demand 

20 Hon. George P. Miller. "Legislative Scientific Committees." Address by the Hon. 
George P. Miller, Chairman, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, January 12, 
1965. Made at Foreign Service Institute Seminar. In U.S. Department of State. Science, 
Technology, and Foreign Affairs. Report on the Seminar held at the Foreign Service 
Institute, January 11 to February 2, 1965. Prepared by L. R. Audrieth, Visiting Pro- 
fessor of Science Affairs at the Foreign Service Institute, and H. I. Chinn, Science Officer, 
International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State. (Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 5. 

21 Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., "Science in the State Department: A Practical Impera- 
tive." Address by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the Corporation, M.I.T., Janu- 
ary 11. 1965. Made at Foreign Service Institute Seminar. In Ibid., pp. 42—43. 

22 "The Integrity of Science : A Report by the AAAS Committee on Science in the Pro- 
motion of Human Welfare." American Scientist (No. 53, 1965), p. 191. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 


large facilities and expensive equipment, beyond the financial means 
of many individual scientific organizations and even many nations." ** 
Speaking as Secretary of State to the Panel on Science and Tech- 
nology of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Jan- 
uary 24, 1967. Dean Rusk described the need to deal more explicity with 
the "uncharted region where the interests of science and foreign policy 
meet" : 

For any American involved in public affairs today [he said], scientific literacy 
is a must ; and that is particularly so in foreign affairs. We are firmly convinced 
that the Foreign Service officer should be familiar with the ways, the concepts, 
and the purposes of science. He should be able to grasp the social and economic 
implication of current scientific discoveries and engineering accomplish- 
ments. * * * 

But the burden is not all on one side. Scientists and engineers must, of course, 
recognize very real progress in many fields outside their own specialties, and they 
should be conscious of the difference between the values of society and the verifi- 
able truths of the natural sciences. For such men there is a role in the foreign 
policy process. 

Secretary Rusk also spoke of the need to look ahead, in appraising 
future prospects and opportunities in science and technology as these 
impact on the foreign policy process : "We cannot clearly foresee the 
advances, discoveries, and innovations which lie ahead, but the uses to 
which we put the new knowledge in our human relationships may well 
be critical." It was necessary to "* * * examine some aspects of the 
changing modern environment which are of direct concern to foreign 
affairs, many of which can only be dealt with internationally." As 
examples, he suggested the pollution of the atmosphere, population 
pressures, the spread of nuclear power reactors, the need for a "co- 
operative assault on the treasure chest of the seas," the "challenges of 
our space environment," and assistance to the developing countries in 
building a base for their technological competence. He also called for 
an "alliance of the natural sciences with the social sciences in meeting 
new facets of old problems in the world laboratory." ** 

Caryl P. Haskins, president of the Carnegie Institution of Wash- 
ington, has called for a "scientific revolution" among the developing 
countries as a means of spurring their advance. While there were 
material reasons for his proposal, it was in the "* * * qualities of 
science as a structure of communication, of philosophy, of faith that 
we find the deepest reasons." 

Without a living science, the new countries will have no access to the cultural 
world fraternity that the fabric of scientific understanding implies. They will not 
share in the lofty concepts that form the priceless heritage of the scientifically 
literate peoples. They will be denied access to one of the significant assurances that 
there is an inherent logic, an underlying stability, unifying the currents of scien- 
tific and technical change that so alarmingly threaten to engulf them. * * * 
Finally, an original science demands, as it also stimulates, the development of 
the critical and creative habits of mind that are essential to the leadership of the 

23 Glenn T. Seaborj,'. "What's Ahead for International Science V Article based upon 
• i Bpeech delivered at the International Conference on Nuclear Physics held in Gatlinburg, 
Tennessee, September 13, 1966. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January 1067), \>. 26. 

-'Dean Kusk. "Science and Foreign Affairs." Keynote address made before Hie eighth 
annual Panel on Science and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Astro- 
nautics, by the Hon. Dean Kusk, Secretary of State, January 24, 1!»<!7. Department of 
state Bulletin (February 13, 19G7), pp. 238-242. 


new nations in every field — the unfettered, flexible, empirical view so essential 
if the nations they lead are to survive and grow. 83 

On a related subject, Herman Pollack, as Director of International 
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, has ob- 
served that 

The realization that the vigor of a nation's economy is now largely dependent 
upon the quality of and the use to which it puts its science and technology has 
given rise to international comparisons of technological proficiency and in turn 
to the problem of the "technological gap." This today is as meaningful to a diplo- 
mat as were comparisons of the size of standing armies several generations ago. 
The brain drain is no longer merely an interesting phenomenon. It has acquired 
the status of a political issue and a fairly hot one, at that. 26 

President Nixon, in a formal statement on "United States Foreign 
Policy for the 1970's," addressing himself mainly to the political 
aspects of the subject, called attention to the importance of science 
and technology for international relations. In military science, he 
observed that "We are now entering an era in which the sophistica- 
tion and destructiveness of weapons present more formidable and 
complex issues affecting our strategic posture." In the field of arms 
control, he warned that "Modern technology makes any balance 
precarious and prompts new efforts at ever higher levels of com- 
plexity." Moreover, "The spread of technological skills knows no 
national boundaries; and innovation in weaponry is no monopoly of 
the superpowers." And more generally, "Unprecedented scientific 
and technological advances as well as explosions in populations, 
communications, and knowledge require new forms of international 
cooperations." 27 

Earlier, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, 
Sept. 2, 1969, the President had urged that body to come to grips 
with several important challenges with an important scientific and 
technological content. Said the President, in part: 

We can only guess at the new scientific discoveries that the seventies may bring. 
But we can see with chilling clarity the gap that already exists between the 
developed economies and the economies of the developing countries and the urgent 
need for international cooperation in spurring economic development. 

If in the course of that Second Development Decade we can make both signifi- 
cant gains in food production and significant reductions in the rate of population 
growth, we shall have opened the way to a new era of splendid prosperity. If we 
do only one without the other, we shall be standing still ; and if we fail in both, 
great areas of the world will face human disaster. 

Increasingly, the task of protecting man's environment is a matter of inter- 
national concern. Pollution of air and water, upsetting the balance of nature — 
these are not only local problems, and not only national problems, but matters 
that affect the basic relationships of man to his planet. 

25 Caryl P. Haskins. "Technology, Science, and American Foreign Policy." Foreign 
Affairs (January 1962), p. 239. 

26 Herman Pollack. "Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Department." Address at 
the University of Illinois Centennial Colloquium on Science and Human Affairs, May 17, 
1967, by Herman Pollack, then Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological 
Affairs, Department of State. Reprinted from Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 
1967. In "Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Department," Reprint. Department of 
State Publication 8204 (July 1967), p. 3. 

27 l\S. President (Richard Nixon), United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New 
Strategy for Peace. A Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, February 18, 
1970. Released from Office of the White House Press Secretary, Mimeo (February 18, 
1970), pp. 7, 106, 110-111. 


The United Nations already is planning a conference on the environment in 
1972. I pledge the strongest support of the United States for that effort. I hope 
that even before then we can launch new national and international initiatives 
toward restoring the balance of nature and maintaining our world as a healthy 
and hospitable place for man. 

Of all man's great enterprises, none lends itself more logically or more eom- 
pellingly to international cooperation than the venture into space. * * * We are 
just beginning to comprehend the benefits that space technology can yield here on 
earth. And the potential is enormous. 

For example, we now are developing earth resource survey satellites, with the 
first experimental satellite to be launched sometime early in the decade of the 

Present indications are that these satellites should be capable of yielding data 
which could assist in as widely varied tasks as these : the location of schools of 
fish in the oceans, the location of mineral deposits on land, and the health of agri- 
cultural crops. * * * We shall be putting several proposals in this respect before 
the United Nations. 28 

Columnist James Reston epitomized the matter : "The New Science 
has created a New Diplomacy." 29 

In summary, science and technology have effected changes in the 
substantive tasks of foreign policy, in the methodology of diplomacy, 
in the management of information on which diplomacy is based, in the 
intellectual training of diplomats, in the range of present options of 
negotiators, and in the prospects for future evolution of diplomacy, 
foreign policy objectives, and the international political system. 
Science and technology cannot be mere disciplines added to the cur- 
riculum of Foreign Service Officers, or services to be rendered by an 
appointed officer or unit of country teams. On the contrary, they are 
an essential and major ingredient of many aspects of foreign policy, 
diplomatic relations, and international behavior. The need is clearly 
evident for improved understanding of the underlying and future 
significance of scientific and technological developments and their 
relation to basic patterns in the formulation and conduct of interna- 
tional policy. 

Accordingly, Chairman Clement J. Zablocki of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations and its Subcommittee on International 
Security and Scientific Affairs (acting as chairman of the latter, then 
named the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific 
Developments) , in a letter of September 1969 to the Director of the 
Legislative Service, called for this study in the following terms: 

Hearings held by the Sul)eommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific 
Developments during the past year while I have been Chairman have convinced 
me of the pressing need for greater coordination between science and diplomacy 
if the United States is to conduct a successful foreign policy. Time after time the 
Subcommittee has been told of scientific and technological developments with 
significant international ramifications, for which little or no policy planning 
has been done. 

The current conditions cannot continue if the United States is to maintain a 
posture of resi>onsible leadership in international affairs. We must begin to 
do the hard thinking necessary to bring our technical abilities and our diplomatic 
skills into concert. 

28 U.S. President (Richard Nixon). "Strengthening the Total Fabric of Pence." Address 
made before the "4th session of the U.N. General Assembly at the United Nations, NY., 
on Sept. 18, 1!m;9. Department of State Bulletin (October C, 1969), p. 301. 

™New York Times (Sunday, Dec. 13, 1964), p. 8E. 


Definitions of Terms 

1. Science and Technology 

Every study that treats of the interactions of science or technology 
with culture encounters the same problem of characterizing the various 
descriptive terms relating to science and its exploitation. In an earlier 
study by the Legislative Reference Service, an effort was made to 
clarify the relationship of basic and applied research with technology. 
The concept expressed there was that basic research has as its goal the 
discovery of facts about nature. It was structured into such disciplines 
as physics, chemistry, biology, and astronomy; into such subdisci- 
plines as solid state physics, inorganic chemistry, and solar astronomy ; 
and into such integrating disciplines as physical chemistry, astro- 
physics, and ecology. 

Applied research was defined as the use of information about nature, 
derived from basic research, and employed to make feasible some 
social goal or to create new technological options for man. It was 
structured in two ways: (1) into loose categories of like fields or sub- 
ject disciplines, such as meteorology, metallurgy, electronics, agron- 
omy; these overlapped with (2) subject categories suggesting purpose 
or mission, such as transportation, communications, materials, and 
standards. All goals of applied research were observed to aim at a 
single overriding objective, which was to develop ways to improve 
man's compatibility with his environment. 

The products of applied research are thus options which man can 
exploit by means of technology. Broadly, these options appear to fall 
into four categories of technology, as follows: 

1. Physical modification of man. — An improvement in the 
feasibility of man's capability to adapt himself to his environment 
by physical changes of his own structure. 

2. Application of natural resources. — An improvement in the 
feasibility of man's exploitation of the resources of nature to 
change the physical environment to render it more compatible 
with man. 

3. Environmental restoration. — An improvement in the feasi- 
bility of corrective actions to restore the physical environment by 
reversing impairments wrought by man or by natural forces. 

4. The, social environment. — An improvement in the feasibility 
of actions by man to enhance his compatibility as an element of 
the changing social/human environment. 30 

In this concept, the effects of basic science take the form of con- 
tributions to culture — an appreciation of the universe of man in all 
its natural laws and relationships. The effects of applied research are 

30 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. Technical Information 
for Congress. Report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the 
* * * Prepared by the Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service, 
Library of Congress, April 25, 1969. House Document No. 91-137, 91st Congress, first ses- 
sion. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969). p. 11. For a more extended 
definition of the terms "basic research," "applied research," and "technology," see : U.S. 
Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Science Policy : A Working Glos- 
sary [Third Edition — 197-6], Prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research and 
Technology by the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, 
Librarv of Congress, March 1976. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, Com- 
mittee print.) pp. 56, 57, 82. 


opportunities. Only in technology does the system of science make 
tangible and material impacts upon human affairs. Technology is 
thus the cutting edge of science, the point at which economic and 
political decisions are required, as to whether an innovation is com- 
patible with the needs and limitations of society. Basic science can 
reveal information about the passage of pure water through a mem- 
brane; applied science can develop information as to which mem- 
branes work best to separate water from dissolved salts; technology 
provides a desalting plant. 

The relationship of technology to domestic and foreign affairs is 
limitless. It encompasses almost all forms of foreign aid, military 
hardware, arms control, the extraction of minerals, agricultural tech- 
nology, transportation and communications systems, exploitation of 
the seas and the ocean floor. It raises questions as to the reshaping 
of social institutions to accommodate new capabilities of man, whether 
to feed his expanding numbers by the "Green Revolution" or to achieve 
peace through "balance of terror." Industrial production and gross 
national product are only two of many measures of the application of 
technology; others are the satisfaction man can take from his control 
or his preservation of his own environment. 

Almost all forms of technology pass over international boundaries. 
The beneficial effects are eagerly sought in East and West. Moreover, 
the sometimes adverse second-order consequences of technology (such 
as pollution, noise, risk of accident, and the like) are felt in all countries 
where technology takes root. As with science, the interest in technology 
is international, and diplomatic concern is warranted for both its 
benefits and its costs. 

2. Diplomacy 

The word diplomacy in this study stands for the broad function of 
making and carrying out foreign policy, and the word diplomat is used 
for a person engaged in this function. While scientists may sometimes 
be diplomats, in this study the term will be used to identify those 
whose primary training, interest, and work is in international political 
problems as apart from scientific or technological problems. It includes 
not only those who negotiate with other nations directly but also 
participants in the foreign policy making machinery within the United 

The background of diplomats, in this sense of the word, may be 
quite varied. The preparation for a traditional diplomatic career in 
the Foreign Service has been a liberal arts education, with much of the 
specific knowledge and skills acquired through experience in the State 
Department or at posts abroad, supplemented by brief courses at the 
Foreign Service Institute. However, many who are engaged in the 
political and economic aspects of foreign policy are not in the Foreign 
Service and have never served abroad. They may be generalists or 
specialists in some geographic area or functional field, and some — 
including the President, many ambassadors, heads of agencies, and 
.Members of Congress — may have achieved their influential positions 
in the making of foreign policy primarily because they were active in 
politics, lather than because of their academic background or expert- 
ness in any international activity. 


The Context of the Study 

1. The /Structure of U.S. Foreign Policy Formulation 

The classical method of the conduct of international relations by the 
United States as well as other nations was through diplomatic repre- 
sentatives stationed in national capitals. The President was in charge 
of the dealings with other countries, assisted primarily by the Secretary 
and Department of State. From the beginning, however, the making of 
foreign policy in the United States has not been a simple matter of 
information and decisions flowing up and down a chain of command 
within the Executive Branch. In establishing a democratic republic, 
the drafters of the Constitution built checks and balances into the 
system of making foreign policy as well as into other areas. Senatorial 
approval was made a requirement for all treaties and appointments 
of ambassadors. Congress as a whole was given several major powers 
directly related to foreign policy, such as the power to declare war, to 
raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy, and to 
regulate foreign commerce, as well as the responsibility for making all 
laws and appropriating funds. The people of the United States could 
also make their voice heard through communications and elections 
and thus were an important factor. 

As profound technological and political changes occurred in the 
middle of the twentieth century and the United States increased its 
participation and leadership in world affairs, the conduct of Ameri- 
can diplomacy became far more complex. New agencies such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency, were established to cope 
with specific problems or handle special programs in the foreign 
affairs field. Older agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, 
the Department of Commerce, and the defense establishment found 
themselves increasingly involved in foreign affairs. The National 
Security Council and other groups were formed to help advise the 
President or to coordinate activities relating to foreign affairs spread 
throughout the Government. 

Official contacts with foreign governments were no longer made 
almost entirely through ambassadors and other members of the foreign 
service. Large numbers of Americans traveled abroad in a wide 
variety of capacities, and an increasing number of foreign visitors 
came to the United States. Membership in numerous international 
organizations, such as the United Nations, made multilateral diplo- 
macy increase vastly in importance. Rapid transportation facilitated 
meetings between chiefs of state and other high government officials, 
and instantaneous communication made it possible for messages of 
foreign policy importance to be carried directly between both the lead- 
ers and the people of different nations outside of traditional diplomatic 
channels. Diplomacy, once the narrow task of a few high officials and 
a select few in the Foreign Service, expanded into a broad effort 
involving a large part of the Government as a whole. 

2. Goals of American Foreign Policy 

Before taking up the question as to the place of science and tech- 
nology in advancing the goals of American diplomacy, it may be 


useful to explore some relevant goals of American foreign policy. 
There are overall goals, variously expressed, of American foreign 
policv toward which all foreign policy actions are more or less directed, 
but they may seem too vague or Utopian to be helpful. While there is 
no single document accepted by all Americans as the official declara- 
tion of foreign policy goals, there is a consensus on what the ultimate 
goals are. These might be summarized as a world of peace and freedom, 
or a peaceful world order in which justice and freedom prevail, or a 
world in which the United States may exist in peace and security. 

Within these broad goals there are more specific objectives. The 
promotion Qf mutual understanding and friendly relations, further 
progress toward a sound and expanding world economy, the wider 
application of international law, the reduction and control of arma- 
ments and the building of collective security systems, for example, are 
objectives through which the United States is seeking to attain a 
world of peace and freedom. These objectives in turn may be broken 
down into still more specific components such as, in the case of the 
reduction and control of armaments, regulation of the military use 
of the ocean bed or outer space. Defining foreign policy goals in each 
case will go hand in hand with the process of determining how science 
and foreign policy are interrelated. Among the questions which might 
be asked are: To what degree are the goals of science and foreign 
policy in specific cases the same or different ? Who formulates the goals 
in each case? Can foreign policy goals be as clear as scientific goals? 
How are priorities determined when there is conflict between a scien- 
tific goal and a foreign policy goal, or between different foreign policy 
objectives when science and technology can be applied to strengthen 
one or the other? 
3. The Growing Importance of Science and Technology in U.S. Culture 

The importance of basic science for technological advance is well 
established: it provides essential new information and ideas, training 
in underlying principles and new concepts of hardware, laboratory 
skills, and an attitude of receptivity of innovation. In the long run, 
the disclosures of basic scientific research may be the most momentous 
factor in social change, and political decisions concerning the support 
of this research may be of the highest consequence. However, the 
effects on society of technology are more obvious and immediate than 
those of science. 

Agricultural technology in this century has brought farm families 
down from 50 percent to less than 5 percent of the population while 
cultivated land shrank and production rose. The application of tech- 
nology to personal transportation brought into being the dominant 
industry in the Nation, restructured the city and altered the social 
role and values of the family. Public health, medical drugs, and pesti- 
cides have enabled a worldwide increase in populations, raising life 
expectancy almost everywhere. Communication technology has 
spawned business enterprises extending into many political jurisdic- 
tions, a large television industry for home entertainment, and infor- 
mation flows that are national — and often international — in their 
reach. The coupling of computers with wire communications serves as 
an ever-increasing part of the population with bank records, billings, 


and access to data bases, giving to the time-sharing computer network 
the character of a public utility. Abundant electrical energy is taken 
for granted in modern society. 

Government concern with the stimulation of science and the uses of 
technology has greatly intensified in the Twentieth Century. Basic 
scientific research, mainly in the universities, relies to a large extent 
on Government sponsorship. In fields of applied science and techno- 
logical development, virtually every agency of Government has found 
some role to play. For many well-established technologies, Govern- 
ment regulation has been found necessary, such as with rail and air 
transport, electric power, radio, and pharmaceutical preparations. An- 
other main interest of Government is in the stimulation of new tech- 
nologies; specific technological tasks have been widely assigned within 
the Government, such as weather modification, water desalting, coal 
utilization, helium conservation, weather satellites, highway construc- 
tion, high-speed trains, rapid excavation, communications satellites, 
and marine resources exploitation. 

On the other hand, defects or "second-order consequences'' of mod- 
ern technology are receiving increasing public attention and present a 
challenge to engineers to reduce the adverse effects of their innova- 
tions. Modern issues center on pollution of the air ; pollution of streams, 
oceans, and ground water; the spread of pesticides; eutrophication of 
lakes ; disposal of solid wastes ; the effects of noise ; toxic chemicals in 
general public use; the information explosion; invasion of personal 
privacy ; the hazards of radiation ; the upsetting of the ecological bal- 
ance ; automobile unsafety ; and, currently, the complex problems 
created by a growing energy shortage relative to a dynamically ex- 
panding pattern of energy utilization. 

Cogent description of the organization of scientists and engineers 
is beyond the scope of the study. The disciplines of science are prac- 
ticed in the universities and foundations, in some Government labora- 
tories, and to a degree in private, industry. Organizations of scientists, 
mainly to exchange and disseminate information, are largely by dis- 
ciplines, although interdisciplinary academies of sciences are active in 
many regions. A large and loose federation of scientists and scientific 
societies exists in the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science. A more formal interface between science and Government is 
provided by the National Academy of Sciences, which has access to all 
scientific and technical societies through the medium of the National 
Research Council. Contact of U.S. scientists with those abroad takes 
many routes: direct person-to-person communication, through the 
Scientific Unions, and through scientific groups under the aegis of the 
United Nations, among others. 

Organization of technologies is still further diversified. Technical 
societies, along roughly disciplinary lines, abound — such as the Ameri- 
can Society for Metals, the Society of Plastics Engineers, and the In- 
stitute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. Other technological 
societies have been formed along "mission" lines, such as the American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, American Ordnance Asso- 
ciation, and the American National Standards Institute. Since tech- 
nology is a major activity in most private industrial corporations, its 


concerns interlock with the economic interests of the business com- 
munity generally. The increasing use of technology to support Govern- 
ment programs has brought many agencies into direct working con- 
tact with the complex private networks of technologists. 

Since military programs absorb the bulk of governmental invest- 
ment in technology, the organizational consequences are profound; 
they include: 
— The evolution of a "military-industrial complex*' with specialized 

capabilities and needs ; 
— The development of "systems techniques'' to make possible the 
design and construction of advanced military weaponry of great 
cost, complexity, and sophistication ; 
— The evolution of numerous "think tanks'' using mathematical and 
other analytical techniques to forecast requirements, develop 
weapons concepts, examine alternative solutions to problems, and 
evaluate progress. 
The technologists also have their more formal point of contact with 
the Government through the offices of the National Academy of En- 
gineering, which shares with the Academy of Sciences the facilities 
and resources of the National Research Council. 

4,. Policy Formulation in Science and Technology 

A study of "American science policy" by Wallace S. Say re, some 

years ago, concluded that it was fragmented and unsystematic and 

perhaps necessarily so. He wrote : 

Unity and comprehensiveness are * * * not likely to be the hallmarks of 
American science policy. Talk of a single, comprehensive "American science 
policy" has an essentially fictitious quality. There will be many science policies, 
rather than a master science policy. Diversity, inconsistency, compromise, experi- 
mentation, pulling and hauling, competition, and continuous revision in science 
policies are more predictable continuing characteristics than their antonyms. 
This has been the history of American science policies and this describes their 
present state of affairs as deplorable. But to live with diversity and accommoda- 
tions of policy, and yet to be impatient of them, may be the process by which a 
democratic society achieves progress in science as well as in other fields. In any 
event, the future seems to offer American scientists more dilemmas than un- 
equivocal answers in science policy. 31 

More recently, a study by the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development, in its "Reviews of National Science 
Policy" series, concluded similarly, although its view of science in- 
corporated both research and development. Said the OECD report: 

The vast research and development enterprise, as it exists today [in the United 
States], does not, therefore spring from a deliberate, coordinated endeavor to 
make the most of the country's potential resources, but rather from scattered 
initiatives, taken in haste to meet an emergency and prolonged by limited pro- 
grammes. In many instances, the mobilisation of men and institutions and the 
establishment of the necessary framework of political structures, have been 
improvised ad hoc, as and when the needs dictated by the international situation 
have been recognised. The goal of the United States, asserted since the Second 
World War, has now become the maintenance and strengthening of its political, 
economic, scientific and technical leadership. * * * 

n Wallace 8. Bayre. "Scientists and American Science Policy." ( Reprinted from Science. 
Vol. 133, Nil 3456, March 24, 1961, pp. 859 864.) /" Bernard Barber and Walter Hlrscb; 
eds. The Sociology of Science. (New York. The Free Press of Qlencoe, 1002), p. 602. How- 
ever, by Title I, "National Science. Engineering, and Technological Policy and Priorities", 
of P.L. 94 2S2. approved May 11. 1!>7»>. the Congress undertook to reverse the position 
taken by Sayre toward a "master" science policy. 


The Federal Government has thus come to look upon the scientific and tech- 
nical effort as a valuable instrument for achieving its political aims and it has 
been led to assume primary responsibility for the development and success of 
this undertaking. 8 " 

With respect to the organization of policy institutions within the 
Federal Government to effect this general aspiration, the OECD 
report noted that there was a "plurality of institutions" without an 
overall plan. It said : 

The Executive and the Legislature have each laboured in their own field to 
develop the scientific enterprise. They have done so in the light of their own 
concrete problems, of defense or national security, of the country's prestige or 
its internal affairs. Their concerns have not always been identical, and the priori- 
ties adopted by the one have not always commended themselves to the other. 
These different wills, though very often complementary, partly explain the 
institutional diversity of the Federal science policy mechanism. 

This Federal mechanism thus embodies two sets of bodies. The first forms part 
of the inner workings of the Presidency, and especially of the Executive Office, 
which takes a direct part in preparing the decisions of the President. The second 
originates in the structure of Congress itself, which has equipped itself with 
specialised bodies to carry out its mission of keeping a watch on the Administra- 
tion and enforcing its own priorities. The two groups are engaged in a continuous 
dialogue on the methods, means, and aims of the scientific enterprise. 33 

Although national science policy is a diffused responsibility, the 
policy regarding technology is much more so. The exploitation of 
technology is the business of most private companies, and is involved 
in the programs of nearly every agency of Government. Accordingly, 
almost every committee of Congress encounters technological issues 
at some time. Technology is the physical means to many national 
ends. Political leaders in the Congress and in the executive branch tend 
to look to the. capabilities of technology — with its support in the more 
basic sciences — to wipe out disease, achieve military security, extend 
man's life, control the numbers of his progeny, eliminate the hazards 
of accident and environmental degradation, insure economic growth 
and stability, erase pockets of poverty, expand the utility of leisure 
time, explore and utilize the oceans and outer space, and perpetuate 
the resource base needed to feed, clothe, house, and equip man for 
safety, comfort, and happiness. 

5. Scientific and Technological Elements in International Relations 

Science and technology are both a part of the substance of inter- 
national relations and an influence on the processes of international 
relations; they create objectives, influence the environment surround- 
ing and conditioning issues, and open up future prospects for signifi- 
cant further change that the process and conditions of diplomacy 
must accommodate. 

Substantively, science and technology create opportunities and 
problems in the achievement of diplomatic goals, and sometimes 
both together. In the exploitation of the seabed, for example, science 
and technology provide stimulus for global research and cooperative 
developmental ventures in a traditionally international environment, 
and problems concerning soverign jurisdiction of new "territory." The 
global spread of such polluting materials as DDT, radioactive wastes, 
and the lead additive in hydrocarbon fuels, result from expanded 

32 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. "Reviews of National 
Science Policy: United States." (Paris, OECD Publications, March 1968), pp. 23, 25. 

33 Ibid., p. 62. 


opportunity in agricultural production, energy generation, and human 
mobility. However, their second-order effects as global pollutants have 
begun to motivate concerted action among nations to preserve and 
restore the world's natural environment. Science and technology are 
called upon to contribute to the solution of such human problems as 
the worsening food/population balance, the "information explosion." 
and the worldwide problem of water resource management. Science 
and technology have generated such diplomatic problems as the control 
of atomic weaponry and radiation, the rapid spread of diseases vec- 
tored by modern aircraft transportation, and the occurrence of crises 
resulting from the instant global communication made possible by 
modern electronics. 

Science and diplomacy are intertwined in many other ways. The 
multiplication of such global science programs as the International 
Geophysical Year, World Weather Watch, and the International Bio- 
logical Program, invariably have their diplomatic aspects. The IGY, 
for example, led a chain of events that included the Antarctic Treaty, 
progress in the use of satellites for space exploration, and the "Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, 
and Under Water." The travel of scientists to frequent international 
meetings, or personal consultation, or research abroad, increases the 
need for services by the Department of State to help and support 
American scientists in these activities. Scientists themselves participate 
in unofficial, exploratory investigations of possible future diplomatic 
opportunities, in such ventures as the "Pugwash Conferences.'' All 
these international contacts among scientists and engineers are difficult 
to evaluate as to their diplomatic consequences, but they are cerrainly 

The methods of science and technology also offer support for the 
conduct of diplomacy in the analysis and solution of international 
problems. Investment in research is a continuing function of the U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, for example. The factfind- 
ing and hypothesis-testing methods of science have been advanced as 
offering possible methodologies for the study of strategy, decisionmak- 
ing, and information dissemination. Engineering techniques are com- 
ing into use in the establishment and achievement of goals in foreign 
aid and communications management. The use of cybernetics, systems 
analysis, and PERT (program evaluation and review technique) 
network analysis are suggested as having application to the manage- 
ment of the huge flow of diplomatic information. 

In view of the deep penetration of the substance, the problems, and 
the methods of science and technology into American diplomacy, a 
number of questions become salient. To what extent have the problems 
generated by science and technology been assessed by the institutions 
created to maintain U.S. diplomacy \ I low adequately stalled and sup- 
ported are these institutions to exploit the potent ia lit ies of science and 
technology in support of the objectives of U.S. diplomacy? What 
problems and opportunities for the future are discernible as a result 
of the great increase in the Government sponsorship of science and 
technology? In what ways are the results of this expanded science and 
technology beneficial for American diplomacy? In what ways are the 
results injurious, or potentially so ( And again, what can be done for 
the future \ 


Formai, Aspects of the Study 

./. Scop* and Lim itations 

As noted earlier, this study was undertaken at the request, in 1969, of 
the then Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific 
Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the 
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the 
House International Relations Committee) . Thus, the focus throughout 
is on the kinds of issues and outcomes that are of particular interest 
to the committee and involve institutional mechanisms or policy con- 
siderations particularly amenable to congressional review and per- 
haps action. The substantive issues chosen for study are of importance 
in terms of the recent past (since World War II), and involve ques- 
tions in which some consensus has already been reached. Some em- 
phasis has been placed on the roles, policies, and problems of U.S. 
Government agencies participating in international scientific and 
technological programs, and of international organizations (both gov- 
ernmental and nongovernmental) in which the United States partici- 
pates officially or nonofficially. 

Subjects have been avoided in which the essence of the situation in- 
volves extensive analysis of information denied to the general public, 
although some classified information was reviewed for purposes of 
background. Covert international activities, such as of the Central In- 
telligence Agency, and Department of Defense international scien- 
tific and technological policies and programs, also are not treated. 

2. Methodology 

The methodology used in this project is the case study approach. 
By examining a selected set of cases and issues illustrating interac- 
tions of science and technology with diplomacy, it may be possible 
to derive insights for the Congress on how to devise policies and 
mechanisms to improve U.S. resources for the management of these 

Use of the case study method enables different researchers to use 
common and accepted concepts important in explaining decisionmak- 
ing, and it facilitates critical review of the findings of each case by stu- 
dents of policymaking. It also permits the surfacing of similar ob- 
stacles, problems, and inefficiencies at the intersections of the Depart- 
ment of State and other institutions, governmental or scientific, with 
an international program content. 

The case study method, in this project, is used to assess two kinds . 
of interaction of science and technology with diplomacy ; one episodic 
(called "cases"), the other continuing (called "issues"). The subjects 
to be studied were chosen to provide an appreciation of the ways in 
which modern science and technology have altered the environment, 
the goals, the substance, the methodology, the organization, and the 
personnel qualifications of American diplomats. The choice of items 
for study has been guided by the following considerations : 

(a) To point the way to a strengthening of support of the 
diplomatic process over a broad spectrum of problems salient 
and meaningful to the Congress ; and 

(b) To demonstrate the workings of the various administrative 
mechanisms that contribute to diplomacy, including factfinding, 


information management, communication, problem-identification, 
problem-analysis, policy decisionmaking, negotiation and media- 
tion, and implementation feed-back. 
Cases are defined as discrete, coherent, and manageable episodes 
involving the interaction of science and technology with foreign 
policy, which are, or are capable of being, encompassed within a single 
program. Interactions of science and technology with diplomacy take 
many forms. Episodic subjects chosen to represent these various inter- 
actions are the international control of atomic energy; commercial 
uses of atomic energy in Europe ; the Mekong Regional Development 
Proposal; the United Nations and the sea bed; the International Geo- 
physical Year; and United States-Soviet relations and technology 

The continuing issues are recurrent international problems or condi- 
tions, with general, long-range goals and incremental or partial ease- 
ments. They are discussed by the late Charles O. Lerche in the follow- 
ing terms : 

Within American foreign policy today there are a number of "continuing 
issues." These are problems stemming from the general policy line the United 
States has been pursuing that are peculiar in that they do not seem to permit 
of any final resolution. Each has been met often within the context of a given 
set of circumstances, but each change in the situational milieu has required that 
new answers be given to the old questions. 34 

Among the examples suggested by Lerche were strategic weaponry 
policy, arms control, foreign assistance, trade and tariff policy, and 
psychological factors. 

The continuing issues chosen for intensive analysis in this study are 
expressed in such terms as understanding the evolution and interna- 
tional political impacts of technology; influencing the level of world 
health; achieving improvements in the food/population balance on a 
global basis; understanding, evaluating, and redirecting the flow of 
scientific and technical personnel from one country to another; ex- 
amining the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. Government programs 
for sending U.S. scientists abroad; and improving the diplomatic 
skills of scientists and the scientific understanding of diplomats. 

Each of these cases and issues is dealt with in a separate chapter. 
Parts 3 and 4 of the study entail analysis of all the "issues" and 
"cases" to ascertain what generalizations might be drawn as to present 
measures and resources for constructively relating science or technol- 
ogy and American diplomacy. 

Plan of the Study 

In general, the issues selected for study are definable but open- 
ended, of a continuing nature. They Have wide ramifications, and 
require a careful selection of data to bring them into focus. Instead of 
an outcome, they may reveal a general tendency or direction. The 
cases, by contrast, are set in a shorter time frame. They tend to 
be more sharply defined and discrete as problems, more precise in 
scope, with some more measurable consequences. For the most part 
they are essentially resolved as to their outcome. 

** Charles 0. Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People. Third Edition. (Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1U07), p. 223, 


1. Criteria for the Selection of Issues 

The specific criteria to be satisfied by each subject for study, as estab- 
lished at the outset, are four in number. First. The subject should be 
of substantial moment, and be regarded as such. Second. The subject 
should have a significant technical content, so that it involves a prob- 
lem of communication between the expert in the field and the gen- 
eralist concerned with the diplomatic implications. Third. The prob- 
lem should involve some aspect of "science in policy" or "policy in 
science" ; that is, it should deal with the application of science or tech- 
nology to advance some international policy of the United States, or 
it should deal with some way in which U.S. science or technology is 
sought to be strengthened by diplomatic action. Fourth. The subject 
should have had sufficient continuity and persistence as a problem be- 
fore the diplomatic community to enable observation of changes that 
have occurred as a result of national action. 

2. Format for the Exposition of Issues 

An effort was made to achieve some degree of uniformity in the 
organization of the various chapters on issues. The format adhered to, 
as planned at the beginning of the project, is in general the following: 

(a) Definition of the issue to be studied ; 

(b) Significance of the issue in present and future contexts; 

(c) How the issue developed; 

(d) U.S. involvement in the issue; 

(e) Congressional concern with the issue; 

(/) Formulation of policy to influence the issue; 
(g) Options available to the policymakers and prospects for 
the future ; and 

(h) Further questions posed by the issue. 
Although consistency in treatment is advantageous, both for con- 
venience in reading and for ease in subsequent comparison and analy- 
sis of cases, nevertheless variation has been unavoidable. Respect for 
the subject matter as well as independent authorship has inevitably 
compelled some degree of departure from a superimposed outline. 

3. Illustrative Questions Researched 

In developing the individual discussion of the issues to be re- 
ported on, attention was given to such questions as the following: 

(a) In what different ways has the issue been characterized? What 
conflicts arise out of different perceptions of it? Is there some kind of 
time frame in which these different perceptions predominate? 

(b) What is the place of the issue in the general matrix of foreign 
policy? What priority of attention has been assigned to it at different 

(c) What are the significant interactions of the issue in question 
with other policy elements? Does it benefit or threaten other national 
policies or programs ? 

(d) Has response to need been comprehensive or incremental? Is 
the effort mounted to influence the issue a powerful and motivated 
national effort, or is it being tackled bit by bit ? 

(e) Has a clear and positive U.S. policy been evolved respecting the 
issue? What is its place in the general structure of foreign policy? 

(/) Has a technically sophisticated mechanism been developed for 
choosing among alternative courses or options in achieving progress 


in the problem ? Has the scientific-technological community been en- 
listed in the development of a program? What does the literature of 
this community say about the way the program has been developed, 
and about its outcome ? 

(g) What interactions have occurred between the United States and 
multinational bodies, or foreign countries, in respect to the issue? 
What is the documentation of international conversations? What sort 
of joint action has been found feasible? What degree of understanding 
as to methods and expected results ? 

If.. Enumeration of the Issues 

Six issues were chosen for study. They are as follows : 

(1) Evolution of international technology. — A review of the emer- 
gence of technology as a factor of change in international relations. 
Under this heading are considered such factors as : The growing aware- 
ness of the relevance of technology for diplomacy ; the practical separa- 
tion of technology from science ; the relations between the international 
exchange of technology and governmental and economic forms of 
social organization; problems of technological transfer (from whom, 
what, to whom, and how) ; U.S. organizations and programs to exploit 
technology for advancement of foreign policy goals; recruitment and 
training; successes; prospects. 

(2) World medicine. — Long-range consequences of worldwide appli- 
cation of medical sciences. Considered under this heading are such 
factors as: An overview of medical advances of the past and their 
impact on the world society, cultural and medical standards, perspec- 
tives on the present state of medical knowledge, the dilemmas of 
world medicine and national policy, national and international medical 
organizations and programs, problems and prospects for the future. 

(3) Food and population. — A study of the changing food/popula- 
tion balance in developing countries. Under this heading will be con- 
sidered such factors as : A review of historical evolution of formulation, 
coordination, and administration of U.S. foreign assistance policies to 
provide for adequate food resource development and management, 
public-health services, stabilization of the population growth rate, 
direct transfer of American technological expertise, U.S. policies in 
support of the development of indigenous E. & D. capabilities to ad- 
dress questions of the food/population balance, and obstacles (cultural, 
social, political, economic, technical) to successful design and imple- 
mentation of U.S. programs. 

(4) Programs for sending U.8. scientists and technical personnel 
abroad. — A study of the purposes, scope, accomplishments, problems, 
and needs of the various Federal programs that sponsor the movement 
of nongovernment scientists and technologists.overseas to teach and to 

(5) The "brain drain''' problem-. — Occurrence, consequences, and 
issues of one-way flows of scientific manpower (including in this con- 
text the entire array of basic and applied sciences and associated 
technologies). Under this heading are considered: The development 
of trained scientists at home and abroad, factors attracting scientists 
to new areas, consequences of outflows and inflows of scientists, prob- 
lems of retention and use of scientists, and administration of the forces 
that influence scientist migrations. 


(6) Science and technology in, the Department of State. — Under 
this heading are considered such factors as: State Department organ- 
ization and procedures for marshaling science and technology in sup- 
port of both short-range and long-range U.S. foreign policy objectives, 
educational programs and briefings on science and technology- for the 
Foreign Service at home and abroad, organization of specialists in 
science and technology within the Department of State and their re- 
lations with generalists in the Department, opportunities and prob- 
lems, and prospects for the future. 

5. Criteria for the Selection of Cases 

Being time-oriented and discrete, the cases are concerned with op- 
erational matters and action decisions, and with the consequences of 
these. They afford a somewhat different outlook from *he studies of 
issues in the ways in which foreign policy is determined and imple- 
mented in a variety of specific problems. Nevertheless, most of the 
criteria applicable to the selection of issues for study apply also to the 
cases. They need to be consequential, and regarded as such. They need 
to have a substantial technical content. And they need to involve de- 
cisions as to the uses of science or technology to further policy, or as 
to the use of diplomatic measures to further some basic capability or 
activity of science or technology. 

Some additional criteria are of particular relevance in the selection 
of the cases. Inasmuch as a number of fields involve sensitive and 
classified matters, for which documentation would be difficult in an 
unclassified study, these will be avoided. Then, the cases need to deal 
with subjects that yield explicit findings of actions taken and their 
results. They should illustrate both geographically-oriented and disci- 
pline-oriented problems. Care has been taken to select a range of 
cases to illustrate a range of institutional structures, kinds of tech- 
nical expertise, and administrative concepts. Finally, the cases selected 
all present the problem of time orientation in a dynamic subject-area; 
that is, the timing of the action-decision and the timing of its imple- 
mentation are relevant to the action and its results. 

6. Form-at for the Presentation of Cases 

An effort parallel to that applied to the issues was made to achieve 
some degree of uniformity in the organization of the various chapters 
dealing with cases. The format adhered to is in general the following : 

(a) The environment of the case and its historical evolution; 

(b) Definition and development of the problem; 

(c) Organizational framework involved in dealing with the 
problem ; 

(d) Chronological account of the development of the problem; 

(e) How the problem came to the attention of the decision- 
making institution; 

(/) Methods and procedures employed in the decision process; 

(g) Description of the ultimate decision; 

(h) Subsequent developments that flowed from the decision (its 
implementation and the responses evoked) ; 

(i) Evaluation of the decision in terms of the ultimate outcome ; 

(j) Evaluation of the decisionmaking process, with particular 
attention to its technical aspects; 

(k) Further questions raised by the case. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-4 


Here again, some departure from the outline has been unavoid- 
able and probably desirable. The 6 cases have different authors and dif- 
ferent content, and the subject matter has tended to determine the 
organization and exposition of the findings. 

7. Illustrative Questions To Be Researched 

In documenting and analyzing the respective cases, authors were 
guided by the following questions : 

(a) How was the problem identified and characterized? Was its im- 
portance perceived at the outset, or did it go through an evolutionary 
process? Was the problem correctly identified at first, or did it emerge 
from initial concern for some different issue ? 

(b) How timely was the identification of the problem? Was it per- 
ceived in time to take effective, constructive action or action after the 
fact? How did the identification of the problem relate to the con- 
temporary political climate and the climate of public opinion ? 

(c) What difficulties were encountered with communication in ap- 
proaching and analyzing the problem ? Did technical content obscure 
the political question or did political content obscure the technical 
problem ? 

(d) What difficulties were encountered in separating, and giving 
separate treatment to, the technical and political aspects? Were the 
decisionmakers able to coordinate the treatment of both together? 

(e) What was the nature of the decision, and how did it relate to the 
various possible alternatives available ? Were the various alternatives 
fairly evaluated? Were the decision criteria appropriate to the prob- 
lem ? Were all voices heard ? 

(/) How timely was the decision? Did the technical difficulties delay 
action unnecessarily ? Were opportunities lost ? 

(g) How stable has the decision proved to be? Were the intended 
purposes accomplished ? Have alternatives emerged subsequently that 
later opinion would have preferred ? 

(h) How effective was the decisionmaking process used? Did it deal 
comprehensively and accurately with the alternatives, their technical 
assessment, and their political evaluation ? 

8. Enumeration of the Cases Researched 
The 6 cases chosen for study are as follows : 

(1) The international control of atomic energy. — The events follow- 
ing the initial use in warfare of atomic weaponry, and the evolution of 
the Acheson report and the Baruch plan. 

(2) Commercial uses of atomic energy in Europe. — Events sur- 
rounding the Eisenhower initiative for nuclear sharing, the evolution 
of the International Atomic Energv Agency, and the events that re- 
sulted from these actions. 

(3) The International Geophysical Year. — Interactions of the In- 
ternational Council of Scientific Unions, national scientific institu- 
tions, and national governments. Origins of the program. Conduct of 
the planning process. The roles of the Department of State, the Na- 
tional Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation. As- 
sessment of t lie scientific and political consequences. 

(4) The Mekong Regional Development Proposal,— Events that led 
to the proposal by President Johnson for a comprehensive, integrated 
multinational, aid program for Vietnam, as an initiative to end the 


conflict there, expressed in his speech at Johns Hopkins University. 
Assessment of the Mekong project itself as example of the opportuni- 
ties and problems of the multinational regional approach to integrat- 
ing technological achievement and social policy. 

(5) The United Nations and the Seabed. — Interactions of national 
sovereignty with international technology in an international environ- 
ment. Attempted resolution of the issue of territorial limits. Problems 
created by the case seen as political and diplomatic rather than techno- 
logical, although it is technology that makes the case important. 

(6) U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations. — Exploratory assessment of 
the political and economic costs and benefits of the emerging trade re- 
lationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and of the 
transfer of technology from the former to the latter. 

9. Organization of the Total Study 

A comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 12 individual studies 
(6 cases and 6 issues) and their findings is given in parts 3 and 4. The 
methodology of the analysis is described in chapter 14. 35 

A word might be said here about the working philosophy which has 
governed the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy research 
project. Authors were encouraged to conduct and present the analysis 
of each case or issue with two perspectives continuously in mind : that 
of the case or issue as a worthy subject in itself, as well as that of its 
relationship to the broad theme of the overall study : i.e., the interac- 
tion of science, technology, and U.S. foreign policy. 

The returns are in for the first of those two complementary aims — 
to make available to the congressional (and in general the public 
affairs) community the analysis and findings of specific cases and is- 
sues, on their individual merits ; the results are gratifying. All 12 stu- 
dies have served significant congressional or other governmental pur- 
poses relating to their specific themes; all have received serious atten- 
tion in academic circles as well; most have had to be reprinted to 
satisfy a demand which persisted for some years after the date of 

But it was the second and larger aim that prompted Chairman 
Zablocki to request this extended research undertaking to begin with, 
and to seek the critical reactions of knowledgeable persons in and out 
of government for the benefit of Congress. This was the aim of making 
an empirical examination, by the case study method, of representative 
instances of the interplay of science and technology with diplomacy 
for the light they might shed on how the U.S. Government could bet- 
ter equip itself to meet the compelling challenges posed by that inter- 
play. To see this problem whole, it was planned at the outset to bring 
all of the research results together in one collected study. The present 
document represents fulfillment of that plan. 

« Numerous references to material In the 12 basic studies occur throughout the overall 
study In both text and footnotes. These references cite pages of the overall study rather 
than the original page numbers. 

-.1 P ha Pter-study equivalents are as follows (for full citations of individual studies, see 
list Of documents in the original study series, p. VII. 

Chapter 1 — Huddle. Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age 
Chapter 3 — Wu. The Bamch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the'Nuclear Age. 
Chapter 4 — Donnelly. Commercial Nuclear Poner in Europe: The Interaction of 
American Diplomacy With a New Technology. 



The empirical approach followed in the project, and the broad 
matrix analysis of project findings in chapters 18 through 23, have 
resulted in a research product of somewhat formidable proportions. 
A certain amount of unavoidable repetition has also resulted. (On 
the other hand, many of the insights scattered through the 12 individ- 
ual studies could not be captured in the concluding analysis without 
distracting from the latter, with its main focus on the shortcomings 
of American institutions for coping with global issues; the individual 
studies therefore remain unique and useful resources in themselves.) 

The complete study consists of 24 chapters (the major subdivisions 
of which, identified by Roman numerals, are referred to as sections) 
organized into a general introduction and 4 parts. A short chapter 
introducing the main analytical portion of the study intervenes be- 
tween parts 2 and 3. Following two introductory chapters at the be- 
ginning, part 1 contains a separate chapter for each of the six case 
studies. Part 2 is made up of six chapters presenting the studies of 
continuing issues. Part 3 is devoted to a comprehensive analytical 
review of the preceding 12 studies, taken individually. Part 4 ex- 
amines the studies collectively under G cross-cutting headings reflect- 
ing broad policy concerns, with concluding observations as to policy 
options for the Congress and the executive branch. The study ends 
with an extensive annotated bibliography. 

As noted in Chapter 15 under Methodology, the order followed in 
presenting the cases and issues — both at large in the overall study 
and, in parallel, in the analysis of parts 3 and 4 — was established by 
the subject matter itself, independently of the date of publication of 
the particular study. The aim in any given case is to focus on enduring 
problems and underlying relationships, not to provide up-to-the- 
minute details. (As a practical matter, the basic studies — chapters 
3 through 14 — have not been updated for inclusion in the full study 
collection; Chapters 1, 2, and 15, however, have been revised from a 
mid-1977 perspective, and to the extent deemed useful chapters 16 
through 24 also have been brought up to date.) The appropriateness 
of this approach seems borne out by the fact that, in general, the in- 
dividual studies have not been outdated with the passage of time, and 
that virtually all of their findings remain valid and relevant. 

The foregoing introduction has been a restatement of the original 
project prospectus. 3 " The latter is here modified only to reflect the 


Chapter 5 — Rullis, The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. 
Chapter 6 — Huddle, The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism. 
Chapter 7- — Doumanl, Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed. 
Chapters — Hardt and Holllday, U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of 

Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy. 
Chapter 9 — Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology. 
Chapter 10 — Quimby, The Politics of Global Health. 
Chapter 11 — Nanes, Beyond Malthas: The Food/People Equation. 
Chapter 12 — Knezo, U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for 

Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange. 
Chapter 13 — Whelan, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International 

Scientific Mobility. 
Chapter 14 — Huddle, Science and Technology in tlic Department of Stat< : Bringing 

Technical Content Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations. 
Chapters 15 through -i (and Chapter 21 Huddle and Johnston, Science, Technology, 
ami Diplomacy in the Vge of Interdependence. 
"U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Toward a New Diplomacy in a 
scientific Age, in the series Selenee, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the 
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Franklin P. Hud- 
dle, Science Policy Research Division. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C., c.s. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, 28 p. (Committee print.) 


facts of work completed in place of the intentions of work in pros- 
pect. In the final reckoning, each user of the study can judge how 
the original goals of the project have been met, as expressed in the 
closing words of that prospectus. The project, said the latter, will — 

. . . involve an identification of the underlying principles of policy, organiza- 
tion, and methodology in the uses of science and technology as instruments of 
diplomacy, and the concurrent principles in the uses of diplomacy to strengthen 
U.S. goals in science and technology. It will be a search for opportunities for 
new initiatives, a search for areas of organization and administration needing 
more emphasis or support, and the identification of unresolved issues of policy. 
Beyond this, it is hoped that the intrinsic merit of each of the case studies 
will make it stand alone, as a study of policy on an important matter, and that 
restatement of the findings will serve as a useful compendium and index of 
the whole enterprise. 

Chapter 2 — The Global Context of Science, 
Technology, and American Diplomacy 



Detente Vis-a-Vis the U.S.S.R 41 

Deterrence 42 

Weaponry 42 

The P.R.C 42 

Isolationism 43 

U.S. Economic Burdens 43 

The Changing U.S. Industrial Economy 43 

The Shaky Global Economy 45 

Atomic Energy 45 

Populations 46 

Food 46 

Oceans 47 

Resource Allocation 47 

Multinational Corporations 48 

Nationalism 48 

United Nations 48 

Regionalism '. 49 

Shrinking World Community 49 

Global Flows 50 

Disorientation 50 



U.S. foreign policy today as never before is confronted by a world 
of restless strivings and uncertain directions. The modern world 
presents a complex mixture of dynamic new forces and drift, of active 
or potential conflict and detente, of wayward nationalism and a grow- 
ing curriculum of multinational cooperative activities. The 200th 
anniversary of the beginnings of history's most successful experiment 
in political democracy finds the Nation pondering the question of how 
to define and advance those aspects of its heritage of independence 
that are valuable in a world of growing interdependence. The mid- 
1970s are thus a pivotal time: a time of reassessment of U.S. foreign 
policy, a time to search for a new and more stable, more durable world 
structure that could be realized by creative diplomatic initiatives, 
built deliberately according to a purposeful and coherent design. The 
resources that the United States can mobilize to meet this challenge 
are mainly the technology and managerial skills in which the Nation 
enjoys an unchallenged superiority. These two strengths, by a con- 
venient fact of history, are precisely those needed by most of the 
other nations of the world in order to achieve progress toward their 
own internal national aspirations. 

However, elements of this changing world do not automatically 
simplify or facilitate the exercise of U.S. leadership in applying these 
needed skills toward the achievement of a more stable, more durable 
world structure of cooperative and peaceful nations. The enormous 
complexity of the world of the 1970s derives from the great variety 
of nations and groupings of nations, each with its own rate and direc- 
tion of political, economic, and technological change, leading in turn 
to changing goals and national attitudes. Change can generate conflict 
or it can promote harmony and cooperation. All of diplomacy resolves 
ultimately into the balancing of these opposites. Whether by bold 
creative moves or by slow and cautious increments, the largely un- 
recognized challenge facing the United States is to use its skills of 
technology and management to assemble the elements of the present 
changing world into the more constructive and reliable order on which 
the future of civilization so manifestly depends. 

As the first consideration, what are the salient elements of the 
modern world? Some of them are the following: 

Detente Vis-a-Vis the U.S.S.R. 

The rigidities of the cold war are being replaced by a new flexibility 
in which the still-potent, still-dangerous adversary relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union is moderated by an 
uneasy and partial truce. This truce is marked by trade agreements, 
grain transactions, agreements on scientific and technological co- 
operation, technology transfers, and other unwarlike dealings epit- 
omized by the term "detente." 




The underpinning of detente remains the possession by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union of an overwhelming nuclear 
destructive capability sufficient to deny survival to either party in the 
event of its use. Having learned to live with this fact for nearly two 
decades, leaders of each nation, while still maneuvering for some slight 
and transitory technological advantage. 1 are mainly seeking a pattern 
of beneficial relationships for their own country — recognizing that it 
may incidentally be beneficial to the adversary, but in the nonmilitary 
sphere. Emerging out of this uneasy truce may possibly be a more or 
less conscious balance of cooperation and conflict reflecting both 
ideological opposition and mutual anxiety over survival. 


The purpose of weaponry is national security. However, the enor- 
mous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons accompanied by 
irresistible delivery system possessed by the United States and the 
Soviet Union has created an impasse. Both parties continue to invest 
scientific talents and resources in further refinements of nuclear 
weaponry but after a epiarter century of this arms race the impasse 
continues, the destructive capability on both sides has increased, and 
the national security on both sides has diminished. Beneath this 
nuclear umbrella that makes overt conflict between the two super- 
powers an act of insanity, the adversaries have experimented with 
various kinds of war by proxy. Experiments in limited war by the 
United States in Korea and Vietnam showed that U.S. high technology 
weaponry had limited utility against a determined adversary in open 
warfare. Competitive supply of weaponry to the opposing sides in the 
Middle East has raised the level of intensity of that conflict and in- 
creased the risk of confrontation between the superpowers. Exports 
of U.S. weaponry to Latin America, Iran, Jordan, and other countries 
has multiplied the potential destructiveness of warfare involving 
these recipients; the gain to the United States has been measured in 
favorable balanee-of-paymenis increments and varying degrees of 
transitory influence, but the cost has frequently been diminished 
national security for the United States. Proliferation of subnuclear 
weaponry continues but the ultimate consequences appear to offer no 
significant benefit to the United States while making small wars more 
lethal and draining the resources of -mall States to maintain their 
arsenals of high technology. 

The P.R.C. 

Emergence of the world's most populous nation from the self-im- 
posed isolation of the period of painful transition to ;i Communist 
dictatorship i- now in process. The growing military and economic 
power of t hi- former "sleeping giant" gives indication that in time the 
People's Republic of China will become, in some respects at least, 

the coequal pa rt ner ad \ er-a ry of holh the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Meanwhile the l\ \i.(\, currently more hostile toward 
the Soviel Union than toward the United Slate-, seeks to persuade 
t he la t ter of the dangers of Soviel aggressive designs. 

1 A major technological advantage by either adversary would be Intolerable to th<> othor, 
iiikI wniiiil pose :i serious Invitation t" preemptive attack before the new weapon could \w 



One lively dispute that divided Americans in the period between the 
two great wars concerned the extent to which this country could re- 
main aloof from European conflicts. The rise of Nazi Germany made 
the dispute salient but it was not resolved until Japanese ambitions 
for Asiatic hegemony precipitated a conflict halfway around the 
world from the initial theater of war. Thereafter, the ties among the 
Axis Powers undercut the position of those who favored U.S. isolation. 
The views of the interventionists were confirmed by events: It became 
fixed in U.S. foreign policy that the United States had an inescapable 
role, a compelling interest, and a great power responsibility in assur- 
ing world peace and stability. During the cold war, this theme domi- 
nated U.S. dealings abroad. An attempt to withdraw from this re- 
sponsibility on the mainland of Asia led to the Korean war. The 
attempt to assert it led to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The 
declining fortunes of the United States in Vietnam led to renewed 
questioning of the extent of U.S. responsibility for maintaining 
peace and stability abroad, and even to a denial of such respon- 

The rationale of great power control over small-country wars and 
internal disturbances remains ill-defined, but recent events in the 
Middle East have demonstrated the hazard of a unilateral withdrawal 
of one great power from the scene, and the perhaps equal hazard of 
several great powers' committing themselves to opposing causes of 
small nations. Several lessons can be drawn from this sequence. 
The most obvious is that the diplomatic reaction to this kind of crisis 
is necessarily ad hoc and governed by circumstances; rigid adherence 
to either isolationism or interventionism would invite disastrous 
consequences. A less obvious but more fundamental lesson is that the 
most successful kind of diplomacy is that which anticipates, and 
devises initiatives to keep small crises from developing. It is note- 
worthy that such successes generate no headlines and create no 
popular heroes, and are recognized only in a small community. 

U.S. Economic Burdens 

Since World War II the U.S. dollar has remained the primary — 
and until recently the strong and stable — currency of international 
commerce. U.S. assistance has been extended to many nations abroad 
in the form of nuclear deterrence, trained soldiery, and arms ship- 
ments to treaty allies and developing nations. These economic bur- 
dens have been increased by U.S. efforts to raise the technological 
levels of developing countries and by commitments to supply ag- 
ricultural products to needy countries at less than market value. 
Efforts to persuade other developed countries to shoulder more of the 
burden of maintaining an international currency and credit system 
and to evolve, with the Soviet Union, a less demanding level of 
armament programs are features of the contemporary economic 
scene. However, the abrupt rise in world petroleum prices, unease in 
the Middle East, and persistent ideological and organizational ob- 
stacles to U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation tend to perpetuate the U.S. 
economic burdens. 

The Changing U.S. Industrial Economy 

The word "developed" applied to the U.S. national economy means 
that a large territory was settled, and that the predominant form of 


productive activity changed from agriculture to manufacturing during 
the first third of the 20th century, and from manufacturing to services 
in the second third. The products of agriculture and other extractive 
industries are food, fiber, lumber, and minerals; those of manufacturing 
are the highly diversified items ranging from clothing to automobile-; 
those of services industries are information and noncommodity- 
related activities. This sequence is probably not reversible, and the 
future health of the U.S. economy depends on the development of the 
services industries and the enhancement of their productivity. How- 
ever, much of the services industry is in Government services which 
consume but do not generate income: Teachers, police, firemen, other 
State and municipal employees, Federal workers, and those in military 

The trend in the United States toward services industries is the 
central feature in a complex of developments that include increased 
emphasis on the quality and quantity of security services that are 
provided by governments, such as protections against crime, unem- 
ployment, old age, and medical costs. Environmental protection has 
recently been added to this list. These services are costly and most of 
them are tax-supported instead of yielding tax revenues. Even as 
population movements toward urban centers have increased, erosion 
has occurred in the urban tax base as the wealthier segment of the 
urban population — and industry as well — has left the central city for 
the suburbs. 

Another complicating factor, perhaps more transient, is the shift 
in the demographic distribution of population toward the young and 
old parts of the lifescale; these are less productive than persons in 
the middle range but absorb services at a higher rate. 

The U.S. tax structure, which is effective in an expanding economy, 
tends to amplify cycles of high and low economic activity. 

In turn, depression of the economy tends to worsen all the other 
economic problems that appear as the Nation proceeds further into 
the "services" phase. As the tax base shrinks and the service- industries 
grow, the ability of the Federal Government to support ambitious 
programs diminishes, while the demand for services and payment for 
them continues to grow. 

The extractive industries in the United States (accounting for half 
the labor force in 1890) now employ less than 5 percent of the labor 
force; manufacturing perhaps another 25 or 30 percent: and services 
the rest. The trend is toward further shrinkage of the first two and 
expansion of the third. 

Shrinkage of the tax base and expansion of tax-supported activities 
have important implications for diplomacy: as to ability to fund 
military programs, support foreign assistance, contribute to United 
Nation-, agencies a major fraction of their support, and invest in large 

re earch and develop nt efforts whose product is increasinglj resisted 

h> the industrial sector as profit margins narrow. The pattern of U.S. 
trade is likewise disrupted by internal economic dislocations. Stag- 
flation, decline in the value of the dollar, and increasing compel it ive 
difficult} of U.S. industry all lead, in turn, to balance-of-payments 
deficit-, making funding of U.S. programs abroad difficult. 

A public stniithiKi in services and welfare rise, demands grow for 

a afer and more wholesome environment, control over hazardous 
condil ion in indust rj , and reduced impacts of mining and forestry on 
wilderness area-. 


While these brakes on industrial growth and productivity have not 
yet reached full strength, they have served to warn that these rising 
long-term and incremental costs in the industrial economy are ap- 
proaching a serious stage. When such costs were coupled with the im- 
pact of the petroleum embargo and price increases from 1973 on, the 
observable result was a mixed situation of recession combined with 
inflation. The effects of these forces were felt most keenly in areas of 
largest populations, notably New York City. Escape from this dilemma 
is vital to the future health of the U.S. diplomatic posture in the 
world — as indeed also for U.S. domestic economic health — but the 
escape route remains undefined. The economic surplus needed to fund 
past levels of global programs may be a product of the U.S. past. U.S. 
foreign policy may rest more in the future on the skill of its diplomacy 
than on the weight of its economic programs. 

The Shaky Global Economy 

Economic interdependence has long prevailed in international re- 
lations. In the 19th century, Central Europe fed on American grain; 
agricultural nations relied on Chilean nitrates; England supplied 
capital to develop rail transportation systems in Argentina, India, the 
United States, and China ; English textile mills wove cloth with United 
States and Indian cotton; and so on. During the 1920s efforts to restore 
this global economy conflicted with internal efforts to stabilize na- 
tional economies and employment; the global monetary system col- 
lapsed in the face of stiff tariff barriers, competitive devaluations, 
multiple currency schemes, and quotas. Restoration of the global 
economy was a high-priority U.S. goal after World War II but, despite 
real progress, its achievement was obstructed by cold war divisiveness, 
nationalistic tendencies of former colonial regions, and — ultimately — 
the inability of the dollar to serve as a global currency in place of the 
long-defunct gold standard. Achievement of a stable global economy 
continues to be a U.S. goal. D6tente with the Soviet Union was con- 
sidered a positive move toward its achievement. But many old and 
some new forces obstruct progress toward the goal: internal obligations 
of developed countries to sustain economic growth and high levels of 
employment; resistance of developing countries to terms of trade 
which they see as blocking their escape from economic colonialism; 
and most recently the exploitation by the OPEC countries of a 
(probably temporary but severely acute) monopoly position in world 
petroleum supply. Efforts at reaching international agreement on a 
new world economic structure were underway at the time of this 
writing but the issue remains in doubt. 

Atomic Energy 

Atomic energy places such extreme demands on technology that 
its advance in competition with fossil fuels as a source of electrical 
energy has been slow. However, the manipulated rise in petroleum 
prices by OPEC and the complex environmental problems in the 
return to coal as a principal energy source are making atomic energy 
potentially more attractive for the future. This trend makes more and 
more difficult the maintenance of control over fuel elements and by- 
product plutonium to protect the world and its peoples against en- 
vironmental insults and irresponsible conversion of plutonium into 
weapons. Since the early 1960s a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy 
has been prevention of nuclear proliferation. The economics of energy 
now places that goal in serious jeopardy. Scientific efforts to develop 


a safer form of energy from nuclear fusion are proceeding but the prob- 
lem is one of greatT technical difficulty and the estimates of time to 
achieve success range from 20 to 50 years. Half a century of uncon- 
trolled nuclear proliferation as a consequence of supplying electricity 
to mankind is a fearsome prospect. 


The ultimate concern of all governments, in terms of both ends ;md 
means, is people. Of growing concern is the relationship between total 
available resources and population in the entire world, but especially in 
the most populous regions and those in which the rate of population 
increase is sharpest. Populations are significant in relation to resources 
of arable land and materials, ability to buy food, levels of consumption 
of all goods, rates at which environmental pollution occurs, and ability 
to extend governance. As populations increase, problems worsen in all 
these categories unless means are found to exert strong positive con- 
trols or motivations. In an interdependent world, population problems 
in any country have effects on all countries. Rates of population 
increase of different countries in the contemporary world tend to be in 
inverse proportion to achieved levels of development. Technology is 
available to feed large increases in populations as well as to control the 
rates of increase, but the enlistment of technology toward either 
purpose requires institutional support which is generally inadequate. 
Many forces are at work that cause population increases while few 
forces have been devised to inhibit population growth in poor coun- 
tries, other than food deprivation as a consequence of food/population 
unbalance. International tensions resulting from population pressures 
are regarded as serious and worsening but international agreement on 
the resolution of the problem is lacking. The dilemma facing the world 
is that governments of poor countries call for aid from developed 
countries to secure the rights of their citizens to living standards 
achieved by developed countries, but cannot reconcile these expecta- 
tions with their practical impossibility in the face of uninhibited 
increases of populations. 


As with population control, the limiting factor on food supply is not 
primarily technological but institutional. Wider exploitation of well- 
established technology of plant genetics, fertilization, storage, process- 
ing, and marketing could treble or quadruple the available food supply 
of the world. But the institutional remedies for the almost inevitable 
increase of famine conditions in the closing quarter of the 20th century 
must deal with food production and distribution as only one ingredient 
in a pattern of development that encompasses health and education, 
nonagricultural employment opportunities in urban and rural area-, 
stable currencies and' international exchanges. Land management 
reform, and stable institutions of government able to administer 
effective tax and investment programs. Failing achievement of these 
conditions, the poor countries will need to rely increasingly on imported 
supplies of food of which the United States is the leading exporter. 
For the United Slate, the options include (a) short-term economic 
advantage by sales to the best market, (b) stern compulsion on the 
poor countries to effect reforms by deliberate choice of markets to 
reward the countries that do so, ami (c) compassionate doling out of 
dwindling food reserves to populations on the basis of relative extremes 
of need. Averting so painful a decision rests not with the United States 


alone but with all potentially food-deficient countries as well. But if 
effective means of cooperation in development are not achieved, the 
ultimate decision will rest inescapably with the leadership of the most 
productive country, the United States. 


The status of the three-fifths of the globe covered by oceans was in 
question in the mid-1970s. Squabbles over fishing rights and seaward 
extent of national sovereignty were frequent. U.S. entrepreneurs 
impatiently waited for some sort of legal determination of seabed 
sovereignty and property rights in order to exploit emerging tech- 
nologies for securing the petroleum and metallic wealth of this remain- 
ing frontier. Naval use of the international medium of the oceans 
remained a plausible exercise of national power, but question was 
being raised as to U.S. supremacy at sea, once taken for granted and 
now seriously challenged. Environmentalists were vocal in denuncia- 
tion of Japanese and Soviet overfishing of the dwindling population of 
whales and of the pollution of the oceans by oil spills and chemical 
effluents. Failure of the maritime nations to agree on a new law of 
the sea in pending negotiations threatened to leave the ocean commons 
in a state of anarchy, instead of leading to a system of cooperation to 
maximize the management of the oceans as a sustained source of food 
and mineral wealth. 

Resource Allocation 

Consumption of minerals and fossil fuels is proportional to the 
level of economic development of nations, and levels of development 
differ greatly. Production of minerals and fossil fuels is related to their 
occurrence in the earth, and they are unevenly distributed among 
nations. Since extractive industries are first to be attempted by 
developing nations, the effect is that of a flow of materials from the 
poor countries to the rich, and a flow of processed goods from the 
rich countries to the poor. Efforts by poor countries to correct these 
evidently disadvantageous terms of trade have brought controversy 
into the United Nations and other forums. For all poor countries to 
reach the levels of materials consumption already achieved by the 
developed countries would far exceed the available reserves of the 
earth. Demands by the poor countries for a larger share of the benefits 
of the wealth from their mines and oil fields signal the need for eventual 
agreement among nations as to an equitable allocation of these 
resources. The wealth of developed countries is in the form of tech- 
nology, management, a built industrial plant, and investment 
capital. It remains to be determined how much of a transfer of the 
technical resources of the rich nations to the poor will be acceptable, 
and how large a share of raw materials the poor nations will insist 
on retaining. Clearly, the developed nations will need to practice a 
greater conservation of imported resources and the developing coun- 
tries will need to moderate their expectations of equaling the con- 
sumption levels achieved by the rich. There is simply not enough to 
go around. But by the mid-1970s, these constraints were insufficiently 
appreciated in either the rich or the poor countries. An attempt to 
ascertain the limits to growth, though usefully signaling an alert, had 
foundered on dubious assumptions while neglecting the practical 
question of how high a standard of consumption was achievable 
over the entire globe with its inexorably increasing population. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-5 


Multinational Corporations 

In response to efforts by many foreign nations to protect their 
own balances of international exchange by restricting the penetration 
of foreign corporations, a form of international commercial institution 
has rapidly proliferated. This form, the multinational corporation 
or MNC, is designed to accomplish the age-old dream of the economist : 
to minimize the economic significance of national boundaries. It 
does help to alleviate once-potent economic causes of international 
disputes, and it can be an effective agent of technology transfer, 
but it also generates new causes of conflict and frustration. Charac- 
teristically, the MNC moves capital, materials, credit, managerial 
expertise, technological skills, intellectual property, and even trained 
labor from country to country in order to maximize its total overall 
and long-term profit. In the process it erodes the national sovereignty 
of host countries, diverts capital and labor from nationally planned 
economic allocations, and competes for economic and even political 
power, while preserving its own economic and technological power 
base remote from the countries it penetrates. At the same time, 
because of the complex and farflung nature of its operations, it tends 
to elude controls which the base country seeks to impose, or even at 
times to outpace the base country's perception that certain controls 
may be needed in its own national interest. In so doing it tends to 
neglect political, social, and institutional costs of its operations. 

As an institution the MNC offers the capability of influencing con- 
structively the evolution of a stable world economy and the develop- 
ment of lagging economies. But as the MNC currently operate-, it 
excites resentment among U.S. labor unions as an instrument to 
cause unemployment at home; it excites resentment in developed 
countries by superimposing foreign management over domestic 
labor; and it excites resentment in developing countries by co-opting 
labor and resources to feed into technologies which are often inap- 
propriate to, and tend to distort, the development process in those 


The disintegration of 10th century colonial empires has resulted in a 
large increase (to L59 as of mid-1977) in the number of separate 
sovereign slate-, each groping toward independence, governance, self- 
determination of national policy, and coherence. Some of these states 
have discovered the ancient formula whereby nationalism, in term- of a 
contrived hostility toward their own neighbors, toward other groupings 
of states, or toward one or another of the great powers, can serve to 
unify and promote coherence of their own political structures. At the 
same time, claims turn into "rights" and exchanges of values become 
"exploitation," creating an attitude of manifesl destiny of the poor. 

I r nited Nations 

Bom in an epoch of hope for a cooperative world of peaceful tuitions, 
the United Nations has degenerated into a cockpil of parochial squab- 
bles. Since the penalty for intransigence in the United Nations is 
inconsequential, the motive for compromise has disappeared and deci- 
sions without practical effect are arrived at in the U.N. General 
Assembly by counting the votes of the ministates. Effectiveness of the 
U.N. Security Council is largely nullified by exercise of the veto power 
by the leading permanent members. Constructive programs of the 


World Bank and the World Health Organization offer a glimmer of 
hope but the intransigence evident in the General Assembly has found 
its counterpart in UNESCO and ILO. By the mid-1970s, respect for the 
United Nations in the United States had been seriously impaired and 
the cost benefit of the association of nations was widely qtiestioned. 
The very substantial contributions of the U.N. system were largely 
unseen while its futilities were highly visible. Whether public opinion 
would be content to tolerate this unsatisfactory state of affairs long 
enough to evolve a more workable and useful U.N. structure remained 
to be seen. 


A basic building block available to U.S. diplomacy in the balancing 
of cooperation and conflict is the circumstance that many contiguous 
nations share common geographic and economic problems and oppor- 
tunities. Many such multinational regions exist throughout the world 
but their effect on the nations that share them varies widely. Some, like 
the Scandinavian countries, have established cooperative relations; 
others, like the nations of former French Indochina, have a long history 
of strife; some, like the States of Central America, are groping toward 
cooperation; and some, like the Middle East, are fiercely divided by 
religion and ideology. The opportunity for economic and social benefits 
to such regions is great but largely wasted; cooperative planning, 
division of labor in the development and testing of useful technology, 
shared infrastructures, and the recognition of commonality of prob- 
lems, opportunities, goals, and approaches, are all available as elements 
to reduce the economic significance of national boundaries. Reasons 
for the neglect of this opportunity to strengthen international amity are 
easy to find, but the want of effort to this end seems hard to justify. 

Shrinking World Community 

Instant global communications, verbal and visual, bring the whole 
world into the living room. A terrorist attack in the Middle East or 
Northern Ireland, an earthquake in Chile or Turkey, an election in 
Australia or Portgual, is described or shown minutes later everywhere 
else. The infinite variety of events inviting global attention over- 
loads the receptors of the individual and the time or space of the 
communicators. Censorship is inherent, not only for reasons of na- 
tional policy or economic advantage but because limited capacity 
compels selection according to some policy or principle. "Newsworthy" 
events — like war or unrest in Morocco, Angola, Belize, Ethiopia, Por- 
tugal, Cyprus, Lebanon, or elsewhere — are reported while crop statis- 
tics, new schools, technological developments, and other constructive 
events are ignored. Even so, the individual is told more than he can 
assimilate. Excessive demands are placed on his enthusiasm and indig- 
nation. In response, the individual tends to dismiss the information 
flow as irrelevant to his own interests, and to rely on the "experts" 
to deal with these hopelessly numerous and complex matters. Or else,- 
in support of his own tradition or esthetic sense, the individual may 
seize on some one conflict as his own, choosing a side for reasons of 
moral predilection or ethnic, religious, or national origin. Even so, 
the average American in 1977 is more aware of the world outside his 
own country than ever before but perhaps more depressed by what 
he perceives. 


Global Flows 

Information on current events is only one of many kinds of flows 
that cross national boundaries. The entire globe is a complex network, 
bound together by systems of transportation and communication by 
land, sea, air, and electronic linkages. Almost all nations contribute 
to and receive these flows, and the traffic along the various media 
continues to grow. The flows include trained persons moving to new 
homes, students seeking further education, tourists learning about 
the world, business people looking for opportunities for profit, scien- 
tists seeking to exchange knowledge, and diplomats bent on facilitating 
the conduct of international relations. Transactional flows also take 
place, in the form of credit, materials and products, ideological views, 
information, diplomatic influence, and expressions of national interests 
and goals. Still other flows, ranging from highly destructive to some- 
thing less than constructive, take the form of terrorist attacks, dis- 
semination of weaponry, the international movement of dangerous, 
drugs, the spread of disease epidemics, hostile signals and threats, 
guerrilla and "underground" movements, and covert operations. 
Encouragement and discouragement of various of these flows is the 
business of every government, some more than others. Together with 
the responses to them that feed back to the original source country, 
these flows aggregate into what is called "foreign relations." Since 
most flows are on the increase, it can be said that foreign relations 
are progressively intensifying for all countries. In the case of the 
United States, the indices of size, wealth, economic activity, military 
strength, and other measures of a dynamic society, are all surpassingly 
high; U.S. foreign relations are accordingly more intensive and com- 
plex than those of any other country in the world. 

However, U.S. institutional mechanisms to manage, plan for, or 
even keep track of these increasing flows are not growing correspond- 
ingly. This fact suggests that the United States is less and less able 
to administer a more and more demanding responsibility for foreign 
policy. It is also probable that the same deficiency exists in other 
highly dynamic developed countries. 


Rarely, if ever, has U.S. foreign policy faced so many fundamental 
changes — in the power base of its own political system, in the com- 
plexities of the external world, and in the challenges and obstacles to 
be met in furtherance of its goals. Disorientation is not too strong a 
term for the state of U.S. foreign policy in the mid-1970s. 

The Nation has recently emerged from a tragic, divisive, and in the 
minds of ninny a futile, war. National attitudes are mixed toward 
further exercise of U.S. power and influence in the world, even to the 
revival of the isolationism of the 1930s. Domestic issues are most 
salient : worries oxer unemployment and inflation, apprehension over 
threatened shortage of energy, concern for the deteriorating environ- 

A long list of disrupt ions abroad have also been of public and official 
concern: the festering and periodically explosive A.rab-Israeli con- 
did, the revolt of the Third World in the U.N. General Assembly. 
Third "World economic challenges to prevailing patterns of commerce, 
periodically renewed concern over the global increase in populations 


relative to global food supply, assertions of nationalism and intran- 
sigence by the many new nations, incidents of bombing and terrorism 
around the world, hijackings and kidnapings, urban guerrilla move- 
ments in several countries, religious conflict in Northern Ireland and 
communal conflict in Cyprus and Lebanon, power shifts or active 
contests at many points in Eurasia and Africa, unease over prolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons and the stability of the nuclear deterrent, 
frustration over the issue of seabed sovereignty, growing awareness of 
the disintegration of the world monetary structure erected after World 
War II and of the possibility of world monetary collapse, and a general 
sense that national goals of the many old and new nations of the world 
were at cross-purposes. 

The want of coherence and shared common purpose in the United 
Nations, the superpowers, NATO, and other groups of nations that 
once found opportunities for cooperation is a distressing characteristic 
of the contemporary world. It is a time for rebuilding and new leader- 
ship toward purposes that all can share. That is the prime challenge 
of American diplomacy in the final quarter of the 20th century. 


Chapter 3 — The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy 
Enters the Nuclear Age 



I. Introduction 57 

Definition of the Problem and Scope of the Study 57 

II. A Short Chronology of Atomic Control Diplomacy After World War II _ 59 
Preliminary Agreements on Nuclear Sharing; U.S. Preparations 

To Negotiate 59 

Impasse of Negotiations in the United Nations 60 

The Historical Context of the Negotiations; the Turbulent Post- 
war Years 60 

III. The Postwar Paradox: Cold War and Internationalism 62 

Preparation for International Control Efforts 62 

Formulation of Atomic Policy in the United States 63 

Domestic Control 64 

Hasty Demobilization of U.S. Military Forces 65 

Formulation of U.S. Policy on International Control 66 

Early Efforts 66 

Preparations for Negotiations in the UNAEC 68 

The U.S. Negotiator and Final Steps to Define Policy. _ 69 

Abortive Efforts in the United Nations Toward Control 71 

The U.S. Proposal 71 

The Soviet Proposal 72 

Debate and Impasse 73 

IV. Issues in the Interplay Between Diplomacy and Nuclear Technology. 76 

Significance of Technological Factors for U.S. Policy 76 

The Form and Purposes of International Control 80 

Proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report 80 

The Board of Consultants' Position Against Inspection. 80 
International Ownership and Operation of Dangerous 

Activities. _ 82 

Retention of "Safe" National Activities 84 

Inspection Provisions in the Report 85 

Reactions Among U.S. Policymakers to the Proposals of the 

Board of Consultants 8.6 

Trend Toward Control in U.S. Policy 87 

U.N. Stalemate Over Control and Inspection 88 

Soviet Reaction to Proposed Internationalization 88 

Action by the UNAEC 89 

The Issue of Stages of Transition to International Control 93 

The Political Basis for Proceeding by Stages 94 

Insistence by Acheson Committee on Step-by-Step 

Approach 95 

Origins of the Discussion 95 

Final Version — Some Technological Considerations 97 

Inconclusive Treatment of the Transition Issue by UNAEC. 99 

The Issue of Enforcement: Sanctions and the Veto 103 

Determining U.S. Policy on Sanctions 103 

U.S. Policy on the Veto: Its Relation to Enforcement 104 

Political Unacceptability of Veto-Free Control in the Nego- 
tiations 107 

Recapitulation of the Three Issues of Atomic Control 108 

V. Some Distinctive Features of the Negotiations 110 

Excessive U.S. Reliance on Technical Control Plan 110 

Lack of U.S. Attention to Soviet Requirements 111 

Soviet Calculation of U.S. Position 112 



V. Some Distintive Features of the Negotiations — Continued P a K« 

One Attempt at Technical-Diplomatic Coordination 113 

Underlying Misconceptions in U.S. Policy 114 

VI. Concluding Observations 118 

Impact of New Technologies on International Relations 118 

The Diplomatic Task: Combining Effectiveness and Acceptability. 119 

U.S. Attitudes in the Conduct of the Negotiations 122 


I. Introduction 

This study is concerned with the first international negotiations on 
the control of atomic energy, during the years immediately following 
"World War II. The arrival of the atom bomb was a technological 
event of unparalleled significance for international affairs. The ulti- 
mate meaning of the bomb itself, as distinct from the possible peaceful 
applications of atomic energy, was that it raised the cost of general 
war for total victory to an unacceptable level. This fact radically 
altered the basis for the positions of the diplomats at the bargaining 
table, and brought with it the problem of how to evaluate and to com- 
municate the significance of the new development. At the same time, 
a changed pattern of relations among nations had emerged as a result 
of the worldwide upheaval of World War II. Participants in this new 
configuration of power faced the unique technological and diplomatic 
situation created by atomic energy. 

Technological advances in the field of atomic energy added a new 
dimension and a new vocabulary to world affairs through such con- 
cepts as mutual deterrence and preemptive strikes. The dynamics of a 
nuclear arms race were dimly perceived at the outset of the nuclear 
age; even so, it is not clear that awareness of this potential would 
have prevented its development. In retrospect, it is understandable 
how the atom bomb, a product of science and technology and a tool of 
diplomacy, prompted a world drive for control. 

More important to this study is the fact of failure in the initial 
efforts of this drive. Despite the strong impetus for diplomatic initia- 
tive in response to a great technological achievement, the negotiations 
got nowhere then and have made little progress since. A principal aim 
of the study is to examine the causes of this costly failure in order to 
provide insights into the interactions among science, technology, and 
diplomacy when they are confronted with a technological development 
of the first magnitude — in this case, one with urgent implications for 
the future of all mankind. 

Definition of the Problem and Scope of the Study 

Because these early efforts to control nuclear weapons occurred more 
than 25 years ago, much historical discussion has accumulated in pub- 
lished sources. In light of this fact and considering the purpose of this 
series of reports, the study will not duplicate the history of these early 
international negotiations. Rather, it will focus on issues associated 
with the interaction of science, technology, and diplomacy. 

The advent of the atomic weapon in 1945 represented a unique tech- 
nological advancement: applications of the newly acquired knowledge 
regarding atomic energy could serve either constructive or destructive 
purposes. This factor, combined with the immediate recognition of 
atomic energy development as a great step forward in man's inquiry 
into scientific knowledge, signified that such development had political 
implications of global proportions. Further recognition of the im- 
portance of the technological development of atomic energy for U.S. 

Note : This chapter was prepared in 1972 by Leneice N. Wu. , 



foreign policy was inevitable. Its significance was enhanced by the 
fact that the first demonstration of the technology was its use as a 
weapon in actual warfare. Considering the decisive role which the 
atomic weapon played in ending the war with Japan, its use gave rise 
to a number of questions for the United States on both the international 
and national levels. 

On the international level, the nations of the world recognized a 
need to prevent proliferation of atomic energy weapons technology 
and capabilities. Questions were raised in official quarters both at home 
and abroad with regard to the intentions of the United States, as sole 
owner of atomic weapons, and how this fact would affect its relations 
with the rest of the world. Officials in the U.S. Government perceived 
the urgency of devising a policy regarding the U.S. contribution to an 
international arrangement for the control of atomic energy to pre- 
vent its employment for weapons purposes, and also perceived the need 
for monitoring by some international means the country-by-count re- 
development of atomic energy. 

The new nuclear science and its early technology also offered the 
potential for development of atomic energy to serve beneficial pur- 
poses, national and international. Traditionally, scientific advance- 
ments are shared readily within the scientific community without re- 
gard to national boundaries. However, the military implications of 
atomic energy generated pressures to prevent traditional free com- 
munication in this instance. 1 

Moreover, concern for the military applications of atomic energy 
necessarily overrode attention to peaceful uses. In turn, these military 
security factors presented obstacles and limitations for the hoped-for 
international cooperation in developing peaceful uses, for the formu- 
lation of a U.S. policy regarding its role in international cooperation, 
and for a program within the United States itself to pursue peaceful 

What challenges did the innovation of the atom bomb present to 
traditional concepts of diplomacy ? Did the policymakers in the United 
States or the diplomats of the negotiations meet them ? Were the scien- 
tific and technological factors of the situation used to support or to 
correct established principles of U.S. foreign policy? What steps were 
taken by diplomats and scientists to understand each other's points of 
view ? Were they successful ? How did they fail? 

These are a few of the salient questions to which this study is ad- 
dressed. The following discussion offers a brief historical overview 
mikI an explanation of the political, military, and technical factors of 
(he atmosphere in which the negotiations took place. During the nu- 
clear policymaking process in the United States and in the interna- 
tional negotiations, certain issues arose which are pertinent to this 
series of studies on science, technology, and American diplomacy. The 
study examines the development of these issues from (he I'.S. policy 
deliberations through their outcome in the negotiations. Finally, it 
discusses a number of prominent features in the negotiations and sets 
forth some general concluding observations. 

1 It was the early nuclear scientists themselves who adopted a policy of secrecy In the 
United States, well before the start of the Manhattan Project, the wartime Rovernment 
effort which developed the atom bomb. 

II. A Short Chronology or Atomic Control Diplomacy After 

World War II 

A chronological summary of the sequence of early developments 
aiming toward international controls may be helpful in. setting the 
stage for consideration of the international negotiations and why they 

Deliberations on U.S. policy in light of the development of the atom 
bomb had been initiated as early as May 1945, when Henry L. Stimson, 
the Secretary of War, led a committee which reported to President 
Truman on the subject. Shortly thereafter, in June, the stage was set 
for the machinery to handle the international negotiations on the con- 
trol of atomic energy, with the signing of the United Nations Charter. 
Two months later the weapon was actually used on Hiroshima on 
August 6, 1945. 

Once the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been 
demonstrated, the Administration took action to publicize as much in- 
formation as was judged appropriate to contribute to public under- 
standing of the weapon and its significance for the United States. An 
important step in this direction was the publication in August 1945 of 
the Smyth report, 2 which explained the basic scientific information on 
the bomb but kept its disclosures within the limits defined by security 
considerations. President Truman took initial steps to enunciate U.S. 
atomic energy policy at both the national and international levels in 
two major addresses in October 1945. 3 

Preliminary Agreements on Nuclear Sharing; U.S. Preparations To 

Public attention shifted to international activity during the closing- 
months of 1945. On November 15, an agreement was concluded by the 
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Called the "Three 
Nation Agreed Declaration," this agreement laid a foundation for in- 
ternational action to control atomic energy. The Soviet Union was in- 
cluded in this endeavor when the Moscow Declaration was signed the 
following month, as a result of meetings of representatives of the 
Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. In the 
United States, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson had been 
appointed earlier in December to head a committee to report to the 
Secretary of State on U.S. policy for the international control of 
atomic energy. 

In January 1946, the newly formed United Nations created an orga- 
nization to deal with the specific problem of controlling atomic energy 
when it drew up the terms of reference of the United Nations Atomic 

2 Henry D. Smyth. A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic 
Energy for Military Purposes Vnder the Auspices of the U.S. Government, 1940—^5. 
(Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945.) 

3 President Truman delivered a message to Congress on atomic energy on Oct. 3, 1945, 
and elaborated on U.S. atomic energy policy in his Navy Day address on October 27, in 
New York. Complete texts of both can be found in Public Papers of the President of 
the United States, 1945. (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961). 
pp. 362-366, 431-438. 



Energy Commission (UNAEC). At the same time, the deliberations 
of Acheson's group were getting underway as an additional group of 
policymakers, largely from the scientific community, provided the 
technical advice necessary to an understanding of the problem and 
to formulating an appropriate policy. This group, known as the Board 
of Consultants, was led by David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennes- 
see Valley Authority. 

The findings of these two groups, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal 
report, 4 were released in March 1946. In the same month, Bernard 
M. Baruch was appointed by President Truman to speak for the 
United States in the UNAEC. Combining his own views on interna- 
tional control of atomic energy with the proposals set down in the 
Acheson-Lilienthal report, Baruch presented the U.S. proposal, which 
became known as the Baruch plan, at the opening session of the 
UNAEC on June 14, 1946. 

Impasse of Negotiations in the United Nations 

Opening proposals of the Soviet Union were presented to the 
UNAEC on June 19. The extensive differences between the policies 
of the two countries were to undergo few modifications during the 
negotiations to follow. Once the initial proposals of the major powers 
had been made, procedural arrangements of the UNAEC were devised 
and implemented. An important group was the Scientific and Tech- 
nical Committee, which examined the technical feasibility of con- 
trol. The report of this group was issued to a major organ of the 
UNAEC, called Committee Two, in October 1946. Following discus- 
sions by this latter body, a report of the whole UNAEC was made 
to the United Nations Security Council on December 31, 1947. 

The Security Council did not resolve the questions raised by the first 
report of the UNAEC on international control of atomic energy, and 
referred the problem back to the UNAEC in March 1947. The second 
session of that body had been underway since January 1 and continued 
until September 1947, when a second report was issued to the Security 
Council. Again, decisive action was not forthcoming from the Security 
Council, and further deliberations were carried on by the UNAEC, 
which issued its third and final report on May 7, 1948. This document 
recorded the admission by the negotiators that their deliberations had 
reached a stalemate. The General Assembly pressed for continuation 
of the discussions, but they were finally suspended in November 1949. 
In the meantime, an important event substantially altered the char- 
acter and outlook of the negotiations and added to the existing diffi- 
culties of an extremely complex international problem. This event was 
the explosion by the Soviet Union on September v 2.">. L949, of its own 
nuclear device. 
The Historical Context of the Negotiations; the Turbulent Postwar 


The events reviewed in this study occurred during a turbulent I 

years during which the great powers and the lesser powers moved 

to establish post war mechanisms and configural ions of power, security. 

and influence. The splitting of Europe occurred ns Bulgaria (Septem- 

u IS Department of State t Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, 
Publication No. 2498 (Washington, D.C U.S. Government Printing Office, 1040), re- 
ferred to as the "Acheson Lilienthal Report." 


ber 1946), Czechoslovakia (June 1948), Hungary (August 1949), and 
East Germany (October 1949) became Communist People's Republics. 
The Greek civil war raged through the early postwar years; the 
Truman doctrine and Marshall plan proposals came in March and 
June 1947 ; the Berlin blockade and airlift began in mid-1948 ; and the 
NATO Treaty was signed in April 1949. 

The Far Eastern world was no less in flux. Indochina and Indo- 
nesian anticolonial wars were in progress by 1946. The Philippines, 
India, and Pakistan attained independence in 1946 and 1947. U.S. 
dominance in the Pacific was consolidated from Hawaii to occupied 
Japan. And the Chinese civil war ended in 1949 with Communist 
ascendency over the mainland. 

The rapidly changing system of international power relationships 
and national interests in the postwar world made more difficult the 
analysis of policy alternatives in the national and international con- 
trol of the atom. Viewed as the most commanding source of military 
power in the postwar world, the atomic weapon altered the world 
power structure immeasurably, and the United States tried to use the 
fact of its possession as a surrogate for great troop strength. But its 
very potency made it an unusable weapon in influencing the shifts of 
power alignment during these years. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union 
sought to blunt the bomb's influence in diplomacy while striving 
vigorously to secure its own nuclear capability. Taking into considera- 
tion all these parallel developments, it is clear why the negotiations to 
bring the new force under international control yielded no useful 
diplomatic product. 

III. The Postwar Paradox : Cold War and Internationalism 

The historical setting for U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at the inter- 
national control of atomic energy contained two opposite and irrecon- 
cilable trends. On the one hand, the end of World War II had wit- 
nessed the emergence of two great powers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, whose basic ideologies were intrinsically at odds with 
one another. The early years of the postwar period when the Baruch 
plan was being negotiated were to reveal a growing antagonism in 
United States-Soviet relations which was to become known as the cold 
war. On the other hand, there also emerged a widespread attitude of 
international cooperation in world affairs, as, in June 1945, the diverse' 
powers attempted to establish a framework for peace through the 
United Nations, an organization which was to receive a serious chal- 
lenge in its attempts to establish international control of atomic energy. 
And despite the increasing awareness of the widening breach between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, efforts were made to achieve 
some measure of cooperation between the two countries, e.g., the post- 
war conferences of ministers. 

Preparation for International Control Efforts 

On the international level, a major concern was the control of atomic 
energy, both as a means of destruction and as a new power which 
could benefit mankind, and the nations of the world acted to set up 
international machinery to cope with this problem. The first step was 
an agreement among those powers which had been involved in the 
development of atomic energy during the war, the United States, 
Great Britain, and Canada. Meetings were held in Washington among 
President Hairy S. Truman, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 
and Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King; as noted above, 
the resulting agreement of November 15, 1945 is known as the Three 
Nation Agreed Declaration. In it, the three countries declared their 
intention to share with all nations the scientific information associated 
with atomic energy for peaceful purposes. However, the Declaration 
acknowledged the dilemma posed by the practical applications of 
atomic energy, in that much of the information necessary to carry out 
the industrial applications was virtually the same as that needed for 
weapons production. It was agreed, therefore, that it was necessary to 
withhold this information until appropriate safeguards could be es- 
tablished to insure that it would be used only for peaceful purposes. 
To this end, the three heads of state suggested that the United Nations 
Organization set up a Commission which would make recommendations 
on the question of international control to the United Nations. 5 

Russian agreement to the principles of the Three Nation Agreed 
I teclaration was obtained the next month, at the Conference of Minis- 
ters in Moscow, and was made public on December 27 in the Moscow 

'For a complete text of the Three Nation Agreed Declaration, sre U.S. Department 
of State The international Control of Atomic Energy, drouth of a Policy, Publication 
•J702 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing office, 1946), pp. 118-120. 



Declaration, a Soviet-Anglo-American statement. In addition to sup- 
porting the idea of establishing a Commission in the United Nations, 
the Moscow Declaration contained the text of a proposed resolution 
to establish the organization, and invited Fiance, China, and Canada 
to cosponsor it at the first session of the U.N. General Assembly in 
January 1946.° The text of the Moscow Declaration was incorporated 
unchanged in a resolution which was passed by the General Assembly 
without a dissenting vote on January 24, 1946, and which thereby es- 
tablished the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) . 
Under the terms of the resolution, the UNAEC was to operate 
closely within the framework of the Security Council, with its provi- 
sion for the veto power, a fact with significance for subsequent nego- 
tiations on the control of atomic energy. The Commission was to be 
composed of one representative of each country on the Security Coun- 
cil and receive directions from the Council "in matters affecting secu- 
rity." The resolution added, "On these matters, the Commission shall 
be accountable for its work to the Security Council," a provision which 
was included as a result of the initiative of the Soviet Union at the 
Moscow Conference. The rationale behind this approach rested on the 
assertion that the most important aspect of the control question was 
the assurance of security. Even at this early stage, the concern over 
the military applications of atomic energy dominated the discussions, 
diverting attention from ways to share knowledge necessary in the 
economic or industrial applications of atomic energy. 7 The resolution 
also set down the terms of reference for the Commission's proposals 
as follows : 

(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of 
basic scientific information for peaceful ends; 

(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary 
to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes ; 

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of 
atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable 
to mass destruction ; and 

(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and 
other means to protect complying States against the hazards 
of violations and evasion. 8 

Formulation of Atomic Policy in the United States 

The commanding position of the United States as a world power 
resulting from its role in World War II and in helping to shape the 
postwar world led to an unprecedented involvement in international 
relations. As the nation in sole possession of atomic weapons, the 
United States bore an added responsibility to seek international con- 
trol over this new and terrible form of destruction. 

Not onlv was it necessary to define national policv on international 
control, but it was also important to determine an appropriate means 
of domestic control, a responsibility which had been given to the Army 

6 See Ibid. pn. 125-127 for the text of the Moscow Declaration. 

7 Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, The Struggle to Control Atomic 
Weapons, 191,5-1,9 (Boston, Mass. : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 213. 

8 "Establishment of a Commission to Deal With The Problems Raised by the Discovery 
of Atomic Energy," United Nations General Assembly Resolution I, Resolutions Adopted b?/ 
the General Assembly During the First Part of Its First Session from 10 January to 11, 
February 191,6, United Nations Document A/64 (London, England: Church House, 1946), 
p. 9. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-6 


during the war. National control of weapons production and disclos- 
ure of information necessary for this purpose posed controversy. In 
addition, consideration was given to the role of U.S. domestic control 
in relation to international negotiations and control. 


The congressional controversy over domestic control of atomic en- 
ergy occurred during the early stages of formulation of U.S. policy 
on international control and during the first months of the negotia- 
tions in the United Nations. A prominent issue in the vigorous public 
debate concerned the extent of the military role in U.S. atomic energy 
programs. Proposals ranged from a military-dominated commission 
responsible for U.S. development of atomic energy to complete ex- 
clusion of the military. Equally difficult was the issue of the kind of 
control to be placed on the release of information on industrial appli- 
cations, that is, data which could apply to weapons production as well, 
without obstructing the exchange of information within the scien- 
tific community necessary to foster maximum development of atomic 

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, approved July 26, provided for a 
full-time civilian Atomic Energy Commission whose members were 
to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. It also established the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
of the Congress to oversee atomic energy matters. Provision was made 
for consultations with and recommendations from a Military Liaison 
Committee on "'matters relating to military applications," 9 but final 
decisions were left to the civilian Commission. As far as dissemina- 
tion of information was concerned, the law set up a category called 
"restricted data,"" which included primarily data associated with 
atomic weapons and fissionable materials. The law then set down the 
nature of the punishments to be used against those convicted of trans- 
mitting restricted data for the purpose of injuring the United States 
or for granting an advantage to a foreign country. Exchange of in- 
formation with foreign countries on the use of atomic energy for in- 
dustrial purposes was forbidden until Congress declared "by joint 
resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards 
against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been 
established." 10 

One section of the law was devoted to the relationship between do- 
mestic control and any international control arrangements which 
might be concluded. The law defined "international arrangement" as 
a t reaty approved by t he Senate or ( )ongress, and recognized the possi- 
bility t hat portions of the U.S. law might be inconsistent with such an 
arrangement. If this should be the case, according to the law, the pro- 
visions of the international arrangement would take precedence as 
long as the agreement was in force. Moreover, tin- Commission was to 
"give maximum effect to the policies contained in any such interna- 
t ional arrangement." " 

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 may have had some effect on foreign 
perceptions of ih<> U.S. position in the negotiations on international 

" Sec. •_'(<■). nil Stat. 757. 

"■ Sec 10(a)(1). «;<> stat. 7<;<; 

" Soc 8(C), 00 Stat. 765 


control. For example, an argument in the United States which favored 
complete civilian control had been the assertion that a military-con- 
trolled program might convey the impression that the general purpose 
of U.S. atomic energy programs was oriented toward weapons pro- 
duction, thereby presenting an unfavorable prospect for U.S. willing- 
ness to seek or accept international control. As the bill was finally 
passed by the Congress, the emphasis on civilian control may have 
helped avoid such an impression. Moreover, the law marked an un- 
precedented intrusion of the Federal Government into private enter- 
prise through its provisions for Government ownership and control 
over fissionable materials and provisions for various licensing powers 
with respect to facilities and activities. Thus, by these provisions the 
Congress demonstrated its awareness of the unprecedented importance 
and dangers of the development of atomic energy. The section on 
international control may have served to show a positive U.S. view 
toward international control and preparedness to implement it. 

However, the considerable precautions which were taken regarding 
release of information may have served to reflect a U.S. desire to retain 
its atomic monopoly. Although these precautions were also based on 
U.S. security considerations and on U.S. suspicions of how other coun- 
tries might use atomic weapons once they had acquired them, nonethe- 
less, the debate on this issue and the resulting provisions in the law may 
have inspired doubts in other countries as to the sincerity of U.S. 
pledges to relinquish its monopoly to an appropriate international au- 
thority. In any case, the following conclusion of a State Department 
publication seems applicable: 

The evolution of a policy for domestic control not only pro- 
vided parallels for the problems that were certain to be met 
in international planning, but it illustrated as no other 
process could the magnitude and complexity of the task that 
awaited inter-Governmental collaboration. 12 


A relevant consideration in the evolution of early U.S. policy for 
the atom is the overall state of the U.S. defense posture in 1945 and 
1946. 13 With the advent of peace, the American public and the troops 
themselves clamored to bring the armies home, on the grounds that 
there was no longer a need to maintain the wartime level of military 
manpower. Besides being influenced by the euphoric atmosphere 
brought on by the end of war, many people looked to the newly de- 
veloped atomic bomb as a sufficient source of military strength. A 
week after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945. 
President Truman responded to public and congressional pressure, 
and announced that inductions would drop from 80,000 to 50,000 per 
month and that within 12 to 18 months, 5i/ 2 million men would be 
released from the service. By April 1946, the number of those dis- 
charged from the Army had reached nearly 7 million. By June 30, 
1946, out of a total of about 3 million military personnel remaining on 

12 State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 21. 

"The following discussion is based primarily on Lieberman. The Scorpion and the 
Tarantula, pp. 227-234. 


active duty in all of the U.S. armed services combined, approximately 
1.4 million were in the Army. 14 

Many U.S. Government officials, especially among the military 
services, had opposed such rapid demobilization of the armed forces 
because of their mistrust of the Russians. One historian cites the 
power vacuum in Europe which resulted from rapid U.S. withdrawal 
as at least one reason for the imposition of Soviet hegemony in East- 
ern Europe during this period. 15 The dramatic cuts in the armed 
forces also were to have an effect on the negotiations for the control 
of atomic energy. One source interprets the situation as follows : 

As the nation's conventional military resources grew 
w T eaker and weaker at a time when Soviet dynamism made 
it imperative that the United States be strong, the place of 
atomic weapons in the overall American military posture 
would naturally become more critical and worthy of 
protection. 16 


Early efforts: Even before the first atomic bomb was used during 
the war-, some persons in the United States were aware of the potential 
need for control of atomic energy and encouraged the Administration 
to initiate action to formulate its policy on the subject. Largely at the 
recommendation of Vannevar Bush, a scientific advisor to President 
Truman and Chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and Devel- 
opment, and another presidential advisor, Harvard University Presi- 
dent James B. Conant, Truman called on Henry L. Stimson, Secretary 
of War, to appoint a group to consider the future needs in the area of 
control, on both the international and domestic levels. Stimson recog- 
nized that to deal with the unique situation created by the development 
of the atomic bomb required knowledge in both science and politics; 
he gathered advisors from these areas, including Bush and Conant, 
Ralph Bard, the Undersecretary of the Navy, William L. Clayton, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and James F. 
Byrnes, who would become Secretary of State two months later, to 
serve as the President's personal representative on the Committee. 
Other members were George Harrison, president of the New York 
Life Insurance Company and a Special Assistant to Stimson, Karl 
Compton, a physicist and president of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, and several scientists who had led in the development of 
the bomb: Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, Dr. 
Arthur II. Compton, and Dr. Enrico Fermi. The unpublished report 
of what is known as the Secretary of War's Interim Committee, which 
nut during May L945, reached a number of conclusions affecting inter- 
national control which were to remain at, issue in future attempts 
toward such control. 

Within a month after the first atomic weapons were used, in August 
194.">, a report w as issued which explained the basic scientific facts asso- 
ciated with the development of atomic energy. Prepared in 1944 by a 
physicist who had been involved in the bomb effort, Dr. Henry I). 

11 U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics (Washington, D.C. : U.S. 
Government Printing Office, l!»7i >. p. lit. 

16 Thomas A. Bailey, ' Dlplomatio History of the American People (New York : Appleton- 
Century Crofts, 1964), p. 778. 

19 Lleberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 234. 


Smyth of Princeton, the report was released to avert any misconcep- 
tion or wild speculation by the public concerning the new weapon. 
Moreover, it v as hoped that by supplying a substantial amount of in- 
formation at this time, the report would alleviate public pressure, espe- 
cially from the scientific community, for release of all pertinent infor- 
mation. The Smyth report supplied basic facts, but not enough to aid 
rival efforts to develop an atomic weapon. 17 

The decision to release the Smyth report was much debated within 
the Administration, but the reasons noted above prevailed. The Smyth 
report was later used as a basic source for the discussions in a Scien- 
tific and Technical Committee of the UNAEC. The conclusion of the 
report is often cited when the study is considered in relation to inter- 
national control : 

We find ourselves with an explosive which is far from 
completely perfected. Yet the future possibilities of such 
explosives are appalling, and their effects on future wars and 
international affairs are of fundamental importance. Here is 
a new tool for mankind, a tool of unimaginable destructive 
power. Its development raises many questions that must be 
answered in the near future. 

* * * These questions are not technical questions ; they are 
political and social questions, and the answers given to them 
may affect all mankind for generations * * * In a free country 
like ours, such questions should be debated by the people and 
decisions must be made by the people through their repre- 
sentatives. This is one reason for the release of this report. It 
is a semi-technical report which it is hoped men of science in 
this country can use to help their fellow citizens in reaching 
wise decisions. The people of the country must be informed 
if they are to discharge their responsibilities wisely. 18 

Among the initial public statements of U.S. policy on arrangements 
for international control was President Truman's address to Congress 
on October 3, 1945. Affirming the U.S. commitment to seek interna- 
tional control of atomic energy and the U.S. desire to share informa- 
tion for peaceful purposes, the President announced the impending 
discussions with Canada and Great Britain which were to result in the 
Three Nation Agreed Declaration. On October 27, 1945, he further 
defined U.S. policy by enunciating five basic principles which, for 
the most part, had originated with Stimson's committee. These con- 
clusions might be viewed as a combination of the primary technological 
and political factors which would condition the evolution of the U.S. 
plan for international control and the negotiations to achieve such 
control. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, associated with early U.S. arms con- 
trol negotiations in the Department of State, has summarized these 
principles as follows : 

1. No nation can long maintain a monopoly of atomic 

2. No nation could long maintain or morally defend a 
monopoly of peaceful benefits of atomic energy. 

17 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar B. Anderson, Jr. The New World 1939/191,6, A History 
of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. I (University Park, Pa. : Pennsyl- 
vania State University Press, 1962) pp. 400-407. 

18 Smyth, General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for 
Military Purposes, p. 165. 


3. For the foreseeable future there can be no adequate 
military defense against atomic weapons. 

4. All the initial processes in the production of fissionable 
materials and certain subsequent processes are identical 
whether their intended use or purpose is peaceful or military. 

5. The nuclear chain reaction required for the release of 
atomic energy is now based upon uranium or thorium as the 
only suitable raw materials occurring in nature. Ores contain- 
ing these materials are only relatively rare. Although rich de- 
posits are not numerous, the lower concentrations of the ores 
have a wide geographical distribution. 19 

Preparations for negotiations in the UNAEC : In January 1946, 
1 month after the conclusion of the Moscow Declaration, James F. 
Byrnes, Secretary of State, announced that he had appointed a com- 
mittee "to study the subject of controls and safeguards necessary to 
protect this 00^-61-11™^!!^' during the international negotiations on 
atomic energy. Assistant Secretary Acheson had been named chair- 
man; the other members were Bush, Oonant, General Leslie Groves — 
head of the Manhattan project which had developed the atomic bomb 
during the war — and John McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of 
War. Although the members of the committee had some knowledge of 
atomic energy matters from the standpoint of both its technological 
and political aspects, Acheson suggested appointing a Board of Con- 
sultants to advise the committee on the technological aspects of inter- 
national control. David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, was given the task of leading the Board. Its other members 
were Chester Barnard, president of New Jersey Bell Telephone, who 
had been active in the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ; 
Harry A. Winne, an engineer and a vice president of General Electric 
Company, who had participated in the Manhattan Project ; and Dr. J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who had directed the weaponry 
installation of the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, New Mexico. 
The composition of the two groups was intended to provide the talents 
necessary to consider both the political and technological aspects of 
the problem of providing a basis for a workable system of international 

In the course of the next two months, the Board drafted a basic plan 
for international control. Following a series of meetings with Ache- 
son's committee, which led to certain modifications and additions, it 
produced a document entitled "A Report on the International Control 
of Atomic Energy." Known as the "Acheson-Lilienthal report," the 
study set down the basic technological factors involved in the develop- 
ment of atomic energy, particularly those which would affect the na- 
ture of the international control system. Once these considerations had 
been provided, the Hoard outlined the basic features of a control plan, 
governed primarily by the technological data. ( )n the whole, the Board 
regarded its work "not as a -final plan, but as a place to begin, a foun- 
dation on which to build." 20 The report was released in late March 
1!» H'» as a basis for public discussion. 

'•Bernhard G. Ftwhhtiofer. I'ostwar Xcaotintionfi for Arms Control (Washington, D.C. : 
Brookings, 19fil), p. :{.'{. 

* State Department "Aeheson-Llllenthal report," p. vlii. 


Writing in 1948, J. Robert Oppenheimer summarized the general 
trend of thinking within the scientific community toward the atomic 
challenge which confronted U.S. diplomacy : 

The control of atomic weapons always appeared possible 
only on the basis of an intensive and working collaboration 
between peoples of many nationalities, on the creation * * * 
of supra-national patterns of communication, of work, and of 
development. The development of atomic energy lay in an area 
peculiarly suited to such internationalization, and in fact re- 
quiring it for the most effective exploitation, almost on tech- 
nical grounds alone. The development of atomic energy lay in 
a field international by tradition and untouched by pre-exist- 
ing national patterns of control. Thus, the problem as it ap- 
peared in the summer of 1945 was to use our understanding of 
atomic energy, and the developments that we had carried out, 
with their implied hope and implied threat, to see whether in 
this area international barriers might not be broken down, 
and patterns of candor and cooperation established which 
would make the peace of the world. 21 

The U.S. negotiator and final steps to define policy : In the mean- 
time, on March 18, 1946, to bring the issue to the United Nations, the 
President named Bernard M. Baruch U.S. representative to the 
UNAEC. One source offers the following description : 

Bernard Mannes Baruch * * * had by his 75th year become 
a symbol of America to his fellow Americans as well as to 
people all over the world. An immensely successful financier 
who had built a fortune in the lusty days of business boom, 
a public servant and sought-after counselor to Presidents of 
both political parties, Baruch was one of the most trusted men 
in all of America. The fact that he was Jewish seemed to 
assure his place in the public mind because it gave his life that 
quality of equal opportunity realized, of Horatio Alger, that 
is so important to America's self-image. 22 

Included in the delegation to the UNAEC were Baruelvs choices 
from leading members of the banking business : Herbert Swope, John 
M. Hancock, and Ferdinand Eberstadt ; the fifth member of the dele- 
gation was Fred Searls, a mining engineer, formerly a journalist, and 
head of the New York State Racing Commission. Richard C. Tolman, 
who had served as a scientific advisor to General Groves, was chosen 
for the same role in Baruelvs delegation. 

Aside from the fact that Baruch spoke for U.S. policy on inter- 
national control of atomic energy, his appointment might be consid- 
ered in two respects with regard to the central issues of this study : the 
primary motives behind the appointment and his role in the policy- 
making process. As to the reasoning behind the appointment of Ba- 
ruch, at this time the issues surrounding the domestic control of atomic 
energy were far from resolved, and prominent among them was the 
possibility of excessive restrictions on the release of information. Con- 
gressional hesitation to allow a free flow of information had been ex- 

a J. Robert Oppenheimer, "International Control of Atomic Energy," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, v. 4. no. 2 (February 1948), pp. 41-42. 
83 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the tarantula, p. 261. 


pressed sufficiently to make it reasonably clear that the United States 
would be limited, if not completely crippled, in its ability to meet its 
secret agreements with the British for postwar collaboration on atomic 
energy matters. 23 

His appointment was apparently motivated by a belief that he could 
help enlarge the Administration's freedom of action in the field of 
international negotiation. Baruch represented the kind of public 
servant who could be entrusted with America's security, as well as 
one who was respected in international circles. Indeed, the chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Eelations Committee pledged Baruch's con- 
firmation without a hearing, once he had assured the committee in 
writing that "there would be no treaty and no disclosures without safe- 
guards, and that no agreement of any kind would be entered without 
the consent of Congress." 24 

The appointment and acceptance of Baruch appear to have been 
based primarily on respect for his political acumen. At any rate, the 
motivations behind the choice of the chief negotiator were not of the 
same character which prompted the appointment and work of Ache- 
son's committee and the Board of Consultants. Indeed, by some per- 
sons, Baruch was not thought to be qualified for the job. The members 
of the Board and Acheson's committee declined to continue in these 
groups under Baruch, partly on the grounds that if Baruch pursued 
policies with which they disagreed, they wanted to retain the right to 
voice their opposition. 25 

One member of Baruch's group — namely, Hancock — reacted nega- 
tively to Baruch's suggestion that the Board of Consultants continue 
its work under the auspices of the State Department. Hancock stated : 

These problems are not often purely scientific problems. 
They blend very quickly into political problems * * *. The 
scientists tend to be unbending and calculating in the field 
of science — which is natural — but they carry over their in- 
elasticity into arguments in the field of international affairs, 
politics in the proper sense, and negotiation. 26 

Apparently there was little common outlook between those represent- 
ing mainly a scientific approach, who had developed the recommen- 
dations for a policy of international control of atomic energy, and 
those representing chiefly a political approach, who were responsible 
for conducting the diplomatic negol iations to implement the emerging 

2n In August 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill had signed an executive agreement, known 
as thi' Quebec Agreement, which was nol made public, and affirmed Anglo-American coop 
eration on atomic energy during the war. A year later, the two leaders signed an aide- 
memoire to supplement the earlier agreement, which provided for full collaboration between 
the two countries following the war. Attempts were made to renegotiate the agreement 
al the time of the Truman-Attlee-Klng conference, when the Americans asserted that active 
collaboration could not be carried out through an executive agreement. Nonetheless they 
agreed, at least in principle, to the idea of equal partnership, in the form of "full and 
effective cooperation." Eventually In April 1!)4<;. when the British pressed for further 
fulfillments, Truman Informed them thai he Interpreted this phrase to Include only the 

field Of hasic scientific Information, and thereby finalized the U.S. decision to withdraw 
from any arrangement which WOUld have Involved lending practical assistance to endeavors 

such as building ami operating production plants. The primary rationale behind thi^ policy 
was that the agreement could aol be kept secret under the provisions of the U.N. ("barter 
and public control efforts which were about to begin, Afte. the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
was passed, compliance with the agreements, as the British Interpreted them, would have 
been legally forbidden. Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission, pp, i'7s 280, 177 I7:i 

-' Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 264 

"■Hewlett and Anderson. History of tin United States Atomic Energy Commission, 
p. 560. 

" Llebennan. The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 291. 


As to Baruch's role in the policymaking process, the negotiator's own 
view of the part he should play, as well as that of his advisors, would 
have a substantial influence on the shape of U.S. policy, and on the 
course of the negotiations. He resented the fact that the Acheson- 
Lilienthal report had been published, lest it be regarded as a statement 
of U.S. policy, thus placing him in the role of a mere "messenger boy." 
Only after consultations with the President and Byrnes was Baruch 
satisfied that his personal views on atomic energy control would be 
considered, although later accounts by Truman and Baruch differ re- 
garding their perceptions of the extent of Baruch's powers at that 
time. 27 

Although Baruch had asked Acheson's committee and its Board of 
Consultants to remain at his disposal during the negotiations, this ar- 
rangement did not materialize. Some meetings were held between 
Baruch's delegation and the two groups. These encounters provided 
the forum for expression of a variety of views on U.S. policy but not 
on a sustained basis. 

Abortive Efforts in the United Nations Toward Control 

On June 14, 1946, the end product of these meetings, and of discus- 
sions within the Administration, was enunciated by Baruch at the op- 
ening session of the UNAEC. The views of both the military services 
and the Congress had been considered, and some of the basic ingredi- 
ents of the Acheson-Lilienthal report had been retained ; other impor- . 
taut characteristics had originated with Baruch and his deputies. 


In Baruch's speech to the opening session of the UNAEC, he noted 
that his proposal was made as a basis for discussion, although it 
eventually came to be regarded as a rather firm statement of the 
U.S. position. Baruch proposed that an International Control Au- 
thority be established "to which should be entrusted all phases of the 
development and use of atomic energy." It would control or own all 
atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security, and 
would control, license, and inspect all others. Its functions would in- 
clude fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy, and conducting 
research and development in the field, in order to remain at the fore- 
front of potential new developments. Once the Authority was estab- 
lished, all bomb manufacturing would be halted and existing bombs 
destroyed, and the Authority would possess all the information as- 
sociated with atomic energy. This proposal marked the first time that 
diplomats had sought to establish a worldwide system of control and 
use of a scientific discovery. 

An important point which was included, and a major contribution 
of Baruch, concerned the issue of enforcement of the arrangement for 
international control. Because of the serious nature of atomic energy 
questions, Baruch expressed the view that any countries which pur- 
sued activities that ran counter to or usurped those of the Authority 
should be subject to punishments. Specific violations were listed, such 
as possession or manufacture of an atomic weapon. Moreover, in order 
to ensure that violators would be punished, Baruch proposed that the 

27 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 
pp. 557-560. 


veto power in the Security Council would not apply on questions con- 
cerning the fulfillment of sanctions. 28 

In the course of the negotiations, the U.S. delegation submitted 
three memoranda which elaborated on the U.S. position. 29 These 
documents and the speeches of Baruch set forth the details of the U.S. 
position on the various issues covered in the discussion below. 


The Soviet proposal was presented at the second meeting of the 
UNAEC on June 19, 1946, by Andrei Gromyko, Deputy Foreign 
Minister and the Soviet Representative on the U.N. Security Council. 
Demanding that atomic energy should be used only for peaceful 
purposes, he proposed that a first step should be a convention outlaw- 
ing the production and use of atomic weapons. Following such an 
agreement, he continued, there should be established "a system of su- 
pervision and control to see that the conventions and agreements are 
observed, and measures concerning sanctions against unlawful use of 
atomic energy." 30 

At this time, Gromyko introduced two resolutions to implement the 
Soviet principles of international control. The first called for an agree- 
ment to ban the use and production of atomic bombs and to destroy 
existing weapons within three months of the conclusion of the agree- 
ment. This resolution also provided that the parties to the proposed 
agreement would pass legislation to punish violators of the agreement. 
The second resolution proposed that two committees be established : one 
to make recommendations on the exchange of scientific information, 
and another to examine methods of insuring compliance with the 
prohibitions of the agreement, including sanctions. The only direct 
response by Gromyko to the U.S. proposal was the expression of 
Soviet opposition to elimination of the veto: 

Efforts made to undermine the activity of the Security 
Council, including efforts directed to undermine the require- 
ments of unanimity of the members of the Security Council, 
upon questions of substance, are incompatible with the in- 
terests of the United Nations * * * . Such attempts should be 
resisted. 31 

The veto question was to remain at issue throughout the negotiations. 
One source has described the Soviet proposals as inchoate: 

Gromyko's proposals of June 19 have, frequently been de- 
scribed in the Western press and by the Soviet representatives 
t hemselves as the "Soviet plan": but they really constituted no 
plan at all. Not, if by a plan, one comprehends a systematic 

28 For a complete text of Banich's speech, see "Proposals for an International Atomic 
Development Authority." Department of State Bulletin, v. 14, no. 364 (June 23, 1946), 
pp. 1057-1062, or State Department, Growth of a Policj/, pp. 138-147. 

»The three memoranda were entitled U.S. Memorandum No. 1. Submitted to Sub- 
committee No. 1 <>t the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, New V>rk. July -'. 
1946; D.S. Memorandum No. 'J Dealing with the Functions and Powers of the Proposed 
Atomic Development Authority. Submitted to Subcommittee No. 1 of the United Nations 
Atomic- Energy Commission, New York, July r>, 1046; and D.S. Memorandum No. 3, Deal 
Ing With the Relations Between the Atomic Development Authority and the Organs of the 
United Nations, Submitted to Subcommittee No. 1 of the United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission, New York, July 12, 1946. _, 

30 Joseph I,. Nogee, Soviet Policy Toward International control of Atomic Energy. 
t N.>tre l lame. Ind. : I'niversit v of Notre Dame Press, l!'t;i |, p. 36. 

m Ibid., p. 37. 


and comprehensive procedure for action. Gromyko's "plan" 
was, in fact, the enunciation of three or four basic principles 
which guided Soviet policy ( promotion of peaceful develop- 
ment of atomic energy, prohibition of atomic weapons, agree- 
ment on international control, and the retention of full sov- 
ereign freedom of action) plus proposals for the further 
organization of the Atomic Energy Commission to deal with 
the problems of control and the exchange of scientific informa- 
tion. On the exact form of international control, Soviet state- 
ments were deliberately vague. 



Early in the negotiations, the structure of the UNAEC was orga- 
nized to include four committees : a Scientific and Technical Commit- 
tee, a Legal Advisory Committee, Committee Two to examine all the 
questions associated with a control plan, and Committee One to coordi- 
nate the work of the other three committees. In July 1946, at the second 
session of Committee Two, Soviet representative Gromyko delivered 
a major speech condemning the U.S. proposals, and declaring that 

as they are presented now [the proposals] could not be ac- 
cepted by the U.S.S.R., either as a whole or in their separate 
parts. 33 

When further efforts to negotiate seemed fruitless, it was decided to 
postpone the deliberations of Committee Two until a report from the 
Scientific and Technical Committee had been submitted. 

The report of the latter Committee, similar in purpose to that of the 
Acheson-Lilienthal groups, was given to Committee Two on October 2, 
1946. Committee Two had passed a resolution suggesting that the Sci- 
entific and Technical Committee "present a report on the question 
whether effective control is possible, together with an indication of 
the methods by which * * * effective control can be achieved." 34 The 
Scientific and Technical Committee had decided to confine its con- 
siderations to the requirements of a control system as dictated solely 
by the technical characteristics of atomic energy development, and 
disclaimed any responsibility for taking political feasibility into ac- 
count. Obviously, the major portion of the information on atomic 
energy was supplied by the United States, primarily through the 
Smyth report and the Acheson-Lilienthal report. In light of this fact, 
the Soviet representative to the Committee interpreted the conclusions 
of the Committee as "hypothetical and conditional" because the Soviets 
considered the information "limited and incomplete." 35 Despite this 
statement, the members of the Scientific and Technical Committee 
concluded that "we do not find any basis in the available scientific 
facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically 
feasible." 3G 

33 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 

33 State Department. Growth of a Policy, r>. SI. 

34 As quoted in First Renort on the Scientific and Technical Aspects of Control. In United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to 
the Security Council, 31 December 1946," Official Records. Special Supplement. Report to 
the Security Council. (Lake Success, New York : 1946), p. 20. 

35 Ibid., n. 50. 

36 State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 86. 


In addition, the Committee reemphasized the scientific principle which 
had provided a basic element in the efforts to establish international 
control of atomic energy, when it stated : 

There is an intimate relation between the activities required 
for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production of 
atomic weapons; most of the stages which are needed for the 
former are also needed for the latter. 3 ' 

The report defined the various dangerous points in atomic energy 
development at which some form of safeguard should be applied, but 
made no recommendations for specific methods of safeguards. 

Committee Two continued its deliberations and prepared a report 
which set forth specific safeguards for various activities, but these 
were deemed only the basic elements of a plan and not a complete plan 
for control. 

The report on safeguards and that of the Scientific and Technical 
Committee were included in a report prepared by the full membership 
of the T T .X. Atomic Energy Commission, and submitted to the Security 
Council on December 31, 1946. The report had been approved by 10 
members of the Commission, with the remaining two, the Soviet Union 
and Poland, abstaining. Following this expression of majority ap- 
proval, Baruch and his. staff resigned on the grounds that the U.S. 
representative to the United Nations (at this time, Warren Austin) 
should serve as the U.S. spokesman in the Security Council. This first 
report of the UNAEC offered various findings and recommendations 
based largely on the proposals submitted by the United States. By 
March 1!> 17. when its debate on the provisions of the first report failed 
of agreement, the Security Council passed a resolution which referred 
the discussions back to the UNAEC and requested a second report 
from that body. The major sources of disagreement in the negotiations 
are discussed below. There was to be little narrowing of these differ- 
ences in the subsequent negotiations of the UNAEC. 

One source describes the "deadlock" at this time as "particularly 
ominous not because of specific Soviet objections to the majority plan, 
but because Soviet criticism was made a part of its ideological con- 
flict with the West." !s Some of the U.S. policymakers who had engi- 
neered the U.S. plan, including both scientists and politicians, became 
disillusioned with the negotiations, and even suggested that the United 
States withdraw from them. However, consultations with U.S. allies 
had discouraged such an idea, and the negotiations continued "'because 
world opinion would not let them stop." 39 

In September 11)47, the UNAEC submitted the second report to the 
Security ( louncil, elaborating on the specific recommendations for con- 
trol in the first report. Besides engaging in this exercise, the second 
round of the. UNAEC deliberations had considered a list of 12 amend- 
ments which the Soviet Union proposed be applied to the findings and 
recommendations of the first report. These amendments, which sought 
to alter some of the fundamental features of the majority plan, were 
not accepted by the Commission. Examples of the questionsot principle 

; [bid., p. 36. 

Is NoRee, Soviet Policy, p. 88. 

80 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 391. 


raised by the Soviet amendments on which no agreement had been 
reached are the question of what was required for strict international 
control of atomic energy, whether international control, including the 
prohibition of atomic weapons, was to be established by one treaty or 
several and in the latter case, the question of priorities, or the question 
of the right of the proposed Authority to conduct research in atomic 
weapons. As was the case with the first report of the UNAEC, the 
second report had been approved by 10 members of the Commission, 
but this time only Poland had abstained, while the Soviet Union had 
registered opposition. 

Because of more pressing matters on its agenda, like the Palestine 
question or the India-Pakistan question, the Security Council de- 
cided not to consider the second report of the UNAEC. Deliberations 
continued in the latter institution through the remainder of 1947 and 
the spring of 1948. These discussions prompted the UNAEC third re- 
port to conclude that an impasse had been reached, and to request that 
UNAEC negotiations be suspended. A resolution for Security Council 
approval of all the reports of the UNAEC was vetoed by the Soviet 
Union in the summer of 1948 ; in the fall, General Assembly consider- 
ation of the question of atomic energy control resulted in a 40-6— 1 ap- 
proval of the majority plan, but the value of this non-binding reso- 
lution lay in propaganda more than in support for successful collabora- 
tion. Further negotiations in the UNAEC, which were continued at the 
insistence of the General Assembly, rapidly deteriorated, and by No- 
vember 1949, the General Assembly agreed to suspend the work of the 

IV. Issues in the Interplay Between Diplomacy and Nuclear 


Identification of a number of basic issues prominent in the U.S. 
policymaking process and in the negotiations will help to clarify the 
way in which technological and diplomatic factors interacted during 
the formulation and negotiation of the Baruch proposals. These basic 
issues will be explored to show this interaction, and also how it affected 
the outcome of each issue. Each issue will be examined in this man- 
ner, first in the course of the U.S. policymaking process and then in 
the international negotiations. Special attention will be given to the 
U.S. proposals as finally presented, the Soviet reaction to them, and 
the outcome of the negotiations. 

Broadly, these issues all dealt with the interlocking concerns of 
national power, human safety, secrecy of atomic technology, privacy 
of the Soviet Union, and the potential utility of peaceful atomic en- 
ergy. Three broad issues emerged : ( 1 ) the form of control, that is, 
international ownership and management versus inspection ; 
('2) transitional stages for the establishment of international control, 
involving transfer of control of information and nuclear production 
facilities from the United States to the international authority; and 
( 3 ) the question of sanctions and the veto. 

Significance of Technological Factors for U.S. Policy 

Before these issues are discussed in detail, it might be helpful to 
note a number of general factors of technology and diplomacy which 
may have influenced U.S. policy and the outcome of the negotiations. 

Foremost among the technological considerations was the U.S. 
monopoly over atomic weapons. The very nature of scientific inquiry 
made it axiomatic that the U.S. monopoly was transitory. Acceptance 
of this factor was a major political motivation for U.S. efforts toward 
international control. Nevertheless, the question arose as to how the 
United States could prevent a premature end to its monopoly and 
thereby avoid endangering either its own security or world security 
while an international system of control was being established. U.S. 
policy on this question would influence the general political atmos- 
phere surrounding the effort to establish international control. 

Among the possible measures which the United States could use to 
protect itself and the world from proliferation of atomic weapons 
until an international system could be set up was stringent control 
of the dissemination of information which would contribute to devel- 
opment of military applications of atomic energy. This idea led to a 
persistent popular misconception regarding the "secret" of the atomic 

Many of the semantic difficulties dated from the first 
months of public knowledge of the wartime program. The 
"secret" of the atomic bomb was a case in point. After more 
than two years of efforts to explain this term accurately, use 
of it still induced an almost automatic emotional response. 



Polling questions which contained references to both "bomb 
secrets" and "international control"' invariably brought 
fewer approvals of the control principle, the automatic reac- 
tion being to "keep the secrets." 40 

At the time of the December 1945 conference which resulted in the 
Moscow Declaration, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and other members of Congress 
repeatedly sought and obtained assurances from the President that the 
United States would not release atomic energy information prior to 
the establishment of adequate safeguards. The protective attitude to- 
ward the U.S. "secrets" was heightened by the revelation in early 
1946 of evidence of espionage in Canada involving the transmission 
of atomic energy information to the Soviet Union. These events served 
not only to reinforce the public attitude toward nuclear secrecy sur- 
rounding the bomb, but also to engender a growing mistrust in the 
United States of the Soviet Union. 41 

In general, the attitude of the United States toward the secret of 
the bomb may have had several effects on its policy and on other coun- 
tries' conceptions of that policy. Mistrust of the Soviet Union, coupled 
with the idea that sole possession of the atomic weapon represented a 
"sacred trust" 42 in terms of U.S. responsibility for world security, 
may have acted as a motive to withhold as much information as pos- 
sible, for as long as possible, until the international control system was 
secure. But a marked reluctance on the part of the United States to 
part with information or facilities may have encouraged critics of 
the U.S. proposals, especially in the Soviet Union, to conclude that 
the United States did not intend to relinquish its monopoly and 
eventually would exercise "atomic diplomacy." 

The notion of devising methods to protect the secret of the bomb 
figured importantly in U.S. policy discussions on international control 
of atomic energy. However, considerations of this nature ran counter 
to a principle which might be deemed applicable to any field of scien- 
tific inquiry : that secrecy cannot long delay the independent acquisi- 
tion of scientific and technological information. This principle had 
special force in the case of atomic energy, in light of the inherent im- 
portance of this information to other nations, especially a great power 
like the Soviet Union. 

A related question which entered U.S. policy deliberations involved 
estimates of how long it would take the Soviet Union to develop its 
own atomic weapon without access to outside information. Such esti- 
mates would indicate how long the United States could expect to 
enjoy its preeminence in the field of atomic energy even if its efforts 
to maintain secrecy, before establishment of effective international 
control, should be entirely successful. Thus, the U.S. assessment of 
Soviet technological capabilities was a factor to be reckoned with in 
the U.S. diplomatic approach to the international negotiations. 

"U.S. Department of State, The International Control of Atomic Energy, Policy at the 
Crossroads, Publication 3161 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 

4 R,P ewlett and Anderson - History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 
I>. 5(11. The spv cas"8 also had an effW-r on Oip concessional deliberations oi domestic 
control of atomic energy and on the U.S. attitude toward international information ex- 
change, e.g., wartime agreements with the British. Ibid., p. 480. 

4 -This phrase was used by President Truman to describe the U.S. role in relation to its 
monopoly on atomic weapons. State Department, Growth of a Policy, p 117. 


Opinions varied within the Administration as to the length of time 
necessary for the Soviet Union to develop an atomic weapon. As early 
as 1D4T). the question was raised in Administration circles. During a 
meeting of Stimson's Interim Committee, a memorandum was cited 
which reflected the estimate by Bush and Conant that it would be 3 
to 4 years before the Soviets could develop an atomic weapon. General 
Groves' estimate is described as follows: ''Taking a very low view of 
Russian ability, he considered 20 years a much likelier figure." 43 
Conant called this figure "highly unsafe." 

The Acheson-Lilienthal report noted the speculative nature of esti- 
mates of this kind. In order to assess a technological situation accu- 
rately, the report contended, it was necessary to have a knowledge of 
the progress of foreign development. Such knowledge, of course, was 
not then forthcoming. But on balance, the report seemed to minimize 
the possibility of an imminent acquisition of atomic weapons by other 
countries. The Consultants touched on this question insofar as it re- 
lated to how much a rival effort would be accelerated by the release 
of U.S. information. Even with the release of purely theoretical in- 
formation, according to the Consultants, "a major program, surely 
lasting many years, is required for the actual production of atomic 
weapons." 44 It might be inferred from this statement that the Con- 
sultants' view of rival efforts, without access to theoretical informa- 
tion, could hardly have been an imminent cause for alarm to U.S. 

One high Administration view, even more explicit regarding esti- 
mates of Russia's ability to develop its own bomb, was conveyed to the 
U.S. negotiating team. Hancock kept a record of a meeting which he 
attended between Byrnes and Baruch, which states : 

Mr. Byrnes briefly reviewed his impression that the Rus- 
sians don't know much about atomic energy or its use in 
bombs. Dr. Conant got no facts regarding it while he was in 
Russia and the assumption is that they know nothing.' 

While it is difficult to appraise the extent to which these assessments 
of Soviet nuclear development influenced U.S. policy, one might infer 
from the course and outcome of the negotiations that these considera- 
tions had weight. Considering the fact that differing estimates were 
made regarding Soviet atomic capabilities, it is possible to note an 
example of one problem which can arise when diplomacy is depend- 
ent upon science and technology. Policymakers do not always receive" 
a technological assessment to which all members of the scientific com- 
munity agree. A wide divergence only complicates the diplomat's task. 
If. for example, there is no clear consensus that an imminent danger 
exists, the diplomat will probably tend to be guided by counsels of 
compromise rather than urgency. And perhaps he should be — but it 
must also be noted that the counsels of urgency could be right, ami that 
in the present instance it was the conservative estimates of General 
Groves which turned out to be the furthest from the true situation. 

An equally thorny political factor which would enter into the dis- 

11 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, p. 3. r >4. 

11 state Department, "Acheson Llllentbal Report," p. 51. 

** Lleberman, The Scorpion and tin- Tarantula, p. 274. Hancock may have been referring 
ti. Conant's trip t" Russia with Byrnes, for the meetings which resulted in the Moscow 
Declaration. Ibid., pp. iog-107. 


cussions was the secrecy shrouding Soviet activities. One source de- 
scribes this phenomenon as follows : 

Western ignorance about the real condition of Russia was 
deemed by the regime, quite logically from its point of view, 
as one of the greatest assets it had in its conduct of foreign 
relations. Access to the U.S.S.R. was never so difficult — i.e., 
virtually impossible — for a foreigner who was not a diplomat 
or Communist, travel throughout the country never so limited 
as between 1946 and 1954. Not even during the Great Purge 
of the 1930's were restrictions so all-encompassing. The fear 
which this restrictive behavior suggests cannot have been 
simply a concern over revelations about the police-state 
aspects of Soviet life. By 1947, only Communists, fellow 
travelers, and the most naive of Western liberals denied that 
aspect of Soviet reality. Much more dangerous was any revela- 
tion of Russian weakness, of the magnitude of the tasks of 
industrial reconstruction and rapid demobilization lying 
ahead of this still primitive society. A truer picture of Rus- 
sia's strength and weaknesses might induce some new and 

unwelcome thinking in the State Department and the 
Pentagon. 46 

Just as U.S. secrecy surrounding the bomb presented problems for its 
policy and the negotiations, the secretive nature of the Soviet Union 
would have a serious effect on the efforts to reach agreement on some 
of the fundamental elements of control. 

Soviet development of atomic energy had proceeded quite well until 
World War II. 47 In terms of the quality of research, the Soviet capa- 
bility at that point has been estimated to have been on a par with that 
of the United States, and the Soviets were catching up in the field of 
equipment. As the extent of Soviet involvement in World War II in- 
creased, however, they apparently found it necessary to abandon their 
efforts. All available manpower and resources were directed to meet 
the German attacks, rather than toward the "calculated gamble" of 
research for a nuclear weapon, at least until the setback for the Ger- 
mans at Stalingrad in 1943. Moreover, as one writer has asserted, "the 
Soviet military strategy of enormous masses of ground troops, backed 
by artillery and close air support was not conducive to a whole-hearted 
search for weapons useful to strategic aircraft." 4S 

Nuclear research in the Soviet Union was resumed in 1944, but a 
blackout was imposed on information at that time. It has been theorized 
that the first Soviet nuclear reactor was in operation by late 1947. This 
occurrence was considered a turning point in the Soviet efforts, a point 
which was reached less than two years after the opening of the nego- 
tiations for international control of atomic energy. It was only a 
matter of time before the Soviet research efforts succeeded, as evi- 
denced by the explosion of its first nuclear device in 1949. 

The contribution of Soviet espionage activities in the United States 
to progress in the field of atomic energy is hard to assess. One writer 

^Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals. America and Russia Since World War II. (New York: 
Viking Press. 1971). pp. 106-107. 

47 The following discussion is based on Kenneth Whiting. "Post-War Strategy," in Asher 
Lee, ed. The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces. (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 91-95. 

«Ibid., p. 92. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-7 


has attempted to put this question in perspective when he comments on 
this possibility as follows : 

We still do not know how much the relatively short gap 
between the first American and the first Russian explosion 
was due to successes in Soviet espionage, and how much it 
was due simply to native Russian capability. At the time it 
seemed to many of us that espionage must have been far and 
away the main reason they were able to accomplish the job so 
quickly, especially after the devastation that had been 
wreaked on them by World War II. Haying since seen some 
excellent Russian technological progress in other fields, we are 
no longer quite so sure that this was the case. We should note, 
furthermore, that it is always easier to do something a second 
time, even if the only thing known from the first time is that 
it can be done. 49 

All things considered, an awareness of the progress of Soviet nuclear 

technology may contribute to an understanding in retrospect of the 

Soviet perceptions and attitudes during the negotiations of the 


The Form and Purposes of International Control 

The first question which arose in connection with the atomic energy 
policy formulation in 1947 was whether the general form of control 
should depend primarily on a system of international ownership and 
management, or on a system which left atomic energy development in 
national hands and relied on inspection to assure compliance with an 
agreement not to develop atomic energy for military purposes. Few 
specifics regarding the substantive aspects of this control issue were 
offered in the early international political actions on the subject. The 
resolution which established the UNAEC simply called on the pro- 
posed Commission to make proposals for "effective safeguards" to in- 
sure compliance with the control arrangement. Although it mentioned 
inspection as one type of safeguard, it offered no commitment to a 
particular method. 


The Hoard of Consultants' 1 position against inspection: The con- 
cept of inspection was distasteful to the members <>!' the Hoard of Con- 
sultants. The Hoard saw it as inherent in the leading alternative to 
their own proposals: to leave atomic energy development in the hands 
of individual nations while prohibiting its development for military 
purposes would require inspection of national activities. Thus, inspec- 
tion would be the sole means of verification of the control system, an 
arrangement which t he ( lonsilltants opposed. 

The Hoard's position, as expressed in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, 
was not based solely on technological considerations; it included "the 
inseparable political, social, and organizational problems involved in 
enforcing agreements between nations, each free to develop atomic 
energy, but only pledged not to use it for bombs." " Nevertheless, the 
argument against inspection in the report originated with the techno- 

'"Herberl York, Race to oblivion: A Participant's liar of the Arm* Race. (New York: 

Si d & Schuster, 1971 >, pp. 34 35. 

60 State I)t'i>iirtinent, "Acheson-Lilienthal report", p. 4. 


logical premise that the processes associated with the development of 
atomic energy, whether for military or peaceful purposes, "are in 
much of their course interchangeable and interdependent." Because of 
this factor, it was considered necessary under a control arrangement to 
monitor each stage in the process of developing atomic energy, from 
raw materials to finished product, to insure that the materials were 
not diverted at some point in the process to weapons development by 
an individual nation. Such a comprehensive inspection system would 
take a great number of inspectors; moreover, the inspectors would be 
called upon to determine intent behind an operation associated with 
atomic energy development. The Consultants asserted that "at no 
single point can external control of an operation be sufficiently reliable 
to be an adequate sole safeguard." 51 

Another technological argument against inspection concerned the 
need for technical expertise in the staff which monitored atomic energy 
activities. To determine the existence of violations, staff members of 
an inspectorate would have to be highly trained in the field of atomic 
energy development. Moreover, the organization would have to be 
involved in research and development activities to keep abreast or 
ahead of advanced and changing developments, in a field which is "es- 
sentially a living art." Otherwise, would-be violators might try to 
exploit breakthroughs if they discovered them first. According to the 
Board of Consultants, an inspection system would "inevitably be slow 
to take into account changes in the science and technology of the 
field." 52 

The remainder of the remarks against inspection in the Acheson- 
Lilienthal report seem to be derived from the "political, social, and 
organizational problems" of a control system, rather than from the 
technological requirements. The Consultants asserted that an inspec- 
tion system having a generally policelike character, would be deemed 
negative and suppressive. This quality would have a number of ill 
effects on the control system and its personnel. First, it would be diffi- 
cult to attract highly qualified personnel in the field of atomic energy 
to an inspection team having this character, and the team itself would 
encounter problems in morale. Second, because inspection of facilities 
would require a large number of inspectors, the presence of many for- 
eigners in participating countries would intrude excessively into na- 
tional activities, challenge the good faith of the nations, and provide 
a likely source of tension and friction. On this particular point, the 
Consultants declared that this arrangement would be "as obnoxious to 
Americans as to any others." 53 Finally, the Consultants contended, un- 
der a system which entrusted atomic energy development to individual 
nations, "suspicion by one nation of the good faith of another and the 
fear engendered thereby are themselves strong incentives for the first 
to embark on secret illicit operations [and] any system based on out- 
lawing the purely military development of atomic energy and relying 
solely on inspection for enforcement would at the outset be surrounded 
by conditions which would destroy the system." 54 Indeed, a basic 
source of the problem associated with inspection, according to the 

51 Ibid., p. 6. 

52 Ibid. 

53 Ibid., p. 7. 

54 Ibid., p. 8. 


Board, was the national rivalries which would result as countries en- 
gaged in atomic energy development : 

National rivalries in the development of atomic energy 
readily convertible to destructive purposes are the heart of 
the difficulty. So long as intrinsically dangerous activities may 
be carried on by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are 
engendered that place so great a pressure upon a system of 
international enforcement by police methods that no degree 
of ingenuity or technical competence could possibly hope to 
cope with them. 55 

International oionership and operation of dangerous activities: 
Awareness of the political problems caused by inescapable national 
rivalries provided the main basis for the Consultants' proposals. The 
Consultants sought to eliminate these rivalries by internationalizing 
certain activities which might become a source of competition among 
nations. As was the case with the Consultants' views of inspection, they 
looked to both technological and political considerations to support 
their ideas for assigning certain activities to an international 

The practicability of such an international Authority, in their view, 
would be derived from certain technological characteristics of atomic 
energy development. An inherent technological difficulty of an inspec- 
tion system was how to determine the intent behind an activity in 
atomic energy development, that is. whether it was designed for peace- 
ful or military purposes. 

The Consultants asserted that specific categories of activity could be 
identified which, if undertaken by an individual nation, clearly would 
constitute a violation of the control system: such activities should be 
assigned to an international Authority. This arrangment would elim- 
inate the need to determine intent behind a national activity in the 
atomic energy field. This concept was developed to the extent that the 
Board named in broad terms certain '"safe" and "dangerous" activi- 
ties. They warned, however, that these categories would have to be 
subject to constant reevaluation and revision in light of potential ad- 
vances in atomic energy. 

One example of how internationalization would function concerned 
the raw materials needed for atomic weapons; namely, ores of uranium 
and possibly thorium. 5 " The existing technical knowledge at that time 
supported the conclusion that these materials were the only source of 
nuclear fuel materials 57 which could energize nuclear reactors for use 
either to produce fissionable materials for nuclear explosives, or to 
generate electricity. The practical problems posed by attempting to 

monitor the use of these raw materials were considered "most difficult." 
Hut management of actual mining operations by an international 
Authority would provide assurance that it could account for all sources 

ra Ihid ]> 5 

w The role of thorium in atomic energy illustrates the difficulty Imposed by secrecy. The 
fact was still "classified" In 1946. that the addition of slow neutrons to thorium converted 
it Into U 238 , which was fissionable. Nevertheless the Acheson-Lillenthal report proposed 
thai its presence In a nuclear reactor Bhould be prohibited withoul Baying why. 

Uranium ores could provide the raw material for production of the fissionable isotope 
uranium-235, and also for the manufacture of plutonlum by the exposure of uranium-238 
to neutrons within a nuclear reactor. Uranium 235 and plutonlum could be used for nuclear 


of raw materials. Moreover, if possession of raw materials should be- 
come the exclusive prerogative of the international Authority, any at- 
tempt on the part of an individual nation to exercise control over raw 
materials would represent a clear violation. Mere possession, irrespec- 
tive of use or intent, would be illegal. An added advantage owing to 
technological factors was that this particular violation would occur 
early enough in the development process to allow other nations to take 
appropriate action to prevent national production of atomic weapons. 
Another advantage created by technological circumstances was that 
uranium and thorium occurred under special geological conditions 
which reduced the task of controlling the raw materials to "manage- 
able proportions," a characteristic of a control system which the Con- 
sultants considered essential to effective safeguards. Moreover, the 
Consultants concluded that enough knowledge had been acquired to 
indicate that this principle regarding raw materials (as well as others) 
was not likely to be altered significantly by further scientific 
discoveries. 58 

A similar case could be made for the plutonium-producing atomic 
reactor, a design which produces material usable for either atomic 
weapons or power. By granting responsibility for building and operat- 
ing such reactors solely to an international Authority, an attempt by a 
country to usurp this activity would represent an unambiguous viola- 
tion. Determination of intent for the use of the product of the re- 
actors would not be necessary. 

Aside from the technological concepts which were considered to 
justify international operation of a number of specified activities, the 
report commented on another quality of such an approach which would 
make it advantageous to a secure system of safeguards. The activities 
which the Consultants contemplated turning over to an international 
Authority were also considered those most likely to foster rivalry 
among nations. Removing these from national hands would greatly 
reduce, if not eliminate competition among nations in atomic energy 
development, thereby enhancing the security of nations under the con- 
trol system. 

Another advantage of internationalization was illustrated by the 
proposal to give the Authority the function of development and re- 
search in the field of atomic energy. This function would be aided by 
the fact that the Authority would conduct the principal processes of 
atomic energy development. Both practical and political concepts 
played a role in establishing the report's position on this point. In the 
opinion of the Board, the control organization would have to stay in 
the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy to maintain 
awareness of discoveries which could have a potential for violation of 
a control agreement. Thus a research and development function for 
the international agency would enhance the efficiency of the control or- 
ganization in detecting violations. An additional reason for assigning 
this function to the international Authority was based partly on the 
technological prospect that in the foreseeable future, atomic energy 
could be used substantially in a beneficial way. This function, it was 
suggested, would attract and hold the skilled, imaginative staff so 
vital to the successful operation of a control authority. But the prin- 

58 Indeed, one section of the report, "The Adequacy of Present Scientific Knowledge." is 
devoted to explaining that there were basic scientific principles which could be expected 
to remain unchanged, and would therefore provide a reasonably sound basis for devising 
a control system. 


ciples to support this idea are expressed in terms which hardly could 
be considered scientific or technological : 

While suppression is not possible where we are dealing 
with the quest for knowledge, this thirst to know (that can- 
not be ''policed" out of existence) can be used, affirmatively, 
in the design and building of an effective system of safe- 

Human history shows that any effort to confine the inquir- 
ing human mind * * * is doomed to failure. * * * Like the 
jiu jitsu wrestler whose skill consists in making his opponent 
disable himself with his own thrusts, the designers of a sys- 
tem of safeguards for security should and can utilize for en- 
forcement measures that driving force toward knowledge 
that is part of man's very nature. 59 

Retention of "safe" national activities : The Consultants recognized 
that a complete monopoly of atomic energy activities by an inter- 
national Authority would not be acceptable politically or economically. 
Therefore, based on the existing technical knowledge, certain types 
of activities were classified as "safe" and Mould be allowed to remain 
in national hands. The judgment that such activities could be retained 
safely on a national level relied primarily on a technological assump- 
tion that "denaturing" of atomic fuel was possible. The Consultants 
asserted that fissionable materials could be contaminated in such a 
way that they would "not readily lend themselves to the making of 
atomic explosives, but they can still be used with no essential loss of 
effectiveness for the peaceful applications of atomic energy." 60 Re- 
versal of the denaturing process, to make the materials suitable for 
weapons production, was thought to involve a difficult and easily de- 
tectable effort. 

Using denatured materials, the Consultants declared, nations could 
puisne a number of legitimate activities, such as the operation of re- 
search reactors (kept below a certain power level), construction and 
operation of reactors to produce radioactive materials, and construc- 
tion and operation of reactors to generate electric power. For these 
activities to be entrusted to national hands, designs would have to be 
devised for reactors which could not be diverted to dangerous use. The 
denatured materials and operation of these activities would have to 
be licensed or controlled in some way by the international Authority. 
In discussing the Authority's licensing functions under which national 
activities would operate, the Consultants raised the following 
questions : 

How shall control be exercised lightly enough to assure the 
free play of national and private enterprise without risk to 
security? I low shall facilities and materials available for 
national and private exploitation 1m> allocated and at what 
cosl '. How may safe activities, assigned to national hands, be 
withdrawn if new discoveries show them to be dangerous? 61 

The entire discussion of national activities in the Acheson-Lilienthal 
report would seem to imply that the Consultants envisioned and sup- 
ported rather active national programs in atomic energy development. 
These activities would be of a sufficient scale and variety to encourage 

m Ibid., p. 15. 

00 Ibid . p. 2\\. 
81 Ibid., p. 35. 


development and competition among nations and private industry. 
Moreover, active national participation in atomic energy development, 
they hoped, would "help correct any tendencies that might otherwise 
develop toward bureaucratic inbreeding and over-centralization, and 
aid in providing healthy, expanding national and private develop- 
ments in atomic energy." 62 

Although the Board contended that the technological factors associ- 
ated with denatured materials lent credence to their expectations for 
national activities, they warned that : 

Although as the art now stands denatured materials are 
unsuitable for bomb manufacture, developments which do 
not appear to be in principle impossible might alter the 
situation.'"' 3 

During Administration deliberations before the opening of the 
UNAEC, Baruch said denaturing had inspired false hopes, and in his 
initial address to the UNAEC he stated that "Denaturing seems 
to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure.'' G4 
Both the first and second reports of the UNAEC granted the 
possibility of permitting national activity using denaturing mate- 
rials only if the denaturing process proved technologically feasible. 
This skepticism of the reliability of denaturing, as well as Soviet op- 
position to proposals for international ownership and inspection, ap- 
pear to have been responsible for the fact that the proposed reliance 
on denaturing did not become a major issue in the negotiations. In 
retrospect, the U.S. position on denaturing appears to have been 
based upon a technology forecast — the assumption of a principle which 
today, 25 years later, has remained undemonstrated in practice. This 
fact points up one occasion when forecasts by scientific advisors would 
not have met the needs of the diplomats. 

Inspection jrrovisions in the report : Despite the number of nega- 
tive aspects of inspection, the Board members pointed out that the 
need for it could not be eliminated entirely. However, the overall plan 
they recommended was aimed at making inspection "so limited and 
so simplified that it would be practical and could aid in accomplishing 
the purposes of security." 65 The requirements for inspection are dis- 
cussed in detail among the functions of the proposed international 

The discussion of the issue tended to emphasize that inspection could 
be beneficial. Because inspectors would also be engaged in research 
on atomic energy , GC their "policing" of national facilities (for example, 
those using denatured materials) would offer opportunities to provide 
helpful guidance and advice to the operators of those facilities, mak- 
ing inspection less objectionable. The only "systematic or large-scale 
inspection activities" contemplated for the proposed Authority were 
those which would be used to take control over raw materials. 67 In 
addition, the report recognized that some procedure would have to be 
devised for the investigation of suspected clandestine dangerous activ- 

82 Ibid., p. 22. 

83 Ibid., p. 23. 

64 Baruch, "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority," p. 1061. 

65 State Department, "Acheson-Lilienthal report," p. 5. 

98 The inspectors of tlie International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today do not reflect 
this concept of the scientist-inspector. Rather, present-day inspectors are precisely that, 
professional men in the complicated and uncertain art of nuclear materials. 

87 Contemporary inspection is focused more on processing, fabrication, use. and reproc- 
essing of nuclear fuel materials than upon mining and refining. 


ities, which might involve the International Court of Justice or some 
similar body, to determine if enough evidence of clandestine activity 
existed to warrant investigation. 68 

The report stressed that operation of dangerous activities by the 
proposed international Authority could eliminate the need for deter- 
mination of intent behind national or private facilities, and would 
thereby avoid the need for extensive and intrusive inspection. In addi- 
tion, the following statement regarding some of the technical diffi- 
culties of engaging in clandestine activities seemed to minimize not 
only the need for inspection but also, perhaps, the possibility that 
evasions might be attempted : 

It is true that a thoroughgoing inspection of all phases of 
the industry of a nation will in general be an unbearable 
burden; it is true that a calculated attempt at evasion may, 
by camouflage or by geographical location, make the specific 
detection of an illegal operation very much more difficult. 
Hut the total effort needed to carry through from the mine to 
the bomb, a surreptitious program of atomic armament on a 
scale sufficient to make it a threat or to make it a temptation 
to evasion, is so vast, and the number of separate difficult 
undertakings so hard to conceal, that the fact of this effort 
should be impossible to hide. The fact that it is the existence 
of the effort rather than a specific purpose or motive or plan 
which constitutes an evasion and an unmistakable danger sig- 
nal is to our minds one of the great advantages of the pro- 
posals we have outlined. 60 



When the Board originally presented its plan to Achesoirs commit- 
tee, both Conant and Groves voiced apprehension that the need for 
inspection had been minimized too much and that the terms which 
the Consultants used to characterize it were too negative. Conant con- 
sidered it vital that there be freedom of access for inspectors. At one 
point McCloy raised the possibility that this plan might be one way 
"'to alter Russia's closed society.'' 70 But Acheson discouraged the idea 
on the grounds that the basic political issues associated with the diffi- 
culties in United States-Soviet relations could not be resolved through 
the efforts to deal with the problem of international control of atomic 
energy. Although Lilienthal agreed readily to make changes appropri- 
ate to the views of Conant and Groves, the report's general tone on the 
issue of inspection remained negat ive. 

Despite the fact that the Board had retained the idea of some na- 
tional activity, significant forces at work in the policymaking proc- 
ess opposed extensive internationalization, for technical and other 

98 For a discussion of Inspection, sop State Department, "Acheson-Lillenthal Report", 
pp. 35 39. 

•"Ibid., pp. 36 ':t The Board seems t<> have given little thought to the possible emer 
gence <>f an international black market in fissionable materials, an issue that is attracting 
considerable attention todaj as the United states and other governments push ahead with 

die development "i i>r ler reader technology, which can greatly increase the amount "i 

fissionable material available for direct use in weapons manufacture, Today it' a nation or 
other institutions can obtain nuclear materials en q black market, it is probable that such 
an instrumentality could fabricate small, inefficient, but still enormously destructive 

at Iininhs. 

7 " Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United Stairs Atomic Energy Commxxsion, 
p. 548. 


reasons. The issue of ownership of raw materials is an apt example. 
Searls, the mining engineer on Baruch's delegation, did not share the 
Consultants' view regarding the manageability of all the sources of 
raw materials, and advised Baruch that the arrangement proposed in 
the Acheson-Lilienthal report would be difficult. His views were sec- 
onded by representatives of mining interests who sought out Baruch 
to argue against international ownership. One mining executive told 
Baruch "an international administration would upset wages, dissat- 
isfy people, and, on account of the different nationals involved, present 
tremendous management difficulties." 71 

Another argument against international ownership was that it vio- 
lated the rights of private enterprise. Hancock, of Baruch's group, 
contended that if uranium was the byproduct of mining operations 
which contributed significantly to a country's economy, international 
ownership would be unacceptable to that country. At one meeting, 
when Hancock expressed his preference for more inspection over own- 
ership, Acheson pointed out that the Russians would not accept this 
arrangement as the predominant safeguard. Hancock disagreed, and 
the two men did not resolve the issue. 72 An alternative plan called for 
operation of nationally owned mines under "reasonable regulations" 
of the Authority or "a system of rigorous inspection and accounting 
procedures for the separation operations at mining locations through- 
out the world." Baruch's team was willing to support this position 
against international ownership. 73 When Baruch met with the Ache- 
son and Lilienthal groups, he announced the delegation's preference 
for "some form of licensing of private mining operations" and sug- 
gested using the term "dominion" to describe the relationship between 
the international Authority and raw materials. 74 Apparently, the tech- 
nological assertions which were advanced to support the Consultants' 
proposals for ownership of raw materials were insufficient for the 
United States to overcome traditional political and economic concepts 
of sovereignty and private ownership. The varying assertions by the 
qualified experts on the manageability of raw materials compounded 
the confusion surrounding the problem of atomic energy control. In 
retrospect, a more important factor was the discovery of uranium 
in the years following the negotiations in places where it was not 
anticipated in 1946. 


As enunciated at the negotiations, the main thrust of U.S. policy on 
the general form of control shifted somewhat from the plan proposed 
in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. In describing the international Au- 
thority, Baruch's speech to the UNAEC offered a variety of specific 
methods of control over various phases of atomic energy development. 
Among the safeguards he proposed were "various forms of ownership, 
dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research, and manage- 
ment." 70 While Baruch stated that these duties should interfere as 
little as possible with the internal affairs of the states involved, every 
phase of atomic energy development would be placed under the juris- 

71 Ibid., p. 563. 

72 Ibid., p. 569. 

73 Lieberman. The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 276. 

74 Ibid., p. 281. 

75 Baruch, "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority," p. 1060. 


diction of the international Authority, in one way or another. One 
point on which the United States yielded to private and national in- 
terests concerned raw materials, which were proposed to be placed 
under the international Authority's "dominion" 1 ; specific forms of 
control over the natural deposits would depend on the geological, min- 
ing, refining, and economic circumstances of the various locations 
where they were found. While the second U.S. memorandum stated 
that the Authority should have such control as would insure "its com- 
plete and absolute ownership of all uranium and thorium produced,'' 
the proposal involved a control system imposed upon national mining 
and concentrating operations, rather than simply transferring these 
activities to the international Authority, as the Acheson-Lihenthal 
report had proposed. 

It will be recalled that the Acheson-Lilienthal report displayed some 
enthusiasm for allowing national and private participation in certain 
areas of atomic energy development. But when Baruch presented the 
U.S. proposals to the UNAEC, the main concern over national ac- 
tivities was that they Avould be subject to licensing and inspection by 
the Authority. As noted above, he questioned the effectiveness of de- 
naturing to prevent illegal diversion of activities in national hands. 
Moreover, Baruch stated that national activities should be subordinate 
to the international Authority and added that this represented "neither 
an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national author- 

In the brief discussion of inspection in Baruch's speech, he men- 
tioned the advantages of the overall plan, which stressed international 
ownership, thus providing unambiguous evidence of violations and 
limiting inspection requirements. He also noted that those activities 
licensed by the Authority would be subject to inspection. II is third 
point, however, which was to become a focus for Soviet opposition 
dining the negotiations, was an insistence on freedom of access. He 
said : Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of 
the Authority must be assured." 7 " Less attention was given to the idea 
of linking the developmental function with inspection, as the Acheson- 
Lilienthal report had done. 77 


Soviet reaction to jrroposed interTiationalizaiion: Typical of the 
Soviet I'nion's reaction to the notion of international ownership was 
Gromyko's comment on the IXAEC's first report; he labelled the 
whole concept "thoroughly vicious and unacceptable," and added that 
international ownership and managerial control "would lend to inter- 
ference by the control organ in the internal affairs and internal life 
of States and eventually would lead to arbitrary action by the control 
organ in the solution of such problems as fall completely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a State." 78 

Soviet reaction to the requirements for inspection set forth by 
Baruch was unequivocal, as indicated by a press release which dis- 

•" Ibid., i>. 1001. 

"The first U.S. memorandum touched on the issue of inspection In a manner similar to 
that of Baruch's speech. The second memorandum expanded on the Idea by elaborating the 
d( tail- of Inspection, I.e.. adequate provision would have to be made for inspectors in terms 

Of communication and transportation, as well as unhindered access to the facilities In 


7 "Stat>- Department, Polioi/ at the Crossroads, p. 80. 


cussed a speech by Gromyko to a committee of the UNAEC in July 


Mr. Gromyko said that the proposed inspection is not re- 
concilable with the principle of sovereignty of states. "No in- 
spection as such can guarantee peace and security." And. he 
added, ''This idea of inspection is greatly exaggerated in im- 
portance. Tt is a too superficial understanding of the problem 
of control." The Soviet Delegate repeated that inspection has 
assumed undue importance in the course of the discussions 
and said that the only real underlying method of control is 
"by the cooperation of the United Nations." 79 

The origin for this opposition appears to have been in the precepts 
associated with the political principle of national sovereignty. One 
U.S. response to this argument was made by Baruch in a speech be- 
fore Freedom House in October 1946 : 

Every treaty involves some diminution of absolute national 
sovereignty, but nations enter into such treaties of their own 
free will and to their common advantage. Indeed, freedom to 
enter into such voluntary international arrangements is in- 
herent in the very concept of national sovereignty. 80 

Action by the UNAEC: The first report of the UNAEC declared in 
its "Findings" that : 

Ownership by the international control agency of mines 
and of ores still in the ground is not to be regarded as man- 
datory. 81 

Broad terms of reference were applied to dangerous activities, a cate- 
gory which seemed to include all aspects of the production of fission- 
able materials: 

* * * Effective control of atomic energy depends upon 
effective control of the production and use of uranium, 
thorium, and their fissionable derivatives. Appropriate mech- 
anisms of control to prevent their unauthorized diversion or 
clandestine production and use and to reduce the dangers of 
seizure — including one or more of the following types of safe- 
guards: accounting, inspection, supervision, management, 
and licensing — must be applied through the various stages of 
the processes from the time the uranium and thorium ores are 
severed from the ground to the time they become nuclear fuel 
and are used. 82 

Looking back from the early 1970s, when most contemporary chal- 
lenges to nuclear power focus on safety and environmental effects, it 
is interesting to note that these matters received scant attention by the 
United Nations in the 1940s. 

The second report of the UNAEC elaborated on the general concept 
of ownership by the Agency and how it applied to source material and 
the operation of dangerous facilities, and thereby addressed itself to 
political problems inherent in such an arrangement. The report's dis- 

79 State Department, Groirth of a Policy, p. 83. 

80 Ibid., p. 91. He might, however, have added that the ripht of withdrawal is also in 
herent in national sovereignty. 

81 United Nations Atomic ' Energy Commission, "First Report of the Atomic Energy 
Commission to the Security Council, 31 December 1946," p. 16. 

8 - Ibid. 


cussion was premised on the assertion that it was not possible to main- 
tain security by allowing nations or individuals to have proprietary 
rights over source materials, nuclear fuels, or dangerous facilities. It 
recognized the need to protect certain rights of individual nations 
and to guard against any abuse of power by the international Agency. 
Ownership by the Agency would be "in the sense of a trust exercised 
on behalf of signatory States jointly." While broad powers over the 
materials and facilities would be granted to the Agency as owner, 
many of these, especially those dealing with ''rights of disposition." 
would be '"very closely controlled by the terms of the treaty or conven- 
tion." Certain arrangements, for example, the location of facilities 
within a country or compensation for source materials, would have to 
be determined through agreement with individual nations. Other ac- 
tivities would be executed by the Agency in accordance with the prin- 
ciples established by treaty for governing the Agency's rights and 
duties as "trustee." 

Similarly, the report proposed that the treaty or convention deter- 
mine principles respecting the geographic distribution of production 
facilities and stockpiles of materials suitable for weapons use ; these 
principles would be such that no particular location would have a 
greater share of materials, and thus would avoid the potential for a 
military capability or military superiority. It was decided that the 
Agency could not be allowed to determine policy on this subject as 
decisions in this area affected world security. 83 Thus, the UNAEC en- 
visioned that decisions on political considerations arising from the 
rights, duties, and limitations of international ownership would be 
agreed to before assumption by the Authority of the powers entrusted 
to it. 

In additional sections of the second UNAEC report, these and other 
concepts were developed in considerable detail ; specific proposals dealt 
with the mining of raw materials and with dangerous activities. Dis- 
cussion of "dangerous activities'' offered proposals on the refining of 
raw materials; the stockpiling, production, and distribution of nuclear 
fuels; and the design, construction, and operation of isotope separa- 
tion plants and of nuclear reactors. 

These later sections of the report contained several observations with 
regard to arrangements with individual nations which the Authority 
would have to make, some of which might have to be included in the 
treaty or convention establishing the Authority. The need for such 
arrangements was recognized, as certain activities of the Authority 
might a licet the economy of a nation or might otherwise warrant com 
pensation by the Authority. The report also listed the various forms of 
inspection and licensing activities and where they would be required. 
Although these proposals in the second UNAEC report were based 
primarily on technological considerations, they also involved political 
factors, as reflected in the prescription that : 

Production facilities, facilities utilizing nuclear fuel, and 
stockpiles be distributed in such a way as to minimize the 
possibility that seizure could provide an aggressor with a 
militarv advantage. 84 

*> United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "The International Control of Atomic 
Energy. The Second Report • • ♦ to the Security Council.- Sept. 11. 1047. Reproduced for 
the United Nations Mission to the United Nations. U.N. Document S/557, Mimeo L>e« 
York United Nations, 1047), pp. 13 17. 

"Ibid., p. 3 


Despite the kind of attention to detail which might have been expected 
to ease Soviet fears, the Soviets continued to express adamant opposi- 
tion to some of the fundamental features of the plan. This attitude 
may have lessened the value of the efforts by the UNAEC to formulate 
the finer points of the control system. 

The third report of the UNAEC may have been commenting on the 
need for the acceptance of the general concept of international owner- 
ship, when it stated : 

Only if traditional economic and political practices are 
adapted to the overriding requirements of international se- 
curity, can these proposals be implemented. Traditional con- 
cepts of f he economic exploitation of the resources of nature 
for priv • e or national advantage would then be replaced in 
this fielu by a new pattern of co-operation in international 
relations. 85 

With regard to inspection, the first report of the UNAEC had stated 
that "only'' through an "international system of control and inspec- 
tion" can atomic energy be "freed from nationalistic rivalries." 86 It 
called for "a strong and comprehensive system of control and inspec- 
tion." On the "freedom of access" issue, the UNAEC seemed to put its 
recommendations in even more specific terms than Baruch, when the 
report stated that the treaty or convention establishing the interna- 
tioral Authority should contain provisions — 

* * * Affording the duly accredited representatives of the 
utornational control agency unimpeded rights of ingress, 
3gi ss, and access for the performance of their inspections 
and other duties into, from, and within the territory of every 
participating nation, unhindered by national or local 
authorities. 87 

Committee Two's report, appended to the first UNAEC report, had 
referred to the need for inspection quite frequently in regard to a num- 
ber of activities. The group defined inspection as follows : 

2. Inspection means close and careful independent scrutiny 
of operations to detect possible evasions or violations of pre- 
scribed methods of operation. In addition to direct auditing 
measures as described above, inspection may include observa- 
tion of points of ingress to and egress from an establishment 
or installation to ensure that materials and supplies are flow- 
ing in the prescribed manner, observation of the activities 
within the establishment or installation, and measures in the 
form of aerial or ground survey and otherwise to guard 
against clandestine activities. To be fully effective, the power 
of inspection may require that the operations be carried on in 
a specified manner in order to facilitate the inspection. In this 
event, inspection verges on supervision. 88 

The need for inspection was discussed in Committee Two's report, 
and during the negotiations, insofar as it related to examination of 
"declared" activities, i.e., those facilities operated by the proposed 

83 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Official Records. Third year. Special 
Supplement. "Third Report to the Security Council. May 17. 194S." (Lake Success, New 
York : August 1948) p. 4. (AEC/31/Rev. 1. June 27, 1948.) 

86 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "First Report of the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission to the Security Council, 31 December 1946," p 16. 

87 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 

88 Ibid., p. 44. 


Authority or by national or private management licensed bv the Au- 
thority. Suspected clandestine activities seemed to present" the most 
difficulties in the findings and recommendations of the UNAEC and 
in the negotiations themselves. Committee Two's report seemed to rec- 
ognize that inspection for clandestine activities represented one of 
the more troublesome political problems to be dealt with in the ne- 
gotiations. Moreover, it reflected a recognition of how certain inherent 
technological demands of atomic energy control were in conflict with 
traditional political requirements of states: 

Like all problems in atomic energy, the detection of clan- 
destine operations is greatly simplified by the technical facts 
of the field. Nevertheless, general and political considerations 
play a larger part in the effectiveness and acceptability of any 
system for the detection of clandestine operations than in most 
other parts of the problem. They will need most careful con- 
sideration when the functions, powers, and organization of 
the agency are defined. It will be here that the conflicts be- 
tween the requirements of the international control agency on 
the one hand and considerations of national sovereignty and 
present practice on the other will have to be resolved. 89 

The second report of the UNAEC attempted to deal with the politi- 
cal problems associated with inspection in a section entitled "Rights 
of and Limitations on the International Agency in Relation to In- 
spections, Surveys, and Explorations." It offered 21 specific proposals 
on such subjects as procedural details of inspections, ground or aerial 
surveys, and the like. Six of these were devoted to proposals dealing 
with investigation of clandestine activities. 90 Many of these procedural 
proposals were made with the understanding that they should be in- 
corporated in the treaty or convention establishing the Authority. The 
following concluding statement may serve as a general comment on 
the character of the inspection envisioned by the UNAEC in its sec- 
ond report: 

In summary, the proposals contained in this chapter pro- 
vide very extensive powers of inspection and search which 
enable the agency to visit any accessible place and provide 
appropriate procedures applicable in certain specified circum- 
stances. It has to be recognized that, in addition to these pro- 
posed procedural requirements and limitations, the good sense. 
as well as the budget, of the agency will themselves be limita- 
tions on the exercise of powers given to the agency and that, 
by virtue of the prospective functions of the agency which 
have been proposed in previous chapters, the amount or inspec- 
tion required and t he attendant interferences will be much less 
than would be necessary under a control system which sought 
to depend on inspection alone. 1 ' 1 

With regard to declared facilities, the Soviets woidd agree only to 
"periodic inspections." or to inspections "carried out at definite inter- 

» Ibid., p. 56. 

■ The main categories of these proposals were the following: (1) requirement of war 
rants or special consenl ; cj i granting of special consent : (3) resorl to domestic or inter 
national court, body, or official; (i> domestic •■,,urts. bodies, or officials required to issue 
warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause; (5) International court, body, or 
official required to issue warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause: and (6) 
scope of warrants. Complete details of these proposals <;m be found in United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission, "The International Control of Atomic Energy, The Second 
Report to the Security Council", pp. 54—55. 

« Ibid., p. 50. 


vals," but opposed permanent stationing of inspectors in countries. 
Soviet proposals on this subject, though more detailed than others, 
were considered by the majority of the Commission as failing to pro- 

an adequate basis for the development * * * of specific 

proposals for an effective system of international control of 

atomic energy. 92 

The U.S. interpretation of the Soviet proposals on inspection was that 
it was "concerned chiefly with bookkeeping and reports." 93 As far as 
investigation of clandestine activities was concerned, the Commission 
reported that in the "minority" (Soviet) position, "inspection as to 
clandestine or unreported facilities is virtually ignored." 94 As was the 
case with international ownership, the extent of agreement on details 
achieved by a considerable number of UNAEC members was nullified 
by Soviet opposition to the basic principles behind the proposals on 

In commenting on the impasse in the negotiations, the third report 
of the UNA EC seemed to focus on how the inspection issue, and the 
agreed technological requirements of control, challenged national at- 
titudes toward security, secrecy, and sovereignty. It said : 

* * * Secrecy in the field of atomic energy is not compat- 
ible with lasting international security. Cooperative develop- 
ment and complete dissemination of information alone prom- 
ise to remove fears and suspicion that nations are conducting 
secret activities * * *. 

The majority of the Commission is fully aware of the im- 
pact of its plan on traditional prerogatives of national sov- 
ereignty. But in the face of the realities of the problem it sees 
no alternative to the voluntary sharing by nations of their 
sovereignty in this field to the extent required by its proposals. 
It finds no other solution which will meet the facts, prevent 
national rivalries in this most dangerous field, and fulfill the 
Commission's terms of reference. 95 

Moreover, the third report placed the issue in a larger perspective 
when it expressed, if perhaps too f acilely, the hope that : 

The new pattern of international co-operation and the new 
standards of openness in the dealings of one country with an- 
other that are indispensable in the field of atomic energy 
might, in practice, pave the way for international co-operation 
in broader fields, for the control of other weapons of mass de- 
struction, and even for the elimination of war itself as an 
instrument of national policy. 96 

The Issue of Stages of Transition to International Control 

A second major problem for U.S. policy and for the negotiations in- 
volved the manner in which an international control Authority would 
assume its responsibilities, or the stages by which there would be a 

82 Proposals and Recommendations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 
Sec. 2, "Report and Recommendations of the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic 
Energy Commission, adopted May 17, 194S." pp. 77-78, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Post- 
war Negotiations, p. 66. 

93 State Department, Polici) at the Crossroads, p. 137. 

91 U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report 1047, p. 103, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Postwar 
Xeriotiations, p. 66. 

95 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, "Third Report to the Security Council," 
pp. 4-5. 

98 Ibid., p. 5. 


transition from the existing U.S. control of atomic energy to a system 
of international control. The issue of these transitional stages involved 
partly the practical steps by which the international Authority would 
arrive at its position of complete control over atomic energy, but it 
also concerned the underlying assumption that this transition would 
have to proceed in such a way that the control system would be made 
reliable before it could assume responsibility for the information and 
facilities associated with the dangerous uses of atomic energy. 

Without jeopardizing its own military security or that of the other 
nations of the world, thereby fulfilling its responsibility as keeper of 
the "sacred trust'' over atomic energy, the United States had to deter- 
mine its policy regarding the sequence and timing of the transfer of 
information and facilities to an international Authority. For other 
countries, the issue of the transitional stages raised questions regard- 
ing whether and when the United States would relinquish its monopoly 
over atomic energy 7 and thus give up what appeared to be a command- 
ing military advantage. Thus, U.S. policy had to be framed to satisfy 
multiple and conflicting purposes. Important related questions for 
policymakers of the United States and other countries were, when 
would the United States stop its production of atomic bombs, and 
what would become of its stockpiles ? 


The concept of stages for the release of information and transfer of 
facilities had its foundations in early U.S. policy on international con- 
trol of atomic energy and in those international agreements which com- 
mitted the United States to seek such control. Initial Administration 
pronouncements regarding atomic energy included assurances that 
the "secret" of weapons manufacture would not be released in the ab- 
sence of international control. In his October 1945 message to Congress, 
which concentrated primarily on national control. President Truman, 
in speaking on the problem of international control, pledged that 
international discussions would "not be concerned with disclosures re- 
lating to the manufacturing processes leading to the production of 
the atomic bomb itself," and that they would "constitute an effort to 
work out arrangements covering the terms under which international 
collaboration and exchange of information might safely proceed." 
Although the President did not specifically mention transitional stages, 
his comments indicate an effort to avoid any implication that the im- 
pending discussions might lead to dissemination of information on 
atomic energy, before control of its destructive uses had been achieved. 
As later developed in U.S. policy, this goal became one of the primary 
purposes for devising transitional stages. 

The Three Nation Agreed I >eclaration of November 1945 offered an 
"exchange of fundamental scientific information * * * for peaceful 
ends with any nation that will fully reciprocate," bul added that much 
of the information on practical applications of atomic energy would 
become available "just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards 

"Harry s Truman, "Special Message to the Conpn>ss on Atomic Energy, October 3, 
I'M.". / ublic Papers of th( President of tin United States, 1945 (Washington, D.C. : u.b. 
Gove'rnmenl Printing Office, 1961 >, i>. 366. 


against its use for destructive purposes can be devised." 98 Moreover, 
the statement recommended that the proposed U.N. Commission pro- 
ceed "by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which 
will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage 
is undertaken." " The same phrase was incorporated in the Moscow 
Declaration and in the resolution which established the UNAEC. At 
the Moscow Conference, the provision that the work of the Commission 
should proceed by stages had been strongly supported by the United 
States; Russian agreement was obtained primarily in exchange for 
Western agreement to Soviet insistence on the close relationship of the 
Commission with the U.N. Security Council. 100 

The idea that the. proposed Commission should proceed by stages 
may have made it appear to the United States that its participation 
in the proposed organization would involve the release of information 
on atomic weapons either for the purposes of negotiation or to set up 
the system of international control. Thus, even before taking part in 
the negotiations on the substantive issues of control the United States 
felt it necessary to seek assurance that atomic weapons information 
would be protected in the absence of international control, and this 
concern was carried over into the negotiations themselves, as it applied 
to the transition from U.S. to international control. 


Origins of the discussion: The idea of transitional stages in the 
Aeheson-Lilienthal report originated in the attitude among the mem- 
bers of Acheson's committee that the security of the United States 
had to be protected before and during the transition to effective inter- 
national control. Some committee members expressed concern lest in- 
formation and facilities associated with manufacturing the atomic 
bomb be released by the United States before a reliable system of in- 
ternational control had been established. The Board of Consultants 
did not set out initially to devise such stages. They viewed their basic 
task as to conceive a "workable system of international control," and 
tended to disregard devising the steps to achieve it. It was only at 
the insistence of the Acheson committee that the Board resigned itself 
to modifying its report to include a general discussion of stages. The 
finished form of the Aeheson-Lilienthal report, however, avoided 
going into considerable detail, on the grounds that specific schedules 
would have to be negotiated in the UNAEC, and that decisions on the. 
timing of the release of information and facilities by the United States 
should be left to the highest policymakers in the Government. 

Although the political basis for the concept of stages had been es- 
tablished in the policy approved by the President, the Board of Con- 
sultants apparently preferred to omit explicit discussion of this sub- 
ject, even though Conant had earlier mentioned to the Board the need 
for transitional stages. 101 In the Board's original report to Acheson's 
committee, the Consultants did not deal with the issue of transitional 

98 state Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 25. 
m Ibid. 

100 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 216. 

101 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 
p. 534. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-8 


stages beyond the assertion that a necessary first step would be a raw 
materials survey. This consideration was primarily an operational 
requisite of the international Authority. When the plan was submitted 
to the committee, Conant, Bush, and Groves were the principal ex- 
ponents of the political and military arguments for determining the 
transitional stages for the release of information and transfer of 

Bush based his position on the recognition that rapid demobiliza- 
tion of U.S. military manpower had resulted in a U.S. dependence on 
the atomic bomb as its primary source of military power, while the 
Soviet Union had retained its large armies. If the international con- 
trol system should be established in one step, and the United States 
relinquished its monopoly, Bush argued, the Soviets would be left in a 
superior military position. 

Acheson's comments on the stages centered on two considerations. 
First, while he granted that the plan should go into effect as quickly 
as possible, he appeared to envision the transitional period as one 
which would reveal whether other nations would adhere to a system 
of international control. Acheson's remarks have been described as fol- 
lows : "As soon as the organization had completed the first transitional 
phase and everyone was 'playing pool,' it would turn to the next. If 
the first phase revealed bad faith, further progress was out of the 
question." 102 Acheson's second point was that the United States should 
be prepared for crises with the Soviet Union and that a variety of 
issues, whether connected with the plan or not, could sabotage the 
whole effort. Therefore, U.S. preeminence in the field of atomic energy 
should not be forfeited immediately, in the event that steps to set up 
the international Authority failed. 

Moreover, support for the idea of stages was based on the commit- 
tee's general view of the complete plan for international control. Both 
Acheson and Conant described the plan primarily as a "warning de- 
vice" whereby the United States and other nations of the world would 
become aware when a country embarked on its own program to de- 
velop nuclear weapons, and could take preventive or punitive action. 
Given this attitude toward the fully operational control system, it is 
understandable that the committee should have sought to retain for 
the United States the highest degree of military preparedness in the 
event of a breakdown as the system was being established, while at the 
same time preventing other nations from developing their own nuclear 

Committee members differed as to the extent to which a detailed 
schedule of transition could be specified. Bush suggested that the 
stages would have to be defined clearly enough to insure acceptability 
of the plan, perhaps on the grounds that such definition would serve 
to strengthen the confidence of other nations in U.S. intentions to re- 
linquish its monopoly. lie recognized, however, that the fine details 
could not be determined at that point, a task which rightly belonged 
to the American negotiator. This position was supported by Acheson. 
Throughout the deliberations between the Board and the committee, 
General Groves supported the idea of setting forth the most explicit 
stages possible, to show "where the American people would come out 

«» Ibid., p. 548. 


if someone suddenly doublecrossed them." 103 It was finally agreed 
that the Board would add a section to its report to deal with stages, 
but only in a "speculative way."' The purpose of the new section was 
"to give the report the ring of reasonableness." 104 

During the discussions with the committee, Lilienthal had ques- 
tioned the group's competence to set down the transitional stages. In 
a meeting following the presentation of their first report to the com- 
mittee, the Board members were apprehensive about the idea, appar- 
ently because of its political implications. One source has described the 
meeting as.follows : 

All had serious misgivings about adding a section on stages. 
It was not that they had any illusions about Russia. They 
recognized that the shift to international control must come 
in orderly steps. But they considered it bad tactics to write 
in an implied distrust of other nations. Their report assumed 
the good faith of Russia. It permitted the concept of stages to 
evolve during the negotiations. It avoided giving the plan a 
made-in- America stamp that would prejudice others against 
it. Yet what could the consultants do ? If they refused to write 
the fourth section, someone else would. Perhaps they ought to 
stick with the task and see it done well. Distinctly unhappy, 
fearing they were blighting the spirit of the work, they de- 
cided to undertake the revision. 105 

Final version — some technological considerations : In keeping with 
the concern expressed by Acheson's committee, the main thrust of the 
discussion in the Acheson-Lilienthal report on transition to interna- 
tional control was the effect which the transition process would have 
on U.S. facilities and information, and thus on the status of U.S. 
military security. The report stated that two different kinds of sched- 
ules needed to be considered. One would include "indispensable re- 
quirements for the adoption and the success of the plan itself" and 
these steps were "fixed by the plan itself." 106 The second kind of sched- 
ules consisted of a number of options which were considered "compat- 
ible with the operability of the plan and affecting primarily its accept- 
ability to the several nations." 107 The task of choosing from these op- 
tions involved the acceptance of the parties concerned. Therefore, it 
should be left to the international negotiations. In dealing with these 
two kinds of schedules, the report divided the nature of the releases 
by the United States into two categories: material and information.. 

The discussion of the release of fissionable materials cited the two 
kinds of schedules mentioned above. In discussing those material ac- 
quisitions by the Authority which were viewed as "fixed by the plan it- 
self," the report treated only the initial operations of the Authority. 
The first step, regarded as "an essential prerequisite for all further 
progress," was for the Authority to obtain "cognizance and control 
over the raw materials situation." Various other steps were listed re- 
garding initial operations of the Authority, but none would affect 
U.S. weapons production facilities. The report left the determination 

103 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 257. 

lf ' 4 Hewlett and Anderson. History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 
p. 549. 

m Ibid., p. 547. 

106 State Department, "Acheson-Lilienthal report," p. 45. 

10T Ibid. 


of the schedules for the transfer of these facilities for later negotiation. 
The same treatment was given to disclosures of information. Nego- 
tiators would need some kinds of information to gain an adequate 
understanding of atomic energy, and thus contribute to effective nego- 
tiation of control. In making a case for these disclosures, the report 
cited an earlier study of classified information, prepared by a group 
in the Manhattan project, which delineated various groups of infor- 
mation which could be released or which had to be retained. The 
Acheson-Lilienthal report noted that this earlier report had been able 
to identify certain categories of information which could be released in 
the absence of international control without jeopardizing national se- 
curity. In appealing for the release of certain kinds of information, 
the Acheson-Lilienthal report pointed out that all of this information 
fell into releasable categories. 108 

The Acheson-Lilienthal report suggested that the timing and se- 
quence of the release of more sensitive information would depend on 
the negotiated stages whereby the international Authority would as- 
sume its operations. Some of this information would be required to 
enable the international Authority to undertake its initial operations. 
Another portion, particularly that on atomic weapons, would not have 
to be released until such time as the Authority was allowed to pursue 
research in this field, presumably during some later stage of transition. 
The report did emphasize that when the Authority was prepared to 
take over an operation, the United States and other countries would 
be obliged to release to the Authority all information, practical and 
theoretical, pertinent to that activity. The report also added that in 
order to take over some activities, the Authority would have to carry 
on planning in advance, and that for these purposes, information 
might have to be released prior to actual operations by the Authority. 
In discussing the need to negotiate many of the schedules for the as- 
sumption of control by the international Authority, the consultants 
commented on the demands this practical requirement for informa- 
tion release placed on U.S. policy : 

The extent to which special precautions need to be taken to 
preserve present American advantages must be importantly 
influenced by the character of the negotiation and by the 
earnestness which is manifested by the several nations in an 
attempt to solve the common problems of international con- 
trol. These questions lie in the domain of highest national 
policy in international relations. 109 
The release of both fissionable material and atomic information was 
discussed in the report in relation to U.S. security; in both areas, the 
report declared that the position of the United States would continue 

»°*The Acheson-Lilienthal report described the product of the Declassification Committee 
as follows: "It recommended against declassification at the present time oi a very con- 
sidernble body Of technical, technological, industrial, and ordnance information, that is 
information bearing directly on the manufacture of weapons and the design and operation 

of production plants. Bit* it recommended the. prompt declassification of a large Dortyot 

.' ..^ S_ -. ' j -n J.--T.-I i i—e „t:„„ «* ,,..,, ,.,-H I. >iil nntllro find W (IP n III) lea 111 1 IV. 

furtherlngTffoSn lo^I-tera muT.rnaT^cirrit^in the absence of International measures. 
Ibid., pp. 53 54. 

we Ibid., p. 49. 


to be a favorable one during the stages of transition. As far as facil- 
ities were concerned during the transition, all operating facilities 
would be located in the United States; and if a breakdown in the con- 
trol system occurred, this country would have the advantage. Sim- 
ilar assurances were given with regard to the release of information. 
As noted above, information necessary for release during the nego- 
tiations met- the security requirements set down in the earlier study by 
the Manhattan District Group. Moreover, the report explained, the 
items of information it advocated were "of a theoretical and descrip- 
tive nature and have in large part to do with the constructive applica- 
tions of atomic energy [and] involve almost nothing of know-how." 110 
The report contended that a major source of U.S. superiority in atomic 
energy rested in the actual experience of working with the facilities. 
Thus, the Acheson-Lilienthal report relied in part on certain tech- 
nological considerations to meet some of the political demands associ- 
ated with the transfer of U.S. information or facilities. (One example 
is the assertion that selective release of technical information would 
not jeopardize U.S. security.) At the same time, however, the Consult- 
ants pointed out that many political decisions would have to be made 
in order to determine U.S. policy on the arrangements for the transi- 
tion to international control. These decisions would be governed partly 
by the general trend of the negotiations, but would have to define the 
circumstances under which the United States was willing to relin- 
quish those atomic energy facilities associated with its destructive ap- 
plications and which were then viewed as temporarily the exclusive 
property of the United States. It is interesting to note that on this 
latter point, the letter of transmittal of the report to Secretary Byrnes, 
written by Acheson, discusses the stages at length, and calls for fur- 
ther study and decisions to support U.S. policy on transitional stages. 
Indeed, the letter even comments on the question of U.S. production of 
bombs, but does not take a position : 

The development of detailed proposals for such scheduling 
will require further study and much technical competence and 
staff. It will be guided, of course, by basic decisions of high 
policy. One of these decisions will be for w T hat period of time 
the United States will continue the manufacture of bombs. 
The plan does not require that the United States shall dis- 
continue such manufacture either upon the proposal of the 
plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency. 
At some stage in the development of the plan this is required. 
But neither the plan nor our transmittal of it should be con- 
strued as meaning that this should or should not be done at 
the outset or at any specific time. That decision, whenever 
made, will involve considerations of the highest policy affect- 
ing our security, and must be made by our Government under 
its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of 
the world situation. 111 


The U.S. policy on stages, as enunciated in Baruch's speech and in 
the memoranda which elaborated the U.S. position, did not develop 

u °Ibid., p. 52. 
v* Ibid., p. vi. 


the concept beyond the level of detail contained in the Acheson- 
Lilienthal report. Indeed, very little was said regarding: the relation- 
ship between the need for stages and U.S. security. In his remarks 
to the opening session of the UNAEC, Baruch mentioned stages only 
in regard to what would seem to be a procedural matter. He merely 
asserted that full control of atomic energy would ''have to come into 
effect in successive stages," and that the transition should be set 
forth in the charter creating the Authority. Baruch recalled the 
language of the resolution creating the UNAEC as the basis for this 

Baruch did mention the U.S. role during the transitional stages, 
with regard to the release of both information and facilities, in terms 
which obviously offered few. if any, immediate concessions on the 
part of the United States. As far as information was concerned. 
Baruch outlined basically the procedure recommended in the Aeheson- 
Lilienthal report, stating that only the information necessary to an 
understanding of atomic energy in the negotiations would be revealed 
by the United States until a successful conclusion was reached. Further 
disclosures would depend "in the interests of all. upon the effective 
ratification of the treaty," and would be carried out when the inter- 
national Authority Avas prepared to assume certain functions. In his 
comments on U.S. facilities, he said that, "The United States was 
prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control 
of activities in this field to the Authority." 112 

The first U.S. memorandum expanded somewhat on Baruch's state- 
ment that the charter establishing the international Authority would 
specify the sequence and timing of the transition from the existing 
conditions to international control. Besides citing this requirement, 
the memo stated that the charter also should specify "the time when 
and the conditions under which the national and private possession, 
manufacture, and use of atomic weapons shall be outlawed." 113 
Nevertheless, U.S. policy on the specific question of the timing for the 
disposal of existing weapons, a major question dining the negoti- 
ations, was not mentioned. The second U.S. memorandum treated the 
question of transit ional stages in a similar manner and did not provide 
any additional elaboration of the U.S. position, particularly concern- 
ing its own contributions during the transitional process. 

Soviet policy on the question of stages was concerned primarily 
with the timing of the destruction of existing atomic weapons. It called 
for the establishment of international control following an agreement 
on the prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons. This sequence 
was never accepted by the majority during the negotiations: 

While it is generally agreed that atomic weapons must be 
eliminated from national armaments, the majority have con- 
cluded that such elimination should come at that stage in the 
development of the international control system which would 
clearly signify to the world that the safeguards then in op- 
eration provided security for all participating states. 114 

Indeed, the Soviet Union itself recognized that there could be no guar- 
antee that a second agreement establishing a control system would be 

u* State Department, drouth of a Policy, p. 146. 
'"Thirl p 14!) 

u* U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report 1047. p. 103, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Post- 
war Negotiations, \>. I 


concluded following conclusion of an agreement to prohibit and de- 
stroy atomic weapons. 115 Apparently, Soviet skepticism regarding the 
sincerity of U.S. pledges to destroy its bombs after the institution of 
international control contributed to the persistence of the Soviets in 
standing by their own proposals. Probably they saw advantage also in 
delay. It seems a strong probability, moreover, that the progress of 
their own development of atomic energy may have reinforced the de- 
termination of the Soviets to maintain their position. (The Soviet 
negotiators may not have been aware of that progress, but those from 
whom they received their policy directives presumably were fully 

In regard to negotiation of the transitional stages, the issue was 
probably reduced to the question of when the United States would 
relinquish its monopoly over atomic energy, or more specificially, its 
bombs and the facilities for producing them. The Soviets asked what 
assurance there was that destruction actually would be carried out. 
During the negotiations, U.S. policy on this particular question was 
not defined beyond the pledge that destruction of existing stockpiles 
would take place when effective safeguards had been established. Ef- 
forts by the UNAEC to settle this question in more precise terms were 
unable to reach an* agreement satisfactory to the Soviets. 

The question of U.S. cessation of bomb production in relation to in- 
ternational control had been raised during the deliberations which 
resulted in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Despite Acheson's assertion 
in the letter of transmittal that the report had not taken a position 
on the timing for a halt of U.S. weapons manufacture, the treatment 
of the issue in the report has been interpreted as follows : 

* * * the report took no definite position, implying there- 
fore, that atomic weapons would continue to be built. Bomb- 
making would have to stop sometime, but that was a ques- 
tion for the President to determine consistent with consti- 
tutional processes and in the light of the world situation. 116 

In a speech before Freedom House in October 1946, Baruch pledged 
the intention of the United States to destroy its bombs "if the world 
would join in a pact to insure the world's security from atomic war- 
fare." His comments on destroying U.S. weapons prior to establish- 
ment of the system posed the question : 

Why should America alone be asked to make sacrifices by 
way of unilateral disarmament in the cause of good will? If 
equality of sacrifice be needed then each should participate. 117 

Truman himself had written to Baruch the previous July : 

We should not under any circumstances throw away our 
gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against 
us. 1 

In discussing the negotiations, Bechhoefer describes this question as 
"perhaps the most fundamental divergence between the Soviet posi- 
tion and that of the West." To Soviet questions on when bombs would 
be eliminated, the U.S. response was that the majority had concluded 

115 Ibid. . p. 71. 

ua Laeberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 258. 
117 State Department, Groirth of a Policy, p. 90. 

118 Hnrrv S. Truman. Memoirs, vol. 2. Years of Trial and Hope. (Garden City, N.Y. : 
Doubleday, 1956), p. 11. 


that weapons should be eliminated "at that stage in the development of 
the international control system which would clearly signify to the 
world that the safeguards then in operation provided security for all 
participating States." 119 

Bechhoefer cites one discussion during the second year of the negoti- 
ations which illustrates the "indecisive nature" of the negotiations on 
the question of stages. The Soviet Union had proposed an amendment 
to the first report which simply called for destruction of manufactured 
and unfinished weapons. The first UNAEC report had proposed dis- 
posal of bombs, an expression which meant the elimination of the bomb 
mechanism and the peaceful use of the nuclear fuel from the dis- 
mantled weapons. The Soviet amendment had omitted any provision 
for use of the nuclear fuel, which posed the real danger following de- 
struction of the bomb mechanism, although they agreed that the fuel 
should not be destroyed. During discussion of the amendment, the 
U.S. representative raised the point that the real issue was not destruc- 
tion of the weapons but control of the nuclear fuel from dismantled 
weapons. In response, the Soviet representative insisted that the 
issue of control could not be discussed apart from destruction of weap- 
ons. Attempts to settle this question in the form of a resolution were 
fruitless, when the group could not even agree on a definition of the 
term "'destruction." References to the term could not be separated from 
the issue of stages, which comprised the basic source of disagreement 
between the positions expressed by the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 120 

In the face of this impasse, a section on the majority plan for control 
in the third report of the UNAEC included the following statement 
regarding stages, which had been retained verbatim from the recom- 
mendations in the first report : 

The treaty should embrace the entire programme for put- 
ting the international system of control into effect and should 
provide a schedule for the completion of the transitional proc- 
ess over a period of time, step by step, in an orderly and 
agreed sequence leading to the full and effective establish- 
ment of international control of atomic energy. In order that 
the transition may be accomplished as rapidly as possible, 
and with safety and equity to all, the United Nations Atomic 
Energy Commission should supervise the transitional proc- 
ess, as prescribed in the treaty, and should be empowered to 
determine when a particular stage or stages have been com- 
pleted and subsequent ones are to commence. 1 '-' 1 

The final report recognized that more details would be desirable, but 
stated that it would serve no useful purpose to attempt to elaborate on 
this and other questions "until agreement on the basic principles of 
control has been reached." 122 

Thus, it would appear that efforts to determine the sequence and 
t imingof the assumption of control by the international Authority may 
have originated in the negotiations simply as a question of tin 1 pro- 

1W I* S Participation in the U.N., report 1947, p. 10.1 as quoted in Beehhoofer, Postwar 
\ egotiations, p. 74, 
<-*' For ;i il.'iailod discussion of this particular point, see ibid., i>i». 72-74. 

121 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission^ "Third Report to the Security Council", 
p. 17 is 

122 Ibid., p. 3. 


cedural steps necessary for setting up the control system. However, the 
negotiations soon became preoccupied with the political implications 
of stages, which were important to the security interests of both 
the United States and the Soviet Union ; that is, the question of when 
the United States would no longer be the sole power in possession of 
atomic weapons. 

The Issue of Enforcement : Sanctions and the Veto 

The third important issue in the effort to establish international 
control of atomic energy was that of imposition of sanctions on viola- 
tors. The question of whether violators of international control should 
be punished grew out of Baruch's advocacy of the idea. He succeeded 
in having it adopted as part of the U.S. proposal. During the negotia- 
tions, the question of the procedural arrangements to deal with sanc- 
tions — specifically, whether the veto power in the U.N. Security Coun- 
cil could be exercised over decisions on them — represented a major 
obstacle to agreement. 


Conant had cautioned the Board of Consultants at the outset that 
the issue of sanctions was a matter for the Security Council to con- 
sider ; and during later discussions, one member of the Board pointed 
out that it would have been presumptuous for a group of technical 
consultants to comment or make recommendations on such a political 
subject. During its deliberations, the Board foresaw war as the prob- 
able outcome in case of a violation, but needless to say it did not enter 
into the subject of the organizational mechanism that would be em- 
ployed to initiate, conduct, and coordinate the war. This was a political 
problem, in the opinion of the Board, and there was no discussion of it 
in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. 

Baruch's idea of establishing sanctions to enforce the control system 
was discussed at the time the U.S. proposal was being developed. At a 
meeting between Baruch's group and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups, 
opposition by the latter to the idea of sanctions was unanimous, ap- 
parently on the grounds that they did not consider the concept work- 
able under existing political circumstances. In turn, the members of 
Baruch's delegation to the UNAEC viewed the Acheson-Lilienthal 
plan as offering merely a warning device and less than a secure system 
to guarantee control of the destructive uses of atomic energy. Although 
Lilienthal granted that the plan was only a warning device, he, 
Acheson, and other members of their groups argued that absolute 
security was unattainable, 123 Nonetheless, Baruch felt strongly that the 
plan did not provide an adequate measure of security and continued to 
press Secretary Byrnes for a policy which included penalties. Baruch's 
position on penalties has been described as follows : 

It was important to * * * show the necessity of enforcing 
the engagements of the nations. Baruch considered penalties 
the sine qua non. He was quite aware this might bring the 

123 Later, Baruch called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the plan for atomic 
energy control. Both General Dwisrht Eisenhower and Admiral Chester Nimitz voiced doubts 
on the effectiveness and acceptability of sanctions, while General Carl Spaatz supported the 
idea. Although Baruch sought the advice of the military, their views did not enter into the 
discussions which determined policy. Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States 
Atomic Energy Commission, pp. 575— 576. 


United States ""athwart of the veto power." for war, the ulti- 
mate penalty, might be necessary. * * * Penalties means im- 
mediate punishment and elimination of any veto of it. * * * 
As for the warning elements in the plan, the American people 
should know how little it amounted to. 124 

Eventually, Baruch obtained approval from President Truman of 
both the idea of sanctions and the provision that the veto power of the 
Security Council would not apply to the decision to administer them. 
Two days before the opening of the UNAEC, Baruch briefed the Sen- 
ate Special Committee on Atomic Energy on the U.S. proposals, and 
the members appeared to welcome the plan approved by the 
President. 1 -"' 


Because U.S. policy on the veto over sanctions was a principal target 
of Soviet opposition, and a major hindrance in the negotiations, a 
discussion of this question might be useful to an understanding of the 
principal issues of this study. It should be noted that the principle 
of unanimity — that is, the veto power — among the permanent mem- 
bers of the Security Council on security matters had been a contro- 
versial issue during negotiation of the U.N. Charter. Strong U.S. sup- 
port for the veto power has been explained as follows : 

* * * The Western powers * * * realized that the veto privi- 
lege placed a premium on inaction at precisely the most criti- 
cal point of great-power disagreement. Long and fruitless ef- 
forts were therefore made by American experts * * * to de- 
vise some method of decisionmaking on security issues that 
would allow the Council to override the negative vote of at 
least one permanent member. All such formulae, however, 
collapsed before the dominating political fact that the ad- 
ministration was not prepared to allow American armed 
forces to be ordered into some unknown future military action 
without U.S. consent. Even had Executive officials felt less 
strongly on the question, they would never have assumed that 
Congress could be persuaded to relinquish so much authority 
to an untried international organization. 1 -" 

Thus, the policy of the United States on the veto, as it applied to 
the question of enforcement of atomic energy control, represented a 
significant departure from its earlier policy on the veto within the 
general framework of the United Nations. Although the question of 
sanctions and its relationship with the veto power was primarily a 
political matter, a number of technological factors associated with 
atomic energy control may have influenced the United States in its 
policy decisions on these subjects. 

This change in US. policy was probably attributable to the nature 
of atomic weapons and the destructive force which they represented to 
policymakers, a perception epitomized in Baruch's opening address to 
the [TNAEC: 

Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its poten- 
tialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet 

121 Ibid., pp. .-,7.", 574. 
'=■'• [bid., pp. 565 574 

120 Emphasis added, itnth B. Russell, The United Nations <m<l United States Security 
Policy. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings, 1968), i>. 51. 


terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. The 
terror created by weapons has never stopped men from em- 
ploying them. For each new weapon a defense has been pro- 
duced, in time. But now we face a condition in which adequate 
defense does not exist. * * * The search of science for the 
absolute weapon has reached fruition in this country. 127 

In light of the fact that the atomic bomb inspired such awe, it is 
not difficult to understand how an important U.S. political stance could 
experience such a drastic modification in the form of the proposal 
that the veto power should not be exercised over sanctions for viola- 
tions of atomic energy control. 128 

Another technological consideration which may have had a bearing 
on U.S. policy toward the veto question concerned the "warning de- 
vice" aspect of the plan in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Policy dis- 
cussions revealed that the Board had not envisioned any international 
stockpile of bombs. Thus, if a nation decided to embark on an atomic 
weapons development program by seizing production facilities of the 
international Authority, the sequence of technological processes of 
producing atomic weapons would take considerable time. The Board 
estimated that it would be approximately 1 year before enough atomic 
weapons could be produced to constitute a significant threat. During 
the drafting of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, one member of the 
group envisioned the following situation in the event of a violation of 
the international control system : 

Supposing denatured material had been allocated to a plant 
which is located in Ruritania, and the Ruritanian Pooh-Bah 
decides to w T elsK on the Atomic Development Authority by 
removing the denaturants. The •Authority's representatives, 
made up of people of many nationalities, try to check on the 
plant, on the watch for just such a move. So the Pooh-Bah 
sends soldiers to get the ADA people out of the way and seize 
the factory. Assuming that the Pooh-Bah has the scientists 
working for him, it will still take him in the neighborhood of 
a year to turn out a bomb. While he's at it, the member coun- 
tries of the Authority, having received no satisfactory answer 
to what's become of their inspectors, go to war with Ruritania 
* * * the war would have to be along conventional lines. 
Naturally, the atomic plant would be the first target for the 
attacking planes. 129 
Presumably, the Board considered that the warning device aspect 
of the plan satisfied the technological requirements of security. How- 
ever, this conception was not shared by all of those involved in U.S. 
policy deliberations. One source states that Baruch's position on this 
question was that the Board's plan provided "no more of a warning 
than S3 months to a year,' " although the origin of his estimate is not 
clear. Moreover, Baruch added that technological developments could 
shorten even that amount of time. 130 These estimates may account for 

127 State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 138-139. 

12R Nonetheless, it should be recalled that this was not the first occasion when this line 
of thinking on the destructive potential of atomic energy affected policy, for it had played 
an important role in inflnpncinc nations, including the United States, to take the initial 
steps ; for example, the Three Nation Agreed Declaration, et cetera, toward seeking agree- 
ment on international control of atomic energy. 

1=0 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 247. n~ m ~.i<,oi n *, 

130 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 
p. 573. 


the sense of urgency with which Baruch treated the veto question in 
his opening speech to the UNAEC : 

* * * There must be no veto to protect those who violate 
their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy 
for destructive purposes. 

The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to 
die. The time between violation and preventive action or 
punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as 
to the course to be followed. 131 

It is unlikely, however, that these factors alone can account for 
Baruch's adamant position on penalties and the veto question. Early 
in the policy deliberations following Baruch's appointment, the elder 
statesman had raised the possibility to Secretary Byrnes and others 
that the negotiations of the UNAEC might provide a forum for the 
attainment of world disarmament, encompassing all weapons. One 
writer labelled Baruclrs notion as "an expression of his idealism and 
expansive self-image." 132 although his position was supported by Eber- 
stadt and Hancock. When Hancock learned that the Secretary of State 
was not enthusiastic about Baruch's idea, one source describes his reac- 
tion : "As Hanock sized up the situation, Byrnes was trying to simplify 
the job by limiting it to atomic energy." 133 The exchange on the subject 
between Baruch and Byrnes has been described as follows: 

* * * Byrnes would have none of this vision. It would be 
"a serious mistake," he said, to attempt to cover these other 
weapons as part of Baruch's present assignment. Baruch was 
equally strong in response : "The problem of atomic energy is 
a problem of the hearts of men — no plan so far proposed gives 
any guarantee of assurance." Only total disarmament offered 
such a guarantee. Byrnes was unmoved. 134 

News of Baruch's proposal for total disarmament prompted one 
member of the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy to admon- 
ish him to "stick to his knitting." l35 Thus, since Baruch's idea of a com- 
prehensive disarmament proposal had been thwarted, it is understand- 
able, perhaps, that if his efforts had to be confined to atomic energy, 
he might seek a control system which would be as secure as possible. 
by providing "immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who 
violate the agreements that are reached by the nations." 130 

In addition. Baruch's insistence on removal of the veto as a vital 
component of the proposed system of punishments may have l>cen 
prompted by the -rowing U.S. attitude of mistrust of the Soviet 
Union. The belief was strong that violations most likely would origi- 
nate with the Soviet Union or one of its allies. Moreover, the Soviet 
Union's performance during the first months of the United Nations, 
which was characterized by frequent use of the veto in the Security 
Council, fortified the impression that Moscow would have recourse 
to the veto to avoid the consequences of its violations. 137 

*» State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 142-143. 
"3 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 277. 

Hewlett and Anderson, History of the Atomic Energy Commission, p. 569. 
■ Lieberman, The Scorpion mni the Tarantula, p. 290. 
Hewlett and Anderson, History o) the Atomic Energy Commission, p. o7G. 
i« State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 138. 

«i During ii..- meetings of the iNAI'c itself, a resolution was Introduced In tbe General 
Assembly, calling for an investigation of Soviet abuse of the veto. Bechhoefer, Postwar 
Negotiations, p. 57. 


Thus, by proposing sanctions to achieve "an international law with 
teeth in it," Baruch may have compensated for losing the personal op- 
portunity to propose and negotiate a comprehensive disarmament plan. 
He may also have sought to satisfy the requirements of a control system 
which he believed the emerging political relationships of the atomic age 



At issue during the negotiations, sanctions and the veto became in- 
volved with the political arguments associated with the general issue 
of the veto power in the United Nations. In order to understand how 
this issue contributed to the failure of the negotiations, it might be 
helpful to examine briefly the course of the issue and U.S. policy during 
the international discussions of international control of atomic energy. 

During the negotiations, the third U.S. memorandum provided a 
vehicle to answer the various legal questions arising from the rela- 
tionship between the proposed international Authority and the United 
Nations, and an important part of this issue was sanctions. The memo- 
randum listed those activities which if pursued by an individual na- 
tion would constitute a serious threat to the peace. These included 
virtually every possible breach of the control arrangement. 138 

The memorandum proposed that the Security Council would deter- 
mine the response to these violations. In defending the provision to 
exclude these matters from the veto, the U.S. position was that it did 
not impair the principle of unanimity in the United Nations, because 
nations would enter into this particular arrangement freely. It also 
emphasized that the proposal to exclude the veto applied only to the 
question of atomic energy. An additional point raised by the memo- 
randum was that the question of sanctions could not be discussed 
without considering the provisions of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
which recognized the "inherent right of individual or collective self- 
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations." Besides noting that an attack with atomic weapons would 
justify a response under Article 51, the memorandum suggested that 
a broader definition of "armed attack" might be included in the treaty 
for the Authority, to include certain preliminary steps to such action. 

Baruch was unyielding on the veto question during the negotiations, 
and his perseverance was matched by the adamant opposition of the 
Soviet Union. One example of the Soviet position on this question is 
in a speech by Gromyko in July 1946 : 

We believe that it would be wrong, and perhaps fatal, to 
undermine, in practice to abandon, the principle of unanimity 

i3s in e gal possession or use of an atomic bomb ; illegal possession, or separation, of 
atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb ; seizure of any plant or other property 
belonging to, or licensed by, the Authority ; willful interference with the activities of the 
Authority ; creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the 
absence of, a license granted by the Authority. The U.S. proposal also granted that admin- 
istrative decisions would be made and carried out only by the international Authority, and 
that the Authority could make decisions on other matters, which were not serious threats 
to the peace. The" latter could be enforced by the Security Council as procedural matters, 
a process which did not involve the veto. State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 


of the permanent members of the Security Council * * * We 
cannot accept any proposal which would undermine in any 
degree the principle of unanimity of the permanent members 
of the Security Council on all questions relating to the main- 
tenance of peace and security. 139 

Bechhoefer notes that Baruch attempted "to soften the impact of 
his position" by recalling that the proposal to eliminate the veto would 
apply only to the control of atomic energy. He also points out that in 
terms of the legality of the provision, it would not affect the veto 
power as established by the U.N. Charter. But, in Bechhoefer's view, 
because the proposal "ran counter to the basic concept of the continued 
unity of the great powers as embodied in the Charter," it indicated to 
the Soviet Union "a U.S. decision to attack the underlying basis of 
postwar settlements." 14 ° 

Baruch was so firmly convinced of the correctness of his stance 
on the veto that he may have missed an opportunity to bargain with 
the Soviets on the issue, or at least to place them in a position where 
they would be called upon to reveal further details of their proposals. 
Bechhoefer cites an instance in 1947, when the Soviet Union proposed 
an amendment that the Authority "should carry out their control and 
inspection functions, acting on the basis of their own rules, which 
should provide for the adoption of decisions, in appropriate cases, 
by the majority vote". 141 The Soviet Union was willing to grant the 
majority vote of the Authority "in appropriate cases," a term which 
could have been explored. Nonetheless, discussion of this amendment 
would have "shifted the question from the problem of a veto to the 
issue of the authority of the control commission, which was politically 
far less sensitive." However, Baruch would accept nothing less than 
his original proposal. 142 

While U.S. policy on the veto had its foundations in both techno- 
logical and political factors, it would appear that the underlying po- 
litical relations of the great powers in the United Nations provided a 
major source of the difficulty in the negotiations. Indeed. Bechhoefer 
concludes that Baruch's position on the veto gave the Soviets the op- 
portunity to oppose the U.S. proposals "'for the wrong reason." The 
basis for this assertion is that disagreement over the veto involved basic 
political differences between the two countries rather than the substan- 
tive, technical aspects of control. 143 

Recap'/tiihiflon of the Three Issues of Atomic Control 

Thus, the United States brought before the United Nations three 
issues making up a program of international control of atomic energy. 
The first involved the control institution itself. This called for a 
scheme of international ownership and regulation, with considerable 
intimate interaction with national programs of atomic energy develop- 
ment. Possibly the newly-formed United Nations would have been un- 
equal to the large task of managing such a program. But the tech- 

"■ [bid. p. B2. 

'hhoefer, Postwai Negotiations, pp. .~>7 58. 

1,1 State Department, Policy >ii the Crossroads, p. ~f>. 

"■' Emphasis added. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 59. 

'" [bid., pp. 59 '''<> 


nical orientation of the design of the proposed institution left un- 
answered many political questions, and after long debate in the United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the scheme was tabled. 

The issue of the transition from U.S. monopoly to international con- 
trol met the same fate. Lacking agreement on the what, it was hard to 
design the hoir of a plan. After much deliberation, the UNAEC came 
reluctantly to this conclusion. 

The question of what should be done to preserve world security in 
the event of a violation of an international atomic control agreement 
likewise went unresolved. This question went to the heart of the issue 
of collective security versus national sovereignty. But even though it 
came at a time when only one nation possessed atomic weapons cap- 
ability, the quest for agreement went unsatisfied. 

V. Some Distinctive Features of the Negotiations 

It appears as though the negotiations came to nothing because the 
control plans advanced by the Soviet Union and the United States 
were each based upon their perceptions of a desirable world order 
and the defense of their respective national interests. In the cir- 
cumstances of that period, these views and the plans based on them 
were not reconcilable. The reasoning and perceptions underlying Soviet 
policy decisions at that juncture are not known with certainty 25 years 
later, and clearly were less well perceived at that time. The fact that 
many of the following observations relate mainly to U.S. policy is not 
intended to be solely a comment on this country's approach to atomic 
energy control. That such observations are useful arises from the fact 
that basically it was the U.S. plan which was accepted by the majority 
in the international negotiations. Therefore, an important part of an 
inquiry into the outcome of the negotiations lies in the origins of U.S. 
policy and inputs of U.S. scientists and diplomats. 144 

Excessive U.S. Reliance on Technical Control Plan 

One characteristic of the efforts to achieve control of atomic energy 
which may have contributed to their failure was the tendency on the 
part of U.S. policymakers and of the majority of the negotiators in 
the UNAEC to accept the constraints developed out of technological 
considerations as the basis for their proposals for a control arrange- 
ment. The foundations for the concrete proposals by the United States 
were the technological studies of the Board of Consultants, and when 
the first signs of impasse appeared in the UNA EC, in 1946, the negotia- 
tors chose to await a report from the Scientific and Technical Commit- 
tee before proceeding with the negotiations. However, each scientific 
group, Lilienthal's and the UNAEC committee, divorced itself from 
any responsibility for considering the political factors involved in a 
control arrangement. And the diplomats and politicians, in addressing 
themselves to the basic political problems which were preventing agree- 
ment, chose to seek a firm basis for their proposals in what were con- 
sidered to be the undeniable technological facts of the situation. 

When it was evident that there was little hope for agreement, the 
basic assertion from the UNAEC was that a minority had failed to 
recognize the compelling technical factors needed to shape 1 an ade- 
quate control system. 145 But there appears to have been a larger failure 

of the i \ can only be .'i matter for speculation 



of the participants on both sides to appreciate that even as powerful 
a scientific and technological event as the discovery and decisive mili- 
tary use of atomic energy could not of itself prompt so radical a re- 
ordering of diplomacy as to reconcile the overwhelming political 
stakes at issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. Spe- 
cifically, this was a failure to reconcile (a) the basic technological 
fact that any effective international control system would have to cope 
with the difficulty of separating peaceful from military activities, and 
(b) the fundamental diplomatic reality that any such system would 
have to accommodate both the Soviet Union's traditional fear of for- 
eign intrusion and the U.S. fear of becoming an inferior military 
power. In retrospect, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the con- 
cessions necessary on all sides to establish a workable arrangement 
for international nuclear control were beyond the scope of traditional 
international behavior. A profound change in concepts of sovereignty 
and security would have been required to insure the success of the 
negotiations. Possibly this principle remains as unappreciated today as 
it was at the time the Baruch plan was being considered. 


Based upon U.S. perceptions of Soviet motives and of Soviet capa- 
bility for nuclear development, acceptability of the U.S. plan for 
atomic energy control was secondary to requirements for an effective 
control system. As early as the U.S. preparations for the Truman- 
Attlee-King meetings, before the Soviet Union had had an oppor- 
tunity to participate in any forum on the atomic energy question, the 
intent of U.S. policy was to devise a workable system of control with- 
out special regard for acceptability of the plan to any other parties. 14 * 
Similarly, throughout the deliberations between Achesoivs committee 
and Lilienthal's group, very little was said regarding the possibility 
of or the requirements for Soviet acceptance of the plan, although 
there was some recognition of the prevalent political facts of life, 
largely mutual suspicion, which would characterize United States- 
Soviet relations during the early postwar period. But an awareness 
of these factors did not prompt active consideration of whether the 
Soviet Union would accept the plan. Rather, it became the goal of 
U.S. policy to devise the necessary arrangements to prevent violation 
of a control system, and eventually, with Baruclvs policy on punish- 
ments and the veto, a guaranteed course of action in the event of viola- 
tion. To the United States, the most likely target of its policy toward 
thwarting or punishing violators was the Soviet Union. 

The suspicious and negative attitude in the "West toward the 
Soviet penchant for secrecy was undoubtedly reinforced by the ex- 
pansionist actions of the Soviet Union in the East European countries 
following the war. Yet Soviet expansionism has been explained as 
an effort to buffer that country from foreign incursions, a traditional 
fear which had been exacerbated by the devastating Soviet experience 

148 Indeed, Secretary Byrnes approached the negotiations for international control of 
atomic energy with a negative attitude, which was carried over into a policy paper which 
Bush prepared for the meeting. In characterizing a conversation with Ryrnes on the issue. 
Bush commented to Conant that "we were discussing carefully ways and means toward an 
effective accord [i.e.. one which was without risk to the United States] rather than 
merely struggling with the question of whether any accord is possible." Bush to Conant. 
Xov. 8, 1945, in the Bush Papers, as quoted in Liebernian, The Scorpion and the Taran- 
tula, p. 167. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-9 


during World War II. 147 The question of how this particular ex- 
planation of Soviet actions at that time might have justified Soviet 
foreign policy in general is a political problem beyond the scope of this 
study. Still, it may be worth noting that this observation, as a pos- 
sible explanation of Soviet expansionism, has been offered to account 
for Soviet rejection of certain elements of the Baruch plan. 148 In the 
Soviet view, these proposed arrangements would have made the Soviet 
Union vulnerable by admitting foreig] rs to the Soviet Union in posi- 
tions of authority. Apart from the ideological trauma of this foreign 
penetration, their presence might enable potential enemies of the 
Soviets to detect sources of strength to attack and evidences of weak- 
ness to exploit. On the other hand, if the United States had recog- 
nized Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence, the same 
argument continues, this gesture may have represented enough of a 
concession by the West to contribute to obtaining a Soviet concession : 
modification of its stand on the presence of foreign inspectors. To 
some extent, a certain amount of outside inspection probably would 
have been necessary for effective control, and obviously a change in 
the Soviet position was essential to reaching agreement. 149 


The Soviet Union's calculation of the motives of the United States 
probably encountered uncertainty with regard to the place which 
atomic weapons held in the overall defense posture of the United 
States. While the Soviets had retained their large forces of manpower 
following the war, the United States had undergone rapid demobili- 
zation of its armies. The extent of U.S. dependence on the atomic bomb, 
and thus any demonstration of its willingness to relinquish it. were 
governed by basic U.S. security considerations. In turn, the fact that 
the atomic weapon had become such an integral part of the U.S. de- 
fense posture only complicated its own efforts to devise an equitable 
policy on a system of international control without jeopardizing U.S. 
or world security. Indeed, Bechhoefer points out that "By January 
1947 * * * it had been ascertained that * * * United States de- 
mobilization had reached the stage where Soviet acceptance | of the 
U.S. plan] would leave the United States naked." Bechhoefer be- 
lieves this might account for l.S. failure to explain t ransitional stages 
in detail, including the stage for elimination of the bomb, although 
he does not explicitly question the sincerity of U.S. motives. 1 ™ 

The principle behind the declarations by the United States that it 
would hold atomic energy in a "sacred trust" in the absence of inter- 
national control raises an additional point which might explain Soviet 
skepticism toward the U.S. plan. This point concerns the moral force 
which US. officials attached to their pronouncements bearing on the 
U.S. position in the negotiations. It would seem that merely by stat- 
ing its aims and responsibilities in atomic energy, these officials may 
have expected other count lies to accept the U.S. pledges without ques- 
tion. For example, during a policy discussion of stages, Acheson's re- 

147 Lieberman. The Scorpion and tin- Tarantula, j> 402. 
" s [bid., p. 404. 

"" iMii , p mi Lieberman'a Interpretation Is, however, o hypothesis which it is impos- 
Bible id prove or disprove nl tin- present time. 
uo Bechhoefer, Postwar Vegotiationa, p. 11. 


marks are described in one source as follows: "When the United 
States presented its plan, it would have to explain the process of tran- 
sition. Then the nations would establish an international authority. 
* * * The United States would not give everything away the day it 
agreed to institute the plan ; rather, it would promise to do so." 151 Cer- 
tain actions — e.g., the atomic test at Bikini in July 1946, less than one 
month following the opening of the UNAEC, or the U.S. failure in the 
UNAEC negotiations to define the specific control conditions which 
would determine when it would relinquish its atomic weapons — 
might well have cast doubt on those pledges, particularly in the eyes 
of the Soviet Union. 

Thus, both the United States and the Soviet Union acted in the 
negotiations primarily to meet their individual needs of security, based 
on their own particular perceptions of the existing threat. Some of 
these perceptions may have been less than accurate. Nevertheless, as 
a result, a basic element in each country's policy toward atomic energy 
control, which could not be ignored or superseded by technological 
requirements, was to avoid an arrangement which would have sub- 
jected one party to the suspected goal of domination by the other. 
For the most part, there is little evidence that a substantial effort was 
made to combine or reach a compromise between those technological 
and diplomatic elements which were necessary to reach agreement on 
international control. By and large, representatives from each field 
retained their parochial interests, especially in light of the attitudes 
of representatives of one field toward the other, and approached the 
problem of atomic energy control accordingly. In short, once the diplo- 
mats had grasped the import of the possibility of a facile solution 
offered by the technical experts, they began to mistrust it. For their 
part, the technical experts had probably underestimated the political 
difficulties in implementing the solution. And finally, the tasks of 
both groups were made difficult by the many previous commitments 
to allies and other countries and to the American people. 

One Attempt at Technical-Diplomatic Coordination 

One example of an attempt to combine technological and political 
factors of atomic energy control may be evident in the proposal of the 
groups led by Acheson and Lilienthal to assign a research and develop- 
ment function to the international Authority. Recognizing the nega- 
tive human response to police methods of inspection, they hoped that 
the purposes of security could be served in two ways through research 
in atomic energy. First, because some national activity would be re- 
tained in this area, the potential for national rivalries would be chan- 
neled into constructive purposes. Second, this function of the interna- 
tional Authority would keep the supranational body technically ad- 
vanced in terms of detecting activities which were illegal under the 

151 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 
p. 548. 


terms of the agreement. The research carried on by the international 
Authority would serve as a beneficial source of consultation for the na- 
tional efforts; periodic inspections would not be solely investigative, 
in the sense of arousing suspicions, which would only threaten the 
entire system of control. Rather, as envisioned by the Board, inspec- 
tions would provide an opportunity for individual nations to receive 
guidance in their efforts through the knowledge of the inspectors, and 
inspections would be less intrusive because of the generally beneficial 
expertise developed in the inspectors by the Authority. Thus, the pur- 
poses of security would be served through methods which met the 
needs of the technology and the less tangible human factors inherent 
in international control. However, obstacles to agreement were so 
weighty in relation to the total effort to agree on a system of interna- 
tional control that this element of the U.S. plan exercised no positive 
influence on the outcome of the negotiations. 

Underlying Misconceptions in U.S. Policy 

A number of misconceptions and miscalculations during the U.S. 
policymaking process on matters pertaining to both the technology 
and the politics of atomic energy control may have influenced the out- 
come of the negotiations. U.S. policy in the negotiations may possibly 
have been conditioned by an attitude that possession of the bomb pro- 
vided great leverage for the United States to press for acceptance of 
its proposals. 

This attitude rested on a number of technological assumptions, 
which eventually proved incorrect. First, U.S. estimates regarding the 
Soviet Union's ability to develop its own atomic weapons ranged any- 
where from 5 to 25 years, whereas the first Soviet atomic explosion 
occurred in IUV.), just 3 years following the opening of the UNAEC. 
This development changed the entire character of the atomic energy 
control problem. Although negotiations on the Baruch plan continued 
until the early 1950's. Soviet possession of atomic weapons — some 
sources reason — necessitated a different approach to arms control, and 
perhaps even made the Baruch proposals obsolete. 

The length of time during which the United St#es could expect 
to maintain its supremacy in the field of atomic energy posed a dilemma 
for U.S. policy. On the one hand, there was the assumption, based on 
historically valid technological considerations, that the loss of the U.S. 
monopoly was inevitable. This recognition contributed greatly to the 
U.S. commitment to seek international control of atomic energy. On 
the other hand, erroneous technological intelligence estimates which 
favored the U.S. position appear to have prompted a further — and as 
it proved, unwarranted — U.S. assumption that it could attain interna- 
tional control on its own terms, and that it could afford to insist on 
certain points in its proposals. This attitude was interpreted as "atomic 
diplomacy" by critics of U.S. proposals, and was justified by propo- 
nents of U.S. policy as fulfillment of the U.S. responsibility for the 
"sacred trust" over atomic energy. 

An additional technological misconception which may have played 
at least a minor role in the outcome of the negotiations concerned the 
extent to which peaceful uses of atomic energy would be made readily 
available to benefit a large number of countries. Much of the scientific 
and technological information which would have contributed sub- 


stantially to development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy could 
not be released in the absence of international controls, as such peace- 
ful development was so closely connected with the information neces- 
sary for development of an atomic weapon. Thus, the hope of sharing; 
the knowledge for beneficial uses of atomic energy became an incentive 
for the Lilienthal Board to devise an effective control system. Such 
hopes apparently influenced both U.S. policymakers and the other 
negotiators in the UNAEC to believe that the control plan offered 
something more than a rein on the destructive forces of atomic energy. 
Although present-day development of atomic energy for peaceful 
uses — a quarter-century later — is advancing at a substantial pace, the 
predictions of 1945 regarding the imminent development of peaceful 
uses seem overly optimistic. Notwithstanding the optimism, however, 
security factors so overshadowed all other issues in the negotiations 
that the drive by individual countries for active international coopera- 
tion in peaceful development failed to develop real momentum at that 

These technological factors tended to limit the ontions of the non- 
nuclear countries participating in the negotiations. Essentially, for 
any such country there were only two options : development of its own 
atomic bomb, at considerable industrial effort and economic cost, or 
controlled access to the technology through acceptance of a plan for in- 
ternational control, defined by the only country which possessed the 
ultimate weapon. To supporters of the U.S. proposals, perhaps suffici- 
ent confidence existed between them and the United States that its 
pledges and its control plan seemed reasonable. Moreover, many coun- 
tries, recovering from their massive war efforts, lacked the reserves of 
resources to develop their own atomic weapons. The promise of the 
potential benefits of atomic energy for national purposes, however 
limited, which the control plan offered may have provided additional 
incentive for approval of the U.S. proposals. 

It is doubtful that the Soviets experienced a similar reaction. In 
commenting on the plan proposed by the Board of Consultants, one 
source speculates on the Soviet reaction as follows : 

* * * The members of the Lilienthal Board were con- 
vinced that adoption of their plan by the Soviet Union would 
cause no less than another revolution in Russian society — a 
revolution which was to be accomplished apparently in re- 
turn for Russian involvement in atomic development. This 
could not have seemed a very desirable quid pro quo to the 
Russians, who knew that they were capable of building 
atomic weapons themselves in three or four years. 152 

A political miscalculation by the United States affecting the negotia- 
tions can be identified in light of U.S. experience in its relations with 
the Soviet Union. One source has expressed the possible Soviet percep- 
tion of the Baruch plan as follows: "The clear advantage offered the 
U.S.S.R. was relief from an 'out of the blue' American atomic air 
attack, but at a price of forgoing any early moves toward nuclear 
equality." 153 An almost axiomatic reflex of the Soviet approach to 
arms control negotiation has been the notion that the Soviet Union 
will not negotiate from an inferior military position. One explanation 

152 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 409. 

163 George H. Quester. Nuclear Diplomacy: the First 25 Tears (New York : Dunellen Co., 
1970), p. 20. 


for the delay in the opening of recent negotiations on strategic arms 
limitation has been Soviet reluctance to bargain until it had attained 
"parity" with the United States in strategic weapons. 154 

A fuller appreciation of this Soviet attitude during the UNAEC 
negotiations might have broadened the perspective of U.S. policy. 
Moreover, if U.S. policymakers had been aware of the fact that the 
Soviet Union had been working assiduously on its own atomic weapons 
during the negotiations, a different approach might have been used. 
Two cabinet members, Secretary Stimson, and the Secretary of Com- 
merce, Henry Wallace, suggested that the Soviet Union be treated in a 
more open manner on atomic energy questions. Stimson, who left the 
Administration in September 1945, suggested including the Soviets in 
atomic energy development as soon as possible after the war. Such a 
move, he believed, would avert Soviet suspicions regarding U.S. inten- 
tions and would mark a first step toward the necessary internationali- 
zation of atomic energy, without giving rise to an arms race. During 
the UNAEC negotiations, Wallace publicly encouraged more active 
cooperation with the Soviet Union, to the point where his remarks be- 
came a source of embarrassment to the Administration; to Baruch the 
vigorous expression of the Wallace position was undermining the U.S. 
position at the UNAEC. As a result, Truman asked Wallace to leave 
his cabinet. Obviously, the suggestions of both Stimson and Wallace 
fell on deaf ears of those in power, who felt it necessary to adopt a 
defensive position toward the Soviet Union. 155 

One source declares that a major weakness of the U.S. policy on 
atomic energy was its diplomatic timing. Details of U.S. policy on in- 
ternational control remained unclear for a few months after the first 
atomic weapon was used. And the approach to the Soviet Union at 
the Moscow conference was made only after consultations with the 
British and the Canadians, a move which one source sees as an indica- 
tion to the Soviets of a conspiracy against them. 156 

Another issue in the negotiations which may have represented a po- 
litical miscalculation by the United States concerned its policy on 
eliminating the veto over sanctions. Bechhoefer concludes that U.S. 
insistence on this provision gave the Soviets the wrong reason for 
opposing the U.S. control plan, since it presented an issue which was 
unrelated to the substantive problems of control. 157 In light of the way 
U.S. policy on the veto developed just two years after the opening of 
the UNAEC, the political impact of Baruch's attitude toward the veto 
in atomic energy matters does not seem to have been noticed by other 
policymakers at the time of the UNAEC meetings. Indeed, U.S. policy 
toward the veto soon developed in such a way as to be inconsistent with 
the position which Baruch was striving to maintain. The Vandenberg 
resolution, passed by the U.S. Senate in July 1948, 158 recommended 

,M For example. Dr. Mnrshnll Shulman. Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia 
University, recently testified to a Senate committee that "Perhaps one reason for the delay 
in the Soviet response was the desire to wait until deployments then planned had made 
their appearance, so thai negotiations could lie conducted on the hasis of equality." U.S. 
Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Arms Control, Inter- 
national Law and Organization. Arms Control Implications of Current Defense Budget. 
Hearings, June and July, 1971, 92d Cong., first scss. (Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. l!»71 1. n 246. 

163 For detailed accounts of the positions taken by Stimson and Wallace, see Lleberman, 
The Scorpion and the Tarantula, pp. 138-155 and pp. 334-358, respectively. 

>'■" Ibid., p. in:, 

inT Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, pp. 59-60. 

«»For a complete texl o1 tin Vandenberg resolution, see U.S. Congress. Senate. Sub- 
committee on the t " n i t <<t Nations Charter. Review <>f tin United Nations Charter, t Col- 
lection of Documents. 83d Cong., Second scss., January 7, 1954. (Washington. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 140-141. 


that the United States supports "voluntary agreement to remove the 
veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international 
disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members." 
(These were areas most hindered by Soviet use of the veto in the Se- 
curity Council.) However, consideration of the resolution may have 
reinforced the U.S. position of maintaining its veto power over mat- 
ters of enforcement, particularly those involving the use of armed 
force. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report stated : 

Some advocates of Charter revision contend that the veto 
should be stripped from decisions involving enforcement ac- 
tion and the use of armed forces by the Security Council. It 
should be pointed out, however, that such a proposal would 
be vigorously opposed by all the great powers, who remain 
unwilling to permit their troops to be thrown into action 
without their consent, and by many other members of the 
United Nations as well. Moreover, it is significant that it is not 
enforcement action in a single instance which has been blocked 
by the veto. 159 

Through this resolution, the Senate helped to clarify U.S. policy on 
enforcement in the United Nations, but these principles represented 
a divergence from Baruch's position on atomic energy questions. 

The Vandenberg resolution also paved the way for the United States 
to take an active part in engineering collective defense arrangements 
such as NATO, under the terms of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The 
fact that the United States sought this kind of vehicle to ensure its 
security and that of its allies marked a recognition by the United 
States of a need for alternatives to the Security Council in this regard. 
As expressed in the UNAEC negotiations, the U.S. position on the 
security arrangements of atomic energy control placed a great deal of 
emphasis on the Security Council as the' principal organ to deal with 
questions of this nature. However, this position toward the machinery 
for security matters seemed to undergo a transition, as indicated by 
subsequent U.S. participation in collective -defense arrangements. The 
development of collective security arrangements may or may not rep- 
resent a possible alternative which was neglected in the effort to set up 
machinery for security under atomic energy control. But it may in- 
dicate a general trend which was casting the Security Council in a dif- 
ferent role from that which seemed to govern the atomic energy 
proposals. And as involvement of the Security Council demanded, 
resolution of the question of how the veto would be used, the emphasis 
on that body may have contributed to the failure of the negotiations. 

Given the existing political conditions at the time, it would be diffi- 
cult in retrospect to determine whether a change of one or several fac- 
tors or developments might have altered the results of the negotiations. 
The complexity of the relationships among science, technology, and 
diplomacy is abundantly illustrated through an examination of these 
first efforts to control atomic energy. It is clear, from the perspective 
of this study, that elements of both the diplomatic and technological 
aspects of atomic energy contributed to the failure of the initial inter- 
national efforts to control it. 

159 Ibid., p. 135. 

VI. Concluding Observations 

The discovery of nuclear fission and its subsequent military appli- 
cation by the United States altered the balance of power among the 
major nations of the world and gave to the United States a few brief 
years of exclusive possession of a military weapon of truly revolution- 
ary potency. During this transitional period and until the present era 
of nuclear stalemate, American diplomacy was able to function from 
a position of great military strength with little need to make conces- 

One of the first impacts of the discovery upon American diplomacy 
was the task accepted by U.S. diplomats of doing what they could to 
bring the nations of the world into sufficient agreement to establish 
the international control of nuclear energy. Examination of their un- 
successful attempt to do so suggests several observations about the im- 
pact of science and technology upon American diplomacy and inter- 
national relations. 

In this examination, it is necessary to be aware of a distinction be- 
tween two questions associated with international control of atomic 
energy and the issue of the interplay among science, technology, and 
diplomacy. First one can examine the events surrounding the Baruch 
plan as they exemplify the impact on diplomacy of an unprecedented 
technological achievement, the atom bomb. The second consideration 
arises from the fact that there were certain technological principles of 
atomic energy which determined the necessary technological character- 
istics of the control system. One might call this area the "technology 
of control.'* Thus, the second question to consider is the interaction 
between the technology of control and the conduct of the diplomatic 
negotiations to establish a control system. A recognition of this distinc- 
tion in terms of the scope of this study is important to an understand- 
ing of the following discussion. 
I in pact of New Technologies on I nt, motional Relations 

In light of the way the discoveries associated with atomic energy gal- 
vanized U.S. diplomacy and stimulated an extended and global diplo- 
matic effort, this case suggests that the creation and application of 
new technologies arising from scientific discoveries may so change re- 
lations among nations that a system of international control of that 
technology becomes desirable to one or more parties. Nuclear en- 
ergy is neither the first nor the last example of a technological innova- 
tion suggesting the desirability of international machinery and proce- 
dures for controlling it. Hut it is probably the most dramatic example 
to date."" 

On the other hand, the fact that the diplomatic effort arose out of 
the discovery of fission, a radical development in itself, did not change 
the basic function of diplomacy or the behavior of diplomats. The U.S. 

""Other examples would include aviation, warships, supertankers, ami communications 


( us) 


experience suggests the venerable aphorism : "Plus ca change, plus 
c'est la meme chose." The idealism of science and its traditions for in- 
ternational cooperation were not strong enough to overcome interna- 
tional political differences. Not even an awareness of the awesome de- 
structive force of the atomic bomb provided sufficient incentive to 
nations to agree on a secure form of control over atomic energy. In the 
face of a new weapon which drastically altered traditional concepts of 
war, intense rivalries among different national interests prevented a 
movement toward common ground on international control of atomic 

While exclusive possession of a new technology stemming from a 
scientific discovery may give a nation an advantage in international 
affairs, that advantage is likely to shrink quickly. In the case of nuclear 
energy, the principal disadvantaged country was able to duplicate the 
discovery of fission and to create a rudimentary initial technology 
sufficient to permit detonation of a nuclear device while the negotia- 
tions were still in progress. Yet during this time U.S. negotiators ap- 
parently assumed that secrecy could preserve their advantage for a 
comfortably long period of diplomatic accommodation. Thus, another 
lesson from this study is that it is unrealistic to rely on secrecy, once 
the application of a new technology has been forcefully demonstrated 
before the world as in the case of the atomic bombs, to prevent other 
nations from acquiring or recreating this technology. 

In approaching the problem which the new atomic energy technology 
imposed on U.S. diplomacy, there was recognition of the need to com- 
bine elements of both areas to achieve a solution to the problem. While 
this principle was easily accepted by diplomats and scientists alike, 
members of each profession were not successful in putting the principle 
into practice. To a considerable extent, the differences between men 
like Lilienthal and Baruch were founded on a certain lack of apprecia- 
tion on each side for the manner in which the members of the other 
side approached the problem of the international control of atomic 
energy. Perhaps this case indicates that for science and diplomacy to 
work together efficiently, the members of each field must express their 
respective points of view fully and in terms which can be understood 
and applied by members of the other field. At the same time, there 
must be a special receptivity by members of each field and a special 
willingness to accommodate to the outlook of the other, in order to 
attain the ultimate goal. 

Not only were mistakes made in the course of the interaction of 
science and diplomacy, but there were also a number of miscalcula- 
tions by the experts in their respective fields, as described in the previ- 
ous section. Whether or to what extent these particular elements, 
contributed to the failure of the negotiations would be difficult to deter- 
mine. Total accuracy on the part of either scientists or diplomats may 
be too much to expect, but certainly in areas basic to the solution of 
critical problems, a high degree of accuracy would seem to be a reason- 
able and necessary goal. 

The Diplomatic Task : Combining Effectiveness and Acceptability 

The second major portion of this conclusion deals with the tech- 
nology of control and the diplomatic efforts to cope with it. This ques- 
tion breaks down further into two features of a control system in which 
science, technology, and diplomacy became involved: effectiveness and 


acceptability. The first concerns those characteristics required of an 
effective system, that is, one which merely fulfilled the function of con- 
trol. For the most part, these could be found primarily in the area of 
science and technology of atomic energy, although certain political 
factors were thought to be essential to a workable plan. The second has 
to do with the acceptability of the plan, those technological and polit- 
ical characteristics of the plan which would lead to agreement among 
nations. In turn, those aspects of the plan which promoted its capacity 
for effectiveness or acceptability interacted in ways which may have 
contributed to the failure of the negotiations. 

During negotiation of the Baruch plan, one can detect two absolute 
factors which were peculiar to the efforts to attain an effective system 
of international control over atomic energy: a technological reality 
and a political reality created by the discovery and use of atomic 
energy. In turn, both of these realities created substantial problems 
for the negotiations, and thus for the acceptability of the plan. 

The predominant political characteristic of atomic energy was the 
fact that the keeper of the military use of the atom represented an 
absolute power for a finite period of time. Thus, the control system had 
to be effective in such a way as to exercise adequate control over this 
tremendous military force. The primary problem this presented for 
the United States was the fact that international control affected the 
very heart of its military security. To the Soviet Union, the political 
impact of the United States as sole owner of the bomb strengthened the 
impression of a very real threat to Soviet military security. More 
assurance of an end to that threat would have been necessary in ex- 
change for Soviet renunciation of its own efforts to develop a bomb 
and accept international control. 

The technological reality of atomic energy which was important to 
the negotiations was the fact that the processes associated with the 
peaceful and military uses of atomic energy were approximately the 
same. And it appeared from the outset that the security of a control 
system would have to be maintained through inspections of an exceed- 
ingly intrusive character. The Soviet Union was faced with this pe- 
culiar attribute of the technology of atomic energy which weighed 
heavily on the choices of a control system and which seriously chal- 
lenged the closely guarded society of that country. To the United 
States, a major consideration influenced by this technological fact of 
life was how to penetrate the rigid secrecy of the Soviet Union in 
order to prevent or detect its expected violation of the control system. 
Perhaps also, to some indeterminate degree, this penetration of Soviet 
society was regarded in the United States as an intrinsically desirable 
goal, apart from considerations of atomic control. 

Thus, during the negotiations to devise a control system, both the 
United States and the Soviet I'liion were faced with certain political 
and technological absolutes which were directly opposite to certain 
fundamental features of their respective countries. These features 
were integral to meeting what each country considered the require- 
ments for maintenance of its national security. The negotiations ne- 
glected to reconcile these requirements with these dominating techno- 
logical and political factors of atomic energy in order to attain 
adequate and acceptable international control. 


On the whole, the technology of atomic energy seems to have deter- 
mined the parameters of the proposals and therefore set the tone of the 
negotiations. When obstacles arose in the policymaking process and in 
the negotiations, the consensus was that there had been a failure to 
recognize the technological factors which supported the proposal for 
the international control system. Yet little effort was made by the 
diplomats to come to terms with some of the political problems which 
contributed significantly to the impasse. At the same time, scientists 
who were in a position to influence policymakers in the United States 
and in the UNA EC refused to accept any responsibility for comment- 
ing on the political feasibility of control or the political elements of a 
possible control system. 

Perhaps a guiding assumption among policymakers and negotiators 
alike was that the technological necessities of effective control would 
force acceptance of that control. But in reality, the drive to devise 
effectiveness in the control system seems to have ignored, if not to have 
defied, the need for special diplomatic efforts to achieve acceptability. 

The area of acceptability received little if any consideration in U.S. 
policy discussions. The basis for the U.S. approach may be found in 
several considerations: a moralistic attitude which characterized the 
U.S. negotiating technique, arrogance generated by the notion of U.S. 
leverage, or prejudice toward Soviet science and technology which led 
to overly hopeful estimates of the life expectancy of the U.S. monopoly 
over atomic weapons. 

It is clear that while science and technology alone could devise a 
control system which would be efficient in its task, and diplomacy 
could provide the fundamentals for an acceptable system to protect 
national security, only a combination of the elements from science, 
technology, and diplomacy could be expected to devise a workable 
system for control which would be acceptable to the leading nations 
of the world. 

Underlying many of the conclusions on acceptability is an assump- 
tion that all parties entered the UNAEC negotiations in good faith, 
and were prepared to bargain diligently for a goal which represented 
the promise of assured security for all. It would be virtually impossible, 
of course, to determine accurately what were in fact the motives of 
each country as it entered the negotiations. But it is reasonably certain 
that the tone of the initial proposals could have helped shape the sub- 
sequent behavior of the countries in the negotiations. As it was, the 
initial proposals may have lessened the force of the drive which was 
necessary to sustain the bargaining process successfully. 

In light of the fact that the Soviets were not far from developing 
their own atomic weapon, one might infer alternatively that the So- 
viets entered the negotiations simply for propaganda value and were 
not genuinely interested in achieving a system of international con- 
trol of atomic energy. Whether or not this was the case, not everything 
possible was done by the West to create an atmosphere of trust or a 
spirit of compromise which would seem to be basic ingredients to 
meaningful negotiation. This fact could cast doubts on the intentions 
of the West. On the whole, one cannot discount entirely the possibility 
of some measure of reluctance on the part of both the United States 
and the Soviet Union to accept the idea of international control of 
atomic energy, a sentiment which would inevitably have influenced 
their behavior in the negotiations. 


U.S. Attitudes in the Conduct of the Negotiations 

Diplomats were clearly the focus of action, with scientists in an 
advisory capacity. No radically new participation of scientists was 
observed in these international negotiations. 

The interplay between science and technology and diplomacy was 
not so continuous or extensive as to require direct participation by 
scientists in the negotiations. Rather, the advice and analysis from 
science advisers served mainly to set the stage for the diplomats and 
their negotiations. 

At a time when scientists enjoyed the peak of postwar public esteem 
for their contribution to the victory in World War II, their normal 
role in the Baruch plan negotiations did not extend beyond technical 
advice. Apparently, the scientific approach with its emphasis upon 
objective, experimentally demonstrable fact did not provide a useful 
paradigm for the international negotiators. 

The characteristics of the proposed control plan, as enunciated by 
the scientists of the Lilienthal Board and those of the UNAEC Scien- 
tific and Technical Committee, suggest that the authors were thinking 
in terms of an ideal situation. Many of the features of this plan, while 
considered necessary to an effective control system, presented notions 
which were totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. A possible al- 
ternative in the U.S. policymaking process might have been to deter- 
mine the basic technological and political requirements for an effective 
control system which each side would accept, and then to try to estab- 
lish some common ground between the two positions. With this process 
as a starting point for the negotiations, perhaps the discussions could 
have proceeded to elaborate on the control system in such a way as to 
explore a variety of proposals and arrive at the proper combination 
of technological and political characteristics which would provide both 
an effective system, and one reasonably acceptable to all concerned. A 
willingness to proceed on this basis might at least, in the Baruch plan 
negotiations, have emphasized good faith and signalled an understand- 
ing that each side had its special political problems to resolve. 

Chapter 4 — Commercial Nuclear Power In 

Europe: The Interaction of American 

Diplomacy With a New Technology 



I. Reasons, Purpose, and Scope 131 

Some Reasons for the Study 131 

Scope and Limitations of the Study 131 

Sources of Information 133 

II. Some Facts About Nuclear Power 134 

Fission and Fusion: Two Sources of Nuclear Energy 134 

Breeding or the Conversion of Useless Atoms Into Useful 

Nuclear Fuel 134 

Natural and Enriched Uranium as Nuclear Fuel 134 

Plutonium: A Manmade Nuclear Fuel 135 

Commercial Nuclear Power 136 

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 137 

Fusion Power: An Expectation Yet To Be Fulfilled 138 

Safeguards : Ways To Assure Discovery of Unauthorized Diver- 
sion of Fissionable Materials 139 

Some Limitations of Safeguards 140 

III. From Hiroshima to Atoms for Peace: Postwar Trends in Regional 

Multinational Cooperation in Europe 141 

An Initial Prohibition of International Cooperation 141 

Initial Pessimism Toward Nuclear Power 142 

Changing Technology and Diplomacy 143 

Interest in International Collaboration 143 

The Evolving Scene: 1945-1953 144 

The Postwar Struggle 144 

The Marshall Plan 145 

The Truman Doctrine 145 

Unification in Europe 146 

The European Coal and Steel Community 146 

The European Economic Community 146 

Common Organs of the European Communities 147 

The Commission of the European Communities 147 

The Council of Ministers 147 

The European Parliament 147 

The Economic and Social Committee 147 

The Court of Justice 148 

Financing the Communities 148 

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 148 

U.S. Attitude Toward European Unity 148 

IV. Atoms for Peace: A Presidential Initiative 150 

Origins of Atoms for Peace 150 

President Eisenhower's U.N. Address : 150 

Implications for Nuclear Power in Europe 152 

Legislation for Atoms for Peace 152 

The Eisenhower Proposal to Congress 153 

The Congressional Response 153 

International Cooperation and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954_ 154 

Some Questions From the Scientific Community 156 

Accomplishments of Atoms for Peace 156 

V. Bilateral Agreements for U.S. Technical Assistance to Commercial 

Nuclear Energy in Europe 158 

Legislation for Technical Cooperation in Nuclear Energy 158 

AEC Organization: The Division of International Programs — 160 

The First Bilateral Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation 161 

Pressures To Promote Nuclear Power Abroad 161 



V. Bilateral Agreements, etc. — Continued Pase 

Providing Working Experience With Nuclear Energy 164 

The Research Reactor Program 164 

Some Doubts and Insights 164 

Fuel for Research Reactors 165 

The Power Reactor Program 165 

The Bilateral Agreement Situation in 1971 167 

Additional Measures To Stimulate Foreign Interest in Nuclear 

Power 168 

Allocation of Nuclear Fuel Materials 168 

Establishing Prices for Nuclear Fuel Materials 169 

Financial Assistance for Foreign Nuclear Powerplants 170 

Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Disposal 171 

Authority for the U.S. Nuclear Industry To Provide Nu- 
clear Products and Assistance 172 

A Reluctance To Export Technology 172 

Safeguarding Nuclear Materials Supplied Through Bilateral 

Agreements 173 

Conclusions and Current Issues 174 

VI. Creating an International Organization: The International Atomic 

Energy Agency 176 

The IAEA: A Brief Description 176 

Changing Goals and Situations 177 

The Fruits of Negotiation 178 

The Role of Scientists in the Negotiations 179 

Some Insights From Congressional Review 179 

Limitations Upon the U.S. Commitment 181 

Warnings of Consequences of Failure To Ratify 182 

The International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 

1957 182 

Bilateral Agreements and the IAEA 183 

A Bilateral Agreement With the IAEA and Three Policy 

Questions 184 

U.S. Participation in the IAEA 185 

Initial U.S. Support 185 

Trends in U.S. Support 186 

A Hardheaded Approach to IAEA Functions 187 

A Stronger Role for the IAEA: The Smyth Report of 1962 188 

A State Department Commentary 189 

An AEC Reaction 190 

A Pessimistic Postscript 

The Decline of the Supply Function 191 

International Standards for Nuclear Safety 192 

International Safeguards for Nuclear Materials 194 

Congressional Interest in IAEA Safeguards 195 

Bilateral Versus IAEA Safeguards 197 

Evolution of IAEA Safeguards: A Brief Chronology 198 

Conclusions and Current Issues 201 

VII. Creating a Regional Nuclear Organization: The European Atomic 

Energy Community (Euratom) 203 

Origins of Euratom 203 

Advice for the Decisionmakers 204 

A Target for Euratom 204 

U.S. Support for European Nuclear Integration 205 

Soviet Opposition to Euratom 206 

Three Policy Issues of Euratom 207 

Whether Euratom Should Manufacture Enriched Uranium. 207 

Whether To Include Military Activities in Euratom 208 

Whether Euratom Should Have a Monopoly of Nuclear 

Materials 208 

A Treaty for Euratom 208 


VII. Creating a Regional Nuclear Organization — Continued 

Establishing the Infrastructure for European Nuclear Power... 209 
Financing and Operating Commercial Nuclear Power- 
plants 210 

Creating a Nuclear Common Market 210 

Joint Enterprises: An Innovation in International Organi- 
zation 210 

Early Changes in Euratom Objectives 211 

Research for Nuclear Power 211 

Funding of Euratom Research 212 

In-House Research and Development for Euratom 212 

Dissension, Crisis, and Delay in Euratom's Programs 213 

The First 5- Year Plan (1958-1962) 214 

The Second 5- Year Plan (1963-1967) 214 

Failure To Adopt a Third 5- Year Plan 215 

Plutonium for Fast Breeder Research 216 

The Supply and Control of Nuclear Materials 216 

Supranational Ownership of Nuclear Fuel Materials 217 

Supplying Nuclear Materials 217 

Euratom Manufacture of Enriched Uranium 217 

Some Difficulties of the Supply Agency 218 

Safeguarding Nuclear Fuel Materials 218 

Euratom Safeguards and U.S. Policy 220 

Euratom and Nuclear Safety 220 

Euratom and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Power. . 221 

Duplication and Dilution of Effort 221 

Proposals for New Research Functions for Euratom 222 

The McKinney Report Recommendations of 1959 222 

Views of the EEC 223 

Conclusions and Current Issues 223 

VIII. Joint United States-Euratom Research and Development 226 

U.S. Interest in Euratom Demonstration of Nuclear Power 227 

Initiation of the Joint Programs 228 

The United States-Euratom Agreement of 1958 229 

The Joint Boards: An Organizational Innovation 230 

A Note on the Environment of the Negotiations 230 

The Euratom Cooperation Act of 1958 231 

A Bilateral Agreement With Euratom 232 

The Joint Power Program 233 

The First Invitation To Participate 233 

The Second Round of Invitations 235 

Financing the Demonstration Plants 235 

The Fuel Guarantee Authority 235 

The Joint Research Program 236 

The First 5- Year Plan (1959-1964) 236 

The Second 5- Year Plan (1965-1969) 237 

Conclusions and Current Issues 237 

IX. The Nuclear Energy Agency: Another Regional Approach to 

International Organization for Nuclear Energy 239 

Origins of the Nuclear Energy Agency 239 

NEA Functions 239 

Some NEA Innovations in Organization of International 

Projects 240 

The Halden Project in Norway 240 

The Dragon Project in the United Kingdom 241 

The Eurochemic Project in Belgium 242 

Building the Infrastructure for Nuclear Power 242 

NEA and Safeguards for Nuclear Materials 243 

U.S. Participation in NEA Activities 243 

Conclusions and Current Issues 244 

X. U.S. Fuel for European Nuclear Power 246 

The Enriched Uranium Business 246 

Requirements for Enriched Uranium and Enrichment Services. 247 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 


X. U.S. Fuel for European Nuclear Power — Continued Page 

U.S. Supply Policy 248 

Advantages to the United States 248 

Disadvantages to the United States 249 

Evolution of U.S. Supply Policy 249 

Special Conditions for Euratom 250 

Toll Enrichment 251 

Financing Nuclear Fuel Inventories 252 

The Deferred Payment Plan 252 

Pricing Uranium Enrichment Service 253 

European Opposition to U.S. Enrichment Monopoly 253 

The U.S.S.R. as an Alternative Source of Supply 254 

Supply Policy Alternatives 255 

Maintaining the Competitive Position of the United States in 

the World Enrichment Market 255 

Enrichment Requirements 256 

The Prospects for Expanding U.S. Enrichment Capacity. _ 257 

Sharing the U.S. Monopoly 258 

Some Views of the Joint Committee 261 

The Gas Centrifuge: A Technical Perturbation for U.S. Policy?. 261 

The Centrifuge and Proliferation 262 

Breaking the Secrecy Barrier 263 

The French Drive for a European Diffusion Plant 263 

Conclusions and Current Issues 264 

XI. The Nonproliferation Treat y and Safeguards 266 

New Urgency for Safeguards 266 

The Four Functions of the Nonproliferation Treaty 267 

U.S. Ratification and Support of the Treaty.. 268 

U.S. Support for Safeguards 269 

Safeguards Provisions of the Treaty 270 

Elements of the IAEA Safeguards System 271 

Negotiation of IAEA Safeguards Agreements: The IAEA 

Safeguards Committee 272 

Some Facets of the Negotiations 272 

Protection of Commercial Interests 273 

Inspections and Their Scheduling 273 

"Strategic Points" 274 

Enforcement of Safeguards 274 

U.S. Support of the Safeguards Committee 275 

The Soviet View 275 

Criticisms of IAEA Safeguards 275 

Some Congressional Doubts 276 

Costs of Safeguards 277 

Financing Safeguards Under the Treaty 278 

A Joint Committee Reservation 279 

Physical Security of Nuclear Materials 279 

Nonproliferation and Euratom 280 

Euratom Concern 281 

A Recent Development 282 

Conclusions and Current Issues 282 

XII. Some Issues Recapitulated 285 

Nuclear Power for U.S. Foreign Policy 286 

Sustaining U.S. Technological Leadership in the 1970s 286 

Reducing European Dependence Upon Imported Energy. 286 

Controlling the Possibilities for Proliferation 287 

Demonstrating the Practicability of Inspection for Arms 

Control 287 

Improving the U.S. Position in World Trade 287 

A Potential Limitation Upon Nuclear Power for Foreign 

Policy 288 


XII. Some Issues Recapitulated — Continued 

Foreign Policy for Nuclear Power 288 

Maintaining the Competitive Position of the U.S. Nuclear 

Industry in the World Market 288 

Further Development and Demonstration of U.S. Nuclear 

Technology Abroad 288 

Expediting the Solution of Environmental Effects of 

Nuclear Power 289 

Establishment of International Standards for Nuclear 

Power 289 

Protecting the U.S. Position in Uranium Enrichment 289 

Glossary 290 


I. Status of Agreements for Cooperation as of April 1, 1958 163 

II. International Agreements in 1970 168 

III. U.S. Contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 

Calendar Years 1960-73 187 

IV. Appropriations for Euratom Research and Training Programs From 

1958 to 1971 213 

V. AEC Contracts for Toll Enrichment With Foreign Customers, 

November 1970 252 

VI. Total Manpower and Cost Estimates for IAEA Safeguards 278 

VII. Summary of Nuclear Facilities in Non weapons States 278 

I. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 138 





>H VjV 

Garigliano Nuclear Power Plant (SENN), Scauri, Italy. This 160,000 KW. 
station began commercial operation in November 1964. 


I. Reasons, Purpose, and Scope 

The interaction between American diplomacy and the new tech- 
nology of unclear power during the past three decades illustrates how 
the development of nuclear power has been a resource for U.S. diplo- 
macy and. conversely, how diplomacy has helped the domestic devel- 
opment of nuclear power in the United States. The purpose of this re- 
port is to describe this interaction and to identify issues that may need 
attention during- the 1970s. 

Some Reasons for the Study 

One of the most dramatic scientific discoveries of our time is that 
of atomic energy. During the brief span of 30 years from the first 
demonstration of a nuclear chain reaction in 1942 to date, a whole new 
technology has been developed, demonstrated, and brought into practi- 
cal use in such widely divergent applications as enormously destruc- 
tive military weapons, naval propulsion, generation of commercial 
electricity, and, most recently, the possible civil use of nuclear ex- 
plosives in engineering, mining, ancl recovery of natural gas. There 
exist today 38 working nuclear power stations in Europe in comparison 
with 28 operable nuclear power stations in the United States. 1 

The applications of this new science and technology by public and 
private bodies have inevitably interacted with American diplomacy. 
On the one hand, American preeminence in military and civil use 
of nuclear power has provided certain advantages ancl leverages for 
U.S. diplomatic action. On the other hand, U.S. foreign policy deci- 
sions have been made to further the progress of domestic use of nu- 
clear power in the United States. These decisions have led to the 
creation of not only one but three international organizations and 
to the establishment of a complex network of bilateral agreements 
for technical assistance by the United States to its allies and friends 
to promote use of nuclear energy. 

As the United States and the industrial nations of the world stand 
on the threshold of an anticipated massive deployment of civil nuclear 
power during the coming years, further issues for diplomacy merit 
attention before the pace of events so accelerates that there will be no 
time for unhurried decisions. 

Scope and Limitations of the Study 

The immediate impact of nuclear energy upon American diplomacy 
following World War II is to be found in the fruitless efforts of the 
United States and the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 
to bring about the international control of this new science and tech- 
nology. Although the UXAEC was to continue in existence until Janu- 
ary 1952, it had for all practical purposes ceased to function in 1949 

1 These nuclear power stations are distributed among the nations of Europe as follows: 
Federal Republic of Germany .">, France S, Italy 3, Netherlands 1, Spain 2, Sweden 2, 
Switzerland 3. and the United Kincdom 14 

Note : This chapter was prepared in 1972 by Warren H. Donnelly. 



and with its demise died the hope that atomic energy could be put 
under international ownership and control. An analysis of this inter- 
action of atomic energy and American diplomacy is to be found in 
a companion study of the Congressional Research Service : Tht Baruch 
Phi n : U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age. 2 

The subsequent interaction between U.S. diplomacy and nuclear 
power is the subject of the present study. Since the first use of nuclear 
weapons terminated the war with Japan in 1945, U.S. diplomacy and 
nuclear energy have been closely and continually intertwined. The re- 
lationships have changed over the years from the early postwar period 
when the United States possessed the great military advantage of the 
atom bomb to back its foreign policy and diplomacy to the situation 
today when the possession of enormously destructive nuclear arma- 
ments by the superpowers of the world has brought a period of nu- 
clear stalemate. While large-scale armed conflict between major nations 
has not occurred since 1945, the many smaller wars and conflicts have 
prevented the postwar years from being an era of peace. 

The starting point for this examination of American diplomacy and 
commercial nuclear power for Europe is President Eisenhower's 
Atoms for Peace Plan of 1953. This initiative, together with the sub- 
sequent rewriting of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, opened the way 
to accelerated development of commercial nuclear power in the United 
States, and to greater technical assistance to, and cooperation with, 
other countries and with international organizations in nuclear power. 
Against this background, the bilateral technical assistance arrange- 
ments of the United States are described and also the U.S. relations 
with the three international organizations set up to foster use of nu- 
clear power in the free world: the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Euratom, and the Nuclear Energy Agency. Next follows in- 
formation on U.S. policy and programs for supplying nuclear fuel to 
Europe. The next-to-last section deals with the Xonprolifcration 
Treaty, and the safeguards which it would impose on civil use of 
nuclear fuel materials in Europe. The study concludes with a reca- 
pitulation of the issues and a look to the future. 

Commercial nuclear power in Europe presents an instructive case of 
major interaction between technology and foreign policy for two rea- 
sons. First, the strengthening of Europe during and since the era of 
the cold war has been a keystone of U.S. foreign policy; Second. 
Europe is the only area other than North America where commercial 
development of nuclear power has attained any prominence. Further- 
more, during the late L950's the economics oi the European energy 
market were more attractive for the early demonstration and appli 
cation of commercial nuclear power than were those of the United 
States with its then abundant and cheap energy supplies of coal, oil, 
and natural gas. 

No attention is given in this report to commercial nuclear power 
in the developing nations of the world because the technology for 

nuclear power has not evolved in this direction. Nuclear power tech- 
nology so far has been characterized by high capital costs, rcquire- 

* Lenelce N. Wu. The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Xuclcar Age, A report 
prepared fur the Subcommittee mi National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of 
tiir House Committee mi Foreign Affairs in the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1972), 67 p. 


ments for a sophisticated infrastructure of supporting technical and 
industrial products and services, a need for highly trained personnel, 
and dependence upon the United States for nuclear fuel supplies. The 
combination of these factors has made nuclear power less attractive 
to developing countries than had been hoped for by early proponents 
of nuclear power. Thus the commercial use of nuclear power is con- 
centrated largely in the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan, and 
the Soviet Union. During the period covered by this study, Europe 
has been a principal theater of interaction between American diplo- 
macy and nuclear technology — both civil and military. For this reason, 
and for the sake of manageability, this examination is limited to 
commercial or civil use of nuclear power in Western Europe. 

This analysis is not intended to be a definitive account of the domes- 
tic nuclear power program of the United States, nor of the nuclear 
programs of the several international organizations that were created 
to further the peaceful use of this new technology. Rather it is intended 
to illustrate typical interactions between a rapidly evolving, science- 
based technology and diplomacy, and to suggest some issues for Amer- 
ican diplomacy that may be anticipated as the evolution of nuclear 
power continues. 

Sources of Information 

The principal sources of information used in this study include the 
hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the annual reports 
of the Atomic Energy Commission, and hearings before the foreign 
relations committees of the House and the Senate. Additionally it 
draws upon publications of the U.S. nuclear industry, notably Nuclear 
Industry, which is the monthly magazine of the Atomic Industrial 
Forum, and Nucleonics Week, a commercial weekly newsletter; also 
used were Nuclear Science and Engineering, which is a commercial 
British journal, and the monthly bulletins of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and Euratom. Several books on nuclear energy which 
have been useful for this analysis include those of Nieburg, Polach, 
Kramish,. Scheinman, and Willrich. 3 The report does not attempt an 
exhaustive examination of all of the literature, but rather seeks to 
select materials that illustrate interaction of U.S. foreign policy and 
domestic policy with commercial nuclear power in Europe. 


3 Harold L. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C. : Public 
Affairs Press, 1964), 255 pp. 

Jaroslave G. Polach, Euratom: Its Background, Issues and Economic Implications 
(Dobbs Ferry, New York : Oceana Publications. Inc., 1964), 232 pp. 

Arnold Kramish, The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row. 
Publishers. 1963). 276 pp. 

Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic 
(Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press. 1965), 259 pp. 

Mason Willrich, ed.. Civil Xuclear Power and International Security (New York: 
Praeger Publishers. 1971). 124 pp. 

Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control (Charlottesville, 

Va. : The Mlchie Company, 1969), 341 pp. 

II. Some Facts About Nuclear Power 

The discovery that useful energy could be obtained from uranium 
atoms initially attracted more academic than commercial interest, and 
the first Government interest in its use was for naval propulsion rather 
than commercial application. 4 This discovery, together with earlier 
speculations that the enormous energy of the sun also originated in a 
different nuclear reaction, laid the foundation for the peaceful, com- 
mercial use of nuclear power, and for employment of this new tech- 
nology as an element of U.S. foreign policy. 

Fission and Fusion : Two Sources of Nuclear Energy 

The two basic processes for the release of nuclear energy are fission 
and fusion. Fission is a demonstrated and practical, although poten- 
tially dangerous, source of energy. Fusion remains to be demonstrated 
as a controlled source of useful energy, although its proponents expect 
that this capacity will be achieved before the end of this century. 5 

Fission refers to the splitting apart, or fissioning, of atoms of ura- 
nium and plutonium accompanied by the release of energy and the pro- 
duction of intensely radioactive wastes. For present nuclear tech- 
nology, the nuclear fuel in general use is atoms of uranium of atomic 
weight 235, or the U-235 isotope. In nature, for each 1,000 atoms of 
uranium, 7 are U-235 and the other 993 are the uranium isotope of 
weight 238 (U-238) which is not directly useful for nuclear fuel. 

Breeding, or the Conversion of Useless Atoms into Useful Nuelear 

In the fission process in a working nuclear power reactor, some atoms 
of U-238 or thorium can be transformed into useful nuclear fuel, 
namely, atoms of plutonium and U-233 respectively. If more of these 
'"fertile" materials are transformed into nuelear fuel than are consumed 
by the reactor, the process is known as "breeding. " Through breeding 
it is possible, in principle, to use all of the U-23S and thorium in nature 
as a nuclear fuel. As a practical matter, it is estimated that successful 
demonstration of breeder technology would multiply the energy re- 
coverable from uranium resources at least fifty-fold, would virtually 
make nuclear power independent of the costs of mining uranium ores, 
and would add the nuclear energy of world thorium deposits to world 
energy reserves. 

Natural and Enriched Uranium as Nucleai Fuel 

In some types of nuclear power reactors, the uranium obtained from 
nature can be used as a fuel. This was tin 1 approach favored by the 
I nited Kingdom and France during the l!>50's and well into the L960'& 

'The lirst U.S. Government Interest was at the Naval Research Laboratory of the 
Department of the Navy where research was proposed to explore the potential use of 
nuclear energy fur naval propulsion, 

8 Details about tli«' scientific anil technological aspects of nuclear power are available in 
such sources as Samuel Glasstone's two definitive imoks : Sourcebook on Atomic Energy 
(New York: I) Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967); and .\miinr Reactor Engineering 
(New York : I >. Van Nostrand Company, inc., 1963) 



The natural uranium reactors offered the advantage that a country 
possessing uranium deposits could have nuclear power without having 
to build its own enrichment facilities or obtain enrichment from 
abroad. On the other hand, for technical reasons, this type of reactor 
is larger and more expensive than reactors of other types. To get the 
same power out of smaller, less expensive reactors it is necessary to 
process the uranium fuel to increase the relative proportion of U-235 
atoms from the 0.7 percent in nature to perhaps 3 percent. This de- 
sired "enrichment" can be obtained by several processes. The process 
in general use is the gaseous diffusion process in which a gaseous form 
of uranium — uranium hexaHuoride — is diffused through a porous 
ceramic barrier. Each time the gas passes through such a barrier, there 
is a slight separation of the lighter U-235 atoms from the heavier 
U-238 atoms. Many hundreds of diffusion stages, even a thousand or 
more for a large plant, are needed to manufacture material sufficiently 
enriched in U-235 for use in weapons. Another enrichment process 
that has strong proponents today is the gas centrifuge process. Here 
the uranium hexaHuoride is whirled rapidly about with the heavier 
atoms being forced outward by centrifugal force. As with gaseous dif- 
fusion, a series or cascade of centrifuges is required, for the separa- 
tion at each stage is slight. Of the two processes, the gaseous diffusion 
process requires a large industrial facility and a large supply of elec- 
tricity. In principle, centrifugal separation, if it is demonstrated to be 
economically feasible, should permit building of smaller plants at less 
capital investment and with less demand for electricity. 

Because enriched uranium has been available in the United States 
from the three plants that were built to make materials for weapons 
and for naval propulsion, and because of advantages of enriched 
uranium as fuel, it was natural for the infant nuclear industry to 
apply its military experience with enriched uranium to commercial 
nuclear power plants. As a result, the principal path of evolution for 
U.S. nuclear power technology has been the use of slightly enriched 
fuels. Now, at the outset of the 1970's, this technology has become 
dominant for much of commercial nuclear power in the United States, 
in the Soviet bloc nations, and in Europe. Even in the United Kingdom 
and France it appeal's that many future nuclear power plants are 
likely to use enriched fuels. 

Plutonium : a Manmade Nuclear Fuel 

Nuclear power reactors fueled with natural or slightly enriched 
uranium also produce plutonium as a byproduct. 6 While some of the 
plutonium atoms are fissioned, enough remain in the used fuel when it 
is removed from a reactor to make recovery of this byproduct nuclear 
fuel economically feasible. The recovered plutonium can be used for 
weapons or as fuel for other nuclear reactors. This dual utility of plu- 
tonium is troublesome for world peace : As nuclear power grows, so 
will the stocks of plutonium, which some observers fear may increase 
the risk of theft or undetected diversion of this material to clandestine 
manufacture of nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the operation of a nu- 
clear reactor for power produces a mixture of plutonium isotopes, 
plutonium-239 and plutonium-240. The longer uranium fuel is ex- 

U-238 atoms capture neutrons emitted by the fissioning U-235 atoms and are trans- 
formed into plutonium. 


posed to the fission reaction, the higher the proportion of plutonium- 
240 (Pu-240). The more Pu-240 is present, the less usetul the ma- 
terial is for weapons because it makes the behavior of the material less 
controllable. On the other hand, limiting the exposure of uranium 
fuel in a power reactor limits the amount of plutonium-240 and makes 
the recovered material more suitable for weapons. 

When nuclear power reactors are operated to produce the cheapest 
electricity, the plutonium they produce as a by-product is not suitable 
for very efficient nuclear weapons because of the Pu-240 present. 
"Weapon grade" plutonium should contain no more than 10 percent 
of these non-fissionable isotopes and preferably less. 7 

One way in which nuclear power reactors could be used to produce 
weapons grade plutonium would be to limit the time the fuel spends 
in the reactor to a few weeks, which is about a tenth of the normal 
exposure time for economic nuclear power. However, even though con- 
taminated with up to 30 percent of plutonium-240, the by-product 
plutonium normally produced in present nuclear power reactors would 
still be usable as the explosive material for primitive but still effective 
nuclear weapons. 8 

When the breeder reactors favored by the United States are commer- 
cially deployed during the 1980's, they will produce more plutonium 
than the nuclear fuel they consume. Use of this technology will allow 
many more nations to become self-sufficient in the production of nu- 
clear fuel. Any nation with sufficient deposits of natural uranium can 
then achieve a nuclear fuel cycle independent of other nations provided 
it has enough enriched uranium or plutonium to start the cycle. From 
the point of view of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, it 
should be noted that the preferable fuel for fast-breeders will be the 
same as that for efficient nuclear weapons, namely, plutonium con- 
taining little of the isotope plutonium-240. The problem of preventing 
the diversion of fissionable material seems likely to become more dif- 
ficult as fast-breeder reactors come into widespread commercial use. 9 

Commercial Nuclear Power 

The large-scale generation of electricity from steam-electric power 
plants requires access to an industrial base that can supply the furnaces, 
boilers, turbines, generators, switchgear, and other electrical apparatus. 
Additionally, it requires access to transportation facilities to move 
huge amounts of fossil fuels — coal, oil, and natural gas. To introduce 
commercial nuclear power requires access to industries that can design, 
manufacture, install, and service the components of nuclear power 
reactors, fabricate and reprocess uranium fuels, and indefinitely store 
the residual radioactive wastes. Of these industrial capabilities, prob- 
ably the most unusual are those for enriching uranium and for reproc- 
essing used nuclear fuels. The other facilities are not greatly different 
from those to be found in an industrialized country. 

The enrichment plants that have been built to date by the United 
States and the Soviet Union are verv large industrial installations 

i Stockho'm International Pence Research Institute. World Armaments and Disarma- 
ment: 8IPR1 Yearbook t:>: l (New fork: Humanities Press, 1972), p. 366. 
- Loc, -it. 
ll.i.l . p. 290. 


representing capital investment thought to be beyond the resources of 
most countries. The United Kingdom and France have small enrich- 
ment plants which were built to make highly enriched uranium-235 
for weapons, but these are not large enough to supply fuel for 
commercial nuclear power. Enrichment plants now in operation use a 
process known as ''gaseous diffusion" and sometimes are referred to as 
gaseous diffusion plants. Recently there has been revived European 
interest in the gas centrifuge, and work is in progress to demonstrate 
the feasibility of this process as an alternative to gaseous diffusion for 
the manufacture of enriched uranium. 

Fuel reprocessing plants are unusual industrial facilities. They must 
be designed, built, and operated to process intensely radioactive mate- 
rials. Because the required equipment, processes, and personnel are not 
readily available from other industries, the construction and operation 
of a fuel reprocessing plant is costly and does not offer possibilities of 
conversion to other uses if the markets for fuel reprocessing should not 
meet expectations. On the other hand, the scale of financial and indus- 
trial effort should be within the capability of most industrial countries. 

An undesired and troublesome waste from fuel reprocessing is the 
radioactive materials produced when uranium or plutonium atoms are 
fissioned. The radioactivity of these wastes decreases slowly, and the 
wastes remain dangerous for centuries. While proponents of nuclear 
power assert that these wastes can be made inert and be safely stored 
for many years, some critics fear their ultimate release to the environ- 
ment with disastrous results. After some 25 years of research and 
development for nuclear power, the United States has yet to demon- 
strate on a working scale the technology for the indefinite storage of 
these wastes. 

At present, only a few industrialized countries now have the indus- 
trial capabilities to supply all the special materials, products, and 
services for commercial nuclear power. But many countries are plan- 
ning to build their own fuel fabricating and fuel reprocessing plants 
to service their nuclear power plants. The International Atomic En- 
ergy Agency expects that by the late 1970 's several additional countries 
will possess the industrial base necessary for nuclear power. At pres- 
ent these countries are limited to Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany, and the Soviet 
Union. But of these only the United States and the Soviet Union have 
a large-scale capability to produce enriched uranium for nuclear fuel. 
The Japanese are exploring with the United States and France the 
possibilities of some form of joint international enrichment project, 
while the French also have been seeking partners to build an inter- 
national enrichment facility in Europe. 

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 

From the preceding notes on vital aspects of nuclear energy, it is 
apparent that the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, 
in contrast to conventional hydro or steam electric power plants that 
burn oil, coal, or natural gas, is only one step in a long and complex 
sequence of technological activities that are necessary for the genera- 





TO UF 6 








Figure 1 

tion of nuclear power. The entire sequence is called the nuclear fuel 
cycle and is illustrated in Figure I. In summary, the major parts of 
the nuclear fuel cycle are as follows : 

(1) Mining and milling of uranium ; 

(2) Refining of uranium and conversion to uranium hexafluo- 

(3) Enrichment of uranium ; 

(4) Conversion of enriched uranium into fuel material ; 

(5) Fabrication of fuel elements for the nuclear power re- 
actors ; 

(6) Use of the fuel elements in working nuclear power plants; 

(7) Reprocessing of spent fuel to recover useful nuclear fuel 
materials; and 

(8) Perpetual storage of intensely radioactive waste's from the 
fission process. 

Fusion Power: an Expectation Yet to be Fulfilled 

In the fusion process, atoms of light elements, primarily hydrogen, 
are fused together with a resultant release of energy. The uncon- 
trolled fusion process is the basis for the hydrogen bomb which has 
so revolutionized foreign relations and national security in the 20th 
century. If a controlled fusion process could be achieved and demon- 
strated to be technologically and economically feasible for generation 
of elect licit v. the world would have a literally inexhaustible supply of 
energy. It is for this reason that the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and many other countries are engaged in fusion, or "controlled ther- 
monuclear," research. 

As ;in environmental benefit, fusion would not produce the enormous 
amounts of radioactive wastes characteristic of lission, and could offer 


the prospect of more efficient conversion of energy into electricity ; a 
fusion powerplant would discharge less waste heat to the environ- 
ment than its fission counterpart, thus easing problems of thermal 

At least three major technical obstacles stand in the way of a demon- 
stration of a workable controlled fusion reaction. Optimists expect 
these can be overcome within the next few decades. On the other hand, 
until a demonstration is actually achieved, national energy policies 
cannot assume that fusion will in fact be available to supply energy 
needs of the 21st century. 

Safeguards : Ways to Assure Discovery of Unauthorized Diversion of 
Fissionable Materials 

The nuclear age brought a new meaning to the word "safeguards" 
in international relations. Safeguards are measures to guard against 
the diversion of nuclear fuel material from uses permitted by law or 
international agreement and to give timely indication of possible diver- 
sion or assurance that diversion has not occurred. 10 Safeguards are a 
means of detecting but not preventing diversion. 

Diversion of plutonium produced in nuclear power plants is con- 
sidered to be the chief danger to national security from commercial 
nuclear power. A fundamental goal of U.S. foreign policy is to dis- 
courage nations which now lack nuclear weapons from building fa- 
cilities to produce nuclear materials to make weapons. The expected 
installation of nuclear power plants in many of these countries will 
make available large amounts of plutonium with an attendant risk 
of diversion. The Internationa] Atomic Energy Agency estimates that 
by 1980 the daily accretion to the world's stock of nuclear fuel mate- 
rials will be sufficient to manufacture 10 nuclear weapons a day. 11 

Some observers expect that from 300,000 to 450,000 kilograms of 
plutonium will be accumulated by 1980 in civil nuclear power pro- 
grams throughout the world. 12 As for slightly enriched uranium, while 
it cannot be used directly in weapons, it could be further processed to 
increase its enrichment to weapons grade. 

Fortunately for international security, the plutonium produced in 
commercial operation of nuclear power plants is not ideal for use in 
weapons. Nonetheless, it would be possible in principle to operate 
some nuclear power plants to produce plutonium better suited for 
weapons materials. "With present nuclear technology, this action would 
require the plants involved to be shut down frequently, which would 
be a conspicuous signal of suspicious behavior. 

All safeguards systems depend upon two elements: (1) the main- 
tenance and review of records showing the receipt, production, con- 
sumption, transfer, and storage of nuclear materials: and (2) the 
undertaking of on-site inspections to determine the validity of these 
records. Physical inspection is necessary- to verify the amount of safe- 
guarded materials actually on hand. An inspector must have access 
to the materials to take measurements and, in some cases, take samples 
for analvsis. 

10 The Department of State used this definition in : U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Hearings, Xonprolifcratinn Treat;/. 90th Cong. 2d Sess., 196S, p. 50. 

11 International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards, (circa 1968) p. 7. 

12 Mason Willrich. "The Nature of the Problem," in Mason Willrieh. ed., Civil Nuclear 
Power and International Security (New York : Praeger Publishers, 19T1), p. 3. 


Some Lim itations of Safeguards 

Control of nuclear materials, both because of their monetary value 
and for their utility to make nuclear weapons, would seem to require a 
combination of accounting and physical controls and protection. This 
double control is not now in practice. Safeguards systems do not 
extend to physical protection against theft or diversion, but are 
designed only to detect such theft or diversion. The hope for safe- 
guards is that their detection capability will deter a would-be diverter 
by his risk of early detection and unmasking in the world community. 
This limitation of safeguards has important consequences. It means 
that assuring the physical security of nuclear materials is a separate 
responsibility of the possessing nation. 

A second limitation of safeguards is technical and statistical. Ex- 
perience indicates that large users and producers of nuclear materials 
can never know precisely how much materials they have ; there can be 
no assurance of the detection of every slight diversion. Unavoidable 
process losses and statistical errors in sampling and measurement set 
limits on accuracy. These limitations do not mean that safeguards 
cannot achieve a high level of effectiveness. They do mean that some 
margin of error is inescapable which might mask some small diver- 
sions. The diversion of substantial amounts of plutonium or highly en- 
riched uranium-235 would probably be detected, but there remains the 
nagging possibility that enough materials might be diverted without 
detection to make a few nuclear weapons. The possession of a few illicit 
weapons by a smaller nation, or possibly a non-national organization 
which might obtain the nuclear materials on a nuclear black market, is 
a real disadvantage of nuclear power to be weighed when considering 
the balance of cost and benefit from a policy of promoting its world 
use. Moreover, the higher the rate at which atomic fuel is used, re- 
processed, and increased by breeding, the larger will be the margin 
of uncertainty attributable to statistical error and the greater the 
chance of undetected diversion. 

III. From Hiroshima to Atoms for Peace: Postwar Trends in 
Regional Multinational Cooperation in Europe 

Nuclear power is capable of both military and peaceful applica- 
tions. While the first research aimed at application of nuclear power 
was for ship propulsion, the first actual application was a bomb. It 
was the latter use that colored the impact of the atom upon U.S. 
diplomacy for the later 1940's and well into the 1950's. 

The first postwar impact of nuclear power upon American 
diplomacy was evident in the unsuccessful struggle of diplomats to 
achieve international control of atomic energy through the United 
Nations and the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. As the effort failed, 
the diplomats had to grapple with the implications of possession of 
atomic bombs by the Soviet Union. And even as diplomacy was learn- 
ing to accommodate to the military implications of atomic energy, 
scientists and engineers were adding a new factor as their research 
and development led to the expectation of early commercial use of 
nuclear power. By the early 1950's this optimism began to affect the 
foreign policy of the United States, as its diplomats and scientists 
undertook initiatives that ultimately led to the creation of two regional, 
multinational organizations to coordinate peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, a military alliance for its military use, a worldwide interna- 
tional atomic energy organization, a network of bilateral agreements 
by the United States with other countries for technical assistance 
with nuclear energy, and a treaty to prevent proliferation of new 
national capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons. These develop- 
ments evidence the impact of the discovery of fission upon American 

In addressing the interaction between American diplomacy and 
programs to foster commercial nuclear power in Europe, this study 
gives limited attention to the role of the United Kingdom. While the 
British were a principal partner of the United States in the wartime 
development of the atomic bomb, this special relationship was dis- 
solved by the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There- 
after the United Kingdom's government moved vigorously to estab- 
lish a civil nuclear power program both to supply energy for domestic 
use and in hopes of increasing future export trade. This they did 
independently of the United States and also of the nations that were 
later to form the European Common Market. The British tradition 
of separation from and independence of Europe has persisted until 
recently. Clearly the separation efforts of the British caused diplo- 
matic interactions between the governments of the United Kingdom 
and the United States. However, an analysis of these interactions is 
not within the scope of this study. 

An Initial Prohibition of International Cooperation 

To maintain nuclear secrecy, Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946, 13 terminated nuclear collaboration with the wartime allies 

13 Public Law 79-585, 60 Stat. 755. 



of the United States. The Act stipulated that until Congress should 
declare by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international 
safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes 
had been established, there could be no exchange of information with 
other nations for the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes. 
Xo such joint resolution has ever been introduced. 

As the cold war intensified, the United States began to favor the 
sharing of some nuclear information to strengthen its NATO allies. 
To this end, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was amended in 1951 14 
to authorize the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) under cer- 
tain conditions to enter into arrangements with allies of the United 
States to give them certain nuclear information. 15 

In congressional debate on this amendment many Members indi- 
cated their belief that such nuclear cooperation should be entered into 
only for reasons so compelling as to overbalance the preference for 
secrecy of the original legislation. Clearly, the 1951 amendment was 
intended to strengthen military alliances rather than to foster commer- 
cial use of nuclear energy in Europe. 

The restrictions of the 194G atomic energy legislation upon U.S. 
technical cooperation with other nations are notable for attitudes they 
represent. During the war years, close collaboration of scientists and 
engineers of the allies had produced the atom bomb within the short 
span of six years from the initial observation of fission in uranium. 
Once atomic energy had entered the arena of international relations 
the attitude changed from cooperation to secrecy. One early task of 
U.S. diplomacy was to reconcile the nuclear interests of U.S. allies 
with this legislative constraint upon international cooperation and 
communication of information for nuclear energy. 

Initial Pessim ism To travel Nuclear Power 

Early postwar preoccupation with military use of nuclear energy 
and initial pessimism as to the commercial utility of nuclear power 
concentrated the impact of atomic energy upon American diplomacy. 
With the rapid expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, particularly 
after perfection of the hydrogen bomb, U.S. diplomats for many years 
operated from a unique position of strength that offset the rapid post- 
war reduction of the Nation's armed forces. 

That commercial nuclear power would soon be feasible seemed un- 
likely in the late 1940's. A leading theoretician of nuclear power, Dr. 
Walter Zinn, in draft ing the firsl program for nuclear power in 1947. 
called attention to the shortage of nuclear fuel. Existing stocks of 
uranium ores were judged scarcely large enough to sustain produc- 
tion of a modes! number of weapons, but inadequate to supply fuel 
for future nuclear power plants. Zinn concluded that the only hope 
for nuclear power lay in successful perfection of the breeder. Trans- 

" Public Law 82 235, 05 Stat. 692. 

u The Act amended Section 10. (a) (3) it required unanimous action by the five ('mn- 
ioners on such an agreement and provided further that certain Information about 
weapons nut be communicated ; thai no such arrangement be entered into with any 
nation "threatening the sccuritj of the United States"; thai the data involved ". . . shall 
he limited ami circumscribed i" the maximum degree consistent with the common defense 
ami Miu ri t y . . ." ; thai the Presidenl gel written recommendations of the National 
Security Council ami incorporate these in a determination that the arrangement would 
". . . substantial]} promote ami would not endanger tin' common defense ami security of 
the United States . . ami that before tin' arrangement was consummated, the Joint 

Committi i' "a Atomic Energj should be Informed ami thirtj days pass. 


luting the breeder concept into practice appeared to be extremely 
difficult and in 1947 the chances for successful breeding were said to 
be marginal at best. 10 

The General Advisory Committee 17 shared Zinn's pessimism. On 
November 23, 11)47, the committee expressed doubt that it would be 
possible under the most favorable circumstances for any considerable 
portion of the power supply of the world to be replaced by nuclear 
fuel within 20 years. 18 

Subsequent history confirmed their observation. Even by the early 
1970s, nuclear power accounts for only a small percentage of electrical 
power generation in the United States and of the world. However, by 
the 1990s it is expected to supply half of the electricity needs of the 
United States and a quarter of U.S. total energy needs. 

Changing Technology mid Diplomacy 

During the late 1940's and early 1950's diplomats struggled toward 
international control of atomic energy. Efforts of the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission resulted in diplomatic frustration. Mean- 
while, scientists and engineers were progressing toward commercial 
nuclear power, and the initial pessimism about commercial nuclear 
power shifted to optimism, an optimism that was soon to affect Amer- 
ican diplomacy. For example, in June 1952 a Canadian leader in 
nuclear energy, J. Lome Gray of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., 
said : 19 

We are convinced, even with our present incomplete knowledge of this tech- 
nology, that fission of natural uranium will produce energy that can and will 
compete economically with coal or oil. We are thinking at this stage of quite large 
control power stations. 

A few months later, AEC Commissioner Eugene M. Zuckert 
wrote : 20 

Study of the development of atomic energy from 1942 leads me to feel that the 
strides the engineers and scientists are making are so great that "power only" 
reactors may be nearer than we dare hope for, even though we are still in the 
early phases of research and development. 

By December 1952, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had 
concluded that atomic power for industrial purposes was technically 
feasible, and that the only problem was its cost. 21 

Interest in International Collaboration 

If this optimism was to be justified, prototype nuclear power plants 
had to be designed, built, and put into operation to provide engineering 
and operating experience for the nuclear industries and the electric 
utilities. The AEC wished to get on with this demonstration, but 
its nuclear power program became caught up in the controversy of 
public versus private generation of electricity. One pragmatic solution 
was to build demonstration plants overseas. Arranging such demon- 

16 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan. Atomic Shield, 1947/1952 (University Park, 
Pa. : The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1969). p. 29. 

17 The General Advisory Committee to the USAEC was created by the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946 and for almost a decade had a powerful influence within the Commission. 

18 Hewlett and Duncan, op. cit.. p. 116. 

19 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on .Atomic Energy. Atomic Poirer anil Private Enter- 
prise, 82nd Cong.. 2d Hess.. December 1952 (Joint Committee print), p. 3. 

20 Loc. cit. Reference to "power only'' reactors is important, for previously many 
observers hwl argued that at best nuclear power could be economically competitive only as a 
byproduct from manufacture of plutonium for bombs. 

= l Loc. cit. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 11 


strations became the task of the diplomats. The AEC supported the 
idea of building demonstration plants abroad. In 1952, AEC Com- 
missioner T. Keith Glennan forecast an increasing demand abroad 
for nuclear power: "This demand naturally will arise first where 
present costs of electrical energy are high and this suggests that such 
a program may have an important place in a future Point Four pro- 
gram," J2 Europe was a likely location because it needed electricity and 
costs of European electricity were higher than in the United States. 
thus setting an easier economic goal for the designers and engineers. 
AEC Commissioner Henry D. Smyth endorsed the idea that the 
nuclear power stations might be built abroad with U.S. financial help 
through Point Four funds. He too pointed out that since power pro- 
duction in the United States was much cheaper than in other countries, 
the economic incentive for nuclear power would be greater abroad. 

By the early 1950's nuclear power had begun to attract the interest of 
the makers and executors of foreign policy. Still it remained of limited 
import as the governments and diplomatic services of the United 
States and its allies struggled to assure the survival of a free Western 
Europe. The experience then with a massive outpouring of U.S. fi- 
nancial and technical aid through multinational organizations was to 
point the way for later multinational ventures in nuclear power. 

The Evolving Scene: 191^5-1953 

Eight years elapsed between the end of fighting in Europe and 
President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan of 195)1 The events and 
trends of these years generated pressures upon the United States to 
take new diplomatic initiatives. One initiative was the President's plan 
to foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the world by 
means which included construction and operation of demonstration 
nuclear power plants in Europe. 

These 8 years saw the initial recovery of Europe, the start of 
the cold war. the onset of economic stagnation in Europe, the mount- 
ing of the Marshall plan and the related establishment of the Or- 
ganisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), creation 
of the .North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Korean 
"War. U.S. pronouncement of the doctrine of massive retaliation, and 
the formation of two multinational European organizations for eco- 
nomic cooperation. 23 


Fighting ended in Europe on May 5, L945. The enormous devasta- 
tion on the continent and in the British Isles made survival and 
restoral ion of commerce and industry the imperatives of the day. Yet 
despite this devastation, the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe estimated that Western Europe had by 1946 regained its 
prewar levels of industrial production. Unfortunately, the extremely 
harsh winter of 1946 17 impeded this initial recovery, which came to 
a halt altofrtherin L947. 

-Ihi.l . p. 25 

M While an examination <>r r.s Soviet relations In Europe lies outside the scop.' of this 
paper, there were i" be interactions between these power blocs with respeel ii> nuclear 
power, for background on the general relations, the reader may wish to consult Thomas 
\Volfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1915 t970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 


With the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the elimination of 
the Nazi threat, the Soviet Union gave priority to its historical strug- 
gle with the capitalist world, the leading member of which was the 
United States. By 1047. Eastern Europe was under full Soviet domi- 
nation : the Soviet Union's subsequent refusal to accept Marshall plan 
aid for herself and her satellites decisively ended the wartime alliance 
and there began the period known as the cold war. The subsequent 
struggle short of war pervaded all sectors of society in both the United 
States and the Soviet Union, including the scientific and technical 
communities, as the two opponents attempted to prove the superiority 
of their respective systems. 

The Soviet threat to Western Europe, together with the threat of 
economic breakdown and resulting political instability, led to Presi- 
dent Truman's initiatives of the Marshall plan and the Truman 
doctrine. These moves were deemed necessary because conditions in 
Western Europe presented a power vacuum between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. The United States feared that Soviet forces 
would enter Western Europe, especially through Germany, where they 
already had a foothold. Consequently, U.S. diplomatic objectives 
were aimed at strengthening Western Europe politically and eco- 
nomically until this power vacuum could be filled. 


The concepts of the Marshall plan were announced by Secretary 
of State George C. Marshall on June 5, 1947. The basic principle of 
American foreign policy was to foster closer collaboration among 
European nations. Further help from the United States therefore 
should be given only after these nations had agreed together upon 
their basic needs and had organized to make effective use of aid from 
the United States. Such aid was in the U.S. national interest, said 
Secretary Marshall, because the modern system of industrial division 
of labor in Europe was in danger of breaking down with a consequent 
demoralizing effect on the world, the generation of disturbances, and 
undesirable consequences for the U.S. economy. 

The Marshal] plan continued in operation until 1951. In addition 
to the financial support it provided, the plan also stimulated European 
nations to organize for economic development through the Organisa- 
tion for European Economic Co-operation. By the end of this remark- 
able venture in international aid. the industrial outputs of the United 
Kingdom. West Germany. France, and other nations of Western 
Europe had increased substantially over the levels of 1947, ranging 
from an increase of 35 percent for the United Kingdom to 334 per- 
cent for West Germany. 


On November 17. 1947, President Truman announced to a joint ses- 
sion of Congress that he would propose a long-range European re- 
covery program to support the freedom-loving countries of West- 
ern Europe in their endeavors to remain free. A few weeks later in 
his foreign aid message of December 19. 1947. the President proposed 
major U.S. aid to Europe, coupling this with the Marshal plan con- 


cept of European joint action and also to the national interests of the 
United States. 

Unification in Europe 

Alter the crisis of initial survival had passed, the remaining 
problems facing the governments of Western Europe were three- 
fold : 

(1) To develop an effective system of collective security; 

(2) To sustain economic stability ; and 

( :; ) To foster further industrial development, 
U.S. foreign policy toward European recovery received another, 
largely unanticipated, technological shock in 1949 when the Soviet 
Union detonated its first atomic explosive. Four years later the 
U.S.S.R. tested its first hydrogen bomb. 24 As the Soviet Union began 
to acquire a nuclear arsenal, the nations of Western Europe, saw rea- 
son to seek unity in their future dealings with the Soviet bloc. A uni- 
fied or federated Western Europe also might hope to emerge as an 
independent global power, capable of exercising substantia] influ- 
ence in world affairs independently of the United States or the Soviet 
Union. The European approach to unity featured the creation of three 
international communities: a coal and steel community, a common 
market, and a nuclear power community. 

The European Coal mid Steel Com in mi ity 

A major step toward the goal of European unity was taken when 
West Germany, France. Italy, and the Benelux countries ( Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) ratified the Treaty of Paris on 
July 25, L952, and brought the European Coal and Steel Community 
( EUSC) into force as an independent multinational organization. The 
treaty required that the six members remove all tariff and other bar- 
riers to the free movement of coal, iron ore, and steel within two years, 
and abolish all discrimination against imports from other members. 
Max Beloff of the Brookings Institution sees the importance of this 
multinational organization in the impetus it gave to Western Euro- 
pean cooperation and integration in political and defense matters. 25 

Tin- Euro/" mi Economic Community 

Within a few years the example of the Coal and Steel Community 
led to the formation of two additional communities: a European com- 
mon market . and an atomic energx community. 

The starting point for these ventures was a conference of the for- 
eign ministers of the ECSC nations at Messina in June 1955, shortly 
before the opening of the United Nation's first international confer- 
ence on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Two years later the Treaty 
of Rome was signed, on March 25, L957, establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC), commonly known as the Common 
Market. The treaty came into force on January 1. l!>f>8. 

The aims of the Common Market are to promote a harmonious 
development of economic activity and cooperation among its members 
through gradual elimination of financial and physical restrictions on 
the free movement of goods, capital, and workers among member 
countries: the harmonization of economic policies; and the consolida 

« December R, 1953 

!»M:i\ Beloff, 77" United States <m<! th< Unity of Europe (Washington, D.C. : The 

Brook i n gs Institution. 1963), p. »'■ 1 


tion of a single external tariff. By the close of 1961, internal tariffs 
among members had been reduced by 40 percent on industrial goods 
and by 30 percent on farm products. Quotas on industrial goods had 
been abolished, and the EEC was working toward a common external 
tariff intended to be 20 percent below the average of The national 
tariffs. Complete internal free trade was to be established on July 1, 
1907. Quotas on trade were removed and national tariffs toward non- 
member countries were aligned toward the common external tariff, 
effective July 1968. 

The second community originating at the Messina conference was 
the European Atomic Community (Euratom). This multinational 
supranational organization of six nations to foster use of nuclear 
energy is treated in detail in sections VII and VIII. 


The parallel membership and organization of the Coal and Steel 
Community, the Economic Community, and Euratom led to an agree- 
ment in 1965 to combine them under a single system of executive, 
legislative, and judicial bodies. This agreement took effect on July 1, 
l'.MlT. and the three communities now share in common a Commission 
of Member States, a Council of Ministers, a European Parliament, 
an Economic and Social Committee, and a Court of Justice. 

The Commission of the European Communities: The Commission 
consists of nine members : two each from the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, France, and Italy, and one each from the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Luxembourg. It implements, administers, and enforces the Treaties 
of Paris and Rome. The Commission works on the principle of col- 
legiate responsibility for respective sectors. Energy is identified as 
one such sector, which in 1970 was the responsibility of the member 
from the Federal Republic of Germany. 26 

The Council of Ministers: A Council of Ministers represents the 
interests of member states, with one representative from each member. 
Usually the representative is the minister concerned with the subject 
before the Council, but the foreign affairs ministers participate in 
the most important sessions. The work of the Council is prepared by 
a Committee of Permanent Representatives of the member states. 

The European Parliament : The legislative arm of the common or- 
ganization is the European Parliament, which supervises the execu- 
tive organs of the communities and debates their annual reports. It 
has the power by vote of censure of a two-thirds majority to dismiss 
the executives of the communities. The Parliament maintains 12 stand- 
ing committees to follow the work of the three communities. One of 
these committees deals with energy, research, and atomic affairs. While 
the Commission need not defer to the Parliament, in practice it tries 
to shape its proposals to attain approval by a majority. 27 

The Economic and Social Committee: An Economic and Social Com- 
mittee of 101 members represents employers, trade unions, and the gen- 
eral interest. Its function is advisory. 

:G The 13 sectors which have been identified are: external relations, external trade, eco- 
nomic and financial affairs, industry, internal market and regional policy, competition, 
budget and information, agriculture, energy, social affairs, transport, research and tech- 
nology, and development aid. 

» The U.S. Department of State Fact Book of the Countries of the World (New York: 
Crown Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 785. 


TIk Court of Just i,-e: A supreme court of seven judges sits in 
Luxembourg with power to decide whether acts of the communities, 
member governments, and private organizations are compatible with 

the treaties. The Court can annul acts of the Commission and the 
( Jouncil of Ministers. Its decisions are directly binding upon all parties 
and are not subject to appeal. The seven justices are appointed for 
terms of six years by the member governments. Through 1968 some 
56< i cases had been brought before the Court. 

Financing the communities: The communities are financed by na- 
tional contributions, much as was the federal government of the United 
States during the era of the Continental Congress. From Janu. ry 1, 
1975. the communities are scheduled to have their own independent 
financial resources derived from : (1) variable levies on farm imports: 
(2) customs duties: and (3) proceeds of up to 1 percent of a value 
added tax. 

The general budget of the communities in 1969 came to about $2.7 
million and was financed by the member governments in the following 
proportions: France, West Germany and Italy, 28 percent each: Bel- 
gium and the Netherlands, 7.1) percent each: and Luxembourg 0.2 

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Dt velojmu nt 

Interest in European cooperation extended beyond the communities 
of the six nat ions and led to establishment of a European multinational 
organization that quickly developed a parallel interest in nuclear 
energy. On December 14. 1960, the Organisation for European Eco- 
nomic Co-operation, which had been set up in 1948 to coordinate efforts 
to restore Europe's economy under the Marshall plan, was reorganized 
into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). England, which was not a member of the Common Market, 
was a member of OECD. One fundamental purpose of OECD was 
"to achieve the highest sustainable growth and employment and a 
rising standard of living in member countries, while maintaining 
financial stability and thus to contribute to the development of the 
world economy." This objective was to be accomplished in part by 
efforts to reduce or abolish obstacles in exchange of goods and services 
and by the maintenance and liberalization of capital movement between 
countries. A new major goal was coordination of economic aid to less 
developed count ries. 

The OECD in the mid-1950's became interested in nuclear energy 
and established a Nuclear Energy A.gency. OECD interests extend to 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science policy research cooperation, 
scientific and technical personnel, indust rial matters, and energy prob- 
lems. The OECD is headed by a council composed of representatives 
of t he member count lies. 

/ .S.Attitudt Toward European Unity 

Every I'.S. administration of the postwar period has supported 
European unity and has looked to the institutions of the European 
communities as the most promising way of achieving that unitv. An 
early example of the I'.S. attitude appears in President Truman's 
pledge in L948 that the consolidated effort of the free countries of 
Europe to protect themselves would be matched by the I'.S. determi- 
nation to help them do so. Support by Congress for European unity 


was also evident in Senate Resolution 239, sponsored by Senator Van- 
denberg, adopted by a vote of 64 to 4 on June 11, 1948. The resolution 
urged t be President to pursue ". . . progressive development of regional 
and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self 
defense." It called for "association of the United States, by constitu- 
tional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements 
as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and 
as affects its national security." 28 

The Congress further endorsed unification and integration in Europe 
through the Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1952. In the former, 
Congress specified as an objective of U.S. foreign policy the economic 
unification and political integration of Europe. 29 During 1951, the 
Department of State apparently decided that the political unification 
should be more actively encouraged, and at a meeting between Mem- 
bers of Congress and the Council of Europe the U.S. representatives 
pressed hard in that direction. The Mutual Security Act of 1952 
included a forthright statement of support for European unity : 30 

The Congress welcomes the recent progress in political federation, military 
integration and economic unification in Europe and reaffirms its belief in the 
necessity of further vigorous efforts towards these ends as a means of building 
strength, establishing security, and preserving peace in the North Atlantic area. 
In order to provide further encouragement to such efforts, the Congress believes 
it essential that this act should be so administered as to support concrete meas- 
ures for political federation, military integration and economic unification in 

Through the late 1940's and into the early 1950's the principal 
impact of nuclear science and technology upon American diplomacy 
was the temporary military advantage it gave to the United States in 
relation to the European Community. Although the United Kingdom 
and France had some knowledge of nuclear weapons they lacked the 
industrial base to make them. Possession of nuclear weapons initially 
enabled American diplomats to extend to allies of the United States 
an umbrella of protection against attack. 

But the exclusive military advantage was short-lived as scientists 
and engineers of the Soviet Union developed their own nuclear 
weapons. By the mid-1950's the realization that the Soviet Union 
would acquire large nuclear weapons plus the optimism of U.S. 
scientists and engineers as they surveyed the initial results of the first 
few years of work to produce commercially useful nuclear power, 
had set the scene for a major new diplomatic initiative: President 
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan of 1953. 

A new scientific and technological achievement was soon to divert 
interest from nuclear energy. With the Soviet Union's successful 
launching of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, the attention of the world 
became directed toward outer space. Facing technological rivalry with 
the Soviet Union, the United States, while still giving some attention 
to nuclear power, began its efforts (which are still continuing) to get 
Europe to cooperate in space programs. 

28 Congressional Record, vol. 04. June 11, 194S p. 7791 

29 The Mutual Security Act of 1951, P.I,. 82-165. 65 Stat. 373. 

30 The Mutual Security Act of 1952, P.L. 82-400, 66 Stat 141. 

IV. Atoms for Peace: A Presidential Initiative 

"Atoms for Peace" is the name of a presidential exercise of diplo- 
matic powers to foster foreign use of the science and technology of 
nuclear energy. It signaled the start of U.S. diplomatic efforts to cre- 
ate an international atomic energy agency; American encouragement 
to two European regional, multinational agencies for nuclear energy: 
establishment of a network of bilateral agreements between the United 
States and individual nations for technical assistance in nuclear en- 
ergy: and a treaty to establish international safeguards over nuclear 
fuel materials. These diplomatic ventures sought to foster civil use of 
nuclear energy abroad, ranging from applications of radioisotopes 
for research and for diagnosis and treatment in medicine to the demon- 
stration of nuclear power for the generation of electricity. I underlying 
the publicized, idealistic purpose of sharing U.S. nuclear science and 
technology were pragmatic, practical considerations of advantages to 
the United States. In this way. the idealism of American nuclear 
scientists and engineers was coupled effectively to the support of U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. 

Three basic goals of I'.S. policy and interest in Europe have re- 
mained constant since the end of World War II: integration of the 
nations of Western Europe, the defense of I '.S. security, and the quest 
for East-West detente. ' Atoms for Peace was to have implications 
for all three goals. 

Origins of Atoms for Peoxn 

Atoms for Peace grew out of a frustrating era for United States 
diplomacy. The Soviet Union had exploded an atomic bomb in 1949, 
an unexpectedly early date. Military forces of North Korea had in- 
vaded South Korea in 1950. The attempts in Europe to establish a 
European Defense Community had failed and international dis 
armament negotiations were deadlocked. One U.S. response was a 
policy that threatened "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons 
against Communist aggression. Another was the President's Atoms for 
Peace proposals as an alternative to the arms race. 

president Eisenhower's ct.n. address 

By 1953, President Eisenhower was persuaded thai the world was 
courting disaster in the continuing armaments race and that something 
had to be done to put n brake on its momentum. lie sought "any kind 
of an idea thai could bring the world to look at the atomic problem 
in a broad and intelligent way and -till escape the impasse to action 
created by Russian intransigence. . . ." :rj After discussion with Prime 

*' l ;on1 recent discussion of U.S. interests find objectives In Western Europe from 

the standpoint of n diplomat, see the speech of I»;i\i<l B. Bolen, First Secretary of the 
American Ei In Bonn, in the Congressional Record, September 20, 1971, pp. S14589 


'Dwiffht l> Elsenhower, Mandate for Change: 1953 1956 (Garden City, N.Y. : Double 
day, 1963 I, p. 252 



Minister Churchill at the Bermuda conferences of 1953, and receiving 
British encouragement, President Eisenhower offered his Atoms for 
Peace proposal in an address to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, December 8, 1953. 33 

Speaking first of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the 
President emphasized two atomic realities of the day : (1) knowledge 
of atomic power which some nations then possessed would eventually 
be shared by others; and (2) even a vast superiority in numbers of 
nuclear weapons would not prevent the damage and toll of human 
lives that could be inflicted by surprise aggression. Even against the 
most powerful defense, he said, an aggressor having enough atomic 
bombs for a surprise attack could probably inflict hideous damage on 
chosen targets. What, then, should be done? The consequences of in- 
action were too forbidding to accept. He said : 3i 

To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two 
atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a 
trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of 
civilization destroyed — the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind 
handed down to us from generation to generation — and the condemnation of man- 
kind to begin all over again the age old struggle upward from savagery toward 
decency, and right, and justice. 

The President proposed to promote peaceful uses of nuclear power 
as a way to reverse the trend of atomic military buildup. Nuclear ma- 
terials committed to peaceful purposes would not be available for 
weapons. To this end, he proposed that the nuclear nations of the 
world, primarily the United States and U.S.S.K., contribute fissionable 
materials to an international pool that would be administered by an 
International Atomic Energy Agency. This pool would provide fuel 
for abundant electrical energy to the power-starved areas of the world. 
The initial contributions to the pool would be small. However, the pro- 
posal had the great virtue, said the President, that it could be under- 
taken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any 
attempt to set up a system of worldwide inspection and control. Elabo- 
rating on his proposal, the President said : 35 

The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding, 
storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The 
ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such 
a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise 

The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to 
devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the 
peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to supply atomic 
energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A 
special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power- 
starved areas of the world. 

The President specifically invited participation of the Soviet Union 
and committed himself to seek the legislation necessary for the United 
States to carry out its part of the proposals. 

Within the United Nations, the response to the Atoms for Peace 
proposal was instantaneous and favorable. The speech was scored as 
a victory for the United States in international affairs by undercut- 

m "Address bv the President before the United Nations General Assembly," Congressional 
Record, vol. 100. January 7, 1954, pp. 61-63. 

34 Ibid., p. 62. 

35 Loc. cit. 


ting a persuasive Communist propaganda offensive that represented 
the United States as motivated by "atomic imperialism'" and aimed 
at monopolizing the benefits of nuclear technology through its policy 
of atomic secrecy. James J. Wadsworth, later to become U.S. am- 
bassador to the conference that was to create the international agency, 
wrote that the United States had gained a diplomatic advantage over 
the Soviet Union by making the first overture to the world commu- 
nity for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 36 

Implications for Nuclear Power in Europe 

From the point of view of Western Europe, the main implications 
of the Atoms for Peace message were threefold : 

(1) In principle it would be possible to obtain from the United 
States enriched uranium and scarce materials such as heavy water, 
for development of nuclear power, subject to agreements for ex- 
change of technical information and control of the materials 
supplied ; 

(2) The United Nations would be entrusted with supply and 
safeguards functions via the proposed international agency : 

(3) A great amount of scientific and technical information and 
data on nuclear energy would be released to the world. 

This latter was significant for until then much of the technology 
for nuclear power was kept secret in the United States. 

The first tangible result of the message was an international confer- 
ence on atomic energy sponsored by the United Nations in Geneva in 
1955. In retrospect, the conference was a unique event. None of the 
three subsequent U.N. conferences released at one time so much scien- 
tific and technical information in such an exhilarating atmosphere. But 
the United States, which was the principal participant in the confer- 
ence, tended to oversell atomic energy, which many, if not all, countries 
looked to as a symbol of modernity and greatness. The year 1955 
marked the launching of all-out nuclear programs in many countries, 
with attendant overestimating of promised benefits and underestimat- 
ing of the technical and economic problems of nuclear power. 37 

Legislation for Atoms for Peace 

A complete redrafting of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 legislation 
quickly followed President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposals 
to clear the way for private development of civil nuclear power in the 
United State- and to open opportunities for nuclear cooperation with 
other nations and with international bodies. The modifications em- 
bodied in the 1954 legislation, 88 while permitting expanded interna- 
tional cooperation, also included provisions to insure that this coopera- 
t ion would promote, not compromise, national security. 

m James .1 Wadsworth. "Atoms for Peace " hi J, Stoessinger and A. Westin, eds., Power 
and Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Inc., 1964), p. 35. 

This aspeel of "over ell" is emphasized by Jules Queron, former general director of 
research ; i ml development for Euratom, In liis essay. "Atomic Energy In Continental 
Western Europe," in Richard L. Lewis and Jane Wilson, eds.. Mamooonin Pins Twenty- 
Yeara (New York : The Viking Press, t.iti I p. 146 
••Public Law 83 703, 68 Stat. 919, approved August 30, 1!»r>4. The vote In the House was 
231 for. 154 against, 'i present, and 4.". not voting; in the Senate it was r.7 for, 28 against, 
nnd 11 not vrot inc. 



Scarcely two months after his Atoms for Peace message, President 
Eisenhower on February 17, 1954 proposed revision of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946. 39 He called for expanded international cooperation 
in atomic energy, but was silent as to the proposed international atomic 
energy agency. The changes he recommended were to : 

Widen cooperation with U.S. allies in certain atomic energy 
matters ; 

Improve procedures for the control and dissemination of atomic 
energy information ; and 

Encourage broadened participation in the development of peace- 
time uses of atomic energy in the United States. 40 
These recommendations, the President observed, were separate from 
his proposal to seek a new basis for international cooperation in atomic 
energy as outlined in his Atoms for Peace address. Consideration of 
additional legislation which might be needed for that proposal should 
await, he said, the outcome of discussions with other nations. 41 But no 
subsequent message ever came. 


The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in May and June 1954 held 
extensive hearings on the proposed revisions of the Atomic Energy 
Act. Administration witnesses supported international cooperation for 
its benefits to the United States. AEC Commissioner Smyth testified 
that the requested amendments would contribute substantially to world 
peace, strengthen the national defense and the defense and economy of 
the free world, and assure the continued leadership of the United 
States in atomic energy. 42 Commissioner Thomas Murray further de- 
veloped the case : 

Industrially underdeveloped countries, whose future economic growth is being 
hampered by inadequate or high-cost fuels and electric energy, might benefit 
significantly if the technical and financial problems can be overcome. For the 
industrially advanced nations, encountering difficulty in continuing to secure 
adequate supplies of cheap fuel and electric energy in the face of diminished 
reserves and mounting costs for local or imported fuel, nuclear-power develop- 
ment may prove to be a key element in future industrial growth. 43 

39 Atomic Energy Art of 1946 — Message from the President. (H. Doc. No. 32S) Con- 
gressional Record, Vol. 100. February 17, 1954, pp. 1921-1924. 

40 Elaborating tbe reasons for international cooperation, the President spoke of the 
need for authority to provide certain information and also nuclear materials to foreign 
countries : 

In the development of peaceful uses for atomic energy, additional amendments are 
required for effective United States cooperation with friendly nations. Such coopera- 
tion requires the exchange of certain "restricted data" on the industrial applications 
of atomic energy and also the release of fissionable materials in amounts adequate 
for industrial and research use. I therefore recommend that the Atomic Energy Act 
be amended to authorize such cooperation. Such amendments should prescribe that 
before the conclusion of any arrangement for the transfer of fissionable material to 
a foreign nation, assurances must be provided against its use by the recipient nation 
for military purposes. Ibid., p. 1922. 

41 Loc. cit. 

42 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energv, Hearings, 8. SS2S and H.R. 8862, to 
Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 191,6, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, part II, p. 562. 

43 Ibid., p. 574. This point was made by EEC Commissioner Murray, an industrialist. 


Secretary of State Dulles, after underscoring Soviet military nuclear 
progress, concluded that the strict secrecy requirements of the 1946 
Act no longer represented the wisest international policy for the United 
States. He identified three circumstances that had combined to create 
the need to relax the original limits on international cooperation: 
(1) the developing Soviet nuclear program, (2) U.S. dependence on 
foreign uranium to manufacture nuclear weapons, and (3) legitimate 
hopes for nuclear power abroad. Arguing the benefits to U.S. self-in- 
terest, 44 Secretary Dulles supported the legislation, in part, so that the 
United States could stay ahead of the Soviet Union in providing 
knowledge of peaceful applications of atomic energy. 45 

Replying to a question as to international implications of failure 
to enact the proposed amendments. Secretary Dulles claimed that it 
would be quite disastrous for the United States. 46 

Some members of the Joint Committee expressed concern lest the 
proposed amendments be regarded as an international "giveaway" of 
U.S. secrets, technology, and materials. These fears were countered 
by Representative TV. Sterling Cole, then chairman of the Joint Com- 
mittee on Atomic Energy. He minimized the significance of the pro- 
posed relaxation of controls over exchange of scientific information 
with other countries. He observed that in comparison with the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946, the new proposals made only one addition to 
information that could already be exchanged. This was dissemination 
of information on industrial and other applications of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes. This, he said, was no giveaway. 

So when you hear talk that this bill proposes to give vital information away 
to the peoples of the world, to foreigners, to enemies as well as friends, just tell 
those people who talk that way to look at the record. The bill does no such 
thing. It scarcely enlarges the field of the exchange of information beyond what 
is presently authorized by law. . . ." 

Interna fi oh ill Coopcrat'ton and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 

The overhauling of the Nation's basic atomic energy legislation in 
l!>r>4 greatly expanded the scope of possible international relations 
to encourage commercial use of nuclear energy abroad. In doing 
so it placed new demands upon U.S. diplomacy. For this reason it 
is pertinent to identify provisions of the new law that affected move- 
ment of scientific information, technology, and materials of nuclear 
energy from the United States to other nations. 

41 For example, be sa id : 

In extending abroad, under proper security safeguards, the evolving technology of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, we shall tighten the lion, is thai tie our- friends 

abroad to us, we Bhall assure materials resources that we need, and we shall maintain 
world leadership In atomic energy — leadership which today is such a large clement of 
our national prestige. Ibid., p. 685. 

*» He said : 

Other countries an- making progress In atomic-power technology. There Is n crowing 
tendency for certain raw materials supplying nations which are not industrially well 
advanced, to turn to such other countries for nuclear power information because they 

have l n disappointed by our Inability to give them significant help. It is clear to me 

that if this trend continues, ihe interests of the United states will be seriously and det- 
rimentally affected There is no need lure to emphasize how Important It Is for us in 
■tay ahead of the U.S.S.R. In providing knowledge of how to put atomic energy to 

peaceful uses. ibid., p. <;85. 

M lie said : 

I would lie sorry if (lie international aspect of this hill failed . . . because I do want 
to emphasize with the greatest earnestness of which I am capable that I believe it 

would be quite a disastrous thing fi.r the United States If these foreign policy aspects 
of the hill were 1 1 ■ . i adopted. 

It would gravely Interfere in my opinion with our ability to get indispensable 
quantities of source material which we have to get from foreign markets and which I 
do not think we can continue to get except on a basis of exchange of Information, 
piTlng of information, which is more liberal than that which Is permitted by the present 

I. or. eil. 

♦7 Congressional Records vol lno, July 23, 1954, p. 11656. 


The Congress declared that development, use, and control of atomic 
energy should be so directed as to "promote world peace, improve the 
general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free 
competition in private enterprise." To attain this goal, the Act speci- 
fied a program to : 

. . . promote the common defense and security and to make available to co- 
operating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely 
as expanding technology and considerations of the common defense and security 
will permit. 

In support of this program, the Act authorized the AEC to cooperate 
with any nation by distributing nuclear fuel and source materials, and 
certain artificial radioisotopes. 48 International nuclear cooperation 
would be effected through bilateral agreements for cooperation with 
individual nations or with a regional defense organization. These 
agreements departed from conventional practice. Instead of being 
treaties, they were agreements negotiated by the AEC which were 
simpler to negotiate and did not require the advice and consent of the 
Senate for their ratification. This arrangement was judged appropriate 
because of the many foreign nations that were expected to wish to 
benefit from U.S. nuclear science and technology. 

Congress did place some limitations upon the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission and the State Department in negotiating such agreements. 
Section 123 of the Act required that each such agreement include: 

(1) The terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the 

(2) A guaranty by the cooperating party that security safe- 
guards and standards agreed upon would be maintained ; 

(3) A guaranty by the cooperating party that any material to 
be transferred pursuant to an agreement would not be used for 
atomic weapons, or for research or development for weapons, or 
for any other military purposes ; and 

(4) A guaranty by the cooperating party that any material 
and any restricted data to be transferred would not be transferred 
to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the cooperat- 
ing party except as specified in the agreement. 

Section 123 further required the President to approve each agree- 
ment for cooperation and to make a written determination that the 
proposed agreement would promote rather than constitute an unrea- 
sonable risk of the common defense and security. Finally, Congress 
preserved for itself the option to intervene by requiring that a pro- 
posed agreement for cooperation together with the Presidential ap- 
proval and determination must lie before the Joint Committee for 30 
days while Congress is in session. 

The expanded legislative charter for AEC to foster use of nuclear 
power abroad prohibited transfer of information on design and fabri- 
cation of atomic weapons and limited the exchange of restricted data 
for peaceful uses to six categories. 40 

Since 1954. this framework of legislative policy, program, and au- 
thorization has been the basis for U.S. cooperation with European 

<q Section 54 authorized forelcn distribution of special nuclear materials ; section 64 distri- 
bution of source materials ; and section 82 distribution of byproduct materials. 

19 The six categories included in Section 144(a) of the Act are (1) Refining, purification, 
and subsequent treatment, of source material: (2) Reactor development: (3) Production of 
special nuclear material: (4) Health and safety; (5) Industrial and other applications of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes; and (6) Research and development relating to the 


nations — singly and in organizations — to foster commercial applica- 
tion of nuclear power. It furnished the point of departure for the 
diplomats who worked to create the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Euratom, the European Nuclear Energy Agency, the network 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements subsequently negotiated by 
the United States, and the Nonprolife ration Treaty. Before 1954, 
the diplomats had to deal mainly with the military impacts of the dis- 
covery of nuclear energy. Thereafter, their responsibilities were ex- 
panded to include the negotiations and other diplomatic activities 
intended to secure for the United States the greatest advantages from 
cooperating Avith and encouraging the development of commercial 
nuclear energy in Europe, and elsewhere. 

Some Questions from the Scientific Community 

Some scientists saw the Atoms for Peace plan as raising serious ques- 
tions. One such scientist was physicist Ralph Lapp, who had served in 
tin' wartime bomb project. In 1956 he posed five questions about inter- 
national promotion of the use of nuclear power which two decades 
later remain largely unanswered. He wrote : 50 

President Eisenhower's atomic plan raises some very serious questions along 
the following lines : 

(1) Is nuclear power technically capahle of aiding foreign nations? 

(2) Can adequate safeguards be devised to keep account of nuclear fuel and 
prevent nn atomic power plant from becoming a bomb producer? 

(3) Is the United States prepared to implement its plan by sharing technical 
know-how with other nations? 

(4) Will tie demand of power plants for nuclear fuel be great enough in the 
near future to siphon off bomb material from military uses? 

(5) "What is the danger that we will accelerate the nuclear arms race (the 
fourth-power problem) by aiding other nations in nuclear technology? 

Accomplishments of Atoms for Peace 

The initial objectives of Atoms for Peace were to help contribute 
to a more stable and peaceful world by sharing with other nations the 
benefits of nuclear science and technology, to improve U.S. relations 
with other nations through such sharing, and to minimize pressures for 
independent and potentially hazardous nuclear programs by cooperat- 
ing in peaceful uses under conditions 'which would discourage diversion 
of atomic materials and equipment to military purposes. 

In recent hearings before the House Subcommittee on International 
Cooperation in Science and Space of the House Committee on Science 
and Astronautics, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission observed that 
these objectives continue to bo valid. With the passage of years, addi- 
tional objective-, have taken on increased importance. For example. 
the Atoms for Peace program has enabled the United States to take 
part in the rapidly expanding world market for nuclear noods and 
service. The program is also "providing an invaluable mechanism for 
a worldwide approach to health, safetv, and environmental problems 
which transcend national boundaries." r '' 

60 R.'ili>Ji B, Lapp, Atoms and People (Now York: Harper k Brothers, Publishers, 1950), 
p. 182. 

Statement of Myron B. Kratzer, Director, Division of International Affairs, T T .S. 
Atomic Energy Commission, In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astro- 
nautics, Rubcommltl i International Cooperation in Science and Space, Hearings, A 

General Review of International Cooperation m Science ami space, 02d Cong., 1st Sess., 
1971, p, :::::: 


Atoms for Peace has been unique as a form of international coopera- 
tion. While cooperation across national boundaries has occurred in 
many scientific fields, international cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy came about as the result of deliberate decisions and spe- 
cific actions of governments, rather than of scientific communities, to 
share the benefits of an important new science and technology. 

The basic concept of Atoms for Peace was to draw on two major 
U.S. assets: (1) the knowledge of peaceful applications of nuclear 
energy; and (2) the industrial capacity of the United States to pro- 
duce in large quantities, and at reasonable cost, the essential materials 
of the nuclear age, especially enriched uranium. 

The costs to the United States of undertaking Atoms for Peace were 
to be minimal, inasmuch as the technology to be made available was 
under development for domestic use, while the plants and equipment al- 
read}* existed to supply the essential materials. Most of the capital in- 
vestment in special factories, laboratories, and test sites had already 
been made; thus, the U.S. contribution of nuclear resources to Atoms 
for Peace was limited largeh T to costs of materials and labor. 

In retrospect over 15 years, Atoms for Peace has involved only mod- 
est financial aid by the United States. U.S. cooperation has been flexi- 
ble, designed to meet the needs and capabilities of countries at various 
stages of technological and economic development. With the develop- 
ing countries, Atoms for Peace cooperation has tended to center on non- 
power uses of nuclear energy, particularly use of radioisotopes in medi- 
cine and agriculture. With the advanced countries, particularly in 
Europe, nuclear power has been the dominant theme of cooperation. 52 

Not everyone has been sanguine about Atoms for Peace. W. Sterling 
Cole, after his experience as the first Director-General of the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency, was pessimistic. In the early 1960's he 
judged that the Atoms for Peace program no longer existed; that the 
United States gave only lip the concepts of Atoms for Peace; 
that it was not a distinct entity ; and that it had become submerged in 
foreign aid along with other types of U.S. foreign assistance. He hoped 
that the President would revive and rejuvenate Atoms for Peace by 
setting it apart as a special type of assistance. 53 Whether Atoms for 
Peace has fared as poorly as this is a subjective question. As Cole has 
said, no separate agency was ever given the clearcut responsibility for 
carrying out the Atoms for Peace program. The AEC may have in- 
herited the responsibility, but it did not receive a specific legislative 
charter to take a strong promotional position. 

62 II. id., p. 334. 

M Testimony of W. Sterling Cole. In U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Fnertrv, 
Hearing*, United States Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Aaencu S7th 
Cong , 2.1. Sess., 1962, p. :;:;. 

V. Bii-ateral Agreements for U.S. Technical Assistance to 
Commercial Nuclear Energy in Europe 

Realization of the ambitious goals for Atoms for Peace by other 
nations, particularly in Europe, required U.S. technical assistance in 
nuclear energy. Two well established methods for pursuing this policy 
were available. The United States could provide technical assistance 
directly to individual countries or it could also support and work 
through regional or international organizations. Each method had its 
advantages. Direct assistance was quicker, credit for successes would go 
to the donor nation, and there were the prospects of influence or lover- 
age for the donor in dealing with the recipients. International bodies, 
on the other hand, had a traditional function of setting standards 
and providing a neutral ground for exchange of information and coop- 
eration between nations of divergent policies and interests. In the case 
of atomic energy, both methods were employed. The United States 
through the Atomic Energy Commission has entered into many coun- 
try-to-country agreements — more commonly known as bilateral agree- 
ments. It also has cooperated with the European Atomic Energy Com- 
munity (Euratom) and with the Nuclear Energy Agency of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
to open American nuclear technology to Europe, and is a principal 
member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which also has 
technical assistance functions. 

This section examines direct technical assistance from the United 
States through the mechanism of bilateral agreements with individual 
countries. It relies heavily upon two reports of the Atomic Energy 
Commission which were submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy in 1960 during that committee's review of the international 
atomic policies and programs of the United States. 54 

Legislation for Technical Cooperation in Nuclear Energy 

At the time of the Atoms for Peace message, the authority of the 
Government to provide technical assistance to foreign nations to 
encourage their use of nuclear power was severely limited. While the 
Atomic Energy Act of 194C> 55 provided for a program to share with 
other countries, on a reciprocal basis, information concerning the prac- 
t ical indusl rial applications of atomic energy, this could not be imple- 
mented before ". . . effective and enforceable safeguards against its use 
for destructive purposes [could] be devised." 56 With the failure of the 
U.S. proposal for the international control of atomic energy, this con- 
dition was never fulfilled and the restriction ended the notable col- 

423 I'M. 

P L. 585, 79th Cong., 60 Stat. 7. r ,r, 7:.. 
id . section I. (b)(2). 



laboration of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Bel- 
gium which had characterized the wartime atom bomb project. The 
only cooperation remaining after 1946 was in exploration for and pro- 
curement of uranium ores needed for the continuing nuclear weapons 
program of the United States. The restrictions on technical assistance 
were relaxed slightly in 1951 by an amendment to the Act 57 which 
authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to exchange certain infor- 
mation with other countries about the "refining, purification and sub- 
sequent treatment of source materials, reactor development, production 
of fissionable material, and research and development related to the 
foregoing." Canada was a primary beneficiary of this amendment. The 
Canadians had continued to transmit information on nuclear energy to 
the United States despite U.S. restrictions upon information in 
exchange. After this amendment, the United States was able to provide 
information to friendly nations that were beginning to show an interest 
in civil nuclear energy. Notable among these countries was Belgium, 
which still controlled large uranium deposits in the Belgian Congo. 

In this amendment, the Congress laid down four principles for U.S. 
technical assistance in nuclear energy, principles that were to be in- 
fluential when the Atomic Energy Act was rewritten in 1954. These 
were : 

(1) A prohibition against communications of weapons design 
and fabrication data ; 

(2) A requirement for adequate security standards in countries 
receiving classified information ; 

(3) A determination by the President that the arrangements 
would promote and would not endanger the common defense and 
security; and 

(4) A requirement that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
be informed of the arrangement 30 days prior to its consum- 

The specification of these principles indicates ways the United 
States can control its technical assistance to and cooperation with 
other countries, ways which would not be possible were such assist- 
ance to be channeled exclusively through an international organization. 
The last principle also is of interest for it asserts congressional interest 
in arrangements for furnishing technical assistance to nuclear indus- 
tries abroad. During the early years of the technical assistance pro- 
gram, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy closely examined the 
individual agreements and their administration. The Joint Commit-, 
tee on Atomic Energy held hearings on international agreements in 
1964, 1965, and 1966. 

Congress gave fresh recognition to international cooperation in 
nuclear energy when it revised the Atomic Energy Act in 1954. 5S One 
of six statutory programs and objectives specified in the Act was a 
"program of international cooperation to promote the common de- 
fense and security and to make available to cooperating nations the 
benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely as expand- 
ing technology and considerations of the common defense and secu- 
rity will permit." 59 

57 Public Law 82-235, 65 Stat. 692. 
68 Public Law 83-703. 68 Stat. 919. 
68 Sec. 3e. of P.L. 83-703. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 12 


Additionally, the 1954 revision defined limits and procedures for 
technical cooperation with other nations and provided for certain 
forms of cooperation to be conducted under executive agreements, or 
"Agreements for Cooperation," commonly known as '"bilateral agree- 
ments." Under the revised act, the United States could encourage 
foreign use of atomic energy and nuclear power through various in- 
centives, which included : 

1. Supplying nuclear fuel materials for research and power 
reactors ; 

2. Providing assistance in the design and construction of these 
reactors ; 

3. Exchange of certain scientific and technical information after 
mutually agreeable controls for sensitive materials and secret in- 
formation had been agreed upon. 

The. Congress specified detailed conditions and limitations on nego- 
tiation of the agreements. Section 123 of the Act states that no co- 
operation with any national or regional defense organization shall be 
undertaken until : 

a. the Commission, has submitted to the President the proposed agreement for 
cooperation, together with its recommendation thereon, which proposed agree- 
ment shall include (1) the terms, conditions, durations, nature, and scope of 
the cooperation: (2) a guaranty by the cooperating party that security safe- 
guards and standards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be main- 
tained ; (3) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material to be trans- 
ferred pursuant to such agreement will not be used for atomic weapons, or for 
research on or development, of atomic weapons, or for any other military pur- 
poses: and (4) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any 
Restricted Data to lie transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation 
will not be transferred to an unauthorized person or beyond the jurisdiction 
of the cooperating party, except as specified in the agreement for cooperation: 

b. The President has approved and authorized the execution of the proposed 
agreement for cooperation, and has made a determination in writing that the 
performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an 
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security : and 

c. The proposed agreement for cooj>eration. together with the approval and 
the determination of the President, has been submitted to the Joint Committee 
and a period of thirty days has elapsed while Congress is in session (in com- 
puting such thirty days, there shall he excluded the days on which either House 
is not in session because of an adjournment of more than .". days) . 

The. Act further specified that the communication of Restricted 
Data. 00 the export of facilities to produce of use nuclear fuel materials, 
and the distribution of nuclear fuel materials to another country could 
occur only pursuant to an Agreement for Cooperation. U.S. citizens 
and companies were prohibited from directly ot- indirectly engaging 
in the production of any nuclear fuel materials outside of the United 
States, except under an Agreement for Cooperation or an AEC au- 
thorization. Tn this way. the Act out control of cooperation between 
the domestic nuclear industry and private industries of other coun- 
tries firmly into the hands of ( he A EC. 

AEC Organization: the Division of International Programs 

In response lo the new positive outlook for international technologi- 
cal collaboration authorized by the Atomic Enersrv Act of 1054, the 
AEC established a Division of [international Affairs in November 

••Tlif term "Restricted Data" Is defined to menu "nil dnta concerning (1) design, mnnu- 
f.-K-ii"-,. ,,r utilization of ntomle weapons : ('Ji the production of special nuclear material 
or i •"■ i the use of special nuclear material In the production of energy, bul shall not include 
data declassified or removed from 1 1 n- Restrict**'! Data category. . . ." 


1955. Its function was to develop and direct a program of international 
cooperation for peaceful applications of atomic energy. The division's 
responsibilities included coordination of AEC activities relating to 
various types of agreements for international cooperation; assistance 
with negotiations for an International Atomic Energy Agency; and 
liaison with the State Department, including direct participation with 
the State Department in preparing proposals to be presented to the 
United Nations. 61 In a subsequent AEC reorganization, the division 
was renamed the Division of International Programs. 

The First Bilateral Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation 

The AEC moved quickly to use its new authority by opening nego- 
tiations with 27 countries for bilateral agreements. By the end of 1955, 
agreements with 22 countries had been comj^leted. 

The first agreements negotiated were those with the three wartime 
nuclear collaborators of the United States. Each agreement reflected 
the special and close relationship that had developed between the 
United States on one hand and the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Belgium on the other. The differences among these agreements also re- 
flected the stages of development of the nuclear science and technology 
of the countries involved. 


The mid-1950s witnessed increased pressure to promote demonstra- 
tion of U.S. nuclear power technology abroad. One example of this 
pressure was a report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy, which was appointed by the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy in 1955 62 63 and was chaired by newspaper pub- 
lisher Robert M. McKinney. It urged vigorous measures to encourage 
the use of atomic energy abroad. The measures included convening a 
series of regional conferences with bilateral partners of the United 
States to establish realistic goals for nuclear power; U.S. supplying of 
nuclear fuels and technological assistance for installation of at least 
1000 megawatts of nuclear power capacity outside the United States 
by I960 64 ; furnishing financial assistance through normal govern- 
mental and private channels; and applying of safeguards to such 
powerplants. 65 

The anticipated returns from encouraging foreign nuclear power 
were seen as substantial for U.S. world leadership and also for the 
domestic nuclear industry. According to the McKinney panel : 66 

61 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, 
July-December 1955 ( Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 85. 

w U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Report of the Panel on the Impact 
of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, S4th Cong., 2d Sess., January 1956. (Joint Com- 
mittee print i . 155 p. 

84 One of the four principal instructions to the Panel was to "consider also the effects 
of the application of atomic energy upon economies and industries abroad." The Joint 
Committee instructed the panel to take into account the interlocking effects that such 
development and application abroad might have on the United States economy and 
industries. Ibid., p. v. 

81 More specifically, the Panel recommended that the United States, In issuing invita- 
tions to such conferences, "announce that it Is prepared to furnish nnclear fuels, provide 
necessary technological assistance and permit contracts for the installation of at least 
1 million kilowatts of atomic generating capacity outside the United States as soon as 
possible — we hope by 1960. The attention of the world should be called to the fact that 
such a program would parallel and possibly exceed the capacity installed during the same 
period at home." Ibid., p. 8. 

65 Loc. cit. 

66 Ibid., p. 95. 


... In the uncommitted areas of the world, American leadership in making 
atomic power available could be a strong influence in guiding these areas toward 
a course of freedom. In this sense, atomic power acquires great importance in 
international relations. This consideration should strongly influence our national 
policy as to the rate at which the development of atomic power suitable for such 
purposes is pressed. There is urgency for the development in the United States 
of atomic powerplants suited to the needs of the other nations of the free- 
world. . . 

This urgency which exists for foreign atomic power has domestic benefits 
as well. The growth of an atomic power program will probably not become signifi- 
cant before 1965. A gap may occur for the power equipment manufacturing 
industry between present domestic interest in atomic power reactors and actual 
sales in substantial volume. If the equipment manufacturers . . . are to be 
expected to carry forward research and development directed toward making 
atomic power competitive in the United States, the foreign market for power 
reactors with its high near term growth potential may offer a solution to bridg- 
ing this gap. The potential demand may represent a $30 billion market. 

But this sense of urgency was not strong enough to warrant U.S. 
incentives to the European electricity industry that went beyond those 
offered by the AEC to the domestic nuclear power industry. The 
McKinney Panel avoided proposals to supply nuclear fuel without 
charge, or to pay repurchase prices for byproduct plutonium from 
European power plants higher than those paid to domestic nuclear 
power producers. Also, no special financial arrangements were pro- 
posed. Instead, the panel preferred the normal channels of U.S. foreign 
financial assistance. "Any other course will complicate to the point 
of un workability what should be a straightforward comprehensive 
policy covering international activities of the United States." r,r 

In reference to the domestic concerns that byproduct plutonium 
from nuclear power might lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
the McKinney Panel opted for a two-pronged approach to safeguards. 
It called for inspection rights under the bilateral agreements plus 
reprocessing of the used European fuel in the United States. 88 

By April 1, 1958, the AEC had in effect 30 agreements for coopera- 
tion in nuclear research and 11 for nuclear power with 39 countries. 
Four more research agreements and three power agreements with an 
additional four countries were signed and being ratified. 09 Table I lists 
these agreements. 

•"Ibid., p. 06. 

«T1ic panel said: "We believe the United States should pet on with making atomic 
power available now to these nations. We believe that this can and should be done on 
an Interim basis with bilateral agreements permitting appropriate Inspection, providing 
for earmarking Of plutonium and uranium 233 thus recovered exclusively for further 
peaceful uses. Other control mechanisms for a broader nature can be devised and agreed 
upon later." Ibid., p. 96. 

"•U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearings, Development, Grotrth 
and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong.. '2d Sees., 1958, p. 79. 



number of 
countries Country 

Scope of exchange 

Effective date 

1 Argentina 

2 Australia 

3 Austria 

4 Belgium... 

5 Brazil 

6 Canada 

7 Chile 

8 China, Republic of 

9 Colombia - 

10 Cuba 

11 Denmark 

12 Dominican Republic 

13 Ecuador 

14 France 

15 Germany, Federal Republic of. 
Germany: City of West Berlin. 

16 Greece. 

17 Guatemala 

18 Israel 

19 Italy.... 

20 Japan 

21 Korea, Republic of 

22 Lebanon 

23 Netherlands 

24 New Zealand 

25 Nicaragua 

26 Norway 

27 Pakistan 

28 Peru 

29 Philippines 

30 Portugal 

31 South Africa 

32 Spain 

33 Sweden.. 

34 Switzerland... 


35 Thailand 

36 Turkey 

37 United Kingdom 

38 Uruguay.. 

39 Venezuela 


Research and 


Research and 


Research and 







Research and 








Research and 



Research and 






Research and 







Research and 
























































































Brazil.. Power 

40 Costa Rica... ._ Research 

41 Iran _ ._ do 

42 Iraq do 

43 Ireland do 

Italy Research and power. 

Peru do 

July 21,1957 
May 18,1956 
Mar. 5,1957 
June 7,1957 
Mar. 16,1956 
July 3, 1957 
July 19,1957 

Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, hearings, "Development, Growth and State of the Atomic 
Energy Industry," 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, p. 79. 


Providing Working Experience with Nuclear Energy 

For the United States to share the benefits of nuclear energy with 
other countries, particularly those of Europe, required a growing cadre 
of trained scientists and engineers in those countries. One way to ex- 
pose these technologists to U.S. nuclear technology was for them to be 
trained at and work in the laboratories of the AEC. Arrangements 
to this end were included in the bilateral agreements for cooperation. 
Another way was to encourage the installation and use of nuclear re- 
actors abroad which would provide still more experience for local 
scientists and engineers. Arrangements to this end were negotiated 
by the AEC and the Department of State with many countries. Some 
agreements provided for help in obtaining research reactors, others 
extended to demonstration nuclear power plants. The latter were to be 
of particular importance for fostering commercial nuclear energy in 


U.S. efforts to get research reactors into the hands of scientists and 
engineers abroad began November 5, 1054. At that time Ambassador 
Henry Cabot Lodge announced to the U.N. General Assembly that the 
United States was prepared to negotiate bilateral agreements with 
other nations. These agreements would commit the United States to 
supply technical assistance and nuclear fuel materials for the construc- 
tion and operation of research reactors. By the end of 1955, the AEC 
reported that agreements for the exchange of information on design, 
const ruction, and operation of research reactor- included the couut ries 
Japan, Lebanon, Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, 
the Republic of China, Spain. Switzerland. Turkey, and Venezuela/ 

On June 11. 1955, President Eisenhower at Pennsylvania State Uni- 
versity outlined new programs to enlarge the scope of U.S. assistance 
to other nations in development of research and power reactor projects 
under agreements with other nations or through the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. For research reactors the President proposed 
that the United States* would contribute half the cost and furnish the 
nuclear fuel needed. lie said : 71 

We propose to offer research reactors to the people of free nations who can 
use them effectively for die acquisition of the skills and understanding essential 
to peaceful atomic progress. The United states, in the spirit of partnership that 
moves as. will contrihute half the cost. We will also furnish the acquiring na- 
tion the unclear material needed to fuel the reactor. 

To keep the commitment within bounds, the arrangements for fi- 
nancing set a limit of $350,000 upon the U.S. contribution, which was 
to he paid in dollars to the cooperating nation after it had completed 
the project and certified the completion. By the end of 1!K>7. six re- 
search reactors of US. manufacture were in operation abroad and 10 
others were under construction or on order. The total US. commitment 
at thai time was $2.4 million for the research reactor projects. 

Some doubts and insights: Several years later, in 1964, the Joint 
( Jommittee \ oiced some reserval ions as to the accomplishments of the 

7 " r s. Atomic Energv Commission, Major ictirities in the Itomic Energy Programs, 
.lulu December 1955 (Washington, D.C. : U.'S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 85. 

71 r.S atomic Energy Commission, Eighteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (Washington, D.C. : r.s. Government Printing Office, 1055), p. 13. 


research reactor program. By then a total of 26 grants had been made 
to 12 countries which had established atomic energy programs. While 
the initial purpose of this program had been to provide scientists with 
working experience with nuclear reactors, some nations sought posses- 
sion of a research reactor as a symbol of national prestige although 
they lacked the trained scientists to operate them. The AEC was 
faced with a touchy international issue. Rather than offend some na- 
tions by refusing them research reactors, the AEC often installed them 
in countries that could not use them effectively. 72 

Today there is little mention of these research reactors. For the in- 
dustrial countries, they have served their initial purpose and have 
been bypassed by more modern reactors for experimentation and the 
training of nuclear scientists and engineers: for the developing coun- 
tries the reactors, while perhaps a mark of prestige, did not appre- 
ciably accelerate the use of atomic energy. In retrospect, the research 
reactor program raises the question of how far a highly industrialized, 
technological nation should go in providing sophisticated equipment 
to countries lacking the personnel or the industrial base to use it effec- 
tively. There is also the question of the extent to which scientific and 
technical manpower assigned to these research reactors in the develop- 
ing nations could have been more profitably assigned to other work of 
greater short term benefits. 

Fuel for research reactors : Initially the United States limited its 
offer to supply nuclear fuel for research and test reactors to material 
of 20 percent enrichment or less, which could not be readily used for 
clandestine manufacture of nuclear weapons. By 1956, the desire of 
the industrial nations for improved research and test reactors had 
caused the United States to announce a major revision in policy which 
permitted the export of uranium enriched up to 90 percent for use in 
special testing reactors. This raised the safeguards issue. The United 
States required the recipient nations to accept comprehensive controls 
and safeguards. 

Two years later, in 1958, this policy was liberalized when the 
AEC announced that highly enriched fuel could be supplied for 
research as well as test reactors. The following year, in 1959, the 
AEC announced its intention to lease such materials to foreign 
countries either through the International Agency or through bilat- 
eral agreements. 


If the United States wished to demonstrate the use of U.S. nuclear 
power technology in Europe, it had to attract the interest of European 
utilities. The "power agreements" were the means to this end. In his 
June 11, 1955 announcement, President Eisenhower said : 73 

72 The USAEC commented on this as follows : 

During the recent hearings on our agreements for cooperation, we discussed the matter 
of follow-up on the research reactor grants which had been made to developing countries. 
Information on these grant reactors is received from a variety of sources such as reports 
by our AEC scientific representatives, reports by IAEA technical teams and consultants, 
and reports by United States scientists. From these reports we are able to obtain an 
idea of the extent to which these reactors arc being utilized. In general, we have con- 
cluded that these reactors are making a contribution to the scientific program of the 
country but they are also capable of being used to a greater degree. Cf. U.S. Congress, 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agreements for Cooperation, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess.. 1964, p. 127. 

73 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Eighteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, January-June 1955, op. cit., p. 13. 


Within prudent security considerations, we propose to make available to the 
peoples of such friendly nations as are prepared to invest their own funds in 
power reactors, access to and training in the technological processes of construc- 
tion and operation for peaceful purposes. 

By the end of 1955, several countries had initiated negotiations in 
response to this invitation. Early in 1956, negotiations were concluded 
with the governments of Australia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland 
for the iirst bilateral agreements for power reactor projects. The agree- 
ments provided for the transfer of Restricted Data 74 and special nu- 
clear materials. They also provided for sale of nuclear fuel materials 
to each country, with the United States retaining an option to the plu- 
tonium produced and the right to approve the transfer of such pluto- 
nium to any other nation or to an international organization if the 
United States decided not to exercise its option. Additionally, subject 
to limitations of available space, facilities, and personnel, the United 
States and its bilateral partners agreed to open their specialized nu- 
clear research facilities to each other. 

The first bilateral agreement for nuclear power development also 
opened the way for direct relations between representatives of the U.S. 
nuclear industry and private individuals and organizations in the 
cooperating nations, thus removing the AEC as a direct participant in 
commercial dealings. Other provisions of the bilateral arrangements 
provided for: 75 

(1) Patent arrangements covering inventions or discoveries 
resulting from the exchange of Restricted Data; 

(2) Security and safeguards arrangements to protect classified 
information and equipment and nuclear materials; 

(3) Future consultation about transfer of rights or responsibil- 
ities of the agreement, particularly those relating to safeguards 
to the International Atomic Energy as might be mutually agreed 
upon, and 

(4) Disclaiming of any warranty by the communicating Party 
on the accuracy and completeness of information, material, equip- 
ment or devices transferred under the agreement and of its suit- 
ability for any particular use or application. 

74 At that time exchange of Restricted Data was significant, for much of nuclear power 
technology was still classified ami unavailable In open literature. The Restricted Data to 
lie exchanged Included: (1) general Information on research reactors, experimental and 
demonstration power reactors; (2) technical Information as mighl lie agreed upon for 
specific research ami demonstration power reactors; and (3) the exchange of classified 
information on reactor materials, specifications, physics and engineering, and also of 
environmental safety information. Restricted Data of military Significance were not to be 
exch.i aged. 

" It should he noted that this disclaimer was also used by the UISAEC for information, 
materials, devices, services, etc., that It supplied to the domestic nuclear Industry and 
so was not unique to the bilateral agreements. 


The term of each of the first bilateral agreements was 10 years. 

By l ( .>r>7. advancing technology of nuclear power led several Euro- 
pean countries to the initiation of negotiations with the United States 
for the transfer of large quantities of nuclear fuel for specific power 
projects. Such arrangements were requested by the governments of 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Union of 
South Africa. Subsequent bilateral agreements with the European 
nations were considered as interim measures pending the establish- 
ment of the Euratom Supply Agency. 

A decade later, nuclear power was so far advanced in Europe that 
availability of nuclear fuel to cover long-term requirements for nu- 
clear power programs became a subject for negotiation. New bilateral 
power agreements were negotiated which committed the United States 
to supply nuclear fuel over a term of 30 years to Switzerland and 
Sweden, and for 10 years to the United Kingdom. These agreements 
also reflected an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act in 1064 76 
which permitted private ownership of nuclear fuel materials, opening 
the way for wholly commercial transactions between companies in the 
U.S. nuclear industry and customers abroad in countries having bi- 
lateral agreements with the United States. These new agreements also 
specified that the IAEA would promptly be requested to assume re- 
sponsibility for applying safeguards to the material transferred under 
agreements. In addition, the agreements committed the United States 
to supply nuclear fuel materials to these governments, or to enrich 
uranium supplied by them. 7? 

The Bilateral Agreement Situation in 1971 

At the end of 1971, the AEC had in effect 34 Agreements for Coop- 
eration in Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States 
and other nations or groups of nations. These agreements covered co- 
operation and technical assistance in the development of peaceful uses 
of atomic energy, and provided for the supply of nuclear materials, 
the exchange of scientific and technical information, and for the safe- 
guarding of U.S.-supplied nuclear materials. Table II listing these 
agreements as of 1970 is the latest list published by the AEC. 

■« Public Law 88-489, 78 Stat. 602. 

77 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, 
January-December 1966 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 
p. 263. 



Effective Termination 
Scope date date 


Argentina Research and power ___ July 25,1969 July 24,1999 

Australia May 28,1957 May 27,1997 

Austria... do Jan. 24,1970 Jan. 23,2000 

Brazil Research... Nov. 9,1966 Aug. 2,1975 

Canada . Research and power July 21,1955 July 13,1980 

China, Republic of Research ...July 18,1955 July 17,1974 

Colombia do Mar. 29,1963 Mar. 28,1977 

Denmark do. July 25,1955 July 24,1973 

Finland Research and power July 7,1970 July 6,2000 

Greece Research Aug. 4,1955 Aug. 3,1974 

India Power Oct. 25,1963 Oct. 24,1993 

Indonesia Research... Sept. 21,1960 Sept. 20, 1980 

Iran Apr. 27,1959 Apr. 26,1979 

Ireland do July 9,1958 July 8,1978 

Israel do July 12,1955 Apr. 11,1975 

Italy . Research and power Apr. 15,1958 Apr. 14,1978 

Japan do July 10,1968 July 9,1998 

Korea. Research Feb. 3,1956 Feb. 2,1976 

Norway Research and power... June 8,1967 June 7,1997 

Philippines July 19,1968 July 18,1998 

Portugal. Research .July 19,1969 July 18,1979 

South Africa. Research and power Aug. 22,1957 Aug. 21,1977 

Spain do Feb. 12,1958 Feb. 11.1988 

Sweden do... _ Sept. 15,1966 Sept. 14, 1996 

Switzerland do Aug. 8,1966 Aug. 7,1996 

Thailand Research Mar. 13,1956 Mar. 12,1975 

Turkey do June 10,1965 June 9,1971 

United Kingdom..- July 21,1955 July 20.1976 

United Kingdom.. Power July 15,1966 July 14,1976 

Venezuela.. Research and power .• Feb. 9,1960 Feb. 8.1980 

Vietnam Research July 1,1959 June 30.1974 

Special arrangement: 

United States-U.S.S.R... Memorandum on cooperation on the peace- Feb. 10,1970 Oec. 31,1971 

ful uses of atomic energy. 

United States-Romania do Jan. 1,1969 Dec. 31,1970 



European Atomic Energy Community Joint nuclear power program Feb. 18,1959 Dec. 31,1985 


Euratom Additional agreement to joint nuclear July 25,1960 Dec. 31,1995 

power program. 

International Atomic Energy Agency Supply of materials, etc Aug. 7,1959 Aug. 6,1979 


Source: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1970, Wash- 
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, appendix 6. 

Additional N< asures to Stimulate Foreign Inti n st in. Nuch ar Pan-, r 
The bilateral power agreements provided incentives to European, 
and other governments to push ahead with use of nuclear power. I*. S. 
measures to foster this interest through these agreements included 
allocations of fuel materials, firm pricing policies, financial aid for 
purchase of nuclear fuel, authority for the U.S. nuclear industry to 
deal with its foreign counterparts, and declassification of nuclear 
power teclmology. These are briefly discussed below. 


On February 22, L956, at the recommendation of the 4EC and with 
the Departments of State nnd Defense concurring, President Eisen- 
hower announced that the Government would make available 40.000 
kilograms of uranium-235 t-> assist industrial power development and 
research within the United States and abroad. Of this material, 20,000 


kilograms were allocated for foreign bilateral partners of the United 
States. The President also committed the AEC to recommend alloca- 
tion of additional supplies as further projects undertaken by the 
domestic nuclear industry and by other nations might require. 78 AEC 
Chairman Strauss described this action as the most important step 
toward peaceful use of atomic energy since revision of the Atomic 
Energy Act in 1954. Concurrently, he noted that the action affirmed 
the United States intention to make fuel available for the expected 
working lifetime of bilateral power reactor projects. 79 

A year later, in July 1957, the President approved an additional 
allocation of uranium-235 for domestic and foreign use, bringing the 
total to 100,000 kilograms. Of this, 50,000 kilograms were allocated for 
foreign use. Based on then current prices, the nuclear fuel allocated 
for foreign use was worth about $850 million. The AEC has been care- 
ful to emphasize that the supplying of this nuclear material was not a 
gift and that payment would be required. 


If the commercial nuclear power industry in Europe was to use U.S. 
nuclear fuel and U.S. nuclear power technology, the European users 
had to know what they would have to pay for enriched uranium. The 
first U.S. announcement of prices came at the opening of the first 
international conference on atomic energy in Geneva on August 8, 
1955. There the AEC announced a price for enriched uranium and 
also prices for natural uranium and for heavy water. 80 

The Geneva announcement, however, was indefinite on many details. 
To minimize these uncertainties, the President announced on Novem- 
ber 18, 1956, detailed terms and conditions for U.S. supply of nuclear 
fuel materials. In a subsequent amplification of the President's 
announcement, AEC Chairman Strauss said that this measure to 
accelerate foreign use of nuclear power under Atoms for Peace 
included : 81 

(1) Establishment of a schedule of charges for uranium-235 
which were to be the same as those for the domestic nuclear 

(2) Adoption of a policy of assurances to bilateral partners of 
the United States that the Commission was prepared to furnish 
uranium-235 in quantities based on estimated fuel requirements 
for specific nuclear power plants for periods longer than 10 years. 

(3) Establishment of prices that the Commission would pay 
for plutonium and uranium 233 produced in foreign nuclear power 
reactors which used United States fuel. The United States would 
use nuclear materials so acquired only for peaceful purposes. 

78 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Twentieth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (Washington, D.C : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. ix. 
78 Loc. clt. 

80 The price set for uranium enriched up to 20 percent was placed at $25 per grnm of 
uranium-235 contained ; natural uranium metal was priced at' $40 a kilogram ; and heavy 
water at $28 a pound. Cf. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in Atomic 
Energy Programs, J uly-Decemher 1955 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1056). p. 80. 

Heavy water at the time was a key material for one kind of nuclear power re.ictor 
which offered improved prospects for using natural uranium for fuel. This technology 
Is currently being developed and used by the Canadian nuclear power Industry. 

81 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Radiation Safety and Major Activities in Atomic 
Energy Programs, July-December 1956 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1057), p. 339. 


(4) Reaffirmation of the earlier Commission decision to pur- 
chase all plutonium and uranium 233 produced in foreign nuclear 
power plants from fuel supplied by the United States through 
June 30, 1963, subject to availability of appropriations. 


In extending special incentives to encourage foreign use of nuclear 
power, the U.S. Government faced a dilemma. On the one hand it was 
well established that the AEC should treat domestic and foreign users 
of nuclear power alike. On the other, special incentives were seen nec- 
essary to induce foreign utilities and governments to risk investment 
in demonstration nuclear power plants. For example, it would have 
been advantageous to lease nuclear fuel to foreign users, which would 
have offered the incentive of a lessened capital outlay. However, at that 
time the domestic nuclear industry was evolving rapidly toward self- 
sufficiency and the AEC required it to buy enriched uranium outright 
rather than lease it. Likewise, while the AEC would fund research 
and development for domestic nuclear power demonstrations, it would 
not share in the requisite capital investment. 

The dilemma was resolved in October 1956 by providing special 
assistance to foreign nuclear power projects through a different chan- 
nel which was not available to the domestic nuclear industry. The AEC 
and the Export-Import Bank agreed upon joint action to help finance 
the construction of nuclear power plants in nations having bilateral 
agreements with the United States. This arrangement was judged nec- 
essary because of the still undemonstrated economics of nuclear power 
and the known higher capital investment required for nuclear power 
plants in comparison with conventional fossil fueled power plants. The 
Bank announced its willingness to consider applications for loans to 
cover the capital costs of nuclear power plants for privately owned, but 
not state owned, utilities abroad. The announcement indicated that the 
terms for such loans would be similar to those for the financing of con- 
ventional power plants for which equipment and technical services 
were obtained from the United States. The Bank indicated that it 
would require the following for a nuclear power project: 82 

(1) A comprehensive engineering survev : 

(2) A technical report by the United States Atomic Energy 

(3) An arrangement for supply of the nuclear fuel for the 
term of the loan: 

(I) Evidence of overall financial and economic soundness: 

(5) Evidence of availability of funds to defray the costs which 
must be met with local currency : and 

(6) Assurance as to the ability of the country to service the 
dollar debt involved. 

The Bank made clear that funds so loaned could be used only to buy 
equipment, materials, and technical services from the U.S. nuclear 

-is Atomic Energy Commission. Radiation Safety and Major Activities in the 
Atomic Pneryy Programs, July-December J956, op. cit., p. 15. 



Commercial use of nuclear energy requires many auxiliary technical 
services and products. One such service, the reprocessing of used nu- 
clear fuels, received special attention during efforts of the United 
States to stimulate commercial nuclear power in Europe. Since a key 
U.S. incentive was the offer to repurchase plutonium or residual ura- 
nium-235 from European power reactors, there naturally arose the 
question of who would reprocess these fuel materials. The question 
was made somewhat more complex by the domestic policy of the 
United States, which sought to establish a self-sufficient nuclear in- 
dustry. During the 1950s one missing link in the U.S. nuclear industry 
was a capability to reprocess used fuels and to store the intensely radio- 
active wastes separated from the used nuclear fuels. 

Domestic policy was announced by the AEC on February 18, 1957, 
when it committed itself to contract with domestic reactor operators to 
reprocess their fuel through June 30, 1967. However, as the AEC at 
that time lacked statutory authority to extend this offer to foreign re- 
actor operators, there remained a gap in the technical services needed 
to promote nuclear power in Europe. In 1957 the Commission pro- 
posed to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that the Atomic 
Energy Act be amended to authorize the Commission to enter into con- 
tracts to reprocess nuclear fuels from foreign power reactors, provided 
that comparable services were available to the domestic nuclear in- 
dustry. The Joint Committee, in favorably reporting this legislation, 
amended it to require that the term of such reprocessing contracts be 
limited to the term of the bilateral agreement in effect, or to compa- 
rable periods offered to the domestic nuclear power plants. In recom- 
mending this action, the Joint Committee underscored the principle 
that while the United States could offer technical aid and assistance 
through the Commission, it could not offer special terms and conditions 
unavailable to the domestic nuclear industry. 83 

The new authority was not used until after nearly 5 years, when 
the first return shipment of used nuclear fuel arrived from Sweden 
and was sent to the AEC's Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The 
costs of processing and shipping were paid by Sweden, which in turn 
received credit for the plutonium and residual uranium-235 recovered 
from the fuel. 84 The intensely radioactive wastes left over from the re- 
covery were stored at the Idaho plant with similar wastes from do- 
mestic fuel. 

Later, when commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plants began to 
be built, the AEC negotiated bilateral agreements wherein it had the 
option to decide whether the reprocessing would be done in its facilities 
or in those of the domestic nuclear industry. In this way the AEC 
hoped to expand the market for the U.S. fuel reprocessors. 

While much was made of the arrangements for fuel reprocessing 
during the late 1950's, the unexpectedly slow growth of nuclear power 
in Europe and the high cost of shipping the intensely radioactive, 
used nuclear fuels combined to limit their return flow to the United 

83 The new authority was given to the Commission in Public Law 85-681, 72 Stat. 632. 

H U.S. Atomic Energv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 

Commission for 1963 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 236. 


States. These factors, in turn, have limited the market of the U.S. 
nuclear fuel reprocessors and also have kept in Europe the radioactive 
wastes associated with the used fuels. 



Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, private firms of the infant 
U.S. nuclear industry could not deal directly with potential customers 
in Europe but had to work through the AEC. This cumbersome proc- 
ess was not suited to the promotional attitude of the U.S. industry. 
Soon after revision of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, the AEC an- 
nounced a general authorization to American firms and individuals 
to engage in any unclassified atomic energy activity with friendly 
countries without having to obtain prior AEC approval. This au- 
thorization greatly simplified cooperation between the domestic nu- 
clear industry and its potential customers. Specific AEC authoriza- 
tion was still required, however, before an American firm could do 
anything which directly or indirectly constituted production of any 
special nuclear material in countries of the Soviet bloc. 85 This re- 
straint, in effect, precluded export of technical assistance, products, 
or power plants to the Soviet Union. 


The essence of Atoms for Peace was a commitment to share the 
benefits of atomic energy, including atomic power, with friendly na- 
tions. This purpose occasionally has come into conflict with the prin- 
ciple that certain U.S. nuclear technologies should not be exported be- 
cause of potential- threats to national security or to world peace. 
Obviously there is no disagreement over control of weapons technology, 
or that for peaceful nuclear explosives. But borderline cases do arise. 
One example is to be found in the export of unclassified technology 
and apparatus for the reprocessing of used nuclear fuels. Countries 
interested in large scale use of nuclear power inevitably must reprocess 
their own fuel or arrange for this service elsewhere. However, if they 
build their own reprocessing facilities there arises the possibility of 
unknown or illicit diversion of recovered nuclear materials to weap- 
ons use, or into a black market for stolen nuclear materials. This issue 
came to a head in L966 when foreign interests inquired of a U.S. com- 
pany about fuel reprocessing technology. The company provided some 
information. When the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy learned 
of t he inquiry, it was critical of t he transact ion. ( Jommittee ( Ihairman 
Chet Ilolilield wrote to the AEC to urge that no non-nuclear nation 
should he assisted in obtaining information and technical know-how 
on reprocessing technology unless that nation first agreed to place under 
IAKA safeguards any fuel reprocessing facility that it might build. 8 ' 

Responding to i he cril icism, A E( ' < Ihairman Seaborg agreed on the 
importance of bringing reprocessing facilities abroad under IAEA 
safeguards. He informed the Joint Committee thai the AEC was un- 

i S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs, .July- 
Dec mbt r 1 95 5, "p. '-if .. p 93. 

'' V s. Congress, .Toinl Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agreements 
for Cooperation — l'jcc, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 187. 


dertaking a study to determine how technical assistance by private 
U.S. firms could be controlled to assure that safeguards would be ap- 
plied to the facility involved. However, such information was unclas- 
sified and AEC regulations for years had permitted its export to coun- 
tries outside of the Soviet bloc. He suggested that the AEC might find 
some specialized technical items needed for fuel reprocessing plants 
which by regulation could be supplied by the U.S. nuclear industry 
only if there was agreement that safeguards would be applied. 87 

The most recent manifestation of this conflict in purposes came in 
July 1972 when the AEC published new regulations that forbade U.S. 
companies to do business abroad in three fields of nuclear power-re- 
lated technology unless AEC approved. 88 The new rules prohibited 
"directly or indirectly" engaging in overseas production of heavy 
water, chemical reprocessing of used fuels, or enrichment of uranium. 
Xo reasons for choosing these three nuclear technologies were given 
in the announcement. 

Safeguarding Nuclear Materials Supplied Through Bilateral Agree- 
U.S. technical assistance for nuclear power inevitably involved the 
supplying of nuclear fuel materials to foreign countries. Since the 
technical assistance program began well before the IAEA came into 
being, there was the question of how the United States would assure 
itself, and the world, that materials it supplied would be adequately 
safeguarded against diversion. The question was answered by includ- 
ing provisions for U.S.-conducted safeguards in the bilateral agree- 
ments and also a provision calling for consultation with the United 
States on transferring safeguards of U.S. materials to an international 
agency when it was formed. U.S. policy for control over U.S. sup- 
plied nuclear materials was established by the AEC in consultation 
with the Department of State. The policy provided that : S9 

(1) The United States would give assistance and advice to the 
recipient country in establishing a national system of control 
over materials and equipment, including adequate materials ac- 
countability and physical control measures ; 

(2) The system would be subject to audit, appraisal, and verifi- 
cation by United States personnel ; 

(3) The specific measures applied in auditing and verifying the 
system would depend upon the type and complexity of the facili- 
ties involved and the type and quality of the material involved; 

(4) AEC staff would provide assistance and guidance to co- 
operating countries. 

To indicate the range of U.S. safeguards activities for its bilateral 
agreements, the AEC reported that in 1969 it had made 52 inspections 
of facilities in five countries. These inspections included the first in- 
spection of the unloading of fuel from a reactor, witnessing the first 
seals to be applied to a power reactor, and inspection of a reactor fol- 
lowing a radiation incident. 90 

"Ibirt., p. 187. 

* 8 Federal Register, vol. 37. July 26, 1972. pp. 14870-1. 

"■' T'.s. Atomic Energy Commission. Major Actiritics in the Atomic Energi) Programs, 
J a nn a rp -December 1959 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing OHice, I960), 
p. 110. 

90 U.S. Atomic Energv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1969 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 60. 


In retrospect, negotiation and administration of the safeguards pro- 
visions of the U.S. nuclear bilateral agreements has proven to be a 
unique and extraordinary achievement in international relations. The 
technological promise of nuclear power, reinforced bv incentives and 
pressures of foreign policy, gave the United States the unusual right 
to send its own inspectors into foreign jurisdiction to inspect and 
verify the use and holding of U.S. supplied nuclear materials. That 
no major confrontation has arisen from the administration of the 
safeguard provisions of the bilateral agreements gives reason for some 
optimism in the future of international relations. For, despite the 
arguments and analyses of those who consider sovereign rights un- 
alterable, there can be pragmatic yieldings and accommodations when 
this is sufficiently in a nation's interest, 

The safeguards provisions of the U.S. bilateral agreements were 
notable also in that they prepared the way for giving the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency practical experience in administration 
of safeguards. While details are given in later sections of this chapter, 
it is worth noting here that this IAEA experience was certainly an 
important factor in the subsequent negotiations of the Xonp ml itera- 
tion Treaty with its provisions for international safeguards to be 
applied by the IAEA. 

Conclusion and Current Issues 

One of the first assignments resulting from the effects of the dis- 
covery of nuclear fission for American diplomacy was to negotiate and 
administer a web of bilateral agreements for U.S. technical assistance 
to foreign nations. Though of lesser status than treaties or executive 
agreements, they nonetheless obtained for the United States unusual 
rights not available through the more traditional and presumably 
more potent and durable instruments of international relations. 

The bilateral agreements were created to provide special technical 
assistance to foster civil use of nuclear energy abroad. These research 
and power agreements demonstrated an effectiveness for supplying 
information, materials, equipment, services, training, and advisers to 
nations that were interested in nuclear power. The power agreements 
also were notable in the rights they obtained for the United States for 
control and safeguarding of nuclear fuel materials and certain equip- 
ment. In the participating nations, inspectors of the United States had 
access to the places where U.S. nuclear materials were being used to in- 
spect them and to verify their quantities. In addition, because of fore- 
thought of U.S. policy and the work of the diplomats and negotiators, 
the. bilateral agreements had provisions which ultimately were to en- 
able the International Atomic Energy Agency to gain useful experi- 
ence with working safeguards. 

The success of the U.S. bilateral agreements, however, worked 
against one major goal of Atoms for Peace. Because the agreements 
provided many advantages to the other countries, and because this web 
of agreements obtained for the United States influence and leverage 
that it otherwise might not have had, there has been a reluctance to 
shift the channel for U.S. technical assistance for nuclear power in 
Europe and elsewhere, from country-to-country agreements to the 
International Atomic. Energy Agency. From a' global viewpoint, it 
might be seen that the United States and other world leaders in nuclear 
power are in competition with the International Agency when they 


deal directly with other countries in supplying technical assistance. 
There is an implied balancing of advantages to goals of individual 
nations versus the anticipated advantages of a strengthened Interna- 
tional Agency. 

Assuming that it is in the best interests of the United States and 
world peace to see the Xonproliferation Treaty operate at full effec- 
tiveness, it may now be time for the United States to reexamine the 
present roles of bilateral agreements and of the International Agency 
as the means for furnishing future technical assistance and incentives 
for nuclear power. Channeling more U.S. aid through the IAEA could 
be expected to strengthen the agency. However, to deemphasize the 
present network of bilateral agreements with individual nations and 
with multinational bodies such as Euratom would lose for the United 
States the benefits associated with direct dealings. 

The United States supplying of technical assistance in nuclear 
energy through direct agreements between the United States and other 
nations, and groups of nations, has been successful and might well 
provide a model for measures to accelerate research and development 
for fusion and other new sources of energy. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-13 

VI. Creating an International Nuclear Organization: The 
International Atomic Energy Agency 

The discovery and application of nuclear energy led to the creation 
of several international and regional organizations. The one associated 
with Atoms for Peace is the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). This section of the study has to do with the diplomatic 
efforts that culminated in creation of the new International Agency, 
and in the evolution of U.S. support for its activities. 

IAEA was the offspring of a Wilsonian idealism reflected in Presi- 
dent Eisenhower's proposal. That the subsequent evolution of the 
Agency in the real world of Bismarckian relationships falls short of 
these ideals should not mask the fact that of all the participating 
nations, the United States has cared the most and worked the hardest 
to create this new Agency, and that the burden of this effort has been 
carried on by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department 
of State. 

The International Agency is open to virtually all the nations of the 
world, including the People's Republic of China. 91 Tt has been shaped 
by political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
as well sis their working relationship within the Agency. These rela- 
tions at times reflected some of the adversary tensions of the cold war. 
and fit other times some of a partnership friendliness of "have" 
nations in relations with the "have-not" members of the Agency. 

Still evolving are the relations of the IAEA with the Nuclear Energy 
Agency of OECD and with Euratom. The ultimate fate of these three 
bodies and their roles vis-a-vis commercial nuclear power in Europe 
remain to be determined. Certainly the foreign policy decisions and 
actions of the United States, whether passive or active, will influence 
their- futures and thereby the future of nuclear power in Europe. 

The f . I /-.'- 1 / a Brief Description 

The Intel-national Atomic Energy Agency was established July 20, 
l!>r>7. to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is an inter- 
national organization within the family of the United Nations, report- 
ing annually to the United Nations General Assembly and. in appro- 
priate cases, to the Security Council and to the Economic and Social 
Council. It has concluded relationship agreements with five other 
specialized agencies of the United Nations. By September 1!>7-_\ the 
number of member states in IAEA totalled 103; they included all of 
the Common Market nations and other nations of industrial conse- 

-el out in the Statute, the principal organs of the Agency are a 
( reneral ( inference, t he Board of ( rovernors, and a Secretariat headed 

w Countries not members of tlio IAEA are North Korea, North Vietnam, .-ind tlm People's 
Republic of Germany, which are nol recojrnized by the United States. A^ for Chinn. in 
.T un<- 1972 the Board of Governors of the IAEA recognized mainland China as the definitive 
government, thus displacing Taiwan. Mainland China has yet to apply for recognition. 

i L76) 


by a Director General. The General Conference includes representa- 
tives of all member states. The Board of Governors consists of 25 mem- 
bers designated by the outgoing board or elected by the General 
Conference. 92 

Regular expenses of the Agency are met out of assessed contributions 
of member states. The revised regular budget for 1972 rose to 
$16,561,000. There are also voluntary contributions from members to 
finance IAEA technical assistance. In 1972 these pledges totalled 
$3,375,000. The United States furnishes about 36 percent of the 
voluntary f imds. 

Changing Goals and Situations 

President Eisenhower's plan to reduce the international threat of 
nuclear weapons would divert nuclear explosive materials to an inter- 
national pool of materials to be used for peaceful purposes, and would 
create an international agency to maintain custody of that pool and 
to enforce a credible system of safeguards. This dramatic and innova- 
tive concept of nuclear disarmament did not long survive. One observer, 
Harold L. Nieberg, says the Atoms for Peace initiative quickly became 
transformed into a means of enlisting the support of the U.S.S.R. 
to dissuade other nations from manufacturing their own nuclear 
materials while imposing upon them (but not upon the two principals) 
a system of international inspection and control over nuclear power. 93 

During the 3% years of diplomatic and legislative effort that went 
into creating IAEA, commercial interest in nuclear power declined as 
nations realized it was not a quick and easy way to supply energy to 
Europe, and the hope of diverting substantial quantities of nuclear 
materials from military to peaceful uses evaporated. Nonetheless in 
1957 AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss told the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations that had the President not proposed the Inter- 
national Agency, we "should be at pains now to invent it." The follow- 
ing excerpt of his testimony summarized the changes which had so 
diminished the prospects for the IAEA. He said : 94 

What has changed in 3 x /2 years is that there has been indefinable improve- 
ment in outlook, a revival of hope for a future in which an atomic cataclysm 
need not be inevitable. That change began with the announcement of the plans 
for this Agency. It is built upon the expectation that the Agency will come into 
being. The still-birth of the Agency can plunge the world back into darkness. 

There is another change that has come about in the same period. In 19.".°, 
uranium was still a rare commodity. A few nations controlled practically all 
there was of it, so far as we then knew. Discoveries of large new deposits have 
demonstrated that uranium is far more plentiful and more widely distributed 
than we ever imagined. 

This availability of fissionable material and the extraordinary progress i'i 
engineering for power development has brought other nations besides the 
United Kingdom, Soviet Russia and ourselves into the atomic power situation 
and will continue to do so. 

As a result of this, I would submit that, had the President never proposed the 
International Agency, we should be at pains now to invent it. Let me be spe- 
cific. With time the operation of atomic reactors all over the world is inevitable. 
It can no more be prevented than one could restrict or prohibit the use of fire. 

82 In 1972 an amendment was proposed to the charter to increase the number on the 
Board of Governors to 33. The amendment was awaiting ratification at the time of 

93 Harold I,. Xifherjr. Nuclear Seereeu and Foreign Pollen (Washington, D.C : The Public 
Affairs Press, 1964). p. 19. 

61 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Enercry, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 84. 


The Fruits of Negotiation 

After more than 3 years of intense U.S. diplomatic effort, an inter- 
national statute was produced which the President approved on 
July 27, 1957. This effort witnessed the unequal interplay between the 
idealism and the pragmatic imperatives of international relations. The 
outcome was an international agency that reflected only modestly the 
ambitious and idealistic goals expressed by some groups of scientists 
for Atoms for Peace. In December 1953 President Eisenhower had 
proposed an international body with the following four major pur- 
poses : 95 

First — encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime 
uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they had ail the mate- 
rials needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate ; 

Second — begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's 
atomic stockpiles ; 

Third — allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the 
great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in 
human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war ; 

Fourth — open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiate at least 
a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private 
and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, 
and is to make positive progress toward peace. 

In 1957 the negotiations produced an International Statute which 
specified a limited goal for the IAEA. Article II specified that : 

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic 
energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, 
so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its 
supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military 

As "military purpose 7 ' is nowhere defined in the Statute, t ho mission 
of the International Agency is general enough to accomplish as little 
or as much as the member nations might desire. 

Arnold Kramish, an observer of the peaceful atom in foreign policy, 
notes that the U.S. negotiators had decided early in the negotiations 
to postpone the idea of a workable pool of nuclear materials. De- 
emphasis of this arms-control function of the Agency also deempha- 
sized the initial safeguards function. Instead, negotiators began to 
talk of a "clearing-house" function, meaning that in some unspecified 
way materials for future bilateral agreements would somehow be 
channeled through the International Agency, but not be controlled by 
it. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge gave an economic reason for this 
change in role. Interviewed at the United Nations on Noveml>er 6, 
1954. he said: "Since the resources of the Agency obviously will be 
limited, it seems more useful to us to use the resources available to 
the Agency for additional programs than for expensive custodial 
arrangements." 96 At the same time, he said that the United States 
would proceed independently with its bilateral agreements with other 
countries, rather than channel them through the new Agency. 

Despite the limited goals finally established for the, International 
Agency, the official U.S. assessment of the negotiations was optimistic. 
Secretary Dulles assured the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
that the I 'nited States had achieved its diplomatic objective of obtain- 

"Dwlpht D. EiRenhower, The Atom for Progress and Pence. Department of State Publi- 
cation No. 5103 (Washington. DC. : T'.S Government Printing Office, 1954). 

99 The New York Times, November 6, 1054, p. 6. 


ing the adoption of the U.S.-originated draft statute without substan- 
tial alteration and with the widest possible international support. 
Despite the widely differing political attitudes and stages of economic 
development of the negotiating nations and the need to reconcile their 
divergent interests, U.S. negotiators had "kept intact every element of 
the President's proposals without sacrifice of substance or principle." 97 
U.S. Ambassador James Wadsworth, who had headed the U.S. nego- 
tiations, concurred in Secretary Dulles' assessment. Speaking of the 
statute produced by the U.S. negotiators, he said : 98 

. . . Functionally, it will make possible an Agency with broad authority to 
assist in research and development in the peaceful uses field ; possess and dis- 
tribute nuclear materials ; carry out the pooling of such materials at. the request 
of member states as proposed by the President: establish and operate its own 
facilities: organize and apply a system of minimum safeguards on request to 
bilateral or multinational arrangements or the atomic energy activities of a mem- 
ber state ; conduct its financial management on a flexible but business-like basis 
in the interest of the entire membership ; establish an appropriate relationship 
with the United Nations and other international organizations; and take into 
consideration recognized standards of international conduct in connection with 
the admission of new members. 


Although the International Agency evolved out of the discovery of 
fission by scientists, the scientific community had relatively little part 
in the negotiations. Individual atomic scientists were members of dele- 
gations to the negotiations and advised the diplomats. Lacking, how- 
ever, were substantial organized attempts by the scientific community 
to shape the functions and activities of the Agency. The European 
nuclear scientist. Professor Gunnar Banders, complained in I960." 

Scientists do not generally know what an enormous effort lies behind the cre- 
ation of a full-fledged international agency. They also do not know what an 
irresistible momentum lies in international organizations. It may be difficult to 
create one, but it is practically impossible to terminate one in peacetime. It is 
therefore only a question of the degree of usefulness of these indestructible giants 
which can be influenced. And here is a point of criticism of ourselves, the scien- 
tists and technologists of the world — we have not as a group realized the potential 
power of the instrument created, and have failed to follow up with action our 
decade of speaking and writing about the duty of scientists. 

With few exceptions, we have not even tried to influence the selection of rep- 
resentatives of our countries for important positions in the Agency organs. No 
organized attempt by scientists has been made to make the Agency promote the 
ideas or the programs about which we have talked and written. Scientists who 
have gone there have usually done so without any knowledge of the real purpose 
of the Agency. Most scientists do not know whether the Agency needs top-notch 
scientific specialists or scientific organizers and administrators. The last question 
would probably be answered 50-50, one way or the other, even by the present 
Board of Governors. 

Some Insights From Congressional Review 

President Eisenhower sent the International Statute for the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency to Congress on March 21, 1957. The 
Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on June 18, 1957. The 
arguments and reasons advanced in support of the International Stat- 

97 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the Joint Com- 
mittee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
op. eit, p. 4. 

9R Ibid., p. 46. 

"° Gunnar Randers "The Scientist's View," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April, 1960), 
p. 164. 


ute gave further insight into what was expected of the IAEA and 
what benefits were expected by interests of the United States. The 
Statute was the subject of hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations with the invited participation of the Senate Mem- 
bers of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 

Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Wadsworth and Chairman Strauss 
of the AEC carried the burden of advocacy and defense. Their 
testimony gives many insights into the diplomatic initiatives of the 
United States, and into U.S. policy for commercial nuclear power in 
Europe, as illustrated in the following sampling. 

In terms of foreign policy advantages to the United States Chairman 
Strauss and Secretary Dulles outlined reasons for congressional ap- 
proval of the International Statute. Approval would : 10 ° 

(1) Accelerate nuclear progress: The Agency would provide a 
forum for the exchange of discovery and invention among all 

(2) Provide safeguards: Provide an effective system of safe- 
guards to insure the development of atomic energy with security. 

(3) Enhance nuclear health and safety: Protect, through in- 
ternational codes, the health and safety of those increasing num- 
bers of persons who would work with or live near nuclear estab- 

(4) Improve manpower utilization: Establish a pool of man- 
power resources which otherwise could be a limiting factor for 
the peaceful use of the atom. 

(5) Strengthen control of nuclear weapons: Demonstrate the 
feasibility of international controls and safeguards which could 
have a constructive impact upon negotiations for the regulation 
and reduction of armaments. 

(6) Reduce pressure for proliferation : By opening the develop- 
ment of nuclear power to international scrutiny, the Agency could 
reduce internal pressure within nations to develop their own nu- 
clear weapons because of suspicion of the nuclear activities of 
their neighbors. 

(7) Improve the climate of international r< 1 at ions: Initiate co- 
operation with the Soviet Union which could have a favorable 
impact upon the climate of international relations. "The splitting 
of the atom might conceivably lead to a unifying of the now di- 
vided world." 1(il 

™ Ibid., pp. 4-5 


In his summation of these advantages Secretary Dulles described 
the potential of the proposed Agency : 

. . . for economic development of large areas of the world ; for cooperation with 
other nations, including the Soviet Union, in ways which will reduce interna- 
tional tension and promote the practice of peaceful and constructive collabora- 
tion ; for encouraging peaceful use of the atom and averting the spread of nu- 
clear military potential to additional countries ; and for giving the nations ex- 
perience with a system of international safeguards which could build confidence 
and further the prospects of disarmament. 102 


Assurances were also offered that U.S. commitment of support was 
small. Secretary Dulles emphasized that the Agency would not be a 
"giveaway organization" for U.S. nuclear fuel materials. Countries 
receiving materials from the Agency would have to pay for them. 
Moreover, there was no U.S. commitment in the Statute to supply 
nuclear materials. The supply of materials, services, or equipment was 
a voluntary matter, and the Agency had no authority to require a 
member to supply anything. Also, the United States would pay no 
more than its share of the administrative expenses of the Agency. 
Neither would the IAEA become a giveaway organization for U.S. 
atomic secrets. It would distribute only that information on nuclear 
energy which was free of security restrictions. Finally, any nuclear 
fuel materials distributed would be unsuitable for weapons. 

As a gesture of U.S. support for the International Statute, Chairman 
Strauss at the closing session of the United Nations conference on the 
final draft Statute delivered a message from President Eisenhower 
announcing that the United States would make available (but not 
give) to the International Agency 5,000 kilograms of uranium-235, 
an amount sufficient to fuel three to five nuclear power plants for their 
working lifetime. Furthermore, the United States offered to match 
additional allocations of nuclear materials to the Agency by all other 
member nations. 103 

The offers received close congressional scrutiny to make sure they 
did not constitute a subsidy to commercial nuclear power in Europe. 
Senator Hickenlooper questioned Secretary Dulles pointedly, inquir- 
ing where the recipient countries would get the money to pay for 
this fuel material. Mr. Dulles speculated that recipients might find 
the money in the foreign exchange they would otherwise have to 
spend to import fuel. In any event, there was nothing in the Inter- 
national Statute which directly or indirectly committed the United 
States to finance the costs of the uranium. The recipient countries 
would have to pay. 104 Chairman Strauss was even more emphatic : 105 

The United States has not offered to make a gift of those materials to the 
Agency. The President's statement explicitly speaks of "terms" to be agreed 
upon. Articles 9, II, and 13 of the Agency statute likewise provide specifically 
for reimbursement. In any event, the advice and authorization of Congress would, 
of course, be sought before any gift were made to the Agency, or to any nation or 
group of nations, should such a gift appear advisable at some future date. 

182 Ibid., p. 6. 

103 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Radiation Safety and Major Activities in the Atomic 
Energy Programs, July-December 1956, op. cit., p. 12. 

104 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, op. cit.. ». 49. 

Agency, op. cit.. p. 49. 
105 Ibid., p. 92. 



Secretary Dulles advised Congress that failure to ratify the Inter- 
national Statute would be disastrous. The injury to the prestige and 
influence of the United States in the world would be of ''incalculable 
proportions." 106 

Failure to adopt the Statute would pass the atomic initiative to the 
Soviet Union or, more likely, destroy the project. He said : 107 

This is essentially a made-in-America project. It is one which has caught the 
imagination of the peoples of the world, and for us to he the nation that 
rejected it would have very fateful consequences indeed. 

Whether or not the project would survive that I douht. The only nation that 
could make it survive would be the Soviet Union which is the only other nation 
which has sufficient quantities of this material to make it a viable project. 

The Soviet Union, recognizing that this was a project which greatly enhanced 
the prestige of the United States, sought for about 2 years to block it and 
thwart it. They finally saw it was going ahead anyway, and then apparently 
adopting the old political slogan "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em," they have 
now become very active in trying to join up and to try to give a certain leadership 
of its own to the movement. 

I think however, if we did not. ratify the treaty, the whole effort would 
collapse and the responsibility for that collapse would of course be clearly 
pinned on to us, and it would involve a blow to our prestige and influence in 
the world of almost incalculable proportions. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957 

The resolution giving the advice and consent of the Senate to the 
ratification of the International Atomic Energy Agency was adopted 
by the Senate on June 18, 1957. On June 19, a bill to provide for the 
participation of the United States in the activities of the Agency was 
introduced. Hearings began on July 2 by the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, which were held to complement hearings of the 
Foreign Relations Committee when it acted on the resolution recom- 
mending that the Senate give its advice and consent to the ratification 
of the statute. 

The participation Act, Public Law 85-177 (71 Stat. 453) is similar 
to the participation Act providing for representation of the United 
States at the United Nations and also at other specialized interna- 
tional agencies. The Act permits the President to name the repre- 
sentatives and deputy representatives of the United States to the 
IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference, and to the 
other organs of the Agency. The representatives and deputy repre- 
sentatives are appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The represental ives are to vote and act in accordance with the instruc- 
tions of the President. The Act also authorizes the payments of the 
United States share of the annual budget of the Agency and included 
provisions to encourage Federal employees to go with the Agency. 108 

To be sure that the nuclear materials distributed to the Agency are 
not a ''giveaway.' 1 they are required to be paid for at no less than the 
charges established for domestic use. While the President's offer of 
5,( K)0 kilograms of \ 235, together with matched amounts of materials 
that might be made available to the Agency by other members, was 

w»Ibid., pp. 14 15. 
'"■ Ibid., p. i t 

""• Federal employees serving with tlio IAEA .ire given 3-year prntootlon on Civil 
Service retirement, life Insurance, and reinstatement r i^u < s in tnelr positions. 


authorized by the Act, these materials must be distributed to the 
Agency under agreements for cooperation. These provisions pre- 
vented the AEC from furnishing nuclear materials wholesale to IAEA 
which might then act as ia broker and finance its fuel supply function 
by charging a brokerage fee while still keeping the price paid by 
the recipient no more than would have been charged for direct purchase 
from the United States. There was one exception. The AEC could 
assist and encourage research on peaceful uses of nuclear energy or 
medical therapy by distributing without charge during any year 
material valued at not more than $10,000 in the case of one nation, 
or $50,000 for any group of nations. Foreign distribution of nuclear 
materials exceeding the 5,000 kilograms ottered by President Eisen- 
hower would require congressional approval. 

The Act required the President to report annually to Congress on 
the International Agency and U.S. participation ; the Department of 
State and the AEC were directed to keep the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations cur- 
rently informed. 109 To prevent unacceptable changes in the Interna- 
tional Statute, the Act required that in the event of an amendment 
which the Senate disapproved by a formal vote, all authority for 
U.S. participation would terminate. 

Bilateral Agreements and the IAEA 

When Congress authorized U.S. participation in the International 
Agency, the AEC had had almost three years of experience with 
negotiating and administering bilateral agreements to foster the civil 
use of nuclear energy. Considering that the International Agency, in 
its watered-down version, was to serve in part as a clearing house, 
would the United States shift its emphasis from the bilateral agree- 
ments and deal with other countries through the Agency ? This the 
United States chose not to do. 

When Congress approved U.S. participation in the IAEA, the 
United States already had bilateral agreements with some 40 coun- 
tries. Most of these were for nuclear research with a few for nuclear 
power. 110 Secretary Dulles and the State Department were inclined 
toward channeling U.S. aid through the International Agency. Sec- 
retary Dulles advanced three reasons for this: 

(1) Although the bilateral agreements included adequate pro- 
visions for safeguards, unless there was an international agree- 
ment on common standards, future competition among supplying 
nations for the nuclear fuel market would almost certainly erode 
the safeguards of the bilateral agreements; 

(2) Nations with bilateral agreements with the United States 
for development of nuclear power would not indefinitely accede 
to U.S. inspection of the nuclear powerplants. "They will accept 
international supervision indefinitely, but they will not, I think, 
indefinitely accept mere inspection by another nation." 11X and. 

109 This annual reporting requirement was terminated In 1965 by Public Law S9-34S. 
79 Stat. 1310. 

110 At that time, negotiation with 4S nations had produced 44 agreements for cooperation 
with 42 nations. Of these, 34 were in force — 29 for research and 5 for power. The remaining 
10 agreements were awaiting completion. Fifteen of the participating nations were Euro- 
pean, with all of the Common Market nations represented. 

111 U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, op. cit., p. 66. 


(3) The United States lacked adequate technical personnel to 
meet all potential needs for inspection. It would be preferable to 
avoid this drain by sharing the task with others. 

While the State Department testimony indicated that the United 
States would probably continue to use bilateral agreements, it sug- 
gested also that bilateral agreements should not be made a more attrac- 
tive source of these materials than the International Agency. The 
United States had a moral obligation to be a good member of the 
Agency and to try not to undermine it. 112 

Chairman Stra'uss clearly favored use of bilateral agreements. The 
United States, he testified, should not abandon these direct agreements 
with other countries when the Agency came into existence, or at any 
time in the foreseeable future. He anticipated that the Agency would 
stress activities in which many nations had a direct interest and in 
which the greatest progress could be made by a multinational ap- 
proach. At the same time, the United States through bilateral agree- 
ments would be able to extend to individual countries nuclear coopera- 
tion which . . . conforms more precisely to our traditional and spe- 
cial relationship with those particular countries." 113 He did acknowl- 
edge possibilities of some resistance to bilateral agreements. Some 
countries, he said, had not responded to U.S. overtures to enter into 
bilateral agreements with them. However, these nations had shown 
their willingness to accept from an international agency limitations 
on their sovereignty unacceptable from the United States. 114 

A Bilateral Agreement With the IAEA and Three Policy Question* 
As authorized by the IAEA Participation Act, the AEC began to 
negotiate a bilateral agreement with the International Agency. The 
negotiations took almost 2 years. An agreement for cooperation was 
finally signed at Vienna on May 11, 1959, and entered into force on 
August 7, 1959. 

During the negotiations IAEA became aware that it had no major 
role in the development of nuclear power. Its first Director General. 
W. Sterling Cole, who had resigned from his post as Chairman of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to take this post, strove to carve 
out roles for the Agency as a channel for atomic energy aid. and as a 
proponent of international safety codes and standards and interna- 
tional controls for nuclear fuel materials. When the United States did 
not respond to his vision of a strong International Agency, he became 
a strong critic of U.S. policy toward the Agency. 

One example of Mr. Cole's ideas serves to illustrate the gap between 
expectations and performance for IAEA. On March 9, 1959, before a 
conference of the American Association for the United Nations, Direc- 
tor General Cole asked three questions of policy which indicated both 
his vision of what the Agency should Ik>, and the shortfall from his 
hopes. He asked : 115 

Shall tlif atomic energy contribution of the technologically advanced and ma- 
terially endowed nations to other countries in the world be given and applied 
through truly International channels; or shall we continue to channel such aid 

"- Ibid., p. 165. 

»» Ibid., p. 86. 

"* Ibid., i». 116. 

118 Quoted l>y Senator Clinton Anderson, Jn U.S. Oonpross, Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Hearings, Agreement for Cooperation Between th<- united states and the Inter- 
national Mnmic Energy Agency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 8-10. 


through networks of bilateral agreements for selective nation-to-nation exchange 
without benefit of the balance wheel of international considerations? 

Shall the peacetime production and utilization of nuclear materials around 
the world be carried out under international codes and standards for health and 
safety, or shall we permit the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy under vary- 
ing, perhaps conflicting, and certainly confusing, and only partially effective, na- 
tionally imposed standards for health and safety? 

Shall the nations seek in unison to establish and maintain uniform, prac- 
tical rules to prevent the diversion for military purposes of nuclear materials 
supplied for peaceful use, or shall we dangerously and foolishly let any and all 
supplying countries of such nuclear materials make their own rules and apply 
them as they deem desirable under unpredictable conditions of international 

In 1959 Senator Anderson of the Joint Committee put these ques- 
tions to the AEC during hearings on the bilateral agreement with the 
IAEA, but received inconclusive answers. State Department witnesses 
addressed only the issue of bilateral agreements, and defended their 
continued use because other countries asked for them. 116 

In 1972, with commercial nuclear power in Europe and elsewhere 
apparently ready for substantial growth, Director General Cole's sec- 
ond and third questions assume greater relevance. 

U.S. Participation in the IAEA 

As with other international organizations in the years following 
"World War II, the United States has been the largest single contribu- 
tor to the funding of the International Agency, regularly financing 
about one-third of its administrative costs, and much higher percent- 
ages of voluntary operational funding. It remains to be seen whether 
the present scale of IAEA operations will be adequate for the future 
when its international safeguards responsibilities under the Nonpro- 
life ration Treaty become fully operational. There already have been 
some signs of concern that the United States will be expected to finance 
much of this increase in costs in the future, as it has many U.N. field 


At the first IAEA General Conference in 1957 AEC Chairman 
Strauss announced that the AEC was preparing a program of detailed 
assistance and cooperation which might include offering to IAEA a 
research reactor, an isotopes laboratory, and a comprehensive technical 
library. In addition to formal restatement of President Eisenhower's 
offer of 5,000 kilograms of uranium-235, Chairman Strauss announced 
that the AEC would match offers of 20 kilograms of U-235 made by 
the United Kingdom, 50 kilograms made by the Soviet Union, and 
100,000 kilograms of normal uranium oxide concentrate made by 
Portugal. Subsequently, at the first meeting of the IAEA Board of 
Governors in January 1958, the United States summarized its prof- 
fered support as follows : 

(1) Cost-free services for limited periods of 20 to 30 expert con- 
sultants for use in the Agency's surveys of programs in member 

116 A State Department spokesman commented : 

When we get requests from countries to enter into bilateral agreements, we acknowledge 
those requests and we attempt to accommodate them. We cannot very well spurn the 
Approaches of other countries when they come to us seeking bilateral agreements. So that, 
whereas we continue to enter into them when we are requested, I think it is fair to say 
that it is not our policy to push, so to speak, bilateral agreements at the present time. 
On the contrary, we attempt wherever possible to direct other countries to and through 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Ibid., p. 9. 


(2) Grants matching contributions of other member nations 
up to $125,000 for an IAEA fellowship fund ; 

(3) Approximately 120 fellowships, at an estimated cost of 
$840,000, over the following two years, for education and training 
in nuclear science in the United States ; 

(4) Two mobile radioisotope training laboratories ; 

( 5 ) A research reactor ; 

(6) An isotopes laboratory. 117 


For the 10 calendar years 1960 through 1970, the United States 
contributed $28 million, or about one-third of the IAEA's adminis- 
trative budget, and $10.5 million, or about one-half of its voluntary, 
special programs budget. Details of U.S. funding appear in Table III. 

By way of comparison, the U.S. shares in the costs of United Na- 
tions operations through assessed payments, which amount to 31.5 
percent of the total, and voluntary contributions, which vary from 
10 to 55 percent of the total of individual programs and agencies. 
Assessed payments are authorized and appropriated to the Department 
of State and voluntary contributions are authorized by' the Foreign 
Assistance Act and are separately appropriated. 

At the time of writing, the matter of determining what is a "fair 
share" of U.S. costs in international organizations is a matter of 
congressional debate, both as to assessed dues and to contributions. 
The Senate Appropriations Committee, for example, recently ex- 
pressed its views that U.S. share of such costs should amount to 20 
to :>0 percent of the total. A sense of the Senate amendment to the 
Foreign Aid and Assistance Act for FY 1072 called for the total U.S. 
contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency, including 
in kind contributions, not to exceed 31.5 percent of the total, world- 
wide contribution. The Senate Appropriations Committee in 1072 
expressed a hope, that other countries would increase their contribu- 
tions to international organizations coupled with a more realistic 
effort on their part to provide for their multilateral and their in- 
dividual defense. 118 

The Senate Appropriations Committee while calling for redis- 
tribution of support for international agencies among member states, 
with a smaller U.S. share, recognized the advantages of multi- 
lateral assistance programs. It mentioned the following, saying: 119 

As justified to the committee multilateral assistance programs have a number 
of advantages : 

They promote a wider sharing of the burden of development assistance : 

They reduce the political friction that can arise from reliance on bilateral 
contacts in the most sensitive affairs of nations, such as population and family 
planning, the production of and traffic in dangerous drugs, and surveys of min- 
erals with strategic implications ; 

They enhance the effectiveness of the world development effort by providing 
for the pooling of knowledge and expertise for solving development problems : 

They can operate in areas of political tension such as the Middle East, where 
Individual nations are often unable to function, even in providing essential 
humanitarian assistance. 

117 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Research from Power from Fusion and Other 
Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Program*, January— June 1958, op. cit., p. 25. 

•"U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related 
Programs Appropriations Pill, 19T3, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1972, Sen. Rept. 92 1231. p. 42. 

119 Loc. cit. 









































3, 374 























[In thousands of dollars] 

Regular budget (assessed) Special programs (voluntary) 







1966.... : 


1968 _ 




1972 (estimate) _ _. 

1973 (proposed). _ 


1960-70 information from statement of Samuel de Palma, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 
Affairs. In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, "Economy and Efficiency of U.S. Participation in 
International Organizations," 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, pp. 15-17. 

1971-73 information on regular budgrtfrnro In'erns'ional Atomic Energy Agency, "The Agency's Programme for 1973-78 
end Budget for 1973," IAEA document GC(XVI)/485, 1972, pp. 13, 15, 203. 

Energy Agency, "Scale of Members' Contributions for 1973," 1972, IAEA report GC(XVI) 486, p. 4. 

1971-73 Information on voluntary contributions from U.S. Congress Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 
"Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1973," 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, Senate report 
92— 12 jl , p. 43, and also personal inquiry of the Department of State. 

NOTE: Because the Ag3ncy uses a revolving fund, the budget figures shown are not always the same as 
those in other IAEA or other U.S. documents. 


The Joint Committee's 1959 inquiry into the agreement between 
the AEC and the International Agency gave the AEC an opportunity 
to enlarge upon its explanation of the concept of what the IAEA 
should be doing. Commissioner Harold S. Vance of the AEC, after 
arguing against a nuclear-materials supply role or a role in demon- 
stration of nuclear power for the IAEA, asserted there were many 
other tilings for it to do. 120 

. . . There are problems that do not respect national boundaries in the field of 
health, safety, safeguards, waste disposal and so forth. I believe that if the 
Agency will address itself to those problems and do it a little more vigorously 
and forget this business of trying to be a broker for fuel, that in the long run 
they will be a lot more productive than they would otherwise. 

He proposed four unique services for IAEA : 121 

(1) Resolution of problems of health and safety which tran- 
scend national borders; 

(2) Creation of international security safeguards and controls 
over worldwide usage of fissionable materials ; 

(3) Expansion of East-West cooperation in peaceful uses of 
atomic energy; and 

(4) Pooling of resources to meet the technical assistance needs 
of underdeveloped countries. 

la U.S., Congress, Jo:nt Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearing, Agreement for Coopera- 
tion Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 86th Cong., 

121 Ibid., p. 28. 


As for the first of these services, Commissioner Vance reported 
there was already widespread recognition of the IAEA health and 
safety role. What he said in 1959 has a contemporary sound : 122 

Concerning the general problem of safe usage, all countries with atomic energy 
programs have a mutual concern in minimizing accidental or inadvertent con- 
tamination of property and personal injury through adequate health and safety 
standards. International transport of radioactive materials, waste disposal at 
sea, and safe operation of reactors sited near national boundaries are examples 
of problems predominantly international in nature that can best be resolved 
through a single technically competent world organization. The Agency provides 
both a forum and the implementing mechanism for fulfilling the common inter- 
ests of all nations. 

As for the second opportunity for services, Commissioner Vance 
saw a strong safeguards function for the IAEA as consonant with U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. In his view, the recognition in U.S. bilateral 
agreements of the ultimate desirability of transfer of safeguards re- 
sponsibilities to the IAEA was evidence of U.S. support for this func- 
tion. He did not elaborate on the third and fourth points. 

A Stronger Role for the IAEA: The Smyth Report of 19G2 

Whether IAEA should be given some real international operating 
functions was a question before the State Department, the AEC, and 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1962. The State Department 
in 1961 had called for a competent general review of the Agency in 
terms of U.S. foreign policy, technology, administration, and finance. 
To this end the State Department, in agreement with the AEC, 
established an Advisory Committee chaired by Dr. Henry D. Smyth of 
Princeton University. 123 His committee reported in 1962. 124 

The Advisory Committee concluded that peaceful uses of atomic 
energy ought to play an important role in future foreign policy and 
that active support of IAEA would further this policy. Development 
of nuclear power was the key issue in determining the usefulness of 
IAEA. Because nuclear power was becoming economically attractive 
in many parts of the world, it would be advantageous for the United 
States to encourage the Agency to participate in this development. Five 
of the Smyth Committee's six recommendations were pertinent to U.S. 
foreign policy : 125 

(1) The United States [should] reaffirm and constructively 
support its policy for furthering the utilization of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes throughout the world. 

(2) The International Atomic Energy Agency [should] be rec- 
ognized as the most effective means by which the United States 
can carry out that policy. To that end, activities now being con- 
ducted under existing bilateral agreements should be transferred 
to Agency auspices wherever practical. 

"» Ibid., p. 28. 

123 Dr. Smyth was the author of the notable wartime "Smyth Report" on the Manhattan 
Project. A lending nuclear scientist, he was in 1902 the U.S. representative to the IAEA. 

134 Report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. In U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, United 
States Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962, 
pp. 37-62. 

128 In the opinion of the Committee, these functions should be to : 

a. Provide the best attainable assurance against diversion of material and equip- 
ment to military purposes. 

b. Establish uniform health and safety standards. 

c. Provide technical assistance. 

(1. Reconcile liability and indemnification practices. 

e. Conduct international research projects. 

f . Promulgate International waste management standards. 


(3) The United States [should] take the lead in securing inter- 
national agreement that the Agency be recognized as the instru- 
ment most appropriate for carrying out certain important func- 
tions in the field of atomic energy. 

(4) A detailed study [should] be made within the United States 
Government of the steps to be taken to further the foreign policy 
objectives in the field of atomic power. We believe that such a 
study will show that an effective program need not be costly. 

(5) The United States Government [should] continue to sup- 
port actively the programs of the Agency in the fields listed above 
by providing financial assistance, by supplying experts for special 
assignment, and by encouraging competent technical men to serve 
upon the Agency staff. 

The Smyth Committee extended its study to include two primary 
questions affecting atomic energy and foreign policy : 126 

( 1 ) Did atomic energy occupy a unique position in science and 
technology at that time ? and, 

(2) Did the past and present achievements of the United States 
in atomic energy give this country a unique opportunity and obli- 
gation to promote peaceful uses of atomic energy ? 

The Committee's answer to each question was yes. 

As for the future of nuclear power and the IAEA, Professor Smyth 
posed three questions of policy for the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy : 

( 1 ) Did the United States wish to support the development of 
nuclear power around the world ? 

(2) How important were safeguards ? 

(3) Was the United States really going to use IAEA, or would 
it continue to work largely through bilateral or regional groups ? 


In comment before the Joint Committee on the Smyth report, Mr. 
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Or- 
ganization Affairs, foresaw that expansion of nuclear power was 
likely to be important to foreign policy planning from two points of 
view: safeguards, and assistance to developing countries. Of this 
he said : 127 

First, we are concerned that adequate safeguards be maintained to guard 
against military applications of a proliferating nuclear technology. Second, the 
prospect of increasing use of nuclear energy for power as well as research makes 
it important to help the newly developing nations to develop the new technical 
people who can handle the new technology. 

But he discouraged the idea that the IAEA should be a channel 
for financial aid for nuclear power or that the United States should 
increase its proportional support of the Agency. 128 He anticipated 
some undefined third-party role of the Agency in relation to U.S. 
bilateral agreements. 

12a U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, United States Policy 
Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency, op. cit., pp. 2, 3. 

127 Ibid., p. 14. 

128 Elaborating on this point, he said : "We do not, however, believe that the IAEA or 
any of the other technical agencies of the United Nations complex should be used as 
channels for major inputs of financial aid. The IAEA is not a bank. We continue to believe 
that the international, regional, and national financing institutions are better equipped 
for this purpose," Ibid., p. 14. 


As for the State Department's ideas about the future of the Agency, 
it preferred that IAEA concentrate on technical service functions : 129 

We most explicitly agree that the Agency is the most appropriate instrument 
for establishing uniform health and safety standards, for working out uniform 
rules for liability and indemnification for atomic accidents; for developing and 
publishing international standards for waste management; and for conducting 
research and calling scientific conferences on problems which require interna- 
tional planning and coordination. 

Queried about Dr. Smyth's three policy questions, Mr. Cleveland in 
reply raised questions of his own. He said : 130 

. . . Sure, the United States wants to support the development of nuclear power 
around the world. But do we want to build into our aid program a preference 
for nuclear power as opposed to other forms of power in power development? 
This is a more complex and difficult and interesting question that really has to 
be looked at in terms of the economic program country by country. 

How important does the United States consider safeguards? Very. This is in- 
deed the most important single aspect as we look into the future of the Inter- 
national Agency's program. This is more than any one thing the raison d'etre of 
an international agency. 

la the United States really going to use the Agency? Yes, we are going to use 
the Agency. But whether we will use it in a particular case, given all the con- 
ditions in that case, can only be determined when you look at the case. That 
is a complicated answer to some simple looking questions, but Dr. Smyth knows 
how complicated his questions are. 

Cleveland's own questions went unanswered at the hearings and re- 
main largely unanswered today. This difference between Professor 
Smyth who wished to channel U.S. nuclear technical assistance though 
the IAEA and the Department of State which saw a continuing utility 
in bilateral as well as international channels illustrates the difference 
in approach of an announced advocate of an international agency and 
measures to strengthen it in contrast with the pragmatic approach of 
U.S. diplomacy which views both bilateral and international arrange- 
ments as useful for U.S. purposes. This same pattern of bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements for technical assistance and cooperation has 
appeared in the space program. There too the United States uses bi- 
lateral and multilateral agreements. Able to use either approach, U.S. 
diplomacy is not tied to the success or failure of one method or the 
other, but can choose the combination that best fits its interests. 


Commissioner Leland J. Haworth welcomed the Smyth Commit- 
tee's reaffirmation of a policy of strong support for the International 
Agency, for use of atomic energy as an element of U.S. foreign policy, 
and for support of the Agency as a means to advance U.S. policy. 131 
He agreed that one way to develop the competence of the 
Agency was to transfer to it as many as possible of the AEC activities 
then being carried out through bilateral agreements. But the AEC 
was not ready to commit itself to this idea. As to safeguards, the Com- 
mission endorsed the need for a continued effort to obtain a uniform, 
worldwide, effective system, ideally to be administered by the IAEA. 
But the Agency's system could apply only to materials received 
through the Agency or to those voluntarily placed under its system. 

"•Ibid., p. 1". 
«*>Ibld., pp. 1S-19. 
131 Ibid., p. 19. 


Thus IAEA safeguards could not be global in scope. Nevertheless, the 
Agency's system provided a means to bring a few nuclear facilities 
under safeguards and could set a desirable example of a workable in- 
ternational safeguards system for the future. "For these reasons", 
j>aid Commissioner Haworth, "the AEC judged the Agency's safe- 
guards function to be the most important of its activities." 132 

As for the supply function, the AEC demurred. While any of the 
bilateral partners of the United States could at any time utilize the 
Agency, and it was AEC policy to encourage them to do so, Commis- 
sioner Haworth gave assurance that many countries trusted and pre- 
ferred the bilateral code : 133 

. . . Important as it may be to the Agency for it to serve as a supplier of ma- 
terials (a question on which there have been different opinions) it is even more 
important that Agency safeguards become generally applied. It is, therefore, of 
great significance, in the interests of strengthening the safeguards function of 
the Agency, that greater emphasis be given to the voluntary application of IAEA 
safeguards to bilateral transactions. 

The idea that the IAEA should become involved in financing nuclear 
power also was minimized by the AEC. There were other financial in- 
stitutions. Moreover, a financial role for the IAEA could lead to an 
unbalancing of its functions. It would not, in Ha worth's opinion, bene- 
fit either the Agency or the United States for this country to use the 
Agency as a broker to finance construction of a nuclear power plant at 
an expenditure level several times as large as the Agency's entire 
budget. 134 


The year following the Smyth Committee report, one observer cau- 
tioned that IAEA remained weak and lacking in direction. As seen 
by Arnold Kramish, the Agency was not the idealistic mechanism en- 
visioned by the President in 1953 to diminish the potential destruc- 
tive power of the world's nuclear stockpiles, nor had it provided a new 
channel for peaceful international discussion. If the Agency's 
members wished to develop it for that purpose, they would have to 
strengthen its support. 135 

Likewise in 1966, Sterling Cole was to comment that the IAEA was 
still being avoided or circumvented, and that "not a single nuclear 
power plant capable of producing by-product weapon material has 
come under the Agency control . . ., except for psychological ges- 
tures or demonstrations. 136 

The Decline of the Supply Function 

If the International Agency was to have a viable supply function, 
the appropriate time to establish it was in 1959 when the AEC received 
legislative authority to cooperate with the Agency. But this brokerage 
function that was so important for the plans and hopes of Director 
General Cole was discounted and minimized by the AEC. Appear- 
ing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1959, Commis- 
sioner Vance of the AEC ruled out the possibility that the United 
States supplying nuclear materials to the International Agency on 

132 Ibid., p. 20. 

133 Ibid., p. 20. 

134 Ibid., p. 21. 

133 Kramish. op. cit.. p. 77. 

"'Sterling Cole. "Needed: A Rebirth of the IAEA," Nuclear News, vol. 9 (September 
1966) , p. 19. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 14 


special terms which would enable it to be a competitive supplier in the 
world market. As he analyzed the situation, unless other governments 
volunteered to become suppliers, countries wishing to obtain uranium- 
235 had two options. They could deal directly with the United States, 
or go to the International Agency. He anticipated they would prefer 
the former, which he too preferred as in the best interests of the United 
States. He said : 137 

... if they deal with us under an individual bilateral agreement, we have 
some control over where this material goes and for what purpose it is used, and 
we do not have that if it is channeled through the International Agency. There- 
fore. I think the present arrangement is a good one from our standpoint. 

He opposed Director General Cole's proposition that the United 
States supply nuclear materials to it at a discount of 3 to 5 percent : 13S 

... I believe that this possible function of the International Agency which 
Mr. Cole laid great stress on in his speech in March has been greatly overem- 
phasized in his mind and in the minds of a lot of other people. I do not believe that 
it is one of the principal functions of the International Agency to act as a broker 
between the countries who make U-235 or enriched uranium and the countries 
who require it. 

That same year AEC Commissioner John Floberg told the third ses- 
sion of the IAEA General Conference that the United States saw for 
the Agency a continuing and important role as a supplier of source and 
special nuclear materials. 139 Asked why, in view of the AEC's attitude, 
a bilateral agreement with the International Agency was necessary at 
all, Commissioner Vance said it would provide the machinery for sup- 
plying nuclear fuel, even though the amount to be delivered might be 
nominal. "We have gone this far, we should go on to the point where 
nobody can accuse us of pulling back the offer that was made."' 140 

So although Atoms for Peace proposed a strong supply function for 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, within a few years this 
function had atrophied. U.S. policy prevented the Agency from 
obtaining nuclear materials from the United States at a wholesale or 
discount price for resale to other members. Whether the Agency 
would in fact have been strengthened by a more favorable policy is 
now academic, for other supply channels are now well established and 
it is unlikely that they would be abandoned now in favor of the 
International Agency. 

International Standards for Nuclear Safety 

One little-developed function of IAEA which could have affected 
commercial nuclear power in Europe was the setting of international 
safety standards for nuclear power. Commissioner Vance and others 
had called attention to this function and the Department of Stale 
and AEC had both emphasized the importance they assigned to it. 
During hearings on the International Statute, Secretary Dulles justi- 

137 V K. Concress, Joint Committee on Atomic Enortr.v. Hearings, Agreement for Co- 
operatinn Between the United States and the International Atornie Energy Agency, op. 
clt., p -•• 

" R IMd., p. 21. 

"" r s Atomic Knprpy Commission, Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs, 
January— December jf>5.9,op. clt., p. 104. 

'"t'S. Congress, Join! Committee on Atomic Kncrpy, Hearings, Agreement for Co- 
operation Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, op. clt., 
p. 25. 


fied ratification by the United States because of what the International 
Agency could do to control the dangers of nuclear power. He said: 141 

. . . people are becoming more aware of some of the dangers inherent in this 
progress. When power is produced by nuclear energy . . . such production also 
creates waste products which could imperil health and safety. Today, the need 
is even more imperative for protection against the inevitable byproducts of the 
atomic age. 

The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency is designed to fill 
this need. . . . 

Chairman Strauss was quite frank about the hazards. He testified 
that : 142 

A byproduct of reactors is radioactive waste. This byproduct will probably 
some day be valuable, but presently and for the foreseeable future, it presents 
a huge disposal problem. Solution of the problem is necessary for public health 
and safety. 

If these wastes are indiscriminately dumped at sea, they could spread around 
the world. If they are indiscriminately buried in the earth they may migrate along 
the plunging contours of subterranean strata with no regard whatever for the 
political boundaries that men and nations have scratched on the earth's surface. 

The only way we can safeguard our own health and safety is by securing 
world health and safety. And that can only be achieved by a uniform international 
agreement on standards of health and safety applicable to atomic energy. 

The United States was ready to support the concept of voluntary 
international safety standards. However, it was unready to accept 
the application of such standards by an international agency to its 
own nuclear activities. In 1959 while discussing IAEA Director 
General Cole's ideas about the IAEA, a State Department witness, 
Chad wick Johnson, Office of Special Assistant for Disarmament and 
Atomic Energy, declined to take a position on this question, as indi- 
cated in the following colloquy : 143 

Mr. Johnson. I, of course believe it is a generally good thing for the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency to establish rigid standards of health and 
safety for possible adoption by other countries with which the agency works. 

Senator Anderson. For adoption by other countries. Why not for adoption by 
the principal country that started it, the United States? . . . 

Mr. Johnson. Being a member of the Department of State, I believe that I 
cannotfully answer your question on this matter of health and safety. 

The IAEA itself has not been able to move very far to establish 
international standards for safety in design, construction and oper- 
ation of nuclear power plants. It did convene a Panel on Safe Opera- 
tion of Critical Assemblies and Research Reactors which prepared 
an international safety manual and subsequently assisted in setting 
up safety procedures for a few small research reactors. But the IAEA- 
went no further despite the fact that the nuclear power technology 
is potentially dangerous, and effects of accidents with nuclear power 
plants could cross national boundaries and affect other countries. 

Shortly after the issuance of the Smyth report, Arnold Kramish 
suggested that adoption and enforcement by members of the IAEA 
of international safety standards promulgated and monitored by that 

141 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the 
Jo'nt Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, op. eit., p. 3. 

142 Jbid.,p. 84. 

143 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Agreement for Coopera- 
tion Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, op. clt., 
p. 10. 


body could also contribute to international control of nuclear mate- 
rials. Safety procedures for such hazardous materials and other safety 
concerns are intimately related to the measures for an effective inter- 
national safeguards system. 144 

Despite these statements attesting to the importance of a nuclear 
safety function for the IAEA, there remains a confusing proliferation 
and apparent overlap of radiation safety guides and standards. In 
Europe, there are standards issued by the IAEA and standards pro- 
mulgated by Euratom. The United Nations has continued its Scientific 
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, rather than transfer 
the functions of that U.N. committee to IAEA. Meanwhile, the role 
of the International Agency in setting standards for construction and 
operation of nuclear power plants is now dormant. If commercial nu- 
clear power expands in Europe, as optimists are beginning to antic- 
pate, the issue of international standards for safety and to control 
environmental effects can be expected to revive. If and when it does, 
U.S. diplomats are likely to be faced with the question to what extent 
and in what way should such standards apply to domestic nuclear 
power plants? Should the United States voluntarily agree to apply 
such standards to the domestic industry? Should the United States 
voluntarily permit inspection of design, construction, and operation 
of commercial nuclear power plants? What would be the effect on 
the Intel-national Agency were the United States to refuse to acknowl- 
edge the applicability of these standards? Then too, what might 
such a conflict do to the competitive position of the U.S. nuclear 
industry in the world market ? 

In ternational Safeguards for Nuclear Materials 

Of all the negotiating issues faced by the diplomats and their 
scientific advisors in drafting the IAEA statute, the most intrac- 
table was the safeguarding of nuclear material?. U.S. negotiators were 
caught between (a) the demand for credible inspection and control 
of nuclear materials to reduce the chances of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, and (b) the reluctance of the non-nuclear nations to sur- 
render any sovereign rights to permit inspection. In these negotiations, 
the Soviet Union chose to emphasize the issue of sovereign rights and 
to oppose international inspection. The final compromise reached at the 
United Nations Conference Avas to restrict safeguards to IAEA proj- 
ects or to those projects voluntarily placed under IAEA safeguards. 
Thus hopes were dashed for a worldwide safeguards system that 
would apply to all nuclear materials and facilities in peaceful 

On paper, the Statute specifies an impressive array of power and 
responsibility for the Agency in enforcing safeguards for its projects, 
or projects assigned to it by member states. The International Statute 
requires that such arrangements include provisions for IAEA 
examination of design of nuclear equipment, including power 
reactors: that IAEA health and safety measures be observed: that 
records be maintained for nuclear materials produced or used; and 

*** Kramish, op. clt., pp. r>n-CO. 


that the Agency can send inspectors into the member states to check 
nuclear materials that it supplies. 145 


The questions of what safeguards would entail, why they were 
needed, and how they would work were of continuing interest to both 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy. Safeguards offered two sets of benefits : a means 
to make disarmament more palatable, and a means to improve world 
security in an area of nuclear energy. 

In sending the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
to the Senate, President Eisenhower reassured Congress that the safe- 
guards would be adequate and that the security of the United States 
would not be endangered by nuclear materials made available to or 
through the IAEA. Said the President: 146 

To achieve the confidence essential to cooperation among members of the 
International Atomic Agency, great care has been exercised to insure that fis- 
sionable material will be safeguarded to prevent its diversion to any military 
purpose. A comprehensive safeguard system is provided by the statute. This 
will apply to all aspects of the Agency's activity involving nuclear materials. 
A key part of this system is a plan for thorough international inspection. The 
United States will provide fissionable materials for Agency projects only as 
the safeguard system is put into effect. I am satisfied that the security of the 
United States will not be endangered by materials made available to or through 
this Agency. 

In the hearings which followed, Chairman Strauss described the 
International Agency as prospectively providing a practical, working 
model of an inspection system for disarmament. He said : 147 

The Agency will not, of course, achieve atomic disarmament, nor was it con- 
ceived to attempt that. However, it can promote United States objectives in 

115 Article XII specifies that the Agency shall have the following rights and responsi- 
bilities for safeguarding its own proierts or those of member states : 

1. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities including nuclear 
reactors and to approve it only from the viewpoint of assuring that it will not further 
any military purpose, that it complies with applicable health and safety standards, 
and that it will permit effective application of the safeguards provided for in this 
art'c'e ; 

2. To require the observance of any health and safety measures prescribed by the 
Agency ; 

3. To require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in 
ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or produced 
in the nroi'e^t or arrangement : 

4. To call for and receive progress reports : 

r>. To approve the means to he used for the chemical processing of irradiated mate- 
rials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will not lend itself to diver- 
sion . . . and will comply with anplicable health and safety standards. . . . : 

6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, designated 
by the Agency after consultation with the State or States concerned, who shall have 
access at all times to all places and data and to any person ... as necessary to 
account for source and fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to 
determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in further- 
ance of any military purpose . . . with the health and safety measures referred to in 
. . . tbis article, and with any other conditions prescribed in the agreement between 
tbe Agency and the State or States concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency 
shall be accompanied by representatives of the authorities of the State concerned, if 
that State so requests, provided that the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or 
otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions ; 

7. In the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or States to 
take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate 
assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or 
a member. . . . 

na •"The State of the International Atomic Energy Agencv." Message from the President 
of tbe United States. S5th Cong.. 1st sess., March 21, 1957 (Senate Executive I), p. 2. 

147 U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, op. cit, p. 87. 


the field of disarmament by creating a practical working model of an inspection 
system, and a climate of international opinion in support of our objectives. This 
we may hope, will facilitate establishment of the broader controls needed for 
a successful disarmament agreement. 

Sterling Cole, then chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, strongly supported the safeguards function of the IAEA for 
its implications for disarmament. In a statement to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee he cited its potential for "outstanding accom- 
plishment." He said : 148 

This will be a period of learning about all of the problems— technical, legal, 
psychological — of international inspection and control. The Agency was suggested 
at a time when neither the United States nor Russia were able to agree on an 
inspection and control plan for themselves for disarmament purposes. The 
Agency's operations can produce that technology and that confidence in inter- 
national control which will lead to complete international control of atomic 
energy at an appropriate time later on. Since the Soviet Union has been the 
country principally opposed to international inspection of atomic arms, perhaps 
it will learn that international inspection will not be as unpalatable as 

The State Department underscored the importance of international 
safeguards. In reply to a question as to why the desired safeguards 
could not be had equally well through bilateral agreements, Secretary 
Dulles replied : 149 

. . . while in theory you could have the same degree of inspection under bi- 
laterals as you have under the International Agency, ... in fact there would be 
competition between the countries — there is already evidence of that now — as to 
who would want to sell this material. One result would be dropping these 
standards of inspection, so that in fact we would not be able to maintain our 
own standards as the era of plenty arrives in this field. 

Secondly .... there is objection to continuing inspection just by one nation 
as against an international system. 

Thirdly . . . , we do not have the manpower to do it adequately as the need 

Strauss foresaw that within a few years other nations would be 
offering nuclear materials on the world market and that without the 
International Agency the United States could not then be sure that 
these other nations would impose equally stringent safeguards. Accord- 
ing to Strauss, the Agency could establish standards for safeguards 
more effectively than any system of agreements between individual 
countries. Such standards had to be set up at the outset of the growth 
of a world nuclear power industry. It would be too late to attempt it 
"after the contaminants have been broadcast." 150 

AEC Commissioner Thomas Murray saw IAEA as the only means 
of avoiding international nuclear anarchy. He said : 151 

In no field does the need for international order exist more imperatively than 
in the field of nuclear energy. In the concept of order I include a whole set 
of notions — regulation, control, supervision, commonly accepted standards of 
health and safety, and above all the institution of free and orderly procedures of 
cooperation among nations. You have heard statements about the danger of 
our gradually drifting into a state of atomic anarchy. This is a good phrase in 
which to describe the state in which we already find ourselves. Surely this is 
true in the field of nuclear weapons. Each of the nations engaged in their 
development and production is acting as a law unto itself. 

14S IMd.. p. 171. 
uu Ibid., p. 69. 
' ' [bid., p. 87. 
161 Ibid., p. 175. 


There are no common norms or standards binding on all ; there are no common 
agreements accepted by all. The result is international lawlessness or anarchy 
which shows itself chiefly in the ungoverned — and for the moment seemingly 
ungovernable — race for nuclear armaments. 

This international situation is not simply the road to anarchy. It is itself anar- 
chy. Unless and until this anarchy is resolved into some decent measure of order, 
neither America nor the world at large could enjoy even that basic security that 
consisted in the assurance of continued national existence. 


Since U.S. bilateral agreements provide for U.S. safeguards, it 
might be asked what difference does it make whether U.S. nuclear 
materials are safeguarded under the bilateral agreements or through 
the International Agency. This question was probed by the Joint 
Committee in 1964. Dr. Henry Smyth, speaking both as the U.S. repre- 
sentative to the IAEA and as an adviser to the State Department and 
the AEC, outlined three major advantages of international safe- 
guards : credibility, uniformity, and expense. He said : 152 

First of all, we believe that international safeguards may be viewed as more 
credible than bilateral safeguards. That is, if the U.S. Government, or any 
other government, for that matter, is conducting safeguards inspections in the 
nuclear installations of a very close ally, some question might arise in the minds 
of people at large as to the thoroughness and efficacy of such inspections. If, 
on the other hand, those same inspections are conducted by an international 
inspectorate in which a variety of countries is represented, no one in the world 
can doubt their thoroughness and objectivity. 

Second, we believe that it is important that the safeguards applied to various 
countries be uniform. If 10, 11, or more countries set up their own individual 
inspection systems, it may well turn out that one country has a vigorous 
system and that another country has a lenient one. If transferred materials and 
equipment, whatever their source, are subjected to the same inspection under an 
international organization, there will be complete uniformity - of safeguards 

Third, we believe it is far more expensive for many different countries to 
establish inspection systems than if one international secretariat representing 
the governments both of the supplying countries and the receiving countries 
undertakes this whole job. 

The AEC itself outlined five reasons favoring replacement of bi- 
lateral safeguards, with those of the IAEA. It testified that : 153 

1. The most effective safeguards, the United States believes, are those carried 
out by an international organization. While bilateral safeguards provide adequate 
assurances to the supplier against diversion of materials supplied by them, 
only internationally applied safeguards are capable of giving equivalent as- 
surances to the world at large that nuclear material supplied by one country 
to another is not being diverted to military uses. 

2. Application of safeguards by an international organization develops the 
experience and competence in an international staff which can serve as an im- 
portant precedent for international inspection in connection with any future 
disarmament agreement. 

3. International safeguards would be uniformly applicable and, therefore, 
would minimize tendencies toward discriminatory treatment which might reduce 
arrangements to the level which the least strict bilateral arrangements required. 

4. Relying upon the IAEA to carry out the safeguards function enhances the 
prestige and increases the responsibilities of the IAEA and thereby makes it a 
more effective instrument in all of its fields of endeavor. 

5. Many supplying countries will probably find it difficult if not impossible to 
undertake bilateral safeguards on nuclear materials which they supply. Effective 

102 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agree- 
ments tor Cooperation, S8th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 1965, p. 141. 
153 Ibid., p. 140. 


safeguards on these exports can be realized only if an international organization 
has developed a capability for applying safeguards and recipient nations are pre- 
pared to accept them. 


U.S. support of IAEA safeguards has been and is a curious mixture 
of innovation, generosity, and unusual voluntary actions, offset by a 
reluctance to commit the United States to reliance upon IAEA safe- 
guards and an unreadiness to obtain for the International Agency the 
financial and technical support it will need to carry out its expanded 
safeguards responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty. The 
evolving nature of U.S. participation is illuminated in the following 
chronology of developments in IAEA safeguards. 

Toward the end of 1957, the AEC was working on ways to help 
the IAEA carry out its safeguards functions. In addition to assuring 
that U.S. supplied nuclear materials would be used only for peaceful 
purposes, administration of the safeguards was expected to accumu- 
late technical and administrative experience that would be useful for 
future IAEA operations. 154 

In 1959, Director General Cole attempted to expedite IAEA action 
for a safeguards system. He pleaded with the Board of Governors 
to do so. The nuclear nations represented should demonstrate for the 
"have-not" nations that inspection and other safeguards were not an 
unreasonable invasion of national sovereignty. But the Soviet repre- 
sentatives were not cooperative. They challenged IAEA safeguards 
as unacceptable intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign 
states— a position U.S.S.R. representatives had taken during negotia- 
tion of the International Statute— and argued that IAEA safeguards 
would establish the domination of the strong over the weak states. 
Apparently U.S. representatives and their supporters were able to 
counter the Soviet position, for during 1959 the Board provisionally 
approved principles for drafting a safeguards system. These principles 
were never published. 

In May 1960, the Director General sent a draft of a proposed safe- 
guards agreement to 70 governments. It provided for inspection by 
IAEA inspectors of facilities using nuclear materials obtained 
through the Agency, IAEA approval of reactor designs, and Agency 
supervision of records of reactor operations. In September, this draft 
was debated and adopted at the fourth General Conference. In 19G0 
the AEC took a first step toward providing the IAEA with practical 
working experience with safeguards. At the Agency's General Con- 
ference^ it and several of its bilateral partners announced their will- 
ingness to transfer to the Agency the administration of safeguards 
for U.S. -supplied materials. In that year the United States volun- 
teered to place four nuclear reactors under Agency safeguards. 155 
Full IAEA safeguards, principles, and procedures would apply, 
including inspection and verification of records and accounts. 156 



V S Atomic Encrev Commission. Proprcss in Peaceful Tines of Atomic Encroy.July- 
mhe'r 1957 (Washington. DC. : U.S. Government Printing Office lOr.S), p. 196. 
The four reactors Included two research reactors at the AECVFropkhaven National 

Laboratory, an experimental power reactor at the AEC's Argonne National Laboratory. 

and a small de ostration power plant In an electric utility at Plqua, Ohio. 

•"""T'S Atomic Enerpv Commission. Annual Heport to Congress of the Atomic Energy 

Commission for 1960 (Washington, DC. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1961). p. 205. 


In 1961 the International Agency adopted guidelines for a safe- 
guards system. The AEC in turn adopted these principles and pro- 
cedures to be applied under its bilateral agreements, and the countries 
involved indicated their willingness to consult with the United States 
about future transfer of safeguards for U.S. -supplied materials to the 
IAEA. 157 During 1962 the IAEA and AEC completed negotiations 
for application of Agency safeguards to the four reactors, and two trial 
inspections were carried out by IAEA inspectors at these reactors. 158 

In 1963 the AEC and a bilateral partner completed an agreement 
to transfer to the IAEA the function of safeguarding U.S. -supplied 
material. While most of the nuclear power bilateral agreements of the 
United States were with European countries, the first such agreement 
was executed with Japan. Entering into force on November 1, 1963, 
this trilateral agreement of the United States, Japan, and the Inter- 
national Agency provided for the Agency to safeguard any nuclear 
material, equipment, and facilities supplied to Japan by the United 
States. It also specified that Agency safeguards would apply to any 
fissionable material produced in the Japanese facilities upon its 
return to the United States for reprocessing unless the U.S. substi- 
tuted an equivalent quantity of like material in Japan. 159 This pro- 
vision was doubly innovative: it recognized the idea that IAEA 
safeguards should follow the return flow of safeguarded material from 
a recipient country to the country where it was processed or used; 
and it provided a way for the supplying nations to break the chain 
of safeguards simply by substituting a like amount of material at 
the recipient country. By this device, a supplier country like the United 
States, or the U.S.S.R. or the United Kingdom could avoid IAEA 
inspection of nuclear material sent by a third party. 

The IAEA Board of Governors in 1963 provisionally approved a 
system of safeguards for small power reactors and the Seventh General 
Conference that year adopted a. U.S. -proposed resolution endorsing 
the Board's action. AEC Chairman Seaborg recommended to the 
Conference that the Agency consider extending safeguards to facilities 
for fabricating and for reprocessing nuclear fuel ; also that the Agency 
compile and publish an international registry of ocean disposal sites 
for radioactive wastes and undertake the development of international 
or regional wastes burial grounds. 160 

In 1964 IAEA safeguards were expanded to include power reactors 
of any size. At this time, many members of the Agency called for 
clarification and simplification by revising the whole safeguards sys- 
tem. A start was made in that year. 

In 1965 the IAEA Board of Governors provisionally approved a 
clarification and simplification of the Agency's safeguards system. 
The General Conference that year adopted a U.S.-proposed resolu- 
tion to approve this revision and the Board of Governors effectuated 
the revised system on September 28, 1965. 161 The State Department 

157 U.S. Atomic Unersrv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1961 (Washington, DC. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1002), p. 2::3. 

^U.S. Atomic Enerjrv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1962 (Washington, D.C. : T T .S. Governmpnt Printing Office, 196^), p. 296. 

1C8 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1963 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 2:!4. 

160 Ibid., p. 233. 

161 U.S. Atomic Energv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1965 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 254. 


supported the revision before the Joint Committee, describing it as 
intelligible, comprehensive, and likely to provide a mechanism for 
effective safeguards on peaceful nuclear programs around the world. 162 
Also in 1965 the United States expanded its original four reactors 
offer by voluntarily putting under IAEA safeguards the 175 megawatt 
Yankee nuclear power plant at Rowe, Massachusetts. This action 
provided IAEA inspectors with practical experience with a larger, 
regularly operating, nuclear power plant and was expected to confirm 
the U.S. position that safeguards would not interfere with efficient 
operations of nuclear facilities. During 1965 IAEA inspectors made 
10 inspections of the reactors under voluntary safeguards. 163 

By the end of 1965 two other supplying countries also were using 
trilateral agreements that involved the IAEA. One was among the 
IAEA, Canada, and Japan; and others were among the IAEA, 
the United Kingdom and Japan, and Denmark, respectively. 

In 1966 President Johnson pledged full U.S. support for the 
Agency's safeguards system, which he characterized as one of the 
principal instruments for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. 
In a message to the 10th General Conference, he said : 164 

. . . the Agency has a crucial responsibility to see that the vast beneficial 
uses of nuclear energy are not diverted for military purposes. I cannot say 
often enough that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the 
most important tasks of our times. We look on the Agency's safeguards system 
as one of the principal instruments for accomplishing this task. The U.S. Govern- 
ment fully supports the Agency system and we will do all in our power to support 
the continued growth and technical effectiveness of the system. 

To show its support, the United States voluntarily permitted appli- 
cation of safeguards to a commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing facil- 
ity. That April, at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, 
the United States offered, in cooperation with the company con- 
cerned, 165 to make the fuel reprocessing plant available to the IAEA 
to develop and test safeguards techniques and to gain experience and 
training for its inspectors. During 1966, IAEA inspectors made 10 
inspections of the Yankee plant, including 4 unannounced visits to test 
provisions of IAEA inspection procedures for access at all times to 
power reactors. 

In 1967 the United States suggested at the 11th General Conference 
of the IAEA that the Agency's systems extend to fuel fabrication 
plants. 166 Far more important, on December 2, 1967, President John- 
son announced that when safeguards were applied under a nonpro- 
liferation treaty for nuclear weapons, the United States would volun- 
tarily permit the International Agency to apply its safeguards to all 
nuclear activities in this country, excluding only those with direct 
national security significance. 167 

In 1968 IAEA safeguards were extended to cover facilities for cer- 
tain chemical processing of nuclear fuel materials and for fabrication 

103 Statement of Charles W. Thomas. Office of International Scientific Affairs, Donart- 
iii.nt df State. In D.S. Congress, lolnt Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International 
Agreements for Cooperation, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 14. 

>*'< U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1965, op. clt., p. 2. r >7. 

184 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs, 
.latuinry-December 1966 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 
p. 201. 

ln "' Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., of West Valley, New York. 

1M U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to the Congress on the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1967 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 210. 

ia,7 Ibld., p. 216. 


of these materials into fuel elements for nuclear power plants. Also 
in 1968, the Treaty for Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was 
opened for signature. Under Article III of the Treaty, IAEA would 
be called upon to provide assurance that nuclear energy programs in 
non-nuclear-weapons states adhering to the Treaty were not diverted 
to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. To support IAEA safeguards, the AEC provided the services 
of technical experts, shared results of its research and development, 
and provided safeguards training opportunities for the Agency's 
staff. 168 

On March 5, 1970, the Nonproliferation Treaty entered into 
force. In keeping with Article III which required each non-weapons 
state to accept safeguards by agreement with the International Agency, 
representatives of the United States and 47 other IAEA member 
states, including the nuclear power states of Europe, met twice 
during 1970 to consider the character of such safeguards agreements, 
the procedures to be included, and the methods of financing the 

The "Four Reactor Agreement" of the United States expired on 
July 31, 1970. To continue its cooperation with the IAEA in develop- 
ing effective safeguards, the United States arranged for IAEA 
personnel to take part in safeguards exercises at certain U.S. facilities. 
This was intended as an interim arrangement until such time as 
President Johnson's offer of 1967 to submit all U.S. peaceful nuclear 
activities to IAEA safeguards was implemented. 169 

In December 1970, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in its 
annual report noted that members and staff of the Committee had 
visited the International Agency to discuss safeguard inspection pro- 
cedures. The Joint Committee reported that it was mindful of the 
importance of safeguards, ". . . but is looking very cautiously at the 
growing safeguards program and what could develop into a need for 
increased funding to support the numbers of personnel which may be 
suggested as necessary to run the IAEA safeguards program." 17 ° 

However, the Joint Committee's report for 1971 had little to say 
about safeguards. 

Conclusions and Current Issues 

Had the International Atomic Energy Agency evolved in the di- 
rection indicated by President Eisenhower's idealistic Atoms for 
Peace proposal, it could have had a major influence upon develop- 
ment of commercial nuclear energy in Europe as a channel for 
technical assistance and nuclear materials. However, the tensions of 
the cold war effectively precluded such a role. While the United 
States was the most generous contributor to the IAEA, it chose not 
to promote the Agency as a distributor of nuclear materials or the 
custodian of a pool of such materials. Nor did the United States 
support an international regulatory or standard-setting function for 
the IAEA for design and operation of nuclear power plants. On the 

1W U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1968 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969>, p. 204. 

199 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1970 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1973, p. 129. 

170 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. "Activity and Accomplishments 
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy During the Second Session of the 91st Congress," 
Congressional Record, vol. lltf, December 31, 1970, p. 44324. 


other hand, the Agency provided an arena wherein U.S. and Soviet 
representatives could meet in an atmosphere where political differ- 
ences were less pronounced than for other cold war circumstances. 

From the beginning of the IAEA, the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
as the two principal "have" nations in the world's nuclear com- 
munity were pushed together in their participation in the Agency's 
activities by the pressures of the other largely "have-not" nations. 
These circumstances engendered some mutual interest and the result- 
ing experience demonstrated the possibilities for cooperation between 
the two governments in diplomatic, legal, and technical matters relat- 
ing to nuclear energy. While such cooperation has become common in 
1972. 171 it was most unusual during the formative years of the IAEA. 
The IAEA provided a sheltered field wherein member states belong- 
ing to widely differing world power blocs could cautiously experiment 
with new relations. On the other hand, the variety of viewpoints and 
national desires represented among the members of the Agency on 
occasion led to strained relations within the IAEA's governing bodies 
and has tended to limit the Agency to a lowest common denominator 
of inoffensive activities. 

The IAEA has been a useful test-bed to demonstrate a limited form 
of international inspection, a demonstration that can be important 
for U.S. interests if international limitations upon armaments are 
agreed upon. The IAEA, with strong U.S. backing, has demonstrated 
on a small scale how international safeguards for nuclenr materials 
can work. Perhaps more important, it has done so without generating 
any insoluble problem of national sovereignty. Whether the United 
States and other nations will now be willing to provide the financial 
and technical support required by the Agency to expand its safeguards 
functions enough to adequately implement the Nonproliferation 
Treaty remains to be seen. 

Several specific questions relating to the IAEA are likely to con- 
front U.S. diplomats and policymakers in the future. These questions 
can be expected to bear upon : 

(1) Establishing and enforcing international standards and 
guides for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear 
power plants, nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, and perpetual 
radioactive waste storage facilities ; 

(2) Establishing and enforcing international regulations for 
the shipment of highly radioactive materials ; 

(3) Assessment of environmental effects of nuclear facilities 
located so near to national boundaries that such effects could 
be expected to extend across national borders ; 

(4) Supplying nuclear fuel materials; 

(5) Providing for the perpetual storage of radioactive wastes 
from nuclear power ; 

(0) Safeguarding of nuclear fuel materials for commercial 
nuclear power; 

(7) Possible future relations with the regional nuclear energy 
agencies of the Soviet bloc nations. 

171 The United States and the U.S.S.R. slimed an agreement on scientific find technological 
cooperation on May 24. 1072, that poos hoyond the usual eTehantre of Ideas and opens the 
way to scientific Joint research undertakings and cooperative projects. It estahlished for 
the first time a U.S. -Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Cf. 
Claire R. Geler. The U.B.-Boviet Aqrrcmcvt in Science anrl Technology (Washington, P.P. : 
The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 10, 1972, report No. 
72-179 SP. 

VII. Creating A Regional Nuclear Organization : The European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 

Of the international organizations arising out of the discovery of 
nuclear fission, the most ambitious, but perhaps the most disappoint- 
ing, has been the multinational, regional organization known as 
Euratom. Established in 1958, the purpose of the European Atomic 
Energy Community was to create conditions necessary for the speedy 
establishment and growth of nuclear power within the European Eco- 
nomic Community, whose members then included Belgium, France, 
the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Nether- 
lands. The goal of Euratom was also expected to further the eco- 
nomic integration of Europe, which was a long standing objective of 
U.S. diplomacy. The support and collaboration of the United States 
with Euratom has been directly instrumental in demonstrating U.S. 
nuclear power technology in Europe, and, for a while, provided U.S. 
diplomacy with special leverage in relations with Euratom. 

This section outlines the origins of Euratom, its functions and 
activities, and the disappointments of its research and development 
program. The nature and scale of U.S. support are mentioned and 
show that U.S. participation in Euratom has been greater than U.S. 
participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency or the 
Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. The joint U.S.-Euratom re- 
search and reactor programs are described in section VIII. 

Origins of Euratom, 

The impetus for European economic and military integration that 
followed World War II, 172 and problems with oil supplies were con- 
tributing factors to the idea of a European atomic energy community. 
There was the three-year suspension of Iranian oil production fol- 
lowing nationalization in 1951 and the closing of the Suez Canal in 
1956-57. 173 The initial impetus for Euratom appeared in the mid 1950's 
when statesmen took note of the expectations of nuclear scientists 
and engineers that economically competitive nuclear power was close 
at hand. In June 1955 the foreign ministers of the six members of 
the European Coal and Steel Community met at Messina, Italy and 
decided that commercial nuclear power could provide a desired 
additional spur for European integration. The ministers had in mind 
a vertical integration of a new European nuclear industry which prom- 
ised quick returns to the participating nations, with negligible in- 
terference with established commercial interests. W T ith the European 

172 Cf . section III. 

173 Oil supply interruptions were to occur again with the closing of the Suez Canal in 
1967. the Libyan embargo and the Tapline rupture and cutoff in 1970. The interruptions 
of the 1950's took place at a time when the United States was a relatively modest oil 
importer and still possessed sufficient excess producing capacity to contribute a portion 
of the oil to make up the interrupted supply of other major Western oil consuming 
countries. However, of recent years the United States has become a substantial importer 
of oil and it appears unlikely that the United States could come to the rescue for future 
interruptions of European oil supplies. 



nuclear industry in its infancy, vested interests were few and still 

The exciting early purpose of -Euratom was to create a European 
nuclear technology and a European nuclear power industry, which, it 
was hoped, would be able to compete with the nuclear industries of 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 174 


The foreign ministers decided at Messina to seek the advice of the 
technological community. In November 1956 they commissioned three 
prominent Europeans to report on the early production of nuclear 
power within the six member countries. The three were Louis Armand 
of France, Franz Etzel of West Germany, and Francesco Giordani of 
Italy. 175 Dubbed "the three wise men" in the public press, these three 
were well versed in science, technology, administration, and diplomacy, 
but their advice and interests focused more upon politics and economics 
than upon science. 176 


The product of "the three wise men" was a report, A Target for 
Euratom, 171 delivered May 4, 1957, after the treaties for atomic inte- 
gration had been signed. The substance of the proposals, however, was 
well known beforehand, for in January 1957, the authors had ex- 
pounded their ideas in a public conference. 

A Target for Euratom combined the factors of energy and economic 
policy into a compelling argument for European atomic integration. 
With the Suez crisis still fresh in mind, they observed that a future 
stoppage of oil could be an economic calamity for Europe, and that ex- 
cessive dependence upon an oil supply from an unstable region might 
lead to serious political trouble throughout the world. Estimating 
that future energy requirements of the economic community would 
increase by 83 percent between 1955 and 1975, they advised that the 
economic growth of the six countries was in danger of being seriously 
hampered by lack of another source of energy. They warned that 
without such a new source imports of fuel would rise to intolerable 
amounts, doubling in the next decade and tripling within two decades. 
The authors recommended that the Common Market nations install 
15,000 megawatts of nuclear power by 1967. For perspective, at that 

"* For more detailed insight into the orlpins of Euratom, Cf. Rene Foche, Europe and 
Technology: A Political View (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1970), p. 23. 

178 Louis Armand was then director general of the French State Railways and president 
of the Industrial Equipment Commission of the French Commissariat a l'Energle Atomique 
(CEA). By profession he was an engineer and an administrator. Franz Etzel was a senior 
vice president of the Coal Community. A lawyer and an economist, he was also leader of the 
Christian Democratic Party in Germany. Francesco Giordani was president of the Italian 
National Rfs^arch Council. A professor, nuclear scientist and chemist, he was a leading 
European authority on nuclear science. 

w Professor Warren B. Walsh of the international relations program of the Maxwell 
School, University of Syracuse, underscored this point In his observation that : 

". . . the principal architects of Euratom were specialists In politics and economics, 
especially tne former, rather than scientists .... The genesis of Euratom owed 
more to the Impact of politics and public affairs than the other way around." 

Cf. Warren B. Walsh, Science and International Publio Affairs (New York : Maxwell 
School of Syracuse University, 1967), p. 79. 

177 A Target for Euratom. Reprinted in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom Agreements, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, pp. 38-64. 


time a powerplant of 250 electrical megawatts output was considered 
large, so the goal was equivalent to 60 new such powerplants. 178 

The authors asserted that the Common Market nations could not 
achieve this goal without pooling their resources and obtaining help 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The target 
was admittedly ambitious ; of the six members of the Community, at 
that time only France had any practical experience with nuclear power. 
In summation, the authors presented an optimistic picture of the bene- 
fits obtainable from nuclear integration. They wrote : 179 

. . . Euratom will create new opportunities. It will pool the scientific as well 
as the industrial resources of our six countries and their varied skills. A common 
market for nuclear equipment to be set up within a year will promote industrial 
specialization. Further, Euratom will represent our nations as a single unit 
vis-a-vis other states, and will be far better placed to obtain full cooperation from 
them than our countries separately. 

The authors highlighted reasons for American support and partici- 
pation. For example, the U.S. nuclear industry could expect benefits 
from experience with nuclear power plants built in Europe. Their 
report stated : 180 

... No amount of research can be a substitute for the practical knowledge to 
be gained by large-scale industrial application of atomic power. Europe could 
make this experience available to the United States. Our talks in Washington 
convinced us that, on the healthy basis of a two-way traffic, a close partnership 
as equals can be built up between the United States and Euratom and their 
respective industries. 

What forms could this cooperation take ? The advisors had definite 
ideas, which they expressed as follows : m 

. . . The United States would make available the necessary fissionable mate- 
rials and the technical knowledge to set our industries going. Once Euratom is 
established, a task force composed of some of America's most able men would be 
at our disposal to continue studying with European experts the many technical 
problems posed by our programme. America would provide training facilities for 
our scientists and technicians. Joint projects, for instance to improve and adapt 
reactors, can be envisaged between American and European industries, as well as 
between the American and European Atomic Energy Commissions. 

U.S. Support for European Nuclear Integration 

The joint communique issued from the White House at the end of a 
visit by the three-man Euratom Committee to the United States indi- 
cated strong U.S. support. It said : 182 

The U.S. Government welcomes the initiative taken in the Committee's proposal 
for a bold and imaginative application of nuclear energy. . . . The United States 
anticipates active association in the achievement of the Committee's objective, 
and foresees a fruitful two-way exchange of experience and technical develop- 
ment, opening a new area for mutually beneficial action on both the governmental 
and the industrial level and reinforcing solidarity within Europe and across the 

But U.S. support for Euratom was not unqualified. Secretary 
Dulles made it clear that the United States wished Euratom to con- 
centrate exclusively on development of nuclear power and not aspire 

178 That this target was overly ambitions Is evident In the situation of 1967. In that 
year the six Euratom nations had between them 16 nuclear power reactors with a total 
electrical generating capacity of 2.094 megawatts. 

179 A Tarqet for Euratom, op. cit., p. 47. 
18 ° Ibid., p. 50. 

181 Loc. cit. 

183 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 36 (February 25. 1957), p. 307. 


to such greater goals as the economic welfare of the European Com- 
munity or the fostering of greater political unity among its member 
states. While some European proponents of Euratom looked to it to 
restore the influence of the six nations in world affairs, the Washington 
view was the opposite. The communique at the end of the "wise men's" 
visit said that the parties agreed that Euratom should be solely the 
stimulus to realize the objectives for nuclear power. 183 

In its assessment of U.S. policy for international development of 
nuclear energy, the American Assembly reflected the optimism of the 
times. It saw many benefits for the United States from encouraging the 
use of this new power technology in Europe : 1S4 

A major effort on the part of American industry and government would provide 
the American atomic power program with vitality and purpose and accelerate the 
development of power at home. While it can be expected that highly industrialized 
countries such as those in Europe will ultimately establish their own facilities for 
building their atomic power plants, Euratom can provide American industry with 
experience as well as a market for its products and technology. Such an effort 
would assist the aims of American foreign policy in developing the economic 
strength of, and American ties with, the Western European community, and . . . 
would provide experience in the operation of large-scale reactors of great and 
immediate benefit to our own development program. 

Soviet Opposition to Euratom 

International rivalries quickly raised diplomatic difficulties for 
Euratom. The Soviet Union declared both Euratom and the Economic 
Community to be instruments of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 
nization and labeled Euratom a scheme to rearm Germany with atomic 
weapons. The Soviet Union sent warning notes to each of the six 
Common Market nations, urging them to accept instead the Soviet 
plan for Pan-European economic and atomic integration. While this 
warning was abortive, the Soviet Union was more successful in block- 
ing later Euratom efforts to establish a close relationship with the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency. 

An example of the Soviet Union's position is a statement of the 
U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry issued March 16, 1957. After agreeing that 
economic cooperation in Europe would help to restore disrupted trade 
and scientific and technical connections, the Soviet Union opposed both 
the Euratom and the Common Market as in contradiction to those 
aims and likely to increase the rift in Europe : 185 

However, the plans for creating Euratom and the Common Market are in 
manifest contradiction with these aims. The first thins that strikes the eye 
is that all those taking part in Euratom and the Common Market are members 
of the military NATO grouping. It is obvious that the activities of Euratom and 
the Common Market will be subjugated to NATO aims, the aggressive character 
of whieh Is widely known. 

Under the circumstances, the creation of Euratom and the Common Market 
would inevitably lead to a further widening of the rift in Europe, to an 
aggravation of tensions in Europe, which would complicate the establishment 
of economic and political cooperation on a European basis and give rise to fresh 
difficuties in the solution of the problem of European security. 

Ma For further discussion of this point, Cf. Klaus E. Knorr. "American Forelcn Policy 
and the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." Atoms for rower, United States Policy in 
Atomic Bnergy Development (New York : The American Assembly, Columbia University, 
1957), pp. 100 12fl nnd In particular pp. 123-127. 

1S * Atoms for Power, op. clt, p. 157. _ _ . _ 

"■U.S. < onfrress, Joint Committee on Atomic Enerpy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom. 
Agreements, op. clt., p. 28. 


Three Policy Issues of Euratom 

Three issues in the final international negotiations for Euratom 
further illustrate the problems that may arise out of a national decision 
to foster application of a new technology for the benefit of American 
diplomacy. While the U.S. role is not clearly visible in the working 
out of these issues, it seems plausible that much encouragement and 
influence flowed eastward across the Atlantic. 

The three major issues central to establishment of Euratom were : 

(1) Whether Euratom should manufacture enriched uranium; 

(2) Whether member states should be precluded from military 
use of atomic energy ; and 

(3) Whether Euratom should have a monopoly over nuclear 
materials. These questions shared a common root ; to what extent 
was Euratom to be an instrument to achieve economic inde- 
pendence and political and military independence for Europe ? 1S6 


Until January 1957, European proponents of Euratom had pre- 
sumed that the new organization would give top priority to building 
facilities to enrich uranium. It seemed clear that such a facility would 
be needed to reduce the dependence of Euratom states upon nuclear fuel 
imported from the United States. But this expectation was dashed 
early in 1957 when the Germans proposed that the plan be studied 
further. Although the French pressed for immediate construction 
the forces of delay prevailed. 

The issue impinged directly upon U. S. interests for at that time 
the United States did not favor foreign production of enriched 
uranium. The thought of an enriched uranium facility upon the Con- 
tinent near Soviet-occupied territories and the possibilities that nuclear 
materials might be illicitly diverted from such a plant moved the 
United States to assure the Euratom nations of a supply of nuclear 
fuel. Louis Armand let it be known that while he still favored the 
ultimate construction of an enrichment plant in Europe, he rejected 
it as an immediate objective for Euratom. 187 

The publication of A Target for Euratom defused the issue. Noting 
that until recently the construction of a plant had seemed the only 
way to obtain enriched uranium, the authors noted a changed condi- 
tion : "But there is now no doubt that our countries can obtain en- 
riched uranium from the United States in the necessary quantities, and 
at low published prices." 188 They estimated that enriched uranium 
produced in Europe would probably cost two to three times as much. 
Furthermore, they anticipated the early reuse of plutonium produced 
as a byproduct from other nuclear plants, the use of natural uranium as 
a fuel, and the prompt development of the breeder reactor would 
reduce European needs for enriched uranium. In the face of this 
advice, the proposal to immediately build an enrichment plant dropped 

i8e Tij e discussion that follows draws heavily upon an analysis of Euratom published 
in 1964 by Jeroslav G. Polach, a diplomat and later an economist with Resources for 
the Future. Inc., who was interested in energy and Euratom. Cf. Jeroslav G. Polach, 
Euratom, Its Background, Tssues, and Economic Implications (Dobbs Ferry, New York : 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1964), pp. 61-66. 

187 Cf. Le Monde. February 20. 1957 : also, Polach, op. cit, p. 62. 

188 A Target for Euratom, op. cit., p. 56. 

96-525 O - T7 - vol. 1-15 


from sight, not to reappear for more than a decade. So the United 
States retained its enrichment monopoly. 


Central to Atoms for Peace was the thought of dissuading nations 
from making atomic weapons. This concept was evident in proposals 
during negotiation of the Euratom treaty that the signatories be 
barred from military use of nuclear energy. This proposed restriction 
generated strong opposition in France, which at that time was the 
only one of the six Euratom states with the ability to make weapons. 
In July 1956 during debate of the proposed European nuclear com- 
munity in the French National Assembly, the Gaullists, Radicals, 
Independents, and some members of the Catholic Party solidly op- 
posed any limitation to France's right to produce and use atomic 
weapons. When it became clear to Prime Minister Guy Mollet that 
there was no chance for Euratom if he persisted in his advocacy of 
limiting European use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes, he 
yielded to legislative pressure. Before the Assembly would approve 
French participation in preparing the treaties, he had to assure it that 
his Government would satisfy itself that France's participation in 
Euratom would restrict neither her national atomic program nor her 
right to produce and use atomic weapons for national security. 189 Thus 
the idea that Euratom could serve to prevent nuclear armament in 
Europe was stillborn. 


A key issue of the international negotiations that culminated in 
Euratom was whether this multinational, regional organization should 
have title to all nuclear fuels within the members states, or whether 
member states could individually own these materials. The negotiators 
had before them the example of the United States which in the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 took title to all nuclear materials in the 
Nation and forbade their private ownership. The French representa- 
tives argued that a Euratom monopoly was imperative to ensure non- 
discriminatory access of the members to nuclear supplies. For them 
the principles of monopoly and of equal access were fundamental 
to European atomic integration. The German representatives opposed 
such a monopoly as incompatible with the German free-market econ- 
omy. To settle the issue, French Prime Minister Mollet called a con- 
ference of the six nations in February 1957. The final communique 
from this Paris meeting announced that ownership of fissionable 
materials would be vested in Euratom, except for those held for 
military purposes. 100 

A Treaty for Euratom 

The treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
was si gned in Rome on March 25, 1957. 

Its stated aim was to contribute to the raising of the standard of 
living in member states and to development of commercial exchanges 

1SB Polach. op. clt.,p. 64. 

190 For a discussion of this meeting, cf. Polach, op. clt., p. 66. 


with other countries by creation of conditions for the speedy estab- 
lisliment and growth of nuclear industries. 191 

Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome specifies eight functions of Euratom. 
These are to : 

(1) Develop research and ensure dissemination of technical 

(2) Establish, and ensure the application of uniform safety 

(3) Facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encourag- 
ing business enterprise, and the construction of the basic facilities 
required for the developing of nuclear energy within the Com- 

(4) Ensure a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear 
fuels to all users in the Community. 

(5) Guarantee, by appropriate measures of control, that nuclear 
materials are not diverted for purposes other than those for which 
they are intended. 

(6) Exercise the property rights conferred upon it in respect 
to special fissionable materials. 

(7) Ensure extensive markets and access to the best technical 
means by the creation of a common market for specialized mate- 
rials and equipment, by the free movement of capital for nuclear 
investment, and by freedom of employment for specialists within 
the Community. 

(8) Establish with other countries and with international orga- 
nizations any contacts likely to promote progress in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy. 

As finally approved, Euratom's functions did not include control of 
military uses of nuclear energy, thus yielding to the wishes of the 

The initial members of Euratom were Belgium, France, the Federal 
German Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Later 
the United Kingdom applied for entry but was excluded by the posi- 
tion in 1963 of General de Gaulle. Now that the United Kingdom is 
to become a member of the Common Market, presumably membership 
in Euratom will soon follow. 

Establishing the Infrastructure for European Nuclear Power 

Much of Euratom's functions had to do with establishing the in- 
dustrial and regulatory infrastructure for commercial use of nuclear 
energy in Europe. Its research and development programs supple- 
mented those of France, Italy, and West Germany. It created a nuclear 
common market within the European Economic Community. It helped 
lay the regulatory groundwork of standards to regulate the radiologi- 
cal effects of nuclear power plants. However, its functions stopped 
short of financing the construction of operating nuclear power plants. 

wi j n comparison with the other two European communities, Euratom has the most 
limited aim. The European Economic Community has the widest, its objective being to 
promote harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced 
expansion, increased stability, accelerated raising of the living standards, and closer rela- 
tions among the member states. Compared with that, the aims of the Coal and Steel 
Community are more restrietively associated with its contribution to economic expansion, 
development of employment and raising of living standards. 



The economic uncertainties of nuclear power in the 1950s and its high 
capital costs in comparison with conventional fossil-fuel power plants 
caused supporters of Euratom to urge that it become directly involved 
in financing and management of commercial nuclear power plants. The 
concept that Euratom might become the European equivalent of a 
Tennessee Valley Authority, however, did not survive in the Treaty 
of Rome. The Treaty limited Euratom's scope to facilitating invest- 
ment and ensuring the construction of basic facilities for nuclear 
power. Euratom is authorized to collect and analyze investment in- 
formation for its members. But it has no authority over the decisions 
of the national electricity industries and their investors. This limita- 
tion made it politically acceptable for the United States to work with 
Euratom. For the United States Government to have offered technical 
assistance and other support to a foreign body dedicated to state 
generation of electricity probably would have raised opposition because 
of the predominance of private enterprise in the U.S. electric power 
industry. Thus, Euratom's role evolved in the direction of a broker 
rather than a prime mover in the commercial use of nuclear energy in 


Commercial nuclear energy in Europe needed an internal market 
large enough to justify the requisite investment of economic, human, 
and physical capital. Proponents of Euratom expected it to create a 
nuclear common market which would permit a more economic alloca- 
tion of resources, and the use of the most modern techniques of special- 
ization and mass production. The resulting increase in productivity 
of capital and labor was expected to contribute to higher living stand- 
ards, to general economic growth, and to facilitation of social changes 
in Europe. 

The Treaty of Rome laid the basis for such a market. It provided for 
the unhindered commerce of certain goods and the free movement 
of labor, capital, and services for nuclear energy. Items to move with- 
out tariffs, taxes or quantitative restrictions included nuclear ores, 
fissionable materials, radioactive isotopes, and goods peculiar to the 
nuclear industry. Likewise, free movement of labor seeking employ- 
ment in the European nuclear industry was to be assured to properly 
qualified nationals of the six Common Market nations. 


The drafters of Euratom hoped to create a nuclear industrv which 
could compete against those of the United Kingdom and the* United 
States in world markets. To avoid the limitations of fragmentation 
among many, relatively small industrial concerns, the Treaty of Rome 
provided for joint enterprises to carry out "undertakings of outstand- 
ing importance to the development* of the nuclear industry in the 

Community ""'Joint Enterprise status confers special advantages 

including recognition as a legal personality, and exemptions from cer- 
tain taxes, duties, and charges. In return, a Joint Enterprise is re- 

»• Article 45. 


quired to provide Euratom with information on the construction and 
operation of its facilities. All non-patented information communicated 
to Euratom might be disseminated by it. Joint Enterprise status might 
be conferred under varying terms, but could be annulled when eco- 
nomic conditions permit. To date, four of the early nuclear power 
plant ventures in Europe have been designated as Joint Enterprises. 
These include three nuclear powerplants in "West 'Germany and one 
joint Franco-Belgian project. 

Early Changes in Euratom Objectives 

What an international organization does and what it becomes de- 
pends in part upon its foundation in international law, and upon the 
perception of its functions. Euratom soon began to give less priority 
to the immediate building of nuclear power plants than to its research 
and service function. Euratom's first three annual reports reveal this 
trend clearly and suggest that in many ways the work of diplomats 
had only just begun when the treaty was completed. The first annual 
report emphasized an urgent need for nuclear power in the Com- 
munity and its optimistic outlook for the economic competitiveness 
of this new energy source. Other fields of nuclear activity received 
lesser priority. Euratom's role as a middleman, a broker, was em- 
phasized : 193 

The Commission is entrusted by the Euratom Treaty with the task of creating 
conditions necessary for the establishment and growth of nuclear industries. It 
stimulates initiative and encourages cooperation, follows the progress being made 
in various fields, guides investment and endeavors in every sphere and at all 
levels to achieve its aim of building up the independent nuclear industry. 

On the other hand, the Commission sought to avoid "systematic in- 
tervention," and "any semblance of authoritarianism" or of "isolation- 
ist paths." 

Euratom's second annual report, for 1959, marked a shift away from 
immediate application of nuclear power toward priority for nuclear 
research. While Euratom's nuclear power program continued, its sense 
of urgency and immediacy was gone. Top priority was assigned to es- 
tablishment of a Euratom university — a concept that won no support. 
In its third annual report, for 1960, the change in Euratom's goals 
was marked by a transition from short to long term goals. By then 
Euratom was asserting that a condition for its success, and for that of 
the whole European integration, was to overcome traditional attitudes 
of governments, civil servants, and organizations. The Commission 
assigned the highest priority to ". . . marshalling all the resources at 
its command to foster a European spirit." 194 This goal and the closely 
related proposal for a Euratom university, became a recurring theme 
in atomic integration debates. 

Research for Nuclear Power 

A principal function of Euratom was to coordinate nuclear research 
among the six nations. To this end, the Treaty directed Euratom to 
invite member states, persons, or enterprises to inform it of their nu- 

183 European Atomic Energy Community. First General Report on the Activities of the 
Community, 1958 (Brussels-Luxembourg, 1959). p. 55. 

1B * European Atomic Energy Communitv. Third General Report on the Activities of the 
Communities, 1969 (Brussels-Luxembourg, February 1970), pp. 7-14. 


clear research. Euratom would advise on each program to avoid un- 
necessary duplication and guide research of member states toward 
subjects receiving insufficient attention. However, the Treaty forbade 
Euratom to publish any such programs without consent. 

The Treaty provided Euratom four means of influencing the nuclear 
research of its member states and their nuclear establishments. 
Euratom could : 

(1) Furnish financial assistance for research ; 

(2) Supply nuclear source materials and enriched uranium or 
plutonium at its disposal ; 

(3) Place facilities, equipment, or expert assistance at the dis- 
posal of member states, persons, or enterprises, either against pay- 
ment or free of charge ; and 

(4) Initiate joint financing by member states, persons, or enter- 
prises concerned. 

These features of the treaty were intended to give Euratom some in- 
fluence over research in the national establishments of the member 
states. But Euratom was not authorized to direct the nuclear research 
establishments of its members or their nuclear industries. It could, of 
course, direct the research and development done with its funds in its 
own establishments or in other organizations. Equipped with these 
powers, Euratom in principle could have greatly influenced the Euro- 
pean nuclear industry. But because of dissension among its members, 
these powers were not to be fully exercised. 


Euratom is financed by two budgets : one for operations, the other 
for research and investment. Member states contribute to each. The 
prevailing pattern has been for France, Germany, and Italy each to 
fund 28 percent of the operating budget, Belgium and Holland 7.9 

Sercent each, and Luxembourg 0.2 percent. As for the research and 
evelopment budget, the pattern has been for France and West Ger- 
many to finance 30 percent each, Italy 23 percent, Belgium 9.9 per- 
cent, the Netherlands 6.9 percent, and Luxembourg 0.2 percent. 

Funds for Euratom research for the period 1958 through 1971 
totaled $823.4 million. Table IV shows the breakdown of this budget 
according to component programs. 195 


Euratom's facilities perform long-term, basic research remote from 
large scale commercial application of nuclear power by industrial 
concerns. Euratom also furnishes technological services, scientific and 
technical information, testing, and standardization of measurements. 
The Treaty provided Euratom with its own in-house research facil- 
ities. It specified establishment of a Joint Research Center, 196 which 

196 "Spondins by Euratom," Nuclear News, vol. 14 (April, 1971), p. 43. 
"• Article 8 laid down three conditions for the Joint Research Center : 

(1) The Center shall ensure the implementation of the research programs and of 
any other tasks entrusted to it by Euratom. 

(2) The Center shall also ensure the establishment of uniform nuclear terminology 
and a standard system of measurements. 

(3) The Center could be composed of separate establishments for geographical or 
operational reasons. 



[In millions of units of account (US$)1 

1958-68' 1969 1970 1971 Totals 

Technological research connected with reactor de- 

Fast reactors 97.3 1.4 1.5 1.8 102.0 

High-temperature gas reactors 50.5 3.2 3.2 3.7 60.6 

Heavy-water reactors 176.2 9.4 9.9 11.4 206! 9 

Proven-type reactors 66.2 ' 66 2 

Othertypes 16.3 '."" 16 3 

Technological problems ) 97 n ( 1.6 1.7 2.6) .„',, 

Nuclear materials J u.v \ 2 . 3 2.6 3.0) 40 - l 

Reactor physics _) ln R ( .6 .6 .7) ,. - 

Direct conversion.. ] \ .6 .7 .8 J 14 " 6 

Irradiated fuel recycling 6.9 6.9 

Waste processing 3.0 _ """ 3! 

Plutonium and transplutonium elements 41.3 4.0 4.5 5.1" 54.9 

Total technological research 495.3 23.1 24.7 28.5 571.6 

Public service: 

Nuclear measurements and standards 22.7 2.9 3.2 3.8 32.6 

Data processing and computer center 15.8 3.3 3.9 4.3 27 3 

High-flux irradiations 40.1 3.8 4.2 4.7 52^8 

Biology and health protection 20.5 3.-5 3.8 4.1 31.9 

Radioisotope applications 4.9 .1 —(2) —(J) 5^0 

Training 3.9 .5 .5 .6 5.5 

Dissemination of information 12.2 1.7 — Q) —(a) 13.9 

Total, public service 

Oriented basic research : 

Fusion and plasma physics 

Condensed state physics 

Total, oriented basic research 








6. 4 




64 5 








Grand total 671.4 47.0 49.0 56.0 823.4 

' Two 5-year programs. 

J As from 1970 the appropriations for the radioisotope applications program and the dissemination of information 
program are not included in the research budget. 

Source: Nuclear News, vol. 14 (April 1971), p. 43. 

•was brought into instant existence by transfer of laboratories from 
four of the member states. 197 

Dissension, Crisis, and Delay in Euratom's Programs 

Early hopes that Euratom would become the prime mover for a 
coherent, integrated European approach to development of nuclear 
power technology were dashed by dissension, crisis, and delay. Eura- 
tom's research and development has been threatened with disruption 
and in the eyes of some observers has been weak and fragmented. The 
rivalry between Euratom and national nuclear technology programs 
appeared at an early stage and has since afflicted Euratom's program. 
Member states seem to have acted on the principle that a national 
nuclear development effort must necessarily precede or accompany 

197 The Ispra center. — The first and largest of the Euratom research centers Is that at 
Ispra, Italy. Begun as an Italian nuclear research establishment in 1959, it was transferred 
to Euratom in March 1961 under a 99 year arrangement. Much of Euratom's nuclear tech- 
nology work has been done here. Ispra also contains a scientific data processing center that 
performs computer calculations for the European community. 

The Petten center. — The Petten Nuclear Research Establishment is located adjacent to 
Holland's Reactor Centrum Nederland at Petten, on the North Sea some 36 miles north of 
Amsterdam. Work at Petten focuses on nuclear measurements. Ai large materials-testing 
reactor that was built by the Dutch Government was transferred to Euratom in 1962. 

The Gecl center. — A Central Office for Nuclear Measurements for Euratom Is located 
close to the Belgian National Nuclear Research Center at Mol, north of Brussels and near 
the Dutch border. 

The Karlsruhe center. — A European Institute for Transuranic Elements is located adja- 
cent to West Germany's Karlsruhe Nuclear Center. It is concerned primarily with research 
on plutonium. 


multinational technological cooperation in Europe. They were unwill- 
ing to subordinate national development in a community-wide effort. 
Rene Foche, an international civil servant, describes this principle as 
false because it implies that every European state has an equal right 
to develop every form of advanced technology within its own borders, 
which is the antithesis of the concept of regional specialization charac- 
teristic of a true common market. 198 

The experience of Euratom illustrates a diplomatic reality. The po- 
litical cohesion of members in an international technological under- 
taking is a prerequisite for success, not a desirable byproduct from it. 
The troubles of Euratom's research and development programs show 
also that the cohesive force of internationalism in science was not 
strong enough to withstand the divisive forces of national commercial 

A tenet of modern management, private or public, is that an organ- 
ization must plan ahead, particularly organizations that seek to create 
and apply new technologies. The Treaty of Rome recognized this 
principle by providing for five-year research programs. The first 
five-year plan (1958-1962), concentrated upon organizing Euratom's 
research, particularly at its Joint Research Center. The second five-year 
plan (1963-1967) was soon wracked by dissension and budget troubles. 
The third five-year plan (1968-1972) was not authorized and Eura- 
tom's research is now funded annually. 

THE FIRST 5-YEAR PLAN (1958-1962) 

Research programs for the first 5-year plan were specified in 
detail in an annex to the treaty. It was devoted mainly to equipping 
the establishments of the Joint Research Center and to organizing 
contract, research. For the first 5-year plan $215 million was al- 
located. This amount proved to be more than enough because of a 
slow start and there was a surplus in 1962 to carry forward. "While the 
$215 million spent for the first 5-year plan was a considerable 
sum, it corresponded approximately to the amount spent on nuclear 
research in one year by the United Kingdom. 

Even the first 5-year plan suffered from dissent arising out of 
divergent national approaches to nuclear power technology. The 
French argued that Euratom research should focus upon reactors 
using natural uranium as a fuel, thus reducing European dependence 
upon imported enriched fuels, while the Italians preferred research 
on uses of enriched fuels. 

THE SECOND 5-YEAR PLAN (1903-1967) 

The second 5-year plan started off ambitiously, with the Euratom 
Council unanimously approving a budget of almost $450 million. In 
1965 an additional $5.6 million was allocated. But the plan soon was 
in difliculty. As interests of the member states continued to diverge, 
they jockeyed for the advantage of having Euratom develop the 
particular nuclear power technology they favored. Inflation also 
became a strain and increased the costs of research, particularly at 

1 Foche, op. cit., p. 24. 


Ispra in Italy where about one-third of Euratonrs own research was 

The French continued to criticize Euratom's research. They opposed 
research on the enriched fuel technology favored in the United States, 
arguing that there was little future for expansion of the European 
nuclear industry if its power plants would have to depend upon the 
United States for fuel. As an alternative, France offered to put infor- 
mation and experience of its own nuclear power technology at the 
disposal of the Community. This was the first time such as offer had 
been made, and some observers questioned whether it was seriously 
meant. 199 

The issue of which reactor technology to choose became so con- 
troversial that it went to the Euratom Council for decision when 
Euratom requested a $38 million increase in funding to carry out the 
plan. The French and Belgians lined up in favor of a few projects that 
would concentrate on natural uranium reactors, breeder reactors, and 
fusion. Other members agreed that this concentration would be help- 
ful, but not at the expense of a major revision of the ongoing Euratom 
research. In a final compromise, the Council allocated an additional 
$5.6 million for the five-year plan. Research for "proven-type" reactors, 
a term which meant the U.S. -type reactors, was cut 20 percent. 


Although Euratom's third 5-year plan for research was scheduled 
to start in 1968, by September 1967 the dissension had become so great 
that Euratom abandoned hope for agreement. Instead, Fritz Hellwig, 
the Common Market commissioner responsible for Euratom research, 
proposed a one year "transitional program," which was adopted as a 
stopgap measure, but funded at half the 1967 level. As Euratom en- 
tered 1968 it faced this severe cut in research funds, aimed particularly 
at contract research, as well as isolation from the mainstream of nu- 
clear development in Europe. The national nuclear industries did not 
want Euratom working on technology that was ripe for commercial 
application. That year saw repeated debates about Euratom in the 
EEC Council, as representatives of the major members questioned the 
practicability of a true nuclear energy community. More specifically, 
they asked what kind of research Euratom should sponsor to win 
support of member states. Could Euratom be an effective future force 
for building an integrated European nuclear energy industry? No 
clear answers emerged and the decision on the future of Euratom re- 
search was tabled. 200 

The delay and dissension led Commissioner Hellwig to warn Eura- 
tom that its members either had to work out a joint, long-range pro- 
gram of research or forfeit all hope of getting into the nuclear power 
race. He warned too that prolongation of the Euratom budget crisis 
would jeopardize plans for a Common Market research policy. 201 

The crisis went to the European Parliament. By unanimous resolu- 
tion it observed that the European nuclear community needed common 

1OT Michael Palmer, John Lambert and others. A Handbook of European Organizations 
(New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 19GS). p. 305. 

200 Nuclear Industry, vol. 15 (January, 196S), p. 20. 

201 Nucleonics Week, vol. 9 (October 24, 196S) , p. 8. 


policies for research and technological progress ; that it did not have 
them ; and that this lack would condemn Western Europe to a per- 
manent economic and political inferiority vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world. In a parallel policy paper, the EEC Commission warned that 
if member states could not find a way to advance together, they would 
give up the hope of making a good showing in the race for the nuclear. 
market. 202 

Through 1970 the future of Euratom's research remained uncertain. 
A restructuring which could have been affected by a simple majority 
vote in the EEC Council was nullified when the French objected. 203 
The situation was no better in 1971 when initially the European Par- 
liament refused to approve Euratom's draft research and investment 
budget because it was likely to prolong stagnation and absence of 
decision. 204 


Another example of Euratom's difficulties in carrying out a multi- 
national program of nuclear research was triggered by a domestic 
decision of the United States. Euratom's early research emphasized 
the breeder reactor, and was concentrated in France and West Ger- 
many. For the experimental work to go forward, plutonium was 
needed. Euratom had planned to borrow this material from the United 
States and so had budgeted only for use-charges. When, in 1967, the 
United States decided as a matter of policy to sell rather than loan 
the plutonium to Euratom, the price was set at $8 million. This cost 
caused a financial crisis in Euratom, which asked France to provide 
40 percent of the U.S. sales price. France refused, saying that it was 
up to Euratom to supply the material. Euratom capitulated and ulti- 
mately took the funds from other parts of its budget. Italy then 
complained that France was monopolizing the most commercially 
promising work while the other partners shared only in the costs. 205 

The Supply and Control of Nuclear Materials 

Two institutional prerequisites of nuclear power — supply and con- 
trol of nuclear fuel materials — were the basis for granting suprana- 
tional authority to Euratom. The Treaty of Rome specified Euratom's 
ownership of nuclear fuel materials used for peaceful purposes, and 
vested in Euratom supranational rights of inspection for safeguards. 

The supply function has not grown as originally expected. The safe- 
guards function, in contrast, has been performed effectively and has 
demonstrated the practicability of international inspection. It remains 
to be seen what will happen to Euratom's safeguards function with the 
advent of the Nonproliferation Treaty and its emphasis on the safe- 
guards function of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

203 "Call to Preserve Euratom," Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 14 (January, 

1 y oH ) , p. 8. 

,J^" F '" r;ltom I)lH P" te Drags On," Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 15 (December 
1970) . p. 064. 

sot "Euratom Budget Blow," Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 16 (Januarv/ 
February, 1971), p. 8. 

at For a more detailed discussion of this event, see Daniel Greenberg. "Euratom : Atomic 
Agency Foundering Amidst Squabbles of Its Partners," Science, vol. 163 (February 7, 1969), 



The Treaty of Rome gave Euratom exclusive right of ownership to 
enriched uranium and plutonium within the Community, except for 
materials for military purposes, and also gave Euratom a first option 
to buy ores and unprocessed nuclear fuel materials. Euratom's exclu- 
sive ownership extends to all nuclear fuel materials whether produced 
in the Community or imported into it, except for weapons materials. 206 
Under the Treaty, Euratom has authority to: (1) exercise security 
control over the use of nuclear fuel materials; (2) direct the appropri- 
ate storage of such materials; and (3) forbid their export whenever 
contrary to Community interests. 


If nuclear power was to become a commercial reality in Europe and 
to attain the goals in A Target for Euratom, there had to be reliable 
arrangements for supply of nuclear fuel materials. To this end the 
Treaty authorized creation of an autonomous Euratom Supply Agency 
under the control and direction of the Euratom Commission. 207 Estab- 
lished on June 1, 1960, the Supply Agency's primary function is to as- 
sure equal access to nuclear fuel for all users within the Community. 
The Agency is headed by a director general appointed by Euratom. 
With an initial capital investment of $2.4 million, the Agency operates 
on commercial principles as a public utility. It has a right of option to 
buy all ores and manufactured fuel materials produced in the Com- 
munity and an exclusive right to contract for the supply of nuclear fuel 
materials, whether originating in the Community or imported. Prices 
for its products are expected to reflect normal supply and demand, 
although the Commission can propose price fixing with EEC approval. 
Discriminatory pricing is forbidden within the Community. The 
Agency also maintains records and accounts of nuclear fuel materials 
used or transferred within the Community. 

The potentially powerful supply functions of the agency have not 
been fully exercised. Contributing factors include the glut of uranium 
upon the world market of the 1960's, France's independent manufac- 
ture of enriched uranium for its nuclear weapons, and the failure to 
build Euratom facilities to produce enriched uranium. The effect of 
these factors was to confine the Supply Agency to a middleman func- 
tion of negotiating arrangements with non-Community countries to 
supply nuclear fuel materials. 


Early expectations that Euratom would build and operate its own 
enrichment plant to supply part of the nuclear fuel for Europe were 
disappointing. U.S. policy, which was to discourage this venture, ap- 
parently was influential at first. However, by the later 1960s the Com- 
munity was restive over its dependence upon the United States as a 

206 Articles 84 and 86. But a dispute between France and Euratom, infra, indicates inter- 
pretation of these articles is not without ambiguity. 

207 Articles 54-76. 


sole source of supply. For example, the EEC in its report for 1969, ob- 
served that the setting up of a uranium enrichment facility in the 
Community before 1980 would help to achieve an aim of the EEC, 
namely, to assure secure supplies of enriched uranium at stable prices. 208 
But reaching a policy decision to build an enrichment plant was not 
easy for Euratom. The plant would require a large capital investment, 
and a large supply of electricity, and might be uneconomical to operate 
without subsidy should the United States decide to cut its prices for 
enriching services. Complicating the decision for Euratom also were 
the uncertain estimates for future use of nuclear power in Europe. 
Forecasts of expansion in nuclear capacity ranged from 10,000 mega- 
watts in 1970 — including the nuclear power plants of the United King- 
dom — to 100,000 megawatts by 1980, and to perhaps twice this by 
1985, 209 but these estimates were so qualified as to provide a shaky basis 
for raising the necessary capital. 


The monopoly of the Supply Agency was challenged by the French 
and Italian Governments. In 1965 the Euratom Commission decided to 
revise the charter of the Supply Agency. A now text Avas submitted to 
the Euratom Council and to the European Parliament. But the Coun- 
cil failed to agree and the revision was shelved. Five of Euratom's 
member states regarded the previous Supply Agency's statute as 
remaining in force, but France did not. Thereafter the French Govern- 
ment entered into bilateral transactions with other countries and sup- 
plied nuclear fuel materials directly to them as later did Italy, in seem- 
ing violation of the Supply Agency's charter. 

The EEC Commission in October 1970 attempted to reassert the con- 
trol of the Supply Agency. Reportedly, it sent an ultimatum to France 
to respect the fuel supply provisions of the Treaty. Barring compli- 
ance, the Commission would bring the alleged violations before the 
EEC Court of Justice. The French countered with a proposal to end 
the Agency's control over nuclear fuel arrangements except in time of 
nuclear fuel scarcity. France was said to have West German support 
for its position that EEC member states be permitted to contract inde- 
pendently for their own nuclear fuel supplies. 210 

1 1 ere again is an example of the divisive forces of nationalism. 


For nuclear power to help resolve Europe's energy problems with- 
out, unacceptably increasing (lie risk of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, there had to be credible assurance that diversion of nuclear 
fuel materials would be promptly detected. In assigning a safeguards 
functions to Euratom, the Treaty of Rome made a notable innovation 

*» European Atomic Energy Community, Third General Report on the Activities of the 
Communities, 1969, op. pit., p. 253. 

** Uranium Resources, Production and Demand. A joint report by the European Nuclear 
Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Ajrency (Paris: Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, September 1970) . p. 43. 

"o Nucleonics Week, vol. 11 (October 29, 1970), p. 6. The EEC Commission's ultimatum 
followed a scries of alleged violations by France which Included loan of uranium to the 
Italian government, cut-rate purchase of plutonlum from Canada, and failure to report 
uranium prospecting and marketing plans. 


in international relations. By the Treaty, the Common Market nations 
yielded some of their sovereignty to this multi-national, regional orga- 
nization, and granted to Euratom supranational rights of inspection 
and independent verification of holdings of nuclear fuel materials. 

The Treaty provided that the Euratom Commission — now the EEC 
Commission — shall satisfy itself that in the territories of the member 
states : 

(a) ores, source materials, and special fissionable materials are 
not diverted from their intended uses as stated by the users; 

(b) the provisions concerning supplies and any special under- 
taking concerning measures of control entered into by the Com- 
munity in an agreement concluded with a third country or an 
international organization are observed. 

This provision was to cause some difficulty for the United States, which 
would have preferred to send its own inspectors into the Euratom 
member states rather than rely upon Euratom's inspectors. 

Considering that safeguarding of nuclear materials was also to be 
a function of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it woidd have 
been logical when establishing Euratom to put this function within 
the IAEA. However, at that time the Soviet Union opposed the 
creation of Euratom and had used its influence within the IAEA to 
prevent any cooperative relation between the two agencies. Thus, the 
negotiators had no choice but to equip Euratom with its own safe- 
guards function. 

The Treaty provided Euratom with plenary authority to carry out 
safeguards. Any organization setting up or using facilities for the 
production, separation, or use of nuclear materials, or for the process- 
ing of used nuclear fuels, first has to declare to Euratom the technical 
details of such facilities to the extent necessary for safeguards. Proce- 
dures for the processing of used fuels are also subject to Euratom 
approval. Records are to be kept to account for nuclear materials re- 
ceived, used, produced, or sent out. In addition, Euratom requires that 
any excess inventory of nuclear fuel materials be deposited with it, or 
in a storage place controlled by it. 

A vital innovation of the Treaty is the right accorded Euratom to 
send its inspectors into the territories of member states to verify the 
accuracy of information reported to it. On presentation of their creden- 
tials, these inspectors are to have access at all times to all places and 
data and to any person to the extent necessary to "control ores, source 
materials, and special fissionable materials and to satisfy themselves 
concerning the observation of safeguards." Inspectors of Euratom are' 
to be accompanied by representatives of the state concerned, if that 
state so requests. 

Should a Euratom inspector be denied access, the matter would go 
to the EEC Commission which could apply to the EEC Court of 
Justice for a warrant to enforce the carrying out of the inspection. 
If there is danger in delay, the Treaty authorizes Euratom itself to 
issue a written order that the inspection be carried out. After serving 
of such a warrant or decision, the national authorities of the state 
concerned are expected ". . . to ensure access by the inspectors to the 
places named in the warrant or decision." This power of Euratom has 
yet to be tested in practice. 


Should a member state resist inspection, Euratom is authorized to 
impose sanctions. In order of severity, possible penalties include : 

(1) a warning; 

(2) withdrawal of special advantages, such as financial or tech- 
nical assistance; 

(3) placing the enterprise under the administration of a person 
or board appointed jointly by the Commission and the state hav- 
ing jurisdiction over the enterprise; and 

(4) complete or partial withdrawal of nuclear fuel materials. 
Tadate, no penalties have been imposed, no discrepancies have been 

detected, and member governments have cooperated with inspections. 


Once Euratom was established, the United States negotiated a 
bilateral agreement with it. One issue was safeguards. The United 
States wanted a direct voice in the application of safeguards 
to U.S.-supplied materials, including the right of inspection by U.S. 
inspectors. Euratom would not agree. Ultimately the United States 
and Euratom compromised as the United States agreed to rely upon 
Euratom's system and inspectors, but with the right to audit com- 
pliance with standards set out in the agreement. Congressional sen- 
sitivity on this compromise is suggested by the following exchange 
between Senator Anderson of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
and AEC Commissioner-John Floberg in 1958 : 211 

Senator Anderson : Mr. Floberg, does the language of the agreement as you 
see it give this government the right to inspect facilities erected by Euratom? 

Mr. Floberg: I don't know if I have your question completely in mind, Sen- 
ator, but the agreement and the exchange of letters explaining the agreement 
seem to give us the right to audit, for want, of a better word, the compliance with 
the standards set forth in the agreement. 

Senator Anderson : You used the term "audit" ; do you think it gives us a right 
to look at the books? 

Mr. Floberg : It certainly does, and it gives us the right to weigh, assay, and 
count and otherwise verify. I apologize for that word "audit." It is not. a very 
good one. But I think it is comprehensive enough if you don't take it too literally. 

Euratom and. Nuclear Safety 

The generation of nuclear power, reprocessing of used nuclear fuels, 
and perpetual storage of radioactive wastes from these fuels are in- 
herently dangerous activities. This fact caused the negotiators of the 
Treaty of Rome to vest another supranational power in Euratom : 
to set basic standards for the protection of workers and the general 
public from these hazards of nuclear power. 212 Signatories of the 
Treaty committed themselves to enact national legislation to ensure 
compliance with the basic standards determined by Euratom and to 
take necessary measures with regard to instruction, education, and 
professional training for radiological health hazards. Member states 
in whose territories nuclear experiments of a particularly dangerous 
nature may take place are committed to take additional health pre- 
cautions with Euratom's advice. Consenting opinion of Euratom is 

111 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom 
Agreements, 85th Cong., 2d Seas., 1958, p. 200. 

n » Articles 80-83. The term "basic standards" Is defined In the Treaty to mean: (a) 
the maximum radiation doses compntlhle with adequate safety : (b) the maximum permis- 
sible decree of exposure and contamination ; and (c) the fundamental principles governing 
the medical supervision of workers. 


required also when such experiments are likely to affect the territories 
of other member states. 

As for the disposal of radioactive wastes, each signatory is obligated 
to submit to Euratom "such general data concerning any plan for the 
disposal of any kind of radioactive waste as will enable the Commission 
to determine whether the implementation of such plan is likely to 
involve radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of 
such member states." 213 

Euratom has used its authority to : 214 

(1) establish regulations providing for uniform safety radia- 
tion standards throughout the Community ; 

(2) standardize and coordinate methods for the measurement 
and control of environmental radioactivity ; 

(3) review plans for reactor installations and their radioactive 
waste disposal systems ; and 

(4) study the movement of radioactive substances in the en- 
vironment and safety aspects of nuclear marine propulsion. 

Euratom and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Power 

The Treaty of Rome is silent on the issue of environmental protec- 
tion, a matter of growing U.S. and European concern since the late 
1960s. Euratom has no statutory functions of ascertaining and con- 
trolling the environmental effects of nuclear power and fuel reprocess- 
ing plants. Should the public in Europe show the same interest and 
concern in environmental quality as has been shown in the United 
States, there could be proposals to extend Euratom's authorkv^ accord- 
ingly. Such a development could pose a troublesome issue for U.S. 
foreign policy. Recognition of Euratom's authority as an international 
body to examine and approve design, construction and operation of 
nuclear power plants within its member states could set a precedent 
for international control that might be embarassing were continental 
neighbors of the United States to seek such review of U.S. nuclear 
plants built near their common borders with this country. For example, 
it could point the way for continental neighbors of the United States 
to request some voice in the siting, design, construction, and operation 
of domestic nuclear power plants near U.S. national boundaries or on 
rivers and bodies of water shared with neighboring countries. Con- 
ceding such a voice to neighbor states would mark a shift in U.S. 
foreign policy, a shift likely to be opposed by those who attach great 
importance to preserving the sovereign powers of the United States. 

Duplication and Dilution of Effort 

Euratom, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (see section 
IX), and the International Atomic Energy Agency overlap in many 
of their interests and activities. The Common Market nations and Eura- 
tom itself are members of the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency. Com- 
ing into existence in 1958 one month after Euratom, the NEA was 
organized to promote international nuclear cooperation rather than 
supranational nuclear integration. The Nuclear Energy Agency was 
supported by the British as a counter-project to make atomic integra- 
tion of the Six less attractive. It is interesting, in this context, that the 
first European plant for chemical reprocessing of used nuclear fuels 

213 \rticle 37. 

214 Compilation of National and International Standards. Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, Nuclear Safety Information Center, Report No. ORNL-NSIC-78, 
(October, 1970), t>. 44. 


was put into operation by NEA and not by Euratom, despite the fact 
that the plant was built at Mol, Belgium, within a Euratom state to 
process fuel from Euratom projects. 215 

Duplication in nuclear activities between the NEA and Euratom 
extends to many areas including safety regulations, research, rules for 
third party liability, and maritime nuclear propulsion. In maritime 
nuclear propulsion, however, NEA was not successful and in 1962 
abandoned that field to Euratom. On the other hand, NEA became 
a useful direct channel of communication between Euratom and other 
European countries, particularly the United Kingdom. The NEA's 
international joint undertakings, the Halden and Dragon projects, 
provided Euratom with its first opportunities for nuclear research. 

It would appear that Euratom's usefulness is handicapped by the 
dispersion of its member states' human and financial resources between 
its own programs and those of the NEA and the IAEA. 

Proposals for New Research Functions for Euratom 

As nuclear energy in Europe has moved more into the industrial 
sector for the design and manufacture of nuclear powerplants and 
nuclear fuel, the laboratories of Euratom have had less demand for 
their services. Instead, the final stages of development of competitive 
nuclear power technologies have occurred in the laboratories of indus- 
trial firms behind barriers of trade secrecy. What then will become 
of Euratom's laboratories ? The answer to this question is still evolving, 
and can have significance for American diplomacy. For example, a 
successful redeployment of Euratom's scientific and technical assets to 
resolve the problems of energy supply and conservation might not 
only reduce Europe's dependence upon uncertain energy imports, but 
also bring European manufacturers into a world market which the 
United States hopes to dominate. Additionally, the success or failure 
of efforts to redeploy Euratom's laboratories may provide useful in- 
sights for the United States in dealing with its own problems of recon- 
version of technological personnel and facilities from aerospace and 
defense to other civil functions. One function for American diplomacy 
will be to obtain current information on these evolutionary features of 
Euratom for the benefit of U.S. policy makers. 


An early proposal that Euratom extend the scope of its technologi- 
cal activities into non-nuclear fields is to be found in the 1950 report 
of Robert McKinney to the Joint. Committee on Atomic Energv. Not- 
ing how Europe's need for nuclear power had by then receded, he 
questioned whether nuclear power for the sake of technological pres- 
tige carried as much weight in the post-Sputnik era as it had previ- 
ously. Tailing attention to a wide and growing scientific and tech- 
nological disparity between Western Europe and the United States, 
he speculated as to what European scientists could accomplish within 
a more broadly based scientific community. A new course of action 
for Euratom might be to emphasize collective creation of new sci- 

*™ Folneh, op. clt, p. 130. 


entific and technological resources by a regional integration of the 
European scientific and technological community. 216 

To this end, Euratom could be reconstituted into a European Sci- 
entific and Technical Community. Its laboratories would then be 
open to all of the nations of the Atlantic Alliance. Their function 
would be to advance science and technology upon a broad front. Ac- 
cording to McKinney, the United States should continue to give as- 
sistance including the funding of non-nuclear research. Although the 
McKinney report produced no immediate movement in this direc- 
tion, it foreshadowed the future emergence of this issue. 


The idea of opening Euratom's facilities to non-nuclear research 
was revived in 1967 when a resolution of the EEC Council laid down 
the guideline that wherever legally possible Euratom research might 
also encompass non-nuclear activities. Two years later, in December 
1969, the Council elected to permit use of the Joint Research Center 
facilities for non-nuclear work. 217 In this action the Council recog- 
nized that as nuclear energy moved toward commercial application, the 
research was shifting from public institutions to laboratories of pri- 
vate nuclear industries. Thus Euratom came face to face with the is- 
sues of conversion that were soon to plague the Government and pri- 
vate laboratories of the U.S. aerospace and defense industries. 

More recently, in November 1970, the EEC Commission proposed 
a transformation of Euratom's research capabilities into a Research 
and Development Agency for the Common Market. Euratom's Joint 
Research Center would be merged into the Agency. By this proposal, 
the EEC Commission sought to bring new fields of research into the 
sphere of community action, including research for new materials, 
medicine, meteorology, oceanography, and environmental control. 218 

Conclusions and Current Issues 

Now well into the second decade of its existence, Euratom presents 
a mixed picture of success and failure. Its various agreements with the 
United States have allowed Euratom to supply European nuclear 
power programs with considerable enriched uranium and plutonium 
under its own safeguards system. The United States cooperated by 
regrouping its bilateral agreements with Euratom members into a 
single agreement with Euratom. The Agency has created an effective 
European research capability for nuclear energy. 

On the other hand, these encouraging moves toward European unity 
have been steadily eroded by a wave of nuclear nationalism. Since 
1961, a marked trend toward nationalism in the nuclear industries of 

218 Robert McKinney. A New Look at Euratom. Statement to the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy. May 20, 1959. In U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
Background Material for the Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs 
of the United States, S6th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 960, vol. 4, p. 1258. (Joint Committee print.) 

317 The Council decided on December 6, 1969 that the facilities of the Joint Research 
Center might be used for scientific and technological research other than nuclear. In 
keeping with this decision, the Council also agreed to enter without delay into close 
cooperation with the EEC Commission on the study and choice of subjects for such 
research. Cf. European Atomic Energy Community, Third General Report on the Activities 
of the Communities — 1969, op. cit., p. 210. 

218 "Makings of a New Structure," Nature, vol. 228, (November 28, 1970), p. 796. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 16 


the member nations has nearly drowned Euratom, leaving it since 1968 
without a 5-year program, with sharply reduced funding and, 
perhaps worst of all, without an involvement in application of nuclear 
power technology in Europe. Political difficulties have blocked cooper- 
ation with Euratom's supply function for nuclear materials and with 
plans to develop a European enrichment capability. 

Euratom's successes have come in activities which were distantly 
linked to the competitive status of the national nuclear industries of 
France, Italy, and West Germany. These included model legislation 
to encourage uniformity in national regulation of radiological effects 
of nuclear power, research into subjects without immediate com- 
mercial application, and safeguarding nuclear materials. But Eura- 
tom has not been able to weld together the separate national nuclear 
industries of its members. Euratom research and development which 
approached commercial application has been opposed and was ulti- 
mately terminated. The differing ideas of France, Italy, and West 
Germany as to which kind of nuclear power technology to exploit 
created tensions that on several occasions all but paralyzed Euratom's 
research and development programs and led to the charge that some 
member nations were benefiting disproportionately at the expense of 
others. The inability to form a common European approach to nu- 
clear technology has proved advantageous to the U.S. nuclear industry 
and in the 1970's the use of U.S. nuclear power technologv is well estab- 
lished in Europe, having overmatched the alternative favored by the 
French. Among the Euratom members there is increasing use of joint 
venturas between companies in the several national European nuclear 
industries as an alternative to working through Euratom. There are 
signs also that Euratom's laboratories may have outlived their useful- 
ness and now face the problem of what to do with their human and 
physical resources. Steps to open Euratom's facilities to non-nuclear 
research and development are one indication of the situation. What can 
be learned from this trend to convert Euratom's research installations 
into general research facilities for the European Economic Com- 
munity can be of interest to the United States for two reasons. First, 
a successful transition of a substantial part of Euratom's research 
capabilities to non-nuclear research could strengthen the competitive- 
ness of European high-technology goods and services in the world 
markets vis-a-vis those of the United States. Second, a successful 
transition might well provide useful insights into the problems of 
conversion of existing scientific and technical institutions into new 
fields as their original field becomes worked out, or as changes in 
national priorities and programs make them redundant. This transi- 
tion, of course, is the problem of the U.S. defense and aerospace in- 
dustries with the continuing unemployment of highly skilled scientists, 
engineers, and technicians. 

Several issues for United States foreign policy and Euratom that 
may need future attention include : 

(1) To what extent should the United States encourage Eur- 
atom to build and operate a uranium enrichment plant in Europe? 

(2) In supplying XLS. enrichment technology, if this is done, to 
what extent should the United States attempt to recoup the do- 
mestic investment in developing that technology through licensing 
fees or royalties ? 


(3) Considering forecasts that the United States will soon have 
to decide whether to fund expansion of its domestic enrichment 
plants, what would be the effect upon U.S. foreign policy of a 
limitation or termination of the longstanding U.S. commitment 
to supply enriched uranium to Euratom for commercial nuclear 
power in Europe ? 

(4) What voice should the United States seek in Euratom's 
setting of standards governing the environmental effects of nu- 
clear power plants, and standards for review and approval of the 
siting, design, and construction of nuclear power plants? In ex- 
porting nuclear power plants, will the commercial interests of the 
U.S. nuclear industry be sufficiently protected by a U.S. policy of 
non-intervention ? 

(5) Considering the perplexing status of technology for long 
term storage of the intensely radioactive wastes from nuclear 
power, in what ways would domestic interests of the United States 
benefit from measures to stimulate Euratom work in this field ? 

(6) Considering the priority being given to development and 
demonstration of the breeder reactor in the United States and the 
considerable interest among Common Market countries in breeder 
technology, to what extent should U.S. foreign policy attempt to 
influence European breeder research in the direction of the tech- 
nology favored by the United States? Conversely, considering 
criticisms of the U.S. breeder program for concentrating too much 
on only one breeder concept, to what extent might U.S. foreign 
policy attempt to guide European breeder research toward other 
potentially competing breeder concepts as insurance against an 
unexpected setback or failure in the U.S. domestic program? 

VIII. Joint United States-Euratom Research and Development 

U.S. diplomatic efforts and interest which helped bring about the 
creation of Euratom led naturally to the proposition that the United 
States should work closely with this new multinational body. As 
analyzed in retrospect by Jules Gueron, 219 the following was the ra- 
tionale for a 10-year period of direct technical cooperation between 
Euratom and the United States. Europe had to import an ever- 
increasing proportion of its conventional fuel ; therefore, atomic power 
could become competitive in Europe earlier than in the United States, 
and Europe could benefit economically and technically from being a 
testing ground for United States atomic technology. At the same time 
the United States would aid European unification. 220 This theme is 
examined and confirmed in the following discussion. 

The United States-Euratom program was launched in 1958 and had 
as its target the construction by 1965 of 5,000 megawatts of electrical 
generating capacity in nuclear power plants based on U.S. technology. 
It offered low interest loans from the Export-Import Bank, lease of 
fuel by the AEC, and guarantees on supply of fissile material and per- 
formance of nuclear fuel supply bv the U.S. nuclear industry. In addi- 
tion, the United States agreed to Euratom control of nuclear fuel ma- 
terials instead of direct U.S. control, and to a joint program of research 
and development in support of the joint reactor program. Neverthe- 
less, it proved impossible to reach the 5,000 megawatt target, and only 
with difficulty were three nuclear power plants initiated that had a 
combined output of 750 megawatts. 

In Europe, these U.S. incentives were supplemented by advantages 
provided bv the Euratom Treaty to "common enterprises,'' and bv the 
"participation" assistance especially devised by the Euratom Com- 
mission. Parenthetically, France opposed the whole scheme as a sell- 
out to the United States, while influential voices in the United States 
branded the joint programs as a giveaway. 221 

The joint United States-Euratom programs were a disappoint- 
ment. Their shortfall from original goals was the result in part of an 
unanticipated easing of the energy supply crisis in Europe, of unex- 
pectedly slow progress in nuclear technology, and probably an over- 
estimation of the willingness of European private utilities to risk sub- 
stantial capital investments in demonstration nuclear powerplants. On 
the other hand, the two joint programs did culminate in several work- 
ing demonstrations of nuclear power; moreover, they provided 10 
years of practical working experience of collaboration with a multi- 
national organization to develop and demonstrate a new technology. 

From 1959 to 1909, the United States provided technical and other 
forms of assistance and incentives through Euratom for construction 
of three demonstration nuclear power plants in Europe; it spent some 

sl * FormpT rpnprnl rltrpptor of rpsparph for Euratom. 
120 Gupron, op. pit., p. 149. 
421 Loc. cit. 



$37 million for further development of technology for these demon- 
stration plants; and it offered many indirect incentives to stimulate 
initial commercial use of U.S. nuclear power technology in Europe. 

U.S. Interest in Euratom Demonstration of Nuclear Power 

Even as the international negotiations for creation of Euratom were 
Hearing completion, AEC Chairman Strauss was asserting the tech- 
nological feasibility of nuclear power. In 1957, five experimental 
nuclear power plants at AEC laboratories successfully provided a 
proof of principle for five different technological approaches. But the 
demonstrations were too small to provide cost and operational data 
which would enable the domestic electric companies to decide upon 
their commercial use. The next step for the U.S. domestic nuclear 
power program was to build larger, engineering prototypes that would 
work as part of a commercial utility. 222 Such demonstration plants 
were needed to provide reliable engineering, operational, and cost in- 
formation for the designers and the customers of commercial nuclear 
power. However, the U.S. demonstration power program was slow in 
starting and some observers feared that the Nation's nuclear power 
program would falter if engineering prototypes were not quickly built 
and put into operation. At this juncture, U.S. collaboration with 
Euratom offered a solution because economic conditions in Europe 
were more favorable for practical demonstration of nuclear power 
than were those in the United States. 

AEC Commissioner Vance promptly endorsed this objective. In 
1958 he informed the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that the 
AEC's foreign objectives for nuclear power were twofold : 323 

To achieve competitive nuclear power in friendly foreign na- 
tions during the next 5 years through a comprehensive program 
of assistance clearly defined and vigorously pursued. 

To fortify the position of leadership of the United States in the 

eyes of the world in the peaceful applications of atomic energy, 

particularly with regard to power. 

Also in 1958, the AEC informed the Joint Committee of conditions 

that would have to be achieved in Europe to demonstrate nuclear 

power. These were : 224 

(1) That the economic feasibility of nuclear power be proven, 
not by theory and calculation, not by extrapolation from pilot 
plant operation, but by the full-scale operation of power produc- 
ing units on a scale large enough to assure statistical reliability of 
the data ; 

(2) That the utilities into whose grid the power from these 
nuclear plants must flow become familiar with the technical and 
management problems of operating nuclear stations and accept, 
with confidence, nuclear powerplants ; 

(3) That European equipment manufacturers gain knowledge 
and competence in the production of reactor components ; and 

222 By having the utilities build, own, and operate demonstration plants with the AEC 
providing research and development, special service and materials, and training of per- 
sonnel, the Commission hoped to avoid further entanglement in the public versus private 
power controversy. Proposals that the Commission itself build and operate large nuclear 
power plants did not gain acceptance. 

223 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energv, Hearings, AEC Authorizing Legis- 
lation, Fiscal Year 1959, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 195R, p. 215. 

12i U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom 
Agreements, op. cit., p. 226. 


(4) That the various service industries, such as fuel production 
and fabrication, scrap recycle, irradiated fuel reprocessing, etc., 
be developed as economic operations. 
The AEC recognized that special incentives would be needed to at- 
tract interest and participation of European utilities because nuclear 
power and its economics were not then well enough established to war- 
rant the requisite capital investment by a traditionally conservative 
electric it v industry. The Commission informed the Joint Committee 
that: 225 " 6 

Traditionally conservative and bound by rate ceilings, tbe utilities are not 
prepared to take excessive risks or to invest large amounts of capital in plants 
in which the costs of energy produced may well be above that of conventional 

The fact that there is not already under way a program which would accom- 
plish the objectives of the joint program speaks for itself. Discussions with 
Euratom and European utility personnel indicate that the estimated high cost 
of nuclear power from even proven type reactors and particularly the uncertain 
ties of these costs could preclude a program under which 1 million EKW of 
American type reactors would be installed by 1963, unless additional incentives 
are provided. 

The scale of the joint program, said the Commission, had to be large 
enough that : 227 

(1) The data produced would come from a sufficiently large 
number of power reactors to be useful ; 

(2) A significant number of European industries would have 
an opportunity to participate in construction ; and 

(3) A sufficiently large number of operating utilities would be 
brought into the program to assure that the management of this 
industry would be ready to accept nuclear energy and enter the 
longer range nuclear program with enthusiasm. 

Initiation of the Joint Programs 

Within three months after creation of Euratom in 1058, a joint 
U.S.-Euratom working party was at work. By June 23, 1958. negotia- 
tions and arrangements were far enough along for President Eisen- 
hower to request urgent approval of Congress for arrangements be- 
tween the United States and Euratom, and to seek legislation author- 
izing AEC participation with Euratom in the joint programs of 
demonstration and development and research. The joint programs 
anticipated the building within the Common Market nations of six 
nuclear power plants by 1965 with a total electrical output of 1,000 
megawatts. 228 

European sources were expected to finance the capital, then esti- 
mated at about $350 million, and operating costs, while the United 
States would finance research and development and other incentives. 

President Eisenhower saw dual benefits for the United States. 
Nuclear power in Europe would provide both a needed new source of 
energy for those nations and also an impetus toward European unity. 
As for European unity, he said : *" 

tat Loc. fit. 

22,1 1 million EKW (electric kilowatts) Is megawatts of elc^ti-lcnl capacity. 

a* Ibid., p. 93. 

■w By way of comparison, some single nuclear power plants now being built in the United 
Stntiv nave electrical outputs ereater than 1,000 MW. 

331 U.S.. Conprcss, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom 
Agreements, op. clt., p. 10. 


. . . One motivation which has therefore led to the creation of this new Com- 
munity is the growing sense of urgency on the part of Europeans that their 
destiny requires unity and that the road toward this unity is to be found in the 
development of major common programs such as Euratom makes possible. . . . 

As for other benefits, he said : 

. . . Another important motivation is the present and growing requirements of 
Europe for a new source of energy in -the face of rapidly increasing requirements 
and limited possibilities of increasing the indigenous supply of conventional 
fuels. The Europeans see atomic energy not merely as an alternative source of 
energy but as something which they must develop quickly if they are to continue 
their economic growth and exercise their rightful influence in world affairs. 

To initiate arrangements for the joint programs with Euratom, 
President Eisenhower transmitted to Congress three documents which 
required congressional assent. These were: (1) an agreement for co- 
operation which recognized Euratom as a body with which the U.S. 
Government could negotiate ; (2) a draft of legislation to authorize the 
AEC participation in the joint programs and to authorize appropria- 
tions; and (3) a draft of a bilateral agreement between the AEC and 
Euratom.* 30 


The Agreement for Cooperation between Euratom and the United 
States was signed in Brussels on November 8, 1958. Congress had pre- 
viously approved the agreement on August 20, 1958. The Agreement 
proved to be important to Euratom. Looking back with the benefit of 
5 years hindsight. Federico Consolo, an advisor to the Euratom 
Commission, wrote of the political importance of the agreement : 3Sl 

... In addition to its intrinsic value from the scientific technical, industrial 
and financial standpoint, the Agreement was of considerable political importance, 
since, from the very outset Euratom was able to benefit by the assistance of the 
world's major nuclear power. 

Pierre Kruys, of Euratom, saw this Agreement as : ^ 

... A proof of U.S. support for the Community organizations as the corner- 
stone of the new united Europe. [The Agreement] also paved the way for the 
establishment of the first contacts of the technical departments of the Euratom 
Commission with nuclear centers and industrial concerns in the Community 
countries, as well as for the achievement of a certain number of concrete aims. 

The Agreement provided for two well-defined, closely related joint 
programs between the United States and Euratom : 

(1) Construction of power reactors of a proven American 
type, for a total of 1,000 megawatts electrical capacity, to go into 
operation before the end of 1963, except for two plants sched- 
uled for operation before the end of 1965 ; and 

(2) Research and development on the types of reactors ac- 
cepted under the power reactor program. The budget for the 
joint research program was specified at $50 million for each 
partner for the first five years, with the funds to be spent at home. 

^The text of these documents appears In U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom Agreements, op. cit., pp. 11-18. 

431 Federico Consolo, "The US/Euratom Agreement for Co-operation," Euratom, No. 1. 
(1963), p. 2. 

232 Pierre Kruys, "The Joint US/Euratom Research and Development Programme, Eura- 
tom, So. 1 (1963), p. 8. 


The United States also agreed to supply Euratom with 30 tons of 
contained U-235. 283 Deferred payment was provided for the nuclear 
fuel, and favorable conditions were also offered for the processing of 
irradiated nuclear fuel and for the repurchase by the United States 
of the plutonium produced. 234 Additionally, the U.S. Government 
through the Export-Import Bank, extended long-term credit of $135 
million to Euratom, which Euratom could in turn loan to partici- 
pants in its power reactor program. Finally, the U.S. Government 
recognized Euratom's value as an organ of inspection by conceding 
to it the right of control over fissionable materials supplied by the 
United States. Until then, in other bilateral agreements the United 
States had directly exercised such control. , ' u 


One problehi for American diplomacy was to arrange some form 
of organization which would permit a joint program to go forward 
while retaining substantial control over U.S. funds. The climate of 
the late 1950's did not favor the supplying by the United States of 
unrestricted funds to Euratom. The solution Was to form two joint 
boards wherein the United States and Euratom each controlled their 
own funds, rather than putting them into a common pool. 

A Joint Reactor Board was established to examine proposals sub- 
mitted for the construction of power reactors and to report its rec- 
ommendations to the Euratom Commission and to the AEC. The 
Board was presided over by a chairman from Euratom 235 and a vice- 
chairman from the United States 236 with voting rights, and an equal 
number of Euratom and American experts without voting rights. 

A Joint Research and Development Board, similarly organized, 
was established to examine proposals for research, and to recommend 
action to Euratom and to the AEC. 237 Despite administrative com- 
plications, it appears that the joint boards functioned satisfactorily, 
thanks to the cooperative and cordial attitude on both sides. 238 


The bilateral agreement was negotiated in an atmosphere of con- 
cern in Europe as to the possible consequences of the Suez crisis and 
at a time when nuclear power was expected to offer early competition 
with conventional sources of energy. But once the initial upsurge of 
enthusiasm for the joint programs had slackened, and after the situa- 
tion for conventional power supply in Europe had returned to normal, 
there were observers who thought the Agreement had overreached 
itself in favor of industry, while at the same time being too limited 
for research. These considerations were to spark criticisms in Europe 
that the Agreement had subordinated Euratom to U.S. domestic policy 
and had invested Euratom with excessive powers." 36 

*« Of this 29 tons was for the power reactor program for fuel, and 1 ton for research 
add development. I 

»*In comparison, for the period 1958 through 1961, the United States* commitment 
to supply uranium under Atoms for Peace was a total of 50 tons of Uranlum-235. 

*« Eurn tom'8 Director General for Industry and Economy. 

288 The head of the nuclear section of the U.S. Mission to the Communities. 

*" Eum torn s Director General for Research and Training, and the Head of the Nuclear 
Section of the U.S. Mission to the Communities. 

m Consolo, op. cit. p. 3. 

■• Ibid., p. 4. 


The Eur atom Cooperation Act of 1958 

During congressional consideration of the President's request for 
authority to enter into the joint programs with Euratom, spokesmen 
for the administration supported the proposed Euratom Cooperation 
Act in glowing terms. Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon 
outlined the benefits of strengthened European unity, Western leader- 
ship in nuclear power, 240 and meeting the Soviet challenge. 241 

Leaders of the U.S. nuclear industry supported U.S. cooperation 
with Euratom. One executive spoke of the choice before the United 
States : either to let the European nuclear industry evolve at a pace 
governed by normal commercial considerations or to accelerate it. 
If the first policy were chosen, he thought it would be probably 20 
years before nuclear power would be commercially competitive. Un- 
der the second policy it would be sooner. The joint program would 
meet the needs for acceleration, give the U.S. nuclear industry an 
immediate market, and give European utilities a ceiling on costs of 
fuel for nuclear power. 242 Benefits to the U.S. nuclear industry were 
cited, although there was some doubt that helping Euratom would 
speed the time when a European nuclear industry would compete 
with its U.S. counterpart. 243 

Some doubt about the joint program was expressed by members 
of the Joint Committee. One member saw it as a step to head off 
capture of the nuclear power market by the United Kingdom 244 and 
warned that there were limits to what the proposed joint program 
could accomplish. 245 

Such doubts notwithstanding, the Joint Committee reported favor- 
ably the proposed Euratom Cooperation Act, expressing its belief that 
a vigorous program of cooperation by the United States with foreign 

mo "Of strengthening European unity. Under Secretary Dillon said*: The agreement repre- 
sents the confluence of two important historic developments : first, the peaceful application 
of atomic energy, a policy high among the objectives of this Government ; second, European 
unity, a result of European inspiration and a development on which the United States has 
looked with great interest and favor. Proposed Euratom Agreement, op. cit., p. 23. 

Of the leadership advantages he said : . . . Euratom is unique in having a political 
status, including certain sovereign attributes of the state, which permits us to deal with it 
unilaterallv. Combined with this political status is the scientific, industrial, and financial 
potential of six of the most developed nations in Europe. The successful implementation of 
the program will help maintain Western leadership in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
The continuing attacks on Euratom by the Soviet Union would seem to indicate that they 
draw the same conclusions. Ibid., p. 23. 

241 On meeting the Soviet technological challenge, he said : Recently demonstrated evi- 
dences of advanced Soviet scientific and engineering capability have caused a serious and 
healthy reappraisal within the Atlantic Community of the extent to which the Western 
countries have been exploiting to the full their potential scientific strength and whether 
this strength is being mobilized through the most effective cooperative arrangements. 
Voices in Europe have queried whether the historic position of the United States in the 
fiel'' of science, engineering, and general industrial development is not being overtaken by 
the Soviet Union. Atomic energy is rightfully considered a bellwether of scientific and 
industrial accomplishment. Ibid., p. 25. 

242 Ibid., p. 267. 

243 A spokesman for one company in the U.S. nuclear industry anticipated that the 
proposed program would be mutually beneficial to the United States nuclear industry in 
greatly increasing practical experience. Ibid., p. 314. Another spokesman cautioned that 
enabling Euratom to develop its own industrial capacity more quickly than would be the 
case without American aid would undoubtedly reduce the time in which American equip- 
ment could be sold in Europe. Ibid., p. 329. 

241 At that time the United Kingdom was vigorously pursuing its national program of 
building large nuclear powerplants fueled with natural uranium and there was some 
concern lest the British dominate the world market with this technology. 

245 Representative Craig Hosmer observed that : In considering this legislation the 
Congress should be under no delusion that it will capture the entire European reactors 
market for the U.S. suppliers. Although there are some that will disagree with me t 
is my personal feeling that the bill goes no further than making us competitive in this 
market with the British. The British atomic industry can be loosely described as a govern- 
ment monopoly. They give fuel guarantees and other incentives that would prevent us from 
competing in the European market at all without such legislation as this before us today. 
Cf. his remarks, Congressional Record, vol. 104, August 20, 1958, p. 187S9. 


nations in nuclear power was desirable. 246 The Joint Committee 
summed up the anticipated benefits of U.S. participation in the joint 
programs as follows : 247 

. . . The State Department has testified as to the role Euratoni will play in Un- 
economic integration of Europe, and this is recognized as an important part of our 
foreign policy. Euratom will become increasingly important to Europe as a sup- 
plement to its growing energy requirements in a period when its oil supply from 
the Middle East is in danger. 

Moreover, from the standpoint of the United States atomic energy program, the 
proposed Euratom arrangements offer an opportunity to develop and construct 
United States type reactors abroad. There has been a great deal of testimony that 
it is possible to achieve atomic power in Europe sooner than in the United States 
because conventional power costs in Europe are considerably higher than in the 
United States. 

Perhaps of greatest interest to the United States is the opportunity in the 
Euratom joint program to demonstrate United States leadership in atomic energy 
development, an objective which the Joint Committee considers to be of the high- 
est importance. 

Representative Holifield of the Joint Committee was not impressed 
by the argument that nuclear power could help resolve Europe's energy 

On this point, he said in debate on the bill : 248 

. . . The claim put forward by the more enthusiastic proponents of the original 
Euratom sponsors, that this program would solve the dependence of the Euro- 
pean countries on Middle East oil, is of course unrealistic. The six countries com- 
prising the Euratom group have an installed kilowatt capacity of some 60 million 
units. The pending atomic-power program will amount to 1 million, or one-sixtieth 
of the total capacity. 

Despite these misgivings the bill was passed and the Euratom Co- 
operation Act became law on August 28, 1958, as Public Law 85-840 
(72 Stat. 1084). 


While Congress quickly assented to the initial agreement for co- 
operation and to the authorizing legislation, it did not move as quickly 
upon the bilateral agreement. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
held hearings on the agreement 249 and insisted on changes, particu- 
larly for the safeguarding of nuclear materials to be furnished by the 
United States. After these changes had been worked out with Eura- 
tom, President Eisenhower approved a final version on November 6, 

1958, which was signed in Brussels 2 days later. On January 14, 

1959, the bilateral agreement with Euratom was laid before the Joint 
Committee 25 ° and when no objection was raised, it took effect on 
February 18, 1959. 

The only significant disagreement in the negotiations was over 
U.S. inspection rights and safeguards for nuclear materials supplied 

348 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Euratom Cooperation Act of 1938, 
Sen. Rept. 2370. August 14, 195S. 

947 Loc. clt. Note, the text of this report is also published in U.S. Code, Congressional 
and Administrative News, 85th Cong., 2d Sees., 1958, vol. 3. The excerpt appears at p. 4307. 

M "Cf. his remarks. Congrea*ional Record, vol. 104, Ausrust 20, 1958. p. 18794. 

■»• U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Agreement for Coopera- 
tion with Euratom, 8Rth Cong:., l«t. Sess., 19>59, 150 p. 

*° Before submitting the agreement to the Joint Committee, the President, as required by 
the Atomic Energy Act, made a determination that the "performance of the proposed 
agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense 
and security of the United States." The emphasis was upon security, not upon economic 


by the United States. The U.S. negotiators sought the right to send 
inspectors into nuclear facilities of Euratom member states. The 
Euratom negotiators refused. A resulting compromise was for Eura- 
tom to establish a safeguard system for U.S.-supplied materials in 
accordance with principles accepted by the United States, and to allow 
U.S. assistance in establishing the sj^stem and to frequent consulta- 
tions and visits. Both parties agreed to verification, by mutually 
approved scientific methods, of the effectiveness of the safeguard and 
control system. But the agreement was silent on inspection by U.S. 
personnel. Euratom agreed in the bilateral agreement to consult with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency to assure that its system 
would be reasonably compatible with that of the IAEA. The agree- 
ment also provided that should the International Agency establish 
an international safeguard and control system, the United States 
and Euratom would consult with the IAEA regarding its assump- 
tion of these functions. 251 

With the IAEA now responsible for such a safeguards and control 
system under the Nonproliferation Treaty, it will be interesting to 
see how the Agency's functions will impact upon Euratom safeguards. 

The Joint Power Program 

The initial target of the joint power program was the construction 
of six nuclear power plants in Europe with a combined electrical out- 
put of 1,000 megawatts. These were to use U.S. nuclear technology. 
The goal was partially achieved. By the time the joint power program 
ended, three nuclear power plants with a combined output of 597 MW 
had been built and put into operation, employing two different tech- 
nological approaches. 

The joint program was put into motion by two invitations for pro- 
posals. Some details of these invitations are pertinent as illustrations 
of measures to promote foreign use of a new technologj^. 


On April 13, 1959, Euratom and the U.S. Mission to Euratom in- 
vited proposals from would-be contractors to build nuclear power 
plants to be completed by the end of 1963, and to operate for at least 
10 years. To attract the interest and participation of the conserva- 
tive European electricity industry, the invitations offered five 
inducements : 252 

(1) Financial guarantees for a 10-year operating period for 
the cost of fabrication and the integrity of the nuclear fuel. 253 

(2) Long-term assurance of an adequate supply of nuclear fuel 
at prices comparable to those offered to industry within the United 
States. The U.S. agreed to furnish Euratom with up to 30,000 
kilograms of U-235 on credit at 4 percent interest. 

(3) Assurance for 10 years of a defined market for the pluto- 
nium recovered from the used fuel. 

811 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom 
Agreement, op. cit., p. 9. 

262 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Agreement for Coopera- 
tion with Euratom, op. cit., p. 21. 

™ During: the late 1950's the technology for fabrication of nuclear fuel was still evolving 
rapidly and there was little experience to .indicate how well it would perform in practice, 
or that estimated costs of fabrication could be held down. For these reasons, financial 
guarantees to the electric utilities for cost of fabrication and minimum performance were 
considered to be important incentives. 


(4) Long-term capital loans to cover part of the cost of con- 

(5) Long-term assurance by the United States that reprocessing 
of used fuel would be available to the joint program reactors 
under terms comparable to those offered to nuclear power reactor 
operators in the United States. 

Selection among the proposals was to be made by a U.S.-Euratom 
reactor board according to the following criteria : 

(1) The extent to which the proposed nuclear powerplant was 
expected to approach conventional power costs at the time of its 
completion, and its potential for subsequent improvement. 

(2) The extent to which the project would draw upon the funds, 
materials and services available for the joint program. 

(3) The extent to which the proposal would contribute to the 
advancement of nuclear power technology and to a diversity of 
plant types and designs. 

(4) The extent to which the project would contribute to a strong 
and competitive atomic equipment industry in the United States 
and Europe. 

In addition, Euratom would consider the need to arrive at a reason- 
able geographic distribution of the projects among the member states 
of the Community. 254 

The invitation made it clear that information was expected in return 
for the inducements, specifying that : 255 

... In return for the benefits received, the participants in the program will be 
required to make available information developed on the design, plans, and 
specifications, constructions and operating costs, operations and economics. 

However, the participants were not obliged to disclose manufactur- 
ing "know-how" or techniques. Subsequent experience indicated that 
European companies tended to treat as commercially confidential 
much information that in the U.S. domestic nuclear power program 
would have been freely published. 

The response to the first invitation was disappointing. Although 
letters of interest were received from six Euratom utilities, by the 
deadline of the invitation only one proposal was in hand. The Joint 
Committee became concerned and questioned AEC Commissioner 
Floberg, after his visit to the Euratom countries in 1959, about reports 
that European business was disgusted and worried about Euratom. 
In his reply, Floberg carefully distinguished between Euratom and 
the governments of its member states and their business sector. The 
governments remained optimistic. It was the utilities, said Floberg, 
whose interest had waned. He attributed this changed attitude to a 
number of factors : 256 

The fact of 50 million tons of coal on the surface of the ground and the fact 
of a $5 or so drop in the price of coal in Europe, and the fact of reduced shipping 
rates on American coal to Europe, and the fact of oil discoveries in the Sahara, 
and the fact' of what they call stability in the Middle East . . . and the fact 
of new sources of natural gas to Europe — have all accumulated together with the 
failure of the rate of power consumption to increase at the predicted rate, to 
change the attitude toward the urgency of nuclear power in Europe. There just 
is not any question about that. 

a* Ibid., p. 27. 
a* Ibid., p. 22. 

** U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing 
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1961, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., I960, p. 101. 


When I talk about the changing attitude toward urgency, I am talking about 
the attitude of the utilities. I believe the attitude of the European governments 
has not changed, and I am sure the attitude of the Euratom organization has 
not changed. 

... As far as the utilities are concerned — the ones who are the potential cus- 
tomers — there is not the slightest doubt that there has been some dilution in their 
feeling of urgency. 


Despite the disappointing response to the first invitations and the 
criticism of the Joint Committee, AEC Chairman McCone in 1960 
decided to j>roceed with a second round of invitations. 257 Accordingly, 
on September 2, 1961, the AEC and Euratom tried again. This 
time the invitation solicited construction of nuclear power plants that 
would come into operation no later than the end of 1965. As with the 
first invitation, plants were to be built, owned, and operated by orga- 
nizations of the electricity industries of the Community. The invitation 
also stated that in order to qualify for AEC inducements, the nuclear 
reactors had to be of a type which had reached an advanced stage 
of development in the United States. 


The demonstration power plants were expected to require a greater 
capital investment than corresponding conventional plants. Since Eu- 
ratom itself had no funds for the extra capital costs, the United States 
arranged for loans through the Export-Import Bank to provide $135 
million to finance them. The basis for this figure was explained by 
the Department of State as follows: 258 

Assuming a total cost of $350 million, we can say that the electricity com- 
panies will normally be able to contribute out of their own sources or otherwise, 
around $150 million, that is the cost of conventional powerplants with the same 
capacity. The loan to come from the United States Government being estimated 
at $135 million, there remains a gap of $65 million to be found from other sources. 

This was a reasonable estimate of the dollar value of the nuclear 
equipment and services to be purchased from the United States. 259 

However, by the time the money was needed, the interest rate in 
Europe had dropped enough so that European capital was used. 


The invitations for the joint power program offered a guarantee on 
fuel performance as an inducement. Authority for the AEC to 
provide such guarantee was included in the Euratom Cooperation Act 
of 1958 because the U.S. nuclear industry was not then ready to offer 
the desired guarantee. Yet, only a year later the picture had changed 
and the U.S. nuclear industry was offering guarantees of performance 
that met or exceeded those in the invitations. Commissioner Floberg 
attributed this change to the Euratom joint program. The U.S. fabrica- 
tors began to offer their own guarantees because they wished to avoid 
use of the AEC's authority, which would have required private indus- 

257 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings. AEC Authorizing 
Legislation. Fiscal Year 1961. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960, p. 101. 

sa'U.'S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings. Proposed Euratom 
Agreements, op. cit, p. 111. 
, *» Ibid., p. 234. 


try to divulge proprietary information about performance of its 
products. 260 

The second invitation resulted in two demonstration projects. One 
was a 210-megawatt nuclear power plant for the Societe d'Energie 
Nuclearire Franco-Beige des Ardennes (SENA) built near Givet, 
France, close to the France-Belgian border. The second was a 237 
megawatt nuclear power plant of a "West German firm, Kernkraft- 
werk-RWE-Bayerwerk (KRB) at Gundremmingen, Bavaria. For 
both projects, a U.S. firm was the designer and supplier for the nu- 
clear reactor. 

The Joint Research Program 

The joint research program of the United States and Euratom was 
initially planned for an expenditure of $200 million over 10 years. 
At the end of the program in 1969, the AEC had spent about $37 mil- 
lion and Euratom about the same. For the first 5 years, the U.S. 
funds were authorized annually as a separate item in the AEC's au- 
thorizations. For the second 5 years, congressional interest in the 
joint program had diminished and AEC funding for it was merged 
with other AEC requests for research and development. 

THE FIRST 5 -YEAR PLAN (1959-1964) 

The goal of the joint research program was to improve the per- 
formance of U.S. types of nuclear power reactors. The joint program 
began on December 23, 1958, when Euratom and the U.S. Mission to 
Euratom announced the formation of a Joint Research and Develop- 
ment Board and solicited proposals for research and development. The 
function of the board was to choose among proposals. Criteria for se- 
lection included the potential contribution of the proposed research to 
the goals of the joint program, the technical competence of the research, 
the anticipated costs, and the willingness of the proposer to participate 
in the exchange of technical personnel. The chosen proposals were re- 
ferred to Euratom or to the AEC for negotiation and administra- 
tion. Proposals from European organizations went to Euratom, and 
those from the U.S. nuclear industry and universities went to the 
AEC. In this way, there was no combining of AEC and Euratom 
funds and each organization was in control of the research funded 
by it. 

The response to the invitation was enthusiastic. By the end of 1959 
more than 340 proposals and letters of intent had been received. Of 
some 250 definitive proposals, half were from European and half were 
about equally divided between U.S. organizations and joint proposals 
of U.S. and European concerns. But the selecting among these pro- 
posals and the negotiating of contracts went slowly. Two years later, 
in 1962, only 15 had been authorized for contracts in the United States 
and 38 for Europe. 

One problem was funding. The Euratom Cooperation Act had au- 
thorized an initial appropriation of $3 million and the AEC re- 
?uested an additional $14 million for fiscal year 1960. But the Joint 
Committee cut the request to $5 million, which caused Commissioner 
Floberg to ask the Committee for reconsideration and restoration. He 

480 U.S. ConfcreRR. Joint Committee on Atomic Enerpy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing 
Legislation, Fiscal Tear 1960, op. clt., p. 657. 


expressed his fears that the cut would be a "body-blow" to the future 
of the whole Euratom joint program and could even cause its demise. 
At that time the AEC had in hand proposals from the U.S. nuclear 
industry for research totalling $25 million. The Joint Committee sub- 
sequently increased the authorization by another $7- million, bringing 
the total to $12 million. 

THE SECOND 5 -TEAR PLAN (196 5-1969) 

If the first 5-year program of joint U.S. -Euratom research was dis- 
appointing in terms of research begun, the second was even more so. 
Originally planned at $100 million by both parties, by the start of the 
second 5-year plan, the AEC called for only $15 million each for 
the United States and Euratom. The reasons for this reduction were 
twofold. First, the joint power program had produced proposals for 
only two reactor types instead of the five or six originally expected, so 
less research and development was needed. Second, there had been un- 
expected technological advance in the U.S. domestic nuclear power 
program. The AEC's director of reactor development explained the 
situation to the Joint Committee as follows : 261 

If you will recall, in the first place when we went in with this Euratom pro- 
gram we expected to have five reactors. We had three instead of five. There 
were two types of reactors that actually came under the joint program and 
as we have looked at the type of progress that has been made since, it just 
didn't seem that we could carry out a sensible research and development pro- 
gram of water reactors because they have gotten so far toward commercial- 
ity in the meantime. I think we didn't anticipate when we went into this pro- 
gram originally that water reactors would have gotten as far along during this 
period as they have. 

The pace of the second 5-year program slowed so much that in 
1966 the AEC requested no additional funds. Indeed, in August of 
that year it proposed to Euratom that both parties reduce their level 
of participation for the entire 10 years to about $33 million each. 
Furthermore, the AEC proposed that Euratom accept certain research 
already funded under the AEC's domestic reactor program as ful- 
filling*the United States' commitment to the joint research program. 
The cutback and financial pressure within the AEC stemmed from 
assigning higher priority to research on reactor types other than those 
of interest to the joint program. 262 The situation was as bad in Eura- 
tom. There, the General Advisor to the Euratom Commission for Ke- 
searcli stated that in view of Euratom's current budget crisis, the 
Euratom Commission would be unable to consider matching additional 
research proposed by the United States. He advised further that the 
Euratom budget for 1968 contained no funds to start new projects 
under the joint research program. 263 Consequently, the joint research 
program came to a halt and ultimately faded away. 

Conclusions and Current Issues 

American diplomacy was able to arrange with Euratom for joint 
programs of demonstration and research and development, but could 

201 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing 
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1965, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, p. 370. 

262 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing 
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 908. 

283 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEG Authorizing 
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1969, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968, p. 366. 


not assure the impetus needed to reach the desired goals. The negoti- 
ators did not produce a truly joint undertaking, but rather two paral- 
lel, closely coordinated programs in which each party controls its 
own funds. 

The diplomatic effort did produce several working nuclear power 
plants in Europe that demonstrated U.S. nuclear technology both for 
European and domestic U.S. nuclear markets. The joint programs 
did provide experience in the operation of joint boards, experience 
that could be useful for future multinational ventures. It may be 
worth inquiring how much of this experience has been recorded and 
analyzed for future reference. 

The diplomatic effort of organizing the joint programs did bene- 
fit the US. nuclear industry, which had the opportunity to build 
several more working power plants than would otherwise have been 
possible. On the other hand, the prqgram never measured up to the 
initial expectations and suffered from long delays.. 

As the United States moves into the mid-19 <0's in the face of grow- 
ing national and international imbalances in supply and demand for 
energy, it maj wejll^e useful to inquire what can be learned from 
the joint programs. There, was a working together of government 
agencies, universities, and industrial organizations in several countries 
and useful 'research wa,s perfprjned. Perhaps the experience with the 
joint programs could point the way toward future ventures to de- 
velop new energy sources, such as large-scale use of solar energy, or 
toward conservation of energy through expedited development of 
nifignei;6h^dt6^yh4irii6'§ (JlffiD), Both the strengths and weaknesses 
of the Euratom venture could he, instructive in planning such new de- 
velopments on an international basis. 


'i ■■' 

> ■ • 

IX. The Nuclear Energy Agency: Another Regional Ap- 
proach to International Organization for Nuclear Energy 

Another indication of the impact of the discovery of fission upon 
U.S. diplomacy is to be found in the creation of the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. With Euratom, NEA, and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency all having functions of one kind or another relating 
to nuclear power in Europe, it appears that diplomatic responses of 
the United States and European governments have created a complex 
web of interrelationships. While Euratom during its early years 
enjoyed substantial financial support of the United States, NEA did 
not attract equivalent support. The purpose of this section is to de- 
scribe the origins, purposes and activities of the NEA, and to explore 
the reasons for this difference. 

Origins of the Nuclear Energy Agency 

As was the case for Euratom, the initial impetus for the creation of 
the NEA came from European fears of a fuel shortage. The then 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OECC) re- 
quested Louis Armand of France to survey the situation. Armand 
was one of the "three wise men" who were so instrumental in the crea- 
tion of Euratom and who had argued for Euratom as a way to ease 
foreseen increases in costs and growing shortages of energy for the 
economy of Europe. Armand's report to OEEC reflected this theme of 
anticipated energy shortage, which was repeated in 1955 by a com- 
mittee of experts led by Sir Harold Hartley. The latter committee 
observed that Europe's energy deficit, which then amounted to about 
20 percent of the energy used, was expected to exceed one-third of its 
energy demand by the year 1975. These predictions led to two OEEC 
responses: The promotion of an overall energy policy for member 
nations: and the organization of joint European action to develop the 
production and use of nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy Agency 
was the outcome of the latter. 

NEA Functions 

The Nuclear Energy Agency was established in 1957 by an inter-, 
national statute which entered into force on February 1, 1958. NEA's 
assigned objective is to " . . . further the development of the produc- 
tion and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by the partic- 
ipating countries." NEA's scientific and technological activities 
include : 

(1) Promotion of nuclear technological developments; 

(2) Interchange of specialist knowledge and provision of 
specialist information services ; and 

(3) Studies of reactor characteristics, fuel supplies, and other 
factors affecting the future of nuclear power. 


96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 17 


Other NEA functions concern the administrative and regulatory 
aspects of nuclear energy and the development of a uniform legal 
system in Europe governing such matters as compensation for damages 
from a nuclear accident. 

Member states in the NEA include the European members of the 
OEEC — which later became the OECD — plus Canada, Japan, and 
the United States. Originally named the European Nuclear Energy 
Agency (ENEA), the Agency was renamed the Nuclear Energy 
Agency to reflect the participation of non-European members. 

Like its parent organization, the OECD, the NEA is a forum 
rather than an operational agency. Within the functions outlined 
above, its strong point has been coordination and program confronta- 
tion rather than direct operation. The Agency has led its members into 
agreements on radiation health and safety standards, and on nuclear 
insurance. By contrast, Euratom is an operating organization as well 
as an agency involved in establishing an industrial structure for 
nuclear power in Europe. 

Some NEA Innovations in Organization of International Projects 

In carrying out research and development in nuclear energy for its 
member states, the NEA has made several noteworthy innovations 
in organization. The Agency has three international projects : an ex- 
perimental nuclear reactor in Norway, one in England, and a nuclear 
fuel reprocessing plant in Belgium. The innovations of NEA in 
organizing these projects are instructive for future international 
ventures of limited scale and specific scope and purpose. 


In the early 1950s the Norwegian Institute for Atomic Energy built 
an experimental power reactor in southwest Norway at the town of Hal- 
den. While this reactor does not produce electricity, it produces about 25 
megawatts of heat output which can be used to make process steam for 
an adjoining paper factory. In 1958. through a trilateral arrangement 
involving the Institute, NEA and Euratom, the project became an 
NEA undertaking:, with the Institute acting as an operating con- 
tractor. The AEC subsequently entered into a bilateral agreement 
with the Institute for exchange of technical information. 

The Halden Project is modest in comparison with nuclear projects 
in the United States. At the end of 1969 its professional staff totalled 
43, of whom 13 were seconded by signatories other than Norway. Its 
research program for 1967-69 was about $5.3 million, and its budp-et 
for 1970-72 a bit less. By the end of 1972 the total financing of the 
project is expected to amount to $14.5 million. 264 The Institute owns, 
manages, and operates the project for the signatories with the gui- 
dance of a board of management and an operating committee. 265 

«• Eurona Yearbook, 1970 < London : Europa Publications, Ltd.. 1070), p. 309. 

•* The Halden Board of Management consists of one member designated by each signa- 
tory. Its principal functions are annually to approve the joint progrnm of research and 
experiments and the budget for the program. The Board designates Its own chairman 
and vice-chairman. It is reaulred to meet at least twice yearly. A representative of the 
NEA mny attf-nd In an advisory capacity. 

The Operating Committee is composed of one senior technical specialist designated by 
each signatory. It assists the Board in formulating the joint program, and supervises 
the carrying out of the joint program by the Institute. The committee approves large 
contracts and approves the conditions for the scientific and technical personnel, who 
are paid from the common budget. 



The second experimental nuclear power reactor is the high tem- 
perature reactor project at the Winfrith establishment of the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in Dorset. Known as 
the Dragon Project, this reactor, which was originally built by the 
UKAEA as part of its reactor program, became an international 
project of the NEA through an agreement of March 23, 1959. While the 
initial charter of the project emphasized research, development, and 
demonstration, its objectives were modified in 1969 to permit the 
project to assist the nuclear industries of participating countries in 
their exploitation of this particular nuclear power technology. 

As with the Halden Project, the Dragon Project is modest in size. 
At the end of March 1970, its staff included ill secured from the 
signatory countries. Project expenditures for the year ending March 31, 

1970 were about $5.6 million, while the budget for fiscal years 

1971 through 1973 was projected at about $17.3 million. Over the 14 
years of its operation, the total funding of the project amounted to 
$95 million. 

The administrative arrangements of the Drasron Project are 
characterized by flexibility in professional staffing. The UKAEA acts 
as operating contractor to the NEA. The international character of 
the project is emphasized by selection of staff from all participating 
countries. Only minor difficulties have been experienced in assembling 
the research team, and the working relations between persons of very 
different backgrounds is reported to be good. The administrative sys- 
tem enjoys the advantage that new persons with new ideas can readily 
join the project, but it suffers from a comparatively high turnover rate 
in its staff. 266 

Overall control of the project is exercised by a Board of Manage- 
ment 267 which determines the work program and budget for each 
year. Day-to-day operation of the project is entrusted to a Chief 
Executive who together with other senior staff, is appointed by the 
Board. The arrangement whereby the UKAEA acts as the legal 
agent for the project seems compatible with control of the project's 
affairs by the signatories and the arrangement has been found to 
be an entirely workable solution to a difficult problem. 268 

The United States is involved in the Dragon Project through an 
Agreement for Cooperation between the AEC and NEA under which 
information from the project is made available to the United States 
in exchange for information arising from the AEC's research on this 
type of reactor. 

Results from the project are distributed to the signatories who may 
disclose the information to persons and undertakings in their own 
territories, but not to others except with the agreement of all the 

The international character of the Dragon Project has been em- 
phasized in its staffing, in the policies for carrying out its tasks, and 
in its arrangements for the placing of contracts. As an international 

283 C. A. Ronnie. G. E. Loekett and R. E. Reynolds. "The Dragon Project." Proceed- 
ings of the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (New 
York : United Nations. 196. r O. vol. 1. p. 319. 

287 The Board consists of representatives from all the signatories and from the NEA. 

2S8 Rennie. Loekett and Reynolds, op. clt, p. 318. 


organization, the project has enabled the participants, some of whom 
could not readily afford so large an effort, to take an active part in a 
major investigation of a potentially important type of power reactor. 
It has also enabled the project to benefit from the knowledge and 
specialist facilities available throughout a large part of Europe. An 
optimistic assessment by several of the Dragon staff asserts the proj- 
ect's experience has shown that : 269 

. . . cooperation between individuals, firms and other organizations in a 
number of countries can be established to mutual benefits, and that the coordina- 
tion of the efforts of many and widespread contractors in both research pro- 
grams and in complex engineering tasks can be achieved. The creation of an 
integrated scientific, technical and administrative staff with clearly defined 
objectives, within a fixed time scale and within a fixed budget, has engendered 
the necessary feeling of unity of purpose and concern for the early achievement 
of the tasks on an economical basis. 


Of the three international nuclear energy agencies, only the Nuclear 
Energy Agency has a working fuel reprocessing plant. This facility, 
may, however, be shut down in the face of competition from France, 
the United Kingdom, and West Germany, who have banded together 
in a trilateral arrangement to use their own reprocessing capacity. 
The implications of this change for commercial nuclear energy in 
Europe and for American policy vis-a-vis the European nuclear power 
industry are not yet apparent. 

The NEA fuel reprocessing plant is located at Mol in Belgium. It 
is owned and operated by Eurochemic, an international company with 
a $38 million paid capital whose shares are held by governments, 
public or semi-public bodies, and private industry of NEA countries. 
Eurochemic was established in July 1959 under a Diplomatic Con- 
vention signed in December 1957. At the time its reprocessing plant 
came into service in 1966, it was probably one of the most versatile in 
the world, designed to accept nuclear fuels of virtually any composition 
and manufacture. It has made substantial contributions to the tech- 
nology for reprocessing used nuclear fuels. 270 

In 1971, it was reported that France and Germany, who dominate 
Eurochemic, had decided to cut off their financial support for its 
commercial reprocessing after 1974. 271 Then in mid-October 1971, it 
was further reported that the French and British Government nuclear 
organizations had agreed with a West German consortium to set up 
Europe's first multinational nuclear fuel reprocessing company — 
United Reprocessors GmbH— in Frankfurt. Deprived of its market by 
this venture, Eurochemic is tentatively scheduled to stop commercial 
reprocessing in 1974 except to service small research reactors, and 
possibly to carry on some new research. 

Building the Infrastructure for Nuclear Power 

In addition to its research and development functions, NEA has 
worked to create the infrastructure of regulations and other arrange- 
ments required for the commercial deployment of nuclear energy in 
Europe. It has been active in development of regulations for nuclear 

«* Ih1<1.. p. 323. 

*"> "Work of the European Nuclear Energy Agency," Science Policy Newt, vol. 2 (Sep- 
tember 1970). p. 18. 

•" Nucleonics Week, vol. 12 (September 16, 1971), p. 10. 


health and safety, and for transport of radioactive materials. NEA 
has also been a prime mover in defining and limiting liabilities in case 
of a major nuclear accident. 

Basic norms developed by the Agency for protection against ioniz- 
ing radiations were developed by an NEA Health and Safety Com- 
mittee in liasion with the International Atomic Energy Agency. These 
were adopted by NEA member countries in 1959. Application of these 
norms to specific circumstances are subject to separate recommenda- 
tions by the Agency, usually in collaboration with the IAEA and other 
international bodies such as the World Health Organisation. A deci- 
sion to establish an emergency warning system in case of an increased 
environmental radioactivity was adopted November 23, 1963. 

As for limitation of liability on the part of the owners of nuclear 
power plants, in 1960 an OECD Convention on Third Party Liability, 
was developed in Paris under the auspices of the Agency. Signed by 
most NEA members, the convention came into force in April 1968. It 
defines the underlying principles of all international agreements on 
nuclear liability, and is the basis for most national legislation in 
Europe for this purpose. 

NEA and Safeguards for Nuclear Materials 

An NEA Convention on Security Control, which took effect on 
July 22, 1959, established a safeguards system of inspection and con- 
trol for the movement and use of nuclear fuel materials within the 
Agency's jurisdiction. A Control Bureau adopted rules applicable 
to nuclear facilities using nuclear materials recovered or obtained in an 
NEA venture. The rules cover materials from all NEA undertakings. 
The future of this NEA function after the Nonproliferation Treaty 
takes effect remains to be seen. 

United States Participation in NEA Activities 

U.S. participation in NEA activities has been much closer to tradi- 
tional types of international cooperation in scientific ventures than 
has been its participation in Euratom. AEC's annual reports since 
1960 describes U.S. participation in terms of information exchange, 
cooperation, and participation in special projects — but with no 
mention of U.S. funding of such projects. A typical description ap- 
pears in the AEC's annual report for 1968, which said : 272 

The AEC continued its participation in joint projects with the European 
Xuclear Energy Agency (ENEA), including the Halden Heavy Boiling Water 
Reactor in Norway, the Dragon High Temperature Reactor Project in England, 
Eurochemic in Belgium, and the International Food Irradition Project at Seibers- 
dorf, Austria. Information exchanges on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
and participation in related study groups and symposia continued. 

An earlier annual report, that for 1963, gives more detail about 
U.S. participation in the Dragon Project, which began in 1959 under 
an exchange agreement between the Dragon Project signatories and 
the AEC. It reported that AEC cooperation with the Dragon Project 
had been carried out through exchanges of technical reports and 
correspondence, semiannual conferences, visits, long-term personnel 
exchanges and a cooperative materials testing program. 273 

272 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1968, op. clt., p. 205. 

273 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 196S, op. cit., p. 239. 


Since both the NEA and Euratom were created to foster commercial 
use of nuclear energy in Europe, and since the membership of NEA 
represented until recently a larger potential market for the U.S. nu- 
clear power industry than the six Euiatom members, it seems curious 
that U.S. support to Euratom has so exceeded that for NEA. For the 
latter there are no joint undertakings with U.S. funding. One signif- 
icant difference between the two multinational organizations may 
explain the difference in U.S. suppoit. This, in the opinion of the 
writer, was the presence of the United Kingdom in NEA but not in 
Euratom. During the mid-1950s the U.S. nuclear industry was con- 
cerned that the United Kingdom with its strongly backed government 
program for development and application of nuclear power would be 
able to capture much of the world's nuclear power market. For the 
United States to have funded NEA projects may well have seemed to 
give a principal competitor in the international nuclear market still 
greater advantage. In these circumstances, U.S. suppoit could not 
appear to benefit nuclear power research and development of interest 
to the United Kingdom. 

Conclusions and Current Issues 

The comparative freedom from crises of the OECD's Nuclear 
Energy Agency provides a marked contrast to the trials and difficulties 
of Euratom. What accounts for this difference? It may well be that 
the fundamental differences between the organiaztions provide an 
answer. NEA appears as the traditional kind of international under- 
taking, being more of a confederation of member states than a separate, 
supernational organization. Perhaps relations with the NEA have been 
easier in that the Agency is clearly a working tool of the members 
rather than a form of international government. Perhaps, also, less was 
expected of the NEA. For example, its charter was not to create a 
European nuclear industry but rather to help with technical assistance. 
Whatever the reasons, the history of the NEA has shown more co- 
operation and less friction among participating members than was 
the case with Euratom. Future planners of international technological 
ventures may benefit from an identification and analysis of the factors 
that have caused this difference. 

The relations between the United States and the NEA on one hand 
and the United States and Euratom on the other are also different. The 
United States cooperated substantially with Euiatom in an ambitious 
joint research program, but has preferred a more conventional role in 
its relations to the NEA, limiting its participation largely to exchange 
of information about projects of mutual interest. That the United 
Kingdom was a member of NEA but not of Euratom may have been a 
factor in the difference in U.S. participation. In the formative period 
of the NEA, the United States was concerned with nuclear competi- 
tion from the United Kingdom, which had begun a large-scale deploy- 
ment of nuclear power well before the United States and appeared to 
be a formidable future competitor in the world nuclear market. U.S. 
financial support to NEA could have been seen as fostering a competi- 
tive British nuclear technology, while U.S. finaneial support to Eura- 
tom enjoyed the advantage of being earmarked for projects explicitly 
beneficial to U.S. nuclear technology. 

With the United Kingdom and other European nations now joining 
the Common Market, the membership of NEA and Euratom will 
further overlap. In turn, this raises the question about the separate 


functions of these organizations, and also their relationship to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Should all three continue as 
now constituted? Should the NEA be combined into Euratom? Should 
Euratom be permitted to fade away and its scientific resources be 
transformed into a general European scientific capability, leaving 
nuclear technology to the NEA ? How would such changes affect U.S. 
interests ? These are some questions that seem likely to occur if nuclear 
power in Europe is to fulfill the role projected for it. 

X U.S. Fuel for European Nuclear Power 

Another effect of the scientific discovery of fission was to engage the 
United States Government in the enrichment of uranium, a large scale 
industrial process that until now has provided the United States 
with a strong bargaining position in international nuclear affairs. As 
the United States enters the 1970's, it enjoys a virtual monopoly in the 
non-Communist world market for the supply of enriched unranium or 
enrichment services. Within the next few years, however, interacting 
decisions of domestic and foreign policy will have to be made that will 
affect this U.S. predominance, thereby influencing the foreign policy 
leverage conferred by this position in the nuclear fuel market. 

The 1970's are likely to see new diplomatic, economic, and technologi- 
cal initiatives by European and other nations to reduce their depend- 
ence upon U.S. supply of enriched uranium, while the United States, 
in turn, appears inclined to preserve its competitive position. As the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission sees the situation, supplying uranium 
enrichment services offers the possibility for a great expansion in 
international cooperation between the United States and Europe, even 
though the supply function is attended by many complex problems 
for U.S. foreign policy. 274 Whatever the outcome of still-changing U.S. 
policy, the results inevitably will affect the future of commercial nu- 
clear power in Europe. 

The Enriched Uranium Business 

When Congress revised the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, it. retained 
the original government monopoly of enriched uranium; there were 
no private facilities to produce nuclear fuel. Accordingly, the develop- 
ing nuclear industries at home and abroad leased these materials from 
the AEC. When the Act was later revised to permit private owner- 
ship of enriched uranium, the AEC changed its policies to permit 
customers to supply their own normal uranium which the Commission 
would then enrich. Enrichment service, rather than sale of enriched 
uranium, is now the predominant pattern of AEC operation in 
nuclear fuel supply. 

Today in the United States all but two industrial services required 
for the construction and operation of commercial nuclear power plants 
are available from domestic nuclear industry. The two exceptions are 
the enrichment of uranium and the indefinite storage of radioactive 
products from the used nuclear fuel. The administration's policy is to 
t ransfer these two functions to the private nuclear industry, but when 
and how this will be done is still uncertain. Of the two, the enrichment 
of uranium is by far the larger industrial activity in terms of capital 

271 This idea was developed by Myron B. Kratzer. then Assistant Ocneral Manager of 
the AEC for International Activities, In his testimony before the House Committee on 
Science and Astronautics, May 1971. Of. U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Science and 
Astronautics. Hearings, A General Revietc of International Conjuration in Science and 
Space, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, p. £35. 



investment, costs of operation, and demand for electricity. It also 
appears to have the most far-reaching implications for foreign policy. 

Provision of uranium enriching services by the United States to 
domestic and to foreign customers has gone hand in hand with the 
development and marketing of U.S. nuclear power technology by 
the private nuclear power industry. Through 1970 more than 40 nuclear 
power reactors of U.S. design and technology were in foreign operation, 
being built or on order from abroad. 275 While other major industrial 
nations, particularly in Europe, are competing with the U.S. in the 
world market for nuclear power plants, the U.S. nuclear industry 
appears to hold a dominant position. United States nuclear reactor 
sale** abroad; already have totaled more than $1 billion, mostly financed 
by the Export-Import Bank. These sales are expected to increase 
several fold in the future * 76 Adding to these sales of nuclear power 
plants will be sales of U.S. enriching services. 

The cost of enrichment of uranium accounts for about a third of the 
cost Of nuclear fuel, which makes enrichment the single largest item of 
cost in the whole fuel cycle and an important determinant of the 
ultimate cost of nuclear power. In the eyes of the AEC, the importance 
of having an adequate supply of enriching capacity available when 
needed and at a reasonable cost, coupled with the high cost of process 
development and construction for enrichment facilities justifies the 
closest possible cooperation and communications among the users and 
suppliers of enrichment services. 277 

At present, the three enrichment plants owned by the AEC constitute 
virtually the sole source of enrichment services to non-Communist 
countries. 278 A similar facility exists in the Soviet Union, a compara- 
tively small plant at Capenhurst in England, a small facility at Pierre- 
latte, France, and one of unknown size in China. The Union of South 
Africa is reported to be building an enrichment plant based upon a 
secret process. The facilities in the U.S.S.R., England, and France 
were built to manufacture highly enriched uranium for military 

Requirements for Enriched Uranium and Enrichment Services 

To remain the major supplier of uranium enrichment service for 
commercial nuclear power in the non-Communist world, the United 
States must be prepared to supply this service for domestic and foreign 
orders. For the foreign market, U.S. readiness and ability to supply 
this service must be credible to foreign officials who are responsible for 
their countries' nuclear power programs. 

The demand for enrichment services is expected to grow substan- 
tially over the next few decades as commercial use of nuclear power 
expands. For the United States alone, nuclear power plants are ex- 
pected to increase in total electrical generating capacity from 5,000 
megawatts in 1970 to 15,000 megawatts in 1980 and to 300,000 mega- 
watts by 1985. The AEC estimates that by 1980, 29 percent of the 

875 Kratzer, op. cit., p. 335. 

276 Loc. cit. 

277 Remarks of ABC Commissioner Wilfrid E. Johnson in U.S. Papers for the Fourth 
United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Wash- 
ington, D.C : U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1971), vol. I, p. 2.5-2. 

278 These production plants for enriched uranium are located at Oak Ridge, Tennessee ; 
Paducah, Kentucky ; and Portsmouth, Ohio. Together they represent a U.S. capital invest- 
ment of over $2.3 billion. 


electricity generated in the United States will come from nuclear 
power plants, and in the 1990s about half. As for foreign nuclear 
power, the AEC estimates that nuclear power plants in foreign mar- 
kets accessible to the United States will represent a total electrical 
generating capacity of from 70,000 to 100,000 megawatts by 1980. 
Taking into account that some enriching services will be furnished from 
foreign sources, the AEC projects that foreign and domestic nuclear 
powerplants requiring U.S. enrichment services will total about 225,- 
000 megawatts in 1980. 279 

The value of the enrichment market is estimated to be about $1 bil- 
lion annually by 1980, and $1.5 billion by 1985. The AEC already has 
signed long-term contracts for enriching services of 30 years dura- 
tion. These contracts have an aggregate potential demand of about 
$3 billion, including some $800 million from abroad. 280 

United States Supply Policy 

To foster foreign interest in its nuclear power technology, the 
United States has assured foreign users of a reliable supply of enriched 
uranium. This assurance is necessary because other nations would not 
be willing to make large capital investments in nuclear power plants 
fueled from an external monopoly without strong assurance of the 
long-term availability of enriched uranium. Thus, the cornerstone of 
U.S. supply policies has been a long-term assurance of supply, com- 
mensurate with the reasonable economic life of foreign nuclear power 
plants, on non-discriminatory terms and conditions, and including 
charges comparable to those for the domestic nuclear industry. U.S. 
supply policy has been characterized by repeated assurances of the 
dependability of nuclear fuel supply through export allocations of 
enriched uranium to signatories of bilateral agreements, and through 
enrichment services contracts. 

The sucesss of this policy is illustrated by the fact that most nuclear 
power reactors sold in international trade to date have been of U.S. 
design, using enriched uranium. For the period of July 1962 through 
December 30, 1970, the revenues from the sale of enriching services and 
nuclear materials to foreign users came to $207 million. 281 


Supplying fuel to nuclear power plants in Europe offers advantages 
to the United States. The AEC identifies them as follows: 282 

National security : U.S. supply of enriched uranium for civil pur- 
poses abroad under safeguards assures that the plutonium produced 
in these reactors will not be available for military use. The avail- 
ability of enriched uranium from the United States on attractive 
terms also serves U.S. non-proliferation objectives by reducing the 
incentive for other countries to develop their own enriching capacity. 

Strong international ties: By supplying enriched uranium, the 
United Slates encourages the formation of strong and mutually bene- 
ficial economic ties. 

^"Johnson, op. clt., p. 2.5 2. 

280 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing 
Legislation, Firsal Year 1072, op. clt., p. 22'M. 

281 U.S. Concress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Uranium Enrichment 
Pricing Criteria, 92d Cong., 1st SeSS., 1971. part 2. p. 29. 

* 8= U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings. Future Ownership 
the AEC's Gaseous Diffusion Plant", 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 48. 


Economic benefits: Important economic benefits are realized from 
the sale of enriched uranium abroad. While prices charged by the 
United States do not include profit, they are calculated to recover all 
costs of production including amortization, interest on the govern- 
ment's investment, and a factor for contingencies. The foreign sales 
have helped to provide a cash benefit to the U.S. Treasury and to 
amortize facilities built initially for defense purposes. 

Foreign exchange: Foreign sales provide an important source of 
foreign exchange. To help redress a serious balance-of-payments 
deficit, the United States must look to the export of products based 
on advanced technology and heavy capital investment where U.S. 
superiority cannot be easily offset by labor cost differentials and other 
factors favoring foreign products. 


.: ■ .■•■:■■ ; v . : ' - - . - '. ; • :-,..;• ■• •:■: o* *■ 

Supplying enrichment services to foreign customers also has several 
dra wfoacks : ' 

Commitment of public capital: Enrichment technology is very ex- 
pensive in capital -investment.' A policy of long terni commitfnertt to 
supply enrichment services to foreign customers carries with it an 
implied obligation to make whatever future public or private invest-' 
ment will be necessary to expand or build new enrichment plants. 

Commitment of fossil fuel: Enrichment plants in the U.S. require 
large amounts of electricity, most of which is generated in conven- 
tional powerplants that burn fossil fuels. 283 Not only is this fuel in 
essence exported, but additional land is strip mined in the United 
States for the benefit of electricity users abroad. 

Implied responsibility for misuse of exported fuel: Although en- 
riched uranium suitable for fuel for most contemporary commercial 
nuclear power plants cannot be used directly to fabricate an atomic 
explosive, it would be a very desirable material for clandestine enrich- 
ment facilities to process into weapons grade materials. If the United 
States freely supplies enrichment services in the world market, what 
would be its responsibilities in the eyes of the world were some of that 
material to be illicitly diverted to weapons manufacture ? In Section V 
it was noted that materials were supplied according to the terms of 
bilateral agreements which initially gave the United States unusual 
authority to inspect use of materials supplied by it. Later this author- 
ity was transferred through trilateral agreements to the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency. Presumably, once the Nonproliferation 
Treaty is fully implemented, the IAEA will have full responsibility 
for safeguarding nuclear fuel materials, including enriched uranium, 
as discussed in Section XI. Nonetheless, if enriched uranium supplied 
by the United States does find its way into wrong hands, will it be 
sufficient for the U.S. to simply shift the responsibility to the IAEA ? 


A point of departure for the U.S. nuclear fuel supply policy was 
established on August 8, 1955. On that date, the opening day in Geneva 

283 Admiral Rickover, who heads the AEC's nuclear power program for naval propulsion, 
estimates that the enrichment services required for a nuclear fuel loading requires about 
600 million kilowatt hours of electricity, which would require about 500,000 tons of coal 
to generate. 


of the first United Nation's Conference on the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy, the AEC announced a price for enriched uranium 
to nations which had bilateral agreements with the United States. 
"Within the year, on February 22, 1956, at the recommendation of the 
AEC and with the concurrence of the Departments of State and 
Defense, President Eisenhower announced that the United States 
would make available 40,000 kilograms of uranium-235 to assist in- 
dustrial nuclear power development and research within the United 
States and to enable friendly countries to develop the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy. Of the uranium-235 thus allocated, 20,000 kilograms 
was for domestic use and 20,000 for cooperating countries. 284 By im- 
plication, as additional nuclear projects were undertaken, additional 
supplies of nuclear fuel would be made available. In a parallel state- 
ment, Chairman Strauss added that the AEC would provide uranium- 
235 to support nuclear power development for the expected life of 
nuclear power projects abroad. 

Although these announcements committed the United States to 
supply nuclear fuels, there remained uncertainty as to terms and con- 
ditions of supply. To minimize these uncertainties, the President on 
November 18, 1956, announced details of terms and conditions of sup- 
ply. His announcement permitted nuclear power plant operators 
abroad to estimate more accurately the costs of nuclear power. The 
announcement also emphasized the U.S. desire to sell rather than lease 
nuclear fuel for foreign nuclear power plants, and set out the formal 
criteria under which it would receive and enrich foreign owned 
uranium. 286 

To reassure foreign users of a reliable supply, the AEC in 1968 an- 
nounced that it would deliver supplies of enriched uranium for periods 
as long as five years in advance of actual use so that the users could 
have an inventory in hand. Furthermore, proposals for foreign inven- 
tories of enriched uranium for even longer periods would be 
considered. 286 


When the Atomic Energy Act was revised in 1954, a special limita- 
tion was included to control distribution of special nuclear materials 
to any group of nations. Section 54 required specific authorization by 
the Congress for such distribution. The Euratom Cooperation Act of 
1958 subsequently authorized the transfer of specified amounts of 
uranium-235 and plutonium. This initial authorization has subse- 
quently increased from time to time by legislation. The latest increase 
occurred in 1967 by Public Law 90-190, which authorized transfer 
of up to 215,000 kilograms of contained uranium-235. In reporting 

"•D.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Twentieth Semiannual Report of Atomic Energy 
Gomminnion (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. vlll. 

""U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to the Congress of Atomic Energy 
Commission, January-December 1966, op. clt., p. 274. 

"•U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, 1968 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 210. 


this legislation to Congress, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
underscored the need to assure Europe of an adequate fuel supply for 
its nuclear power plants. According to the Joint Committee, a survey 
of uranium-235 needs for the Community had indicated that the 
earlier ceiling would be insufficient to meet the long-term fuel 
requirements for nuclear power plants which were expected to be 
in operation or under construction in the near future. Additional ura- 
nium-235 would be necessary to fuel an installed nuclear power plant 
capacity of 13,000 electrical megawatts (Mwe) that Euratom ex- 
pected to have in operation or under construction by 1972. The Joint 
Committee observed that this increase represented a logical continua- 
tion of the U.S Government's previous uranium supply policies. 
Assuming that all of the additional uranium-235 was supplied to 
Euratom through U.S uranium enrichment services, the revenues to 
the United States would be about $500 million. There could also be 
additional revenue to the domestic nuclear industry through sale of 
uranium concentrates, conversion services, and reactor equipment. 287 


Beginning January 1, 1969, the industrial role of the AEC changed 
when the United States began to offer "toll enrichment" to European 
users of nuclear power. 288 The AJEC processes customer-supplied 
uranium in its diffusion plants to increase the U-235 content and 
returns to the consumer the desired enriched fuel, plus the residual 
uranium that has been depleted of its normal U-235 content. For this 
enriching service, the AEC charges a toll based on the amount of 
separative work needed to produce the desired enrichment. 

To provide toll enriching service to Euratom, the Atomic Energy 
Commission needed special legislative authorization. This was pro- 
vided in 1967 through Public L&w 90-190 (81 Stat. 575). 

Through November 1970, the AEC had signed 31 contracts with 
foreign customers to supply enrichment services worth $688 million, 
based on a charge of $26 per separate work unit. In comparison, at that 
time AEC's enrichment commitments to the domestic nuclear industry 
totaled $1.6 billion. Of the foreign commitments, those with Euratom 
totaled $124 million. Table V gives the details of the United States 
foreign commitments. 

In estimating enrichment requirements, each nuclear power plant of 
1,000 Mwe generating capacity represents a demand of over a 30- 
year working life of about $110 million, based on AEC prices in effect 
in November 1970. OECD estimates that the nuclear power market of 
the non-Communist world may reach 610,000 installed megawatts by 
1985. If so, the market for toll enrichment could approach §2.5 billion 
annually. 289 

*" U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Atomic Energy Acta — Amend- 
ments, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967. Sen. Kept. No. 743. . 

888 With toll enrichment, the customer furnishes his own natural uranium and thus can 
sav» the initial dollar cost of this material. 

288 Robert L. Loftness. "Nuclear Power Abroad : A Time of Change," Combustion, vol. 113 
(August 1971), p. 13. 



Value of 

Number of contracts 

Customer contracts (millions) 

Euratom - If $124.3 

Japan - — 8 335.3 

Switzerland. - 2 83.3 

Sweden 2 139.1 

Spain , - 1 •» 

Total - 31 688.4 

Source: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, press release N-206, Nov. 24, 1970. 


Throughout the later 1950s, one question for U.S. foreign nuclear 
policy was what financial assistance, if any, should be given to foreign 
countries purchasing U.S. nuclear fuel materials. Shouldthe^ U.S. sell 
them, lease them, or loan money to buy them? The final decision was 
in favor of direct sale for the following reasons : 290 

(1) The cost of the fuel inventory was considered part of the 
capital cost of the facility and hence one that should be borne 
by the owner of the facility. 

(2) The material was expensive and the total value of the fuel 
inventory in the aggregate could reach billions of dollars when 
atomic power came into general use ; and 

(3) It would be unwise for the Commission to establish a prece- 
dent that might lead to its financing very large sums of money 
overseas (which more appropriately was a banking function). 


AEC policy of sale rather than lease had its drawbacks, partic- 
ularly for cooperation with Eurotom. The initial heavy capital outlay 
for enriched fuel could be an obstacle in financing nuclear power 
projects of interest to the United States. To reduce this obstacle, the 
AEC announced on February 2, 1959, that it would supply enriched 
uranium fuel on a deferred payment basis to countries and interna- 
tional organizations that had bilateral agreements of cooperation with 
the United States. 

Under this arrangement, a foreign reactor operator could use the 
fuel for ten years before beginning payments on principal, which 
would be spaced over the following 10 years. Interest on the unpaid 
balance was the same as the use charge for such materials in effect for 
the domestic nuclear industry. Fuel consumed was to be paid for as 
consumed. Tl>e effect of this policy was to defer repayment of a major 
capital cost until the productive period after a nuclear power plant 
had been built and brought into operation. 

To be eligible for deferred payment, the power reactors had to- be 
scheduled for operation before June 30, 1964, and had to use U.S. 
designs and a substantial portion of U.S. components. 

280 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Background Material for the 
Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States, 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1960, vol. 2, p. 392. (Joint Committee print.) 


By early 1964, the AEC and Euratom had signed two deferred pay- 
ment agreements for two Italian projects, and during that year a third 
arrangement was concluded with Euratom for fuel for a French nu- 
clear powerplant. 291 


A potential divergence between domestic and foreign policy for 
nuclear energy arose in 1971 following two successive increases in the 
AEC price for uranium enrichment. The Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy held hearings at which AEC Commissioner Ramey dissented 
from this price increase. 292 He argued for a policy of stability in 
pricing to retain the U.S. position as a fuel supplier, and to discourage 
foreign construction of enrichment plants. He said:* 93 

Because of the AEC's unique position as the supplier of enriching services, to 
the United States and most of the free world, I believe it has a responsibility 
to maintain a stable price for the vital enrichment services which domestic 
and foreign utilities and equipment companies must purchase. . ' , • l ! 

. . . : the inteijnatiqijial implicatipns Qf r tbe ; price increase cap be, serious. Our 
foreign customers, botjh present and potential, are going to be concerned by the 
two price increases in rapid Succession. They are certainly going to want an 
alternative 'Supply of enriching services. This will serve to' reduce the demand 
on. our .capacity and to ^further the construction of- enrichment plants in other 
countries, . : r . ; \ ' ' ■ . . r 

While this. latter faction is already underway or being seriously considered in 
several countries, this proposed pricing action will discourage either the use 
ef United States technology of a partnership with the United States rh con- 
structing the new capacity. A proliferation of enrichment facilities abroad is 
not in anybody|s best interest. ...... i- .--..•.,. 

So domestic policy decisions to increase the charge for enrichment had 
unfavorable implications for U.S. foreign policy. - . 

Apropos of foreign policy, the AEC did not consult the State De- 
partment about these pricing actions. An AEC representative advised 
the Joint Committee that it was a domestic decision : 294 

. . ^. This was a decision that was taken by the Atomic Energy Commission, 
and the State Department was not consulted in advance. I think that while 
this is a very important consideration, the policy we followed is to establish 
our price primarily on the basis of the whole power industry, of which the do- 
mestic industry is the greater part, and then try to treat everybody on a non- 
discriminatory basis. While thought was given to the implications on the foreign 
business, we did not consult outside of the agency on this subject. 

The AEC did, however, inform the Department of State shortly 
before announcing the price increases so that the news could be "prop- 
erly communicated to our embassies and our customers abroad." 295 

European Opposition to U.S. Enrichment Monopoly 

Through the late 1960's, whether Europe might produce its own en- 
riched uranium for nuclear power was a speculative but not imminent 
question. During this time the French and the British sought to 
develop commercially competitive nuclear powerplants fueled with 
natural uranium. While the joint U.S. -Euratom program did result 

281 TT.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress, J96i (Washington, D.C. : 
U.S. Government Printing Office. 1965), p. 202. 

283 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Uranium Enrichment 
Pricing Criteria, on. cit., p. 13. 

288 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 

284 Ibid., n. 21. 
286 Loc. cit. 


in construction of three prototype plants of prevailing U.S. design 
and fueled with enriched uranium, the outcome of the competition 
between natural and enriched uranium fuel cycles was still open. 
Then, in the late 1960's both France and the United Kingdom became 
interested in enriched fuel, which the West Germans and Italians had 
used from the outset. The decision of the French in 1969 to turn from 
natural to enriched uranium brought with it renewed interest in con- 
struction of a European facility to supply this material. A parallel 
proposal that the AEC sell its gaseous diffusion plants to the American 
nuclear industry seems to have shaken European assumptions as to the 
long-term reliability of U.S. supply. 

The European enrichment idea took on new life in mid- 1970 when 
the Commission of the European Communities argued that the setting 
up of a European uranium enrichment capacity must form part of 
the overall scheme of the Community and European efforts towards 
industry oriented scientific and technological development. 298 

In May 1972 the technical and economic problems involved in the 
enrichment of uranium were considered at a meeting of the EEC 
Parliamentary Committee on Energy, Research, and Atomic Prob- 
lems. There, experts reviewed and confirmed the Commission's fore- 
casts of enriched uranium requirements. According to these fore- 
casts, which covered the whole of Western Europe, separative require- 
ments would double every 5 years. It appeared to them impossible 
to obtain a firm, long-term undertaking from the United States to 
supply the necessary materials, and therefore the experts urared the 
community to build its own enrichment plants. However, the con- 
ference was marked by differences of opinion as to the enrichment 
technologv to be adopted. 297 298 

The, U.SjS.R. as an Alternative Source of Supply 

Since the Soviet Union also possesses the industrial facilities to 
enrich uranium for fuel, presumably it, too. could become a supplier 
of enriched uranium or toll enrichment services in the world market. 
The U.S.S.R. has indeed indicated interest in supplying nuclear fuel 
for European power reactors. For example, in March 1971 the French 
Government announced it had signed a short term contract with the 
U.S.S.R. for toll enrichment of 80 tons of French materials. The 
contract was between the French national atomic energy organization 
and the Soviet agency, Technab Export. It called for delivery of the 
feed material by the French in 1973 with return of enriched product 
in 1973 and 1974 at a guaranteed price of between $5.6 and $7.2 million. 
In comparison, AEC policy is to bill customers at the price in force at 
time of delivery. The enriched Soviet uranium is fuel for a new French 
power reactor being built with U.S. technology. 

Speaking of this contract, an aide to the French Minister of Industry 
commented that it might force the Americans to think twice about 
more price increases for enrichment services. The Soviet price was less 
than the AEC's price and was not subject to escalation. Whether the 

»• "uropean Enrichment." Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 15 (July/ August 
1970). p. 556. 

■» h '"ar Engineering International, vol. 17 (July. 1972), p. 516. 

"• Three separative processes were proposed : gas centrifuge, gas diffusion, and nozzle 
separation. The French favor diffusion, the Dutch and English favor the centrifuge, and 
the West Germans favor the nozzle process. 


Soviet Union is willing to offer toll enrichment services on a long term 
basis over the life of a power plant remains to be seen. 299 

The French emphasized that they were buying enrichment services 
from the Soviet Union on a trial basis. An advantage for France was 
the absence from the contract for any requirement that the material 
supplied by the Soviet Union be placed under safeguards. France has 
steadily maintained that because it is a nuclear weapons power, apply- 
ing safeguards to nuclear fuel imported by its nuclear industry is 
meaningless. The Soviet Union apparently agrees with the French 
position. Had the French placed the enrichment contract with the 
AEO under the AEC-Euratom bilateral agreement, Euratom safe- 
guards would have applied to the material. Moreover, the Euratom 
Supply Agency, whose jurisdiction the French have challenged, would 
have been an intermediary to the transaction. By contrast, the Soviet 
supply contract bypassed Euratom. 300 

It remains to be seen whether these preliminary signs of a Soviet 
interest in supplying enriched uranium or enrichment services outside 
of the Soviet bloc signal a future drive by the U.S.S.R. to penetrate the 
free world nuclear fuel market. If the Soviets were to do so, the United 
States would be faced with troublesome diplomatic decisions as to 
what extent and in what way it would counter such a Soviet move. 

Supply Policy Alternatives 

If present AEC projections for the growth of nuclear power in the 
United States and abroad are correct, the United States can expect 
to maintain its dominant position in the world market for enriched 
uranium and uranium enriching services through the 1970's with its 
present facilities. If foreign policy interests of the United States 
warrant preservation of a favorable position in world nuclear com- 
merce, this country within the next few years will have to make 
several basic policy decisions and commitments. For example, will the 
United States decide to make the capital investment in new produc- 
tion capability needed to sustain its position ? Will the United States 
continue its present policies of full cost recovery for its enriching 
services, or will it, if necessary, adopt competitive pricing to compete 
in the market, or to discourage other nations from building their own 
enriching facilities? These are some questions that will have to be 
answered within the next few years. 

Maintaining the Competitive Position of the United States in the 
World Enrichment Market 
Whatever may be the ultimate position of the United States in the 
world's enrichment market, present AEC thinking anticipates that 
this country will retain a dominant position well into the 1980's. 
Commissioner Johnson at Geneva in 1971 reported estimates that 
foreign enrichment would supply perhaps 5 percent of the market 
by 1975 and rise to about one-third by 1985, still leaving two-thirds 
of the market for the United States. He was confident the United 
States would meet these demands : S01 

m Nucleonics Week, vol. 12 (March 18, 1971), p. 2. 

saa 'Nuc 1 ear Industry (April 1971), pp. 40—41. The Soviet Union also has agreed to supply 
nuclear fuel to Finland and has opened enrichment talks with Sweden and West Germany. 

301 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, U.S. Claims Capability to Meet Crowing Demands 
for Uranium Enrichment Services, AEC Press Release No. 0-152, September 8, 1972, p. 1. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 18 


... We are confident that by pre-producing some enriched uranium, by im- 
proving the efficiency and increasing the capacity of our existing plants, and by 
optimizing their operating modes, we can meet all of our domestic and foreign 
enriching requirements until about 1982 — even if no new plant is brought into 
operation before that date. 

Two U.S. policies affected the planning for these increases. First 
was the Presidential policy for eventual transfer of uranium enrich- 
ment to the private sector. Second was the AEC announcement in 
June 1971 of a program to give U.S. companies full access to the 
enriching process technology so that they might decide what role they 
would play in providing commercial enrichment services. If govern- 
ment plants are transferred to the private sector, there will be the 
questions of arrangements between the AEG and the private owners 
.to fulfill the foreign commitment of the United States. 


, Assuming enriched uranium will fuel much of the non-Communist 
world's nuclear power plants unt^l .nuclear, breeders are introduced in 
'#i©_ Jateij 1980's, and that the demand far enriched uranium and enriqh- 
ing .services will continue>w ( until then, 302 there arises the question 
of the U.S. ability to deliver during the l&JOV That ability will depend 
upon the production capacity of U.S. industrial plants, the availa- 
bility of electricity to operate, the separation process, and the cost of 
that electricity. To put the 'capital and the electrical power require- 
ments of a large diffusion plant into perspective in relation to nuclear 
power plants they serve, each megawatt of electrical power supply 
committed: to operation at the enrichment plants will produce enough 
enriched uranium to fuel from 24 to 45 megawatts of nuclear power 
plant output. 303 

. Viewed another way, the U.S. commitment to supply uranium en- 
richment services for foreign users of nuclear power calls for a power 
plant with an electrical power output of 1,000 megawatts for each 
additional 24 to 45 nuclear power plants of comparable power output 
to be fueled with enriched uranium. It remains to be seen whether 
the commitment of this much generating capacity in the United States 
for the benefit of electricity industries abroad is acceptable at a time 
when the United States is itself facing the prospect of electricity 
shortage. The issue will certainly require the balancing of foreign 
policy and domestic policy considerations. 

Three means are at hand to meet these commitments. The AEC 
can bring its present production plants up to full capacity; it can 
modify present plants to increase their productivity; and it can 
build new plants. Complicating these options is the administration's 
policy that the government's uranium enrichment plants should be 
sold to private industry. 

AEC Commissioner Johnson discussed these options at Geneva 
in 1971. Considering the present separation capabilities, he observed 
that the AEC's three enrichment plants during the fiscal year 1972 
had operated at about half their production level, and that even at 
these reduced levels the AEC was still producing enriched uranium 

aoafThese assumptions could be upset by challenges of the breeder programs by some 
environmentalist croups, or by delays In the demonstration of this technology. 
*» Ibid., p. 2.5-7. 


in excess of current requirements. AEC's operating plans call for 
continuing "pre-production" of enriched uranium for nuclear fuel, 
with the present pre-production inventory large enough to satisfy 
nuclear power needs for about the next two years. As domestic and 
foreign demands increase, the AEC plans to return the existing three- 
plant complex to full output by 1978. Parenthetically, this will require 
the AEC to find an electrical power supply of about 3,400 megawatts, 
equivalent to about three large new power plants, at a time when 
construction of such plants has been delayed. 

Concerning expansion of the present plant capacity, planned im- 
provements would substantially increase the output of enriched 
uranium for the same electrical input at an estimated capital cost of 
$500 to $600 million. If, in addition, the electrical power supply for 
the three plants can be increased by about one-sixth, from 6,100 mega* 
watts to 7,400 megawatts (an increase equivalent to the output of a 
large, modern electrical generating plant), and an additional invest- 
ment of $200-$300 million be made, the United States enrichment 
capacity could be sufficiently increased to meet AEC estimates for 
foreign and domestic requirements for the 1970's. 

Looking into the early 1980's and beyond, and assuming present 
forecasts are valid, one can estimate that the needs for enrichment 
will exceed the capability of the present U.S. complex, even after 
modification and increased power supply. New production plants will 
be needed, together with electric power plants if the United States is 
to hold its dominant position as a world supplier of enriched uranium. 

The AEC estimates that the latest date for a firm decision to build 
new production capacity is 1975. If the present output is not expanded, 
then a decision will have to be made no later than 1973 to build new 
production capacity. Beyond these dates, assuming present demand 
estimates are correct, without additional capacity this country will 
be unable to meet combined domestic and foreign demands for en- 
riched uranium. 304 


While the AEC was optimistic at the last Geneva conference on 
atomic energy that it would obtain funds to increase the productivity 
of its existing enrichment plants, some members of the Joint Com- 
mittee on Atomic Energy were less optimistic. In opening a hearing 
in March 1971 on uranium enrichment programs, Congressman Chet 
Holifield said the Joint Committee agreed that the AEC should im- 
prove its production plants, and that this should be done before other 
U.S. alternatives were considered for enrichment supply such as 
sharing U.S. technology with foreigners. But, he observed, the ad- 
ministration over the three preceding years had not requested the 
funds for these improvements and the Office of Management and 
Budget was even withholding some $16 million aDproDriated for this 
purpose. The Joint Committee was of the opinion that the United 

804 As this report was being completed, there were Indications In the trade press of the 
nuclear industry that shortages of U.S. enrichment capacity would appear by 1985. How- 
ever, there was disagreement as to how soon to begin work to avert this problem. The 
Atomic Industrial Forum released a study in October 1972 in which an AIF committee saw 
no way of avoiding a future shortfall in uranium separative work capacity unless plans for 
the first major increment in new plant -capacity are Initiated before the end of 1972. On the 
other hand, AEC spokesmen were Quoted as saying that a decision on Increased capacity 
need not be made before 1976. Cf. Nucleonics Week, vol. 13 (October 19, 1972), p. 1. 


States should keep itself ahead in this important technological market 
instead of helping other nations to become competitors. 305 

Sharing the U.S. Monopoly 

If other nations acquire their own enrichment capabilities, either 
individually or through a multinational organization, there arises the 
foreign policy question whether the United States should seek to in- 
fluence such foreign ventures and, if so, by what means. 

While the European Economic Community has the ability to 
develop and build enrichment plants, for these to have a reasonable 
chance of economic success they must be economically competitive 
with the United States and, possibly, the U.S.S.R. One major cost for 
a European plant would be the duplicating of research, development, 
and experience of the United States. That cost could be minimized 
were the United States to supply the technical information, and per- 
haps certain critical materials and components. In return for such 
assistance, the United States would expect some voice in the organiza- 
tion and its operations. A U.S. policy decision to supply its technology 
could hasten the end of the American monopoly in enrichment serv- 
ices and perhaps increase the risk of undesirable proliferation of the 
world's capability to make nuclear weapons materials. 306 

The proffering of U.S. enrichment technology was broached before 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1969. Some members viewed 
it as a way to reduce the scale of the future government commitment 
to expand the AEC's production plants. Representative Craig 
Hosmer was impatient with foreign complaints about the realibility 
of the United States as a supplier of enriched uranium. He remarked 
with some asperity that : 307 

I am personally sick and tired of hearing them complain about the un- 
reliability of the United States. As far as I am concerned, I want to make it 
clear I don't care who enriches this stuff. I think that the proliferation feature 
can be taken care of. Where our danger exists is that a bunch of people are 
going out and installing more capacity in an unrelated fashion to the existing 
capacity and growing demand so that we reach the point where the demand 
for enriched uranium goes down and we have a lot of unamortized plants on our 
hands somewhere in the world, and I hope that they are in Europe and Japan. 

The following year, after some speculation in the newspapers that 
the United States was planning to share enrichment technology 
abroad. 308 Commissioner Johnson sooke about this possibility and indi- 
cated the AEC would be open-minded to foreign inquiry. 309 

so" The hearing inouired Into the AEC's ability to meet future domestic and foreign com- 
mitments. Of. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Author- 
izina Lcaislation Fiscal Year 1972, 92d Coner., 1st Sees., 1971. part 4, p. 2238. 

3ns While the separation plantR themselves probably would not produce weapons grade 
materials, the slightly enriched uranium they would produce would be n convenient feed 
material for the clandestine manufacture of highly enrlcbed uranium for weapons. 

807 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearings, Future Ownership of the 
AEC's Oaseous Diffusion Plants, 91st Cone., 1st Sess.. 1969. p. 55. 

•""The Washington Post of October 23, 1970, carried a feature article about a plan to 
share secret American nuclear technology with foreign countries as being recommended by 
the AEC and the State Department. One major reason for the proposition was that at least 
six other countries were on the verge of producing their own enriched uranium. The Wall 
Street Journal of October 26. 1970, reported that the Administration was weighing an 
AEC proposal that United States Interest* would benefit from the sharing of its uranium 
enrichment technology with friendly nations. 

809 Wilfrid E. Johnson, "Uranium enrichment — U.S. Policy, Requirements and Capabili- 
ties," AEC Press Release S-38-70, November 17, 1970. 


Early in January 1971, Representative Hosmer enumerated the 
advantages to the United States of a European diffusion plant based 
upon U.S. technology. These were : 310 

United States is relieved from financing this increment of enrichment capacity. 

United State.s conserves its irreplaceable energy fuels. 

United States stands to receive royalty income. 

All parties gain more time for centrifuge R. & D. 

Slowdown of centrifuge development postpones its possible contributions to- 
ward proliferation. 

A cooperative international pattern is established for dovetailing enrichment 
capacity to enrichment requirements. 

Precedent may be created for effective IAEA controls over enriched uranium. 

Other countries are relieved from dependence on the United States for uranium 
enrichment services. 

If the deadline for decision is missed, Mr. Hosmer cautioned, these 
advantages will be lost and the United States and other countries will 
be forced to make other arrangements for post-1980 enrichment 

In his second foreign policy message to Congress on February 25, 
1971, President Nixon called attention to U.S. preeminence in technol- 
ogy and posed the policy question : How far should the United States 
share the fruits of its research and technology ? Taking nuclear energy 
as an example, he announced that the administration had undertaken 
consultations with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning 
ways in which the United States could assist its allies to construct a 
multinational uranium enrichment plant. 311 

In a separate statement of U.S. foreign policy for a technological 
age, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, restated the question of 
whether the United States, with adequate safeguards, should offer 
to share uranium enrichment technology with other nations. He 
said : 312 

The current situation with respect to enriched uranium fuels offers signifi- 
cant opportunities for furthering international cooperation in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy. Because of its advanced technology and plant capacity 
the United States has been in effect the only exporter of enriched uranium fuel 
for power reactors. Indeed, our export earnings from sales of nuclear power 
plants, fuels, and related services are over $1 billion now and are expected to 
reach $5 billion by 1975. 

But worldwide demand for this fuel continues to grow, and it is clear that other 
nations intend to diversify their sources of supply. But we are now considering 
whether, with adequate safeguards, we should offer to share our uranium 
enrichment technology with other nations building a civil industry. 

Going further, Secretary Rogers saw the sharing of uranium enrich- 
ment technology as an example of opportunities open for scientific 
cooperation when political cooperation may not be feasible : 313 

Because the problems dealt with by science usually have a low specific gravity 
in political terms, scientific cooperation is often possible where political co- 
operation is not. 

The habit of cooperation is a good one to keep. If it is kept, it surely will have 
spillover effect in increasing the constructive role of international organizations 

310 Remarks of Congressman Craig Hosmer, Congressional Record, vol. 116, January 2. 
1971, n. 44805. 

311 "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s : Building for Peace," Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents, vol. 7 (March 1, 1971), p. 374. 

812 Cf. William P. Rogers, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Technological Age." An address 
by . . . Department of State publication 8571, General Foreign Policy Series 252 (March 
1971), p. 11-12. 

313 Loc. cit. 


in establishing new patterns of international cooperation, and in strengthening 
observance of international law. 

As to whether U.S. foreign policy interests preferred a multina- 
tional venture or separate national ventures, the AEC said it was 
preferable for the Europeans to go to the multinational route and build 
a plant under adequate safeguards. Commissioner Ramey agreed that 
cooperation could help rationalize the future expansion of U.S. and 
foreign enrichment capacity and would provide the United States 
with revenues that would otherwise be lost through the establishment 
of completely independent foreign efforts. He said : 314 

It is worthy of npte that the French have recently announced plans to initiate 
detailed economic and technical studies on construction of a diffusion plant . . . 
and planned for operation in the late 1970s. If such a plant were constructed 
as a multinational effort, it might fit into our plans in this program, and I gather 
that the French would be interested in exploring possible cooperation along 
these lines with the United States. 

Clearly, other countries are determined to acquire an independent enrichment 
capability and will be successful to some degree in this effort. Thus, under a 
sound businesslike arrangement, I believe we stand more to gain than to lose by 
joining these foreign developments rather than by remaining outside. 

The State Department confirmed the U.S. interest in the multi- 
national approach, advising the Joint Committee that : 315 

First, we assume that the cost of the gaseous diffusion plant is such that it 
probably would be more attractive to a multinational group than it would be to 
a single nation. Secondly, we feel our interest would be better served if the 
enrichment facilities are built by a multinational group rather than under the 
control of a single country. So the whole approach we have t in mind is to en- 
courage the multinational approach. 

Most recently, the AEC reported at Geneva in 1971 that the 
United States had notified certain nations of Europe and the Pacific 
Basin of its willingness to enter into exploratory discussions on the 
possibility of a multinational uranium enrichment project. To support 
such a venture, the United States would be prepared to make avail- 
able, for fair compensation, the advanced gaseous diffusion tech- 
nology and know-how of the AEC for the establishment of one or 
more multinational projects for the construction of separations plants 
of substantial capacity, subject to appropriate controls. 319 

According to the nuclear trade press, AEC and State Depart- 
ment officials met informally at Geneva with representatives of 10 
nations and the European Economic Community to define earlier 
announcements that the AEC was ready to talk about sharing U.S. 
enrichment technology. The United States reportedly sought to es- 
tablish whether the EEC was absolutely determined to build its ura- 
nium enrichment plant in Europe or whether it would consider another 
site that might have economic advantages of lower power costs. 317 

In separate messages during August, the EEC nations and the 
United Kingdom expressed varying degrees of enthusiam for estab- 
lishing a multinational gaseous diffusion plant with U.S. technology, 
and called on the EEC to conduct formal talks with the United Stales 
on their behalf. The EEC message, expressing a noncommittal will- 
ingness to talk, noted the AEC/s diffusion data would be included in 

31 «T\S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, 1EG luthorteing Legis- 
lation Finrnl fear 1972, op. rit., p. 2247. 

w Ibid., p. 2267. 

*i«U.S. Atomic Bnerpv Commission, U.S. Claims Capability to Meet droning Demands 
for Uranium Enriching Services, op. Hi., p. 2. 

'"Nucleonics Week, vol. 12 (September 9, 1971), p. 


a comparative -study of the merits of otheV processes $ or manuf aefcu*^ 

ingen^iched uranium. 318 ■ rYniavi 

r.«T! . • •> ' . ■-■ ■ • . ' ?y • .• ■ ; • ..' mmu 

! ■ • 


The 'Joint ■•Committee on Atomic Energy has closely followed pro-: 
posals to'sell U.S. diffusion technology. Considering the close relation 
between the Joint Committee and the AEC, and its insistence upon 
being Currently informed of the Commission's activities, the Commit- 
tee's views must be taken into account by U.S. diplomats seeking to 
arrange ior export of this technology. 

• In 1969 the Joint Committee was not convinced that the United 
State*' should encourage the building of a European enrichment 
capacity. One member of the Conimittee bluntly warned other conn-' 
tries that onee they established their own enrichment capacity, there 
was not a single, solitary reason for the United States to retain the 
"incredibly generous" terms of its toll-enriehment contracts. Should 
the Europeans persist with their plans to build their own facilities, 
he said, then the United StatesI should consider alternatives. For in- 
stance, the United States might sell enriched uranium at competitive 
prices in the world market .rather than at production costs. Were this 
to be done, the capacity of the U.S. production plants and their operat- 
ing efficiencies would permit sale of enriched uranium at prices well 
below those feasible for a European plant. While such a policy might 
increase AEC's domestic operating expenses, it could substantially 
help alleviate the U.S. balance-of -payments deficit in word trade. 319 
The Joint Committee kept pressing the administration for details 
about the export or sharing of U.S. diffusion technology. For example, 
on September 16, 1970, it met in executive session with the Atomic 
Energy Commission to express its concern that the executive branch 
did not have specific and detailed plans to propose. The Committee 
clearly regarded possible export of enrichment technology as a signif- 
icant and fundamental change in U.S. policy for international atomic 
energy. At the close of the 91st Congress, in December 1970, it an- 
nounced its intention to take a hard look at any proposal that this 
technological asset be provided to foreign entities; The Committee 
said it would examine the question not only from the "giveaway" 
aspects, friit also from the point of view of its possible effects on na- 
tional security and obligations of the United States Under the Non- 
Prolrferation Treaty. 380 

The Gas Centrifuge: A Technical Perturbation for U.S. Policy? 

3y early 1972, three European nations were working together to 
perfect and demonstrate the gas centrifuge m process for enriching 
uranium. They saw this as an alternative to depending upon the 
United States for enrichment service, or for gaseous diffusion tech- 
nology. If the gas centrifuge development is proven to be technologi- 
cally and economically successful, the subsequent deployment of this 
process could raise problems for U.S. diplomacy. Even now, there is 

«* Loc. cit . . 

*»Xu(teo*lC9 Week, vol. 10 (April 17, 19«0), p. 5. 

8ao U.S. .Cj>ngress k Joint Committee 011 Atomic Energy, "Activtty and Accomplishments of 
the Joint Gomnrtttee on Atomic Energy during the Second Session of the Olst Congress," 
Congressional Record, vol. 116, p. 44324. 

881 Cf. Section II for a description of the «as centrifuge process. 


question regarding U.S. efforts to discourage development of the 
centrifuge process at home and abroad because of possible effects 
upon the U.S. position in the world enrichment market, and, perhaps 
more importantly, because of the implications of centrifuge tech- 
nology for nonproliferation. On the other hand, if the commercial 
use of the centrifuge enrichment process appears to be inevitable, 
what could U.S. diplomacy do to influence the use and control of that 
technology ? 

The centrifugal process is not a new technological surprise. It was 
one option open to the Manhattan Project during World War IT and 
some research and development has been carried on since then. What 
is new now is the concerted effort of several European states to develop 
the process as an alternative to that now used by the United States, 
the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and France. 

The new work is being carried on by Dutch and German groups. 
Not committed by past technological decisions and investments, these 
groups in the early 1950's revived work on the centrifuge to enrich 
uranium. The United States also kept some centrifuge work alive at 
Oak Ridge, but did not deploy it. By the late 1950's, enough progress 
had been made in West Germany for the British to reopen their centri- 
fuge studies and later in the 1960's, the first steps were taken toward 
multinational development of a working uranium enrichment capa- 
bility using this process outside the framework of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, the European Nuclear Energy Asrencv, or 


In addition to significant technological differences between the gas 
centrifuge and the gaseous diffusion process for enrichment of ura- 
nium, there are other economic and security differences of international 
concern. Whereas the gaseous diffusion process of the United States 
requires major capital investment in large facilities and great amounts 
of electricity, both of which are difficult to conceal, the gas centrifuge 
process in principle can be employed on a much smaller scale, at less 
capital investment, with considerably less demand for electricity for 
each kilogram of enriched uranium produced ; all these make it easier 
to conceal. Gas centrifuge factories offer flexibility in construction 
and operation; additional units can be readily added, which means 
that plant investment can be closely geared to actual growth of the 
nuclear fuel market, and the capital investment can be spread out in 
time. Of course, the smaller the installation the less the rate of produc- 
tion for enriched uranium. On the other hand, the centrifuge process 
should in principle be able to produce weapons grade materials as 
well as nuclear fuel material. Existing enriched nuclear fuel from 
other sources might be illegallv diverted to gas centrifuge factories, 
thus making the production of weapons quality material easier and 
more feasible in smaller facilities. 

For these reasons, the construction of gas centrifuge plants would 
>aiso questions about the effectiveness of safeguards. It would be pos- 
sible in practice for smaller nations to join the "nuclear club" by 
building concealed centrifuge enrichment plants which might use 
for their feed materials enriched uranium ostensibly obtained to fuel 
nuclear power reactors. 



As a result of U.S. actions to inhibit work and publication of in- 
formation on the centrifugation process, 322 foreign centrifuge research 
proceeded in secret and little was heard of it until an announcement 
in 1968 by the Dutch, West Germans, and the British suggesting that 
a tripartite arrangement to build a centrifuge enrichment plant was 
under discussion. Notably absent from the initial discussions were the 
French who had been emphatic in their desire to reduce their de- 

gmdence upon the United States for uranium enrichment services, 
arenthetically, the French several years earlier had opposed a British 
proposal that European countries join with Britain in expanding its 
diffusion plant. 323 

Accordingly, on March 4, 1970, a tripartite agreement of collabora- 
tion on developement of the gas centrifuge process was concluded 
by the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United 
Kingdom. A few months later, in August, the tripartite members 
offered associate membership to Belgium and Italy. The three govern- 
ments claim the centrifuge process can provide cheaper enrichment for 
Europe than can other processes. 

The British Minister of Technology, Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, 
at the signing of the tripartite agreement, spoke of the enterprise as 
a cornerstone of United Kingdom technological collaboration with 
other countries in Western Europe which, he hoped, could lead to 
fuller economic and political cooperation of the European Economic 
Community. 324 

The French Drive for a European Diffusion Plant 

In February 1971 the French Government complicated the diplo- 
matic aspects of the enrichment market by its decision to promote con- 
struction of a diffusion plant in Europe. Apparently this action was in 
part a reaction to the tripartite centrifuge undertaking. Subsequently, 
on March 11, 1971, the Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique (CEA) 
announced that it was ready to build a commercial diffusion plant 
with or without partners. The proposed French plant may also nave 
been in response to the Algerian decision to take over French oil inter- 
ests. Later, French President Georges Pompidou anounced that his 
nation's sixth development plan for the years 1971 to 1975 would in- 
clude construction of 8,000 megawatts of nuclear electric generating 
capacity, to be fueled with enriched uranium. This announcement 
underscored the seriousness of French interest in a European gaseous . 
diffusion plant. • 

a 23 Centrtfugation separation is defined by AEC regulations (10 CFR 25, Appendix A) 
to be Secret Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act. Under this regulation, no one 
may have access to this Information unless the applicant fulfills several stringent conditions 
and also gives the United States an Irrevocable license to use or have used any U.S. patent 
on an Invention relating to this process made by the access permit holder. In addition, 
the permittee Is required to grant the AEC the right to use any technical information 
or data of a proprietary nature developed during the permit and for 1 year thereafter. 
Finally, the permittee has to make quarterly reports to the AEC on its work, even though 
the research is funded wholly from private sources. Cf. 10 CFR 25.23. 

328 Of this omission, a British nuclear journal commented : 

... It will no doubt interest the political commentators to speculate on the reasons 
for leaving out of the initial discussions other countries who have been particularly 
active in this field, notably France and Japan. From the technical point of view, it is a 
pity that greater efforts were not made to overcome the present political high temperatures 
to include France. . . . Cf. "Centrifugal Feelers," Nuclear Engineering International, 
vol. 14 (January 1969). p. 5. 

324 "Gas Centrifuge Agreement Signed," Atom, No. 162 ( April 1970) , p. 62. 


By 19V0 the French Government was planning for an enrichment 
facility with a capacity about three times the estimated need for 
1980. The substantial excess capacity would be available to sell on the 
world enrichment market. As for competition with the United States, 
the planned sales price would be less than that currently charged by 
the AEC. The proposed facility would be financed two-thirds by loans, 
leaving $200 million to be raised through direct capital investment of 
$40 million a year, a sum which would be well within French means. 
French technology would be used, which the French consider equal 
to that of the United States and superior to Britain's. However, they 
would like access to U.S. technology, if this access is not top expensive. 

An interesting aspect about the French plan was its circumvention 
of normal diplomatic channels and government-to-government negoti- 
ations. Instead, the French invitation was informally addressed to 
European industry with the thought of securing participation by 
corporations rather than governments. While the latter may have been 
preferred, the French reportedly had grown tired of diplomatic de- 
lays. Also, an appeal directly to industrial firms could permit in- 
direct support from governments publicly committed to the gas 
centrifuge project. France apparently hoped that Britain, the Nether- 
lands, and West Germany can be attracted to join in a diffusion plant 
venture and to abandon their centrifuge project. From the standpoint 
of the U.S. interest, the French proposal of a single, multinational 
enrichment plant would be preferable to a possible proliferation of 
nationally-owned, gas centrifuge plants. Time for a final decision is 
beginning to run out. One must be made by 1973 if Western Europe is 
not to risk a shortage of nuclear fuel. 325 

Conclusions and Current Issues 

During 1970-71. diplomacy and diplomats were involved with, or 
affected by, a number of initiatives taken by European governments 
to secure for themselves a role in uranium enrichment. Taken as a 
whole, these initiatives suggest that the forces of fragmentation 
within the European nuclear community remained strong. They re- 
flected also U.S. desires to encourage multilateral construction and 
operation of a large enrichment plant in Europe as an alternative to 
a proliferation of smaller separate facilities. The initiatives included : 

(1) A declaration by the EEC of the need to construct a Eu- 
ropean enrichment facility ; 

(2) A tripartite agreement among Britain, West Germany, 
and Holland to develop the gas centrifuge for enrichment of 

( 3 ) A decision by the French Government to plan construction 
of an enrichment plant in Europe ; 

(4) A French decision to study construction of an enrichment 
facility by means of collaboration of technical companies; 

(5) The announced AEC intention to permit a limited number 
of American companies to have access to secret enrichment tech- 
nology ; and 

(6) An AEC offer to help foreign countries, particularly Eu- 
ropean, to build an enrichment plant. 

»*Nucleonic8 Week, vol. 12 (March 18, i:iTn, pp. 1-2; Nuclear Industry (April 1971), 
p. 40 ; Wall St net Journal (March 12, 1971), p. 5. 


Although the United States had built its uranium enrichment plants 
to produce nuclear materials for weapons, these facilities have become 
an important economic asset for the United States and for its nuclear 
foreign policy. Because of these facilities, the United States has been 
able to offer long-term commitments to supply enriched uranium for 
nuclear power plants in Europe. For the next few years, these plants 
have sufficient capacity to do so. But within this decade, decisions 
must be made that will decide the future competitive standing of the 
United States in the enriched-uranium market. Some related issues 
include the following : 326 

Will the United States, for reasons of economic and foreign 
policy, seek to preserve its position as the world's leading supplier 
of enriched uranium and enrichment services ? 

What measures should the United States consider if other na- 
tions, singly or in concert, attempt to break the long-standing U.S. 
enrichment monopoly by building their own enrichment facility ? 
Is the further development of gas centrifuge technology in 
Europe likely to lead to a technological surprise for the United 
States, should the economic and technological feasibility of this 
technology be demonstrated ? 

What measures can or should the United States consider to 
discourage further development of the gas centrifuge ? 

What diplomatic options are open to the United States should 
the Soviet Union seriously enter the world enriched-uranium 
market ? 

Since supplying enrichment services requires the use of large 
amounts of electricity which, in the United States, comes from 
coal-burning powerplants, and considering present air pollution 
problems of the United States and the environmental impacts 
of mining coal, do the foreign policy benefits of supplying en- 
richment services to foreign customers balance the energy and 
environmental costs to America ? 

328 As this case study went to press, two events underscored the possibilities for change 
in the role of the AEC in furnishing enrichment services for foreign and domestic customers. 
On December 6, 1972, the AEC gave notice of a temporary suspension of new contracts for 
enrichment services except for (1) firm quantity type contracts under negotiation on that 
date, (2) contracts which have been submitted to customers for execution, and (3) new 
short-term contracts to provide firm quantities of enriching services needed by domestic 
and 'foreign customers to cover near-term requirements. The Commission imposed this 
temporary suspension to permit time to complete its review of alternative methods of 
contracting and to establish ". . . such modified method as will provide greater assurance 
that the needed enrichment capacity at the Commission's plants will be available on a 
timely basis. . . ." Another reason was to provide further assurance of ". . . augmenta- 
tion of available enriching capacity in the 1980's and beyond by private resources." Cf. 
Federal Register, voL 37, December 8, 1972, pp. 26145-26146. 

The second event was an AEC announcement of December 6, 1972 which stated that it 
is not the intention of the Commission to construct new enrichment plants to meet growing 
requirements since it believes that the private sector can undertake to provide the required 
capacity on a timely basis. The AEC, however, will remain in a position to furnish enrich- 
ment services to the private sector to the extent of its available capacity. To stimulate the 
requisite private effort, the AEC announced proposed modifications to its regulations which 
would make the government's enrichment technology available. (Cf. Federal Register, 
vol. 37, December 9, 1972, pp. 26345-26348.) At a press conference, AEC Chairman Schles- 
singer said that If industry does hot do the job, the government must do it. He also said 
that a vigorous industry could maintain the "clear" U.S. advantage in exporting nuclear 
power technology and by the 1980's might produce $3.5 billion a year in foreign sales 
compared With $900 million In 1972. (Cf. Washington Post, December 9. 1972, p. A-3.) 

XI. The Noxproliferation Treaty and Safeguards 

A recent impact of the scientific discovery of fission upon American 
diplomacy and foreign policy is to be found in the Treaty on Non- 
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Thirty years after scien- 
tists correctly interpreted the meaning of small light pulses upon a 
cathode ray screen, the U.S. Senate, on March 13, 1969, gave its advice 
and consent to ratification of an unprecedented concept in interna- 
tional relations: a general commitment to international inspection 
within national borders. The concept is radical in two respects : first, 
it divides nations into two classes — those which have the atom bomb 
and those which do not ; second, it commits the non-weapons signatories 
to the Treaty to yield up some of their sovereignty to international in- 
spections, in return for which they are assured against the dangers of 
undetected diversion by their neighbors of nuclear materials to manu- 
facture nuclear weapons. The Treaty is unusual, too, in its operative 
provisions which bind the non- weapons countries to negotiate bilateral 
safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Whether this commitment to 
agree will prove effective, or whether, as some critics claim, it will 
prove to be worthless; whether IAEA safeguards can, in fact, provide 
sufficient assurance to alleviate international fear of clandestine 
diversion on nuclear materials to weapons — these are presently un- 
answerable questions. 

The entry into force of the Nonproliferation Treaty on March 5, 
1970 has put into motion a whole host of new international negotiations 
between the IAEA and the non-nuclear weapons countries, and also 
negotiations with those nuclear weapons powers which would volun- 
tarily place their civil nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. 
Complicating the diplomatic effort is the refusal of France and the 
People's Republic of China, which both possess their own nuclear 
weapons, to sign the Treaty, and its rejection by India which appears 
technologically capable of making such weapons. 

New Urgency for Safeguards 

Discussion of safeguards is timely now because the amounts of nu- 
clear materials present in the fuel cycles of commercial nuclear energy 
remain modest. Before the end of the decade of the 1970's, however, this 
situation is expected to change. Amounts involved by then will present 
a tempting target to those who may wish to obtain fissionable material 
for weapons. By the end of the 1970's many countries are likety to 
be generating significant amounts of nuclear energy with concurrent 
production of plutonium, and thus possess a potential for making 
nuclear weapons in quantity. 

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in its 1972 
yearbook <>n world armaments warns that the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons would lead to a totally new situation in military and strategic 
affairs. According to SIPRI, the, main factor behind the anticipated 
spread of nuclear weapons technology is that for most environments 
nuclear power reactors provide the cheapest means of producing elec- 
tricity. While, some energy analysts are not this optimistic, pro- 
ponents of nuclear power anticipate its widespread use within the 
next two decades. 



SIPRI points out that in 1971, 16 countries had 128 nuclear power 
reactors in operation with a total generating capacity of 35,000 mega- 
watts. By 1977, 32 countries are expected to have 325 working nuclear 
power plants with a total output of 174,000 megawatts. By 1980, the 
world nuclear capacity estimated by SIPRI will probably exceed 
350,000 megawatts. 

These nuclear power plants will produce plutonium as a by-product. 
SIPRI estimates that 13 tons will be produced in 1972, increasing to 
65 tons annually in 1977 and to 130 tons in 1980. By 1980, about one- 
third of this plutonium will be owned by countries which do not now 
have nuclear weapons. This amount of plutonium, in theory, might 
supply nuclear explosives to manufacture 100 weapons per week of 
the size dropped on Hiroshima. 327 

In SIPRI's analysis of the potentialities for proliferation, it identi- 
fies 15 countries capable of developing nuclear weapons within the 
short- or medium-term future. Therefore the attitudes of these coun- 
tries toward the Nonproliferation Treaty are of intrinsic interest. 328 

The Four Functions of the Nonproliferation Treaty 

In broad outline, the Nonproliferation Treaty has four major 
functions, which are to : 

(1) Commit the nations of the world which do not now have 
nuclear weapons not to produce or to receive them in the future ; 

(2) Assure equally that such nations have the full peaceful 
benefits of the atom ; 

(3) Provide assurance, through international safeguards, that 
the peaceful nuclear activities of states which have not already 
developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making sucn 
weapons ; and 

(4) Recognize the determination of the parties that the Treaty 
should lead to further progress toward arms control and dis- 

The Treaty identifies two classes of nations : those which have the 
atom bomb, and those which do not. The latter are expected to open 
their borders and nuclear facilities to international inspection, 
which nations that possess the atom bomb have not agreed to 
do. In return, the non-weapons countries have the pledge of the 
weapons-possessing powers not to give nuclear weapons to non- 
weapons states. Among the major nuclear nations, the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom are parties to the Treaty.. 
France and the People's Republic of China have not signed it, nor 
have three nations thought to be able to produce weapons: India, 
Israel, and the Union of South Africa. The South Africans assert that 
they are developing a secret process to enrich uranium. Among other 
leading countries, early in 1972 eight had signed but had not ratified 
the Treaty. These included Australia, Belgium, Egypt, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and West Germany. 

Among the nations party or signatory to the Nonproliferation 
Treaty are several which have a strong enough industrial and finan- 
cial base to produce nuclear weapons. These include Australia, Can- 

827 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. World Armaments and Disarma- 
ment ; SIPRI Yearbook 1972 (New York: Humanities Press, 1972), pp. 288-290. 

338 The 15 countries identified by SIPRI fall into two groups : the non-signatories and 
those which have signed hut not ratified the Treaty. Early in 1972 the nations in each 

froup were as follows : Non-signatories included Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, 
outh Africa and Spain ; signers included Australia, Belgium, Egypt, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 


a da, Japan, perhaps Argentina, the Scandinavian nations, and West- 
Germany. These nations naturally expect something in return for 
foregoing development of their own nuclear weapons capability. In 
addition to sharing in benefits from nuclear power, they expect to be 
protected from proliferation of nuclear weapons capability among 

their neighbors.. 

The Nonproliferation Treaty obliges nations having nuclear weap- 
ons to share the benefits of nuclear energy with the other nations, 
and also to support the International Atomic Energy Agency as it 
struggles to perfect credible and acceptable safeguards systems. Each 
state party to the Treaty needs to be assured that fissionable material 
in the possession of each non-nuclear- weapon neighbor is not used to 
make weapons. IAEA has the unenviable task of an international 
watchdog to ensure that the non-nuclear-weapons states fulfill their 
obligations under the Treaty. Each such state has committed itself to 
negotiate an agreement with the IAEA under which it will accept 
safeguards to verify compliance with these obligations. But the 
Treaty does not itself specify the nature of the safeguards system to 
be adopted. 

U.S. Ratification and Support of the Treaty 

As a nuclear-weapons state, the United States is exempt from 
IAEA safeguards. Nonetheless, when President Johnson signed 
the Nonprohferation Treaty on July f, 1968, he offered to put com- 
merieal nuclear power in the United States under IAEA safeguards. 
He said : 329 

We will cooperate fully to bring the Treaty safeguards into being. We shall 
thus help provide the basis of confidence that is necessary for increased coopera- 
tion in the peaceful nuclear field. After the Treaty has come into force, we will 
permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to :ill 
nuclear activities in the United States — excluding only those with direct na- 
tional security significance. Thus the United States is not asking any country 
to accept any safeguards that we are not willing to accept ourselves. 

In this commitment, President Johnson repeated his earlier offer of 
December 2, 1967. The United Kingdom made a similar offer on De- 
cember 4. 1967. The Soviet Union did not join in these offers. Instead, 
it took the position that inspection of any atomic activities within 
the nuclear-weapons countries was unnecessary and irrelevant as the 
Treaty does not prohibit these nations from having or manufacturing 
nuclear weapons. 

The Ratification Treaty was opened for signature on July 1. 1968, 
and was signed that same day by the United States, the United King- 
dom, the Soviet Union, and 53 other members of the United Nations. 
President. Johnson transmitted the Treaty to the Senate on .Inly 9. 
lie advised the Congress thai the Treaty would do more than just pro- 
hibit the spread of nuclear weapons. It would also promote the fur- 
ther development of nu, deai- energy for peaceful purposes. Elaborat- 
ing the anticipated benefits of the Treaty, the President said : 

I believe Hint tins treaty will greatly advance the goal of unclear cooperation 
for peaceful purposes under international safeguards. 

It will require that all parties which export nuclear materials and equip- 
ment n. non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful purposes make sure that such 
materials, and those used or produced in such equipment, are under international 

3=8 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 4 (July 8 1968) p 1044 
^"Nuctc'ir Nonproliferation Treaty," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 
vol. 4 (July 15. 1968), p. 1091. 


It will require all noninuclear parties to accept international safeguard? on 
nil peaceful nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction, 
or carried out under their control anywhere. 

It will help insure cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
and the exchange of scientific and technological information on such peaceful 

It will enable all countries to assist non-nuclear parties to the treaty with their 
peaceful nuclear activities, confident that their assistance will hot he diverted 
to the making of nuclear^weapons. x ' 

It obligates the nuclear- weapon parties to make potential benefits from any 
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions available— oh a non-discriminatory 
basis, and at the lowest possible cost— *o parties to the treaty that are. required 
to give up the right, to have their own nuclear explosives. 

The next day the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations opened 
hearings on the Treaty. 'On September 17 the committee- voted 13 to 
3, with three abstentions, to recommend ratification. However, the 
Senate did not act before adjournment and President Johnson's term 
of office ended with the Treaty not yet approved. President Nixon on 
February 5, 1969 sent a special message to the Senate recommending 
its approval. In it, he reendorsed the previous commitment that the 
United States would permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to all 
peaceful nuclear activities in the United States. Also he repeated U.S. 
willingness to join with all Treaty parties to insure that the potential 
benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be 
made available to non-nuclear- weapon parties. 331 

Brief additional hearings were quickly held by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee 332 and the Senate gave its advice and consent 
on March 13, 1969. The Treaty was ratified at Washington on Novem- 
ber 24, 1969, and the instrument of ratification was deposited on 
March 5, 1970, at which time the Treaty entered into force. 

U.S. Support for Safeguards 

The commitment of the non-weapons nations to open their nuclear 
activities to international safeguards is a notable innovation in inter- 
national relations. Arriving at this commitment was a major feat 
of international diplomacy. In testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dean Rusk recounted some 
of the difficulties. The problem which had most complicated the nego- 
tiations arose out of the existence of two international safeguards sys- 
tems : those of IAEA and of Euratom. It has always been U.S. policy 
to work toward a single, worldwide system of safeguards. However, 
the Common Market countries were reluctant to allow the IAEA 
safeguards system to operate in their countries for fear that this ar-. 
rangement would lead to abandonment of Euratom with unfavorable 
effects on progress toward European unity. As a result, the United 
States in its negotiations had to seek accommodation for both systems. 
But this was contrary to the interests of the U.S.S.R. The" Soviet 
Union was agreeable to mandatory safeguards requirements for the 
non-weapons signatories of the treaty, but held that those safeguards 
should be administered by the IAEA. The U.S.S.R. was a member 
of the IAEA but not of Euratom. From the outset of the negotia- 
tions, the Soviets had opposed accepting Euratom safeguards as a 
substitute for those of IAEA on the ground that this alternative 
amounted to self -inspection by Euratom members. 

fV'^ clear Nonproliferation Treaty," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 
vol. 5 (February 10. 1969), p. 219. 

^U.S Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nonproliferation 
Treaty, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969 part 2. 


The safeguards impasse was not resolved until May 1968 when the 
United States and the Soviet Union jointly presented a final draft 
of the Treaty to the United Nations, which avoided the issue by 
committing; non-nuclear weapons states to negotiate safeguards agree- 
ments with the IAEA either individually or together with other 
states. The Secretary of State, in submitting the Treaty to the Presi- 
dent and recommending its transmittal to the Senate, pointed to the 
statement of principles enumerated by the U.S. Co-chairman of the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (now the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament, or CCD) and by Ambassador Arthur 
Goldberg when the Treaty was presented to the United Nations 
General Assembly. The principles were : 333 

(1) The safeguards system of the IAEA must be credible; 

(2) Individual nations or groups of nations could negotiate 
safeguards agreements with the IAEA. By indirection this meant 
Euratom could do so ; 

(3) Existing national records and safeguards should be used 
by the IAEA. 

Safeguards Provisions of the Treaty 

Probably the most controversial part of the negotiations concerned 
the issue of verification of nuclear materials holdings. Article III sets 
out terms and conditions for safeguards, prohibited acts, non-inter- 
ference with safeguards, and for agreements between the IAEA and 
signatory states. The arrangements finally agreed to were as follows : 

Scope: Safeguards shall be applied on all source or special fission- 
able material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory, 
jurisdiction, or control of non-nuclear-weapon parties, for the exclu- 
sive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligations 
under the Treaty not to divert fissionable materials to weapons use. 

Prohibited acts: Transfer is prohibited of source or special fission- 
able material or equipment or material especially designed or pre- 
pared for the processing, use, or production of special nuclear material, 
to any non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the item 
shall be subject to safeguards. 

Non-interference : Safeguards shall be implemented ?o as to avoid 
hampering either the economic and technological development of the 
parties or international cooneration in peaceful nuclear activities. 

Safeguards agreements : The Treaty commits the non-weapons signa- 
tories to negotiate details of a safeguards agreement with the Inter- 
national Agency, and specifies how these agreements are to be nego- 
tiated. Non-weapons parties may enter into such agreements with 

838 The detailed statement of those principles follows : 

(1) There should he safeguards for all non-nueloar weapons parties of such a nature 
that all parties ean have confidence in their effectiveness. Therefore safeguards estab- 
lished bv an agreement negotiated and Concluded with the IAEA in accordance with 
the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system must enable the IAEA 
to ctrrv out its responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion Is taking place. 

(2) In discharging their obligations under Article III. non-nuclear-weapons parties 
may negotiate safeguards agreements with the 1 VKA individually or together with 
other parties : 'ind sneciflcallv. ail agreement covering such obligations may be entered 
Into between tbe IAEA and other international organization the work of which is 
related to the IAEA and the membership of which Includes the parties concerned. 

(3) In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make nnnronriate 
use of existing records and safeguards, provided that under such mutually agreed 
arrangements the IAEA can satisfy Itself that nuclear material is not diverted to 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 

Of. U.S. Congress. Senate. Commltl >n Foreign Relations. Hearings, Nonproliferation 

Treaty, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968 part 1 p. 255. 


the IAEA either individually or together with other states. This latter 
provision could enable Euratom member nations, for example, to 
work out group arrangements for Euratom. 

Safeguards are not mandatory for parties who already possess 
nuclear weapons. This situation was upsetting to many non- weapons 
states during negotiations, but ultimately the distinction was accepted. 

Chairman Seaborg of the AEC, in supporting the Treaty, men- 
tioned the concerns expressed by several countries that the application 
of IAEA safeguards might place the non-weapon states at a commer- 
cial disadvantage by compromising their commercial secrets or by 
interfering with the operation of the facilities. He called these fears 
groundless and explained : 334 

Agency inspectors are precluded from interfering in plant operations and they 
normally require access only to information that is not commercially sensitive. 
Nevertheless they are barred from transmitting any information that they 
receive to unauthorized parties and any state has the right to declare a proposed 
Agency inspector unacceptable. 

Negotiation of safeguards agreements was to begin within 180 days 
from the original entry into force of the Treaty. 

To date, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved safeguards 
agreements with three states : Austria, Finland, and Uruguay. More 
approvals are expected at coming meetings of the Board. 


The IAEA safeguards system under the Treaty is based on four 
main elements to be incorporated into individual safeguards agree- 
ments during negotiations : 

( 1 ) A review of the design of nuclear facilities ; 

(2) Specification of a system of facility records and accounts; 

(3) Specification of a system of facility reports; and 

(4) Inspections of safeguarded nuclear facilities to verify 
compliance with the safeguards agreement. 

The design review, based on information given to the Agency by the 
state or obtained by initial inspections, is to ensure that each facility 
will permit the effective applications of safeguards. The review will 
also be used to determine the material balance areas 335 and to select 
those "strategic points" 336 which will be used for measuring nuclear 
material flows and inventories. 

Agency inspectors will be sent into states to audit records and 
reports ; to verify the information in the records and reports by physi- 
cal inspection, independent measurements, and sampling; and to ex- 
amine facilities to check on measuring equipment and operations 
carried out. The frequency and duration of IAEA inspections are to 
be kept to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation 
of the safeguards procedures. The inspectors are expected to carry 
out their duties in a way which will avoid hampering the operation 
of nuclear facilities or the technological development of a nation's 
nuclear industry. However, the Agency's inspectors must be given 
access to any location where earlier reports and inspections have indi- 

331 Ibid., p. 100. 

335 A materials balance area Is an area within which the accounts for nuclear materials 
entering, leaving, and stored must be kept In balance. 

336 For a discussion of "strategic points" see page 144. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-19 


cated that nuclear material is present. Information about the inspec- 
tors is to be given to the state before the inspection is made, and the 
state may, if it wishes, object to an individual inspector and ask that 
another be sent. Moreover, the state has the right to have inspectors 
accompanied by its officials. 



In April 1970, the IAEA Board of Governors created a Safeguards 
Committee to recommend the contents of draft safeguards agree- 
ments. The Committee was open to all member states of the Agency, 
whether Board members or not. This open membership was in recogni- 
tion of the general interest in safeguards and the desire of many non- 
weapons member nations to participate directly in formulating con- 
tents of the safeguards agreements which they ultimately would be 
asked to conclude. The Committee met intensively over many months 
and issued three reports, covering all aspects of the proposed safe- 
guards agreements. 337 With the approval by the Board of Governors 
of the final report on April 20, 1971, the IAEA was ready to nego- 
tiate and conclude all aspects of the necessary safeguards agreements 
with parties to the Treaty. 

In defining the basic content of the agreement between the states 
and the IAEA, the Safeguards Committee recommended a text similar 
to that in the Nonproliferation Treaty itself. But whereas the Treaty 
refers to the Agency's right and obligation to verify the prevention 
of the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes, the Com- 
mittee's document 338 limits the verification procedure to nuclear ma- 
terials. This change should make the agreement more acceptable to 
Euratom countries, for it shifts the emphasis away from facilities 
and toward materials. 


Underlying the IAEA's guide for the structure and content of 
safeguards agreements are two principles that deserve attention. 339 
It called for (1) arrangements that would provide the Agency with 
an effective means to detect the diversion of nuclear materials or to 
identify unusual circum stances that warrant further investigation; 
and (2) the fullest possible use of existing national systems of ac- 
counting and control for nuclear materials, and the requirements that 
their findings be verified by independent measures. 

**» Mr. Peter Kelly, a United Kingdom representative on the Board of Governors and 
a participant in the Committee's work, gives some insight into the daily workings of 
this group of nearly 50 very different delegations. Relating his experiences, he wrote: 

Quite early In our work a moderate, compromising spirit displayed itself in the 
Committee. Then the atmosphere became friendly, at times even humorous. Instead 
of confronting opposed views in the Board room, delegates took to talking them 
over in the lounge, or in one or two nearby restaurants. In such environments, even 

tie i :i Intractable looking problems proved soluble : even the prickliest-looking 

delegate proved to have a human side, informal consultation came to count for 

more and more in our work: and when we got hack to the Hoard room even the 

Intractable problems had been one daren'1 say "fixed," but, perhaps, "adjusted.' 
Cf. International Atomic Energu Igency Bulletin, vol. L3, No. •". (1971), p. 10. 
338 IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and states 
Required m Connection With the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
\. publication INFCIRC/153 (May 1971), 29 pages. 

The following diSCUSSion draws extensively upon a commentary liy Myron I?. Kratzer, 
then Assistant General Manager for International Activities of the I'.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission, in into national Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol. 13, No. 3 (11)71), 
pp. 11 13. 


One of the most important actions of the Safeguards Committee 
was to specify the use of national systems of accounting and control 
for nuclear materials. The United States consistently supported this 
idea to avoid duplication of systems. For the United States the princi- 
ple of independent verification is the cornerstone of any meaningful 
system of safeguards. Deciding whether there has been a diversion 
must rest on objective evidence examined by international inspectors 
and not on information made available by the inspected party itself. 

As analyzed by the United States, it was impractical for the Agency 
to operate a materials accountability system with its own accountants 
and auditors in each nuclear facility. This approach would have de- 
manded far more resources than would be available to the Agency, as 
well as far more intrusion into national nuclear operations than would 
be tolerable. Independent verification to authenticate findings and 
data in, national systems was seen as the solution. 

The .Federal Republic of Germany, likely to be a principal Euro- 
pean user of nuclear power, wanted a national accounting and control 
system, to serve as a fink between the IAEA and operators of nuclear 
power plants. According to one analysis: "This arrangement reduces 
the Agency's safeguards costs and. at the same time avoids the arising 
of substantial differences in the .application of safeguards between 
countries forming part of a regional safeguards systems," 340 

,A satisfactory national svstem would include a measurement system 
for the determination of the quantities of nuclear fuel material im- 
ported, produced, shipped, lost, or otherwise removed from inventory. 
It would #lso ; need procedures for evaluating accumulations of un- 
measured inventory and losses, the precision and accuracy of measure- 
ments, differences in shipper/receiver measurements, and so on. A 
state having a national svstem with these characteristics would pre- 
sumably Tbe subject to a minimum of Agency verification. 


Another important result of the Safeguards Committee's work was 
to provide a state being inspected with assurances that its legitimate 
commercial interests would be protected. The guidelines enjoin the 
Agency to exercise extreme care in the protection of commercial se- 
crets, to avoid undue interference with the nation's peaceful nuclear 
activities, and to conduct safeguards in a manner consistent with 
the economy and safety of the activities concerned. 

The Safeguards Committee's report incorporates the principle that 
information about design of nuclear facilities supplied by member 
states should be limited to that necessary for safeguards. It also con- 
tains an important new feature that if a state so requests, the review 
of information of particular commercial sensitivity can take place in 
the country concerned so that reports and drawings do not have to 
leave the country or remain on file in the IAEA. 


The draft agreement lays down formulas for determining the 
"intensity" of inspection for several categories of nuclear facilities. 

mo Werner Ungerer, "Safeguards : Five View?," International Atomic Energy Agency 
Bulletin, vol. 13, No. 3 (1971), p. 4. 


Reactors would be subject to a predetermined inspection rate, while 
that for other facilities would depend upon the throughput of nuclear 
materials or their inventory. The inspection effort contemplated under 
the new approach ranges'from one inspection per year for modest 
facilities, such as research reactors, to several man-years of continuous 
inspection in the case of commercial scale reprocessing or fuel fabrica- 
tion plants. The arrangements also permit the Agency to employ a 
part of its routine inspection effort on an unannounced basis. In the 
case of sensitive facilities such as fuel reprocessing plants, the maxi- 
mum inspection effort would rise in proportion to the square root of 
the throughput, reflecting the concept that large size plants give eco- 
nomies of scale not only of operating costs but also for the inspection 
effort needed. 341 

"strategic points" 

The Safeguards Committee proposed one answer to the question 
of how far IAEA inspectors could go in performing their functions. 
It advanced the concept of "strategic points,'' which are also explicitly 
recognized in the Treaty. The "strategic points" concept means that 
Agency inspectors would normally confine their access to locations 
selected by the Agency in advance, where nuclear material can be 
most easily measured, contained, or observed. IAEA inspectors would 
stay at these points and not roam throughout the facilities. In this 
way. the chance that an inspector might obtain technological informa- 
tion of commercial value can be reduced and interference with plant 
operations held to a minimum. 

The effectiveness of this limited inspection concept depends on new 
technological advances and administrative skills. Development of 
tamper-proof instruments and seals, for example, will be needed. Some 
procedures that have been developed will impress some countries or 
observers as too harsh ; others as too lenient. Disagreements can be 
expected between the IAEA and the countries subject to inspections. 
Nevertheless the fact that many nations have agreed to subject a po- 
tentially significant, future undertaking — the commercial use of 
nuclear power — to international inspection is encouraging. 

enforcement or safeguards 

The Safeguards Committee of the IAEA inevitably has had to deal 
with the question : what would be done in the event of a known or 
suspected diversion? This question, it will be recalled, was one of the 
most thorny and unresolved issues in the abortive negotiations of the 
Banich plan. 

The draft agreement provides for procedures designed to afford op- 
portunity for resolution of any diversion issue through consultation 
between the TAEA and the nation concerned. Should this not be pos- 
sible, the TAEA Board of Governors is empowered to apply the pro- 
vision of the Agency statute relating to noncompliance which includes 
among other steps, a report to the United Nations Security Council. 
The agreement also provides for the arbitration of disputes by an 
impartial tribunal, except those relating to a finding of non- 

M1 Frnnk Bnrnnhy. Director of the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, quips that 
this must he the first time a square root appears In an International agreement. 



The United States has consistently supported the Safeguards Com- 
mittee's work. Addressing the 14th session of the IAEA's General 
Conference in September 1970, AEC Chairman Seaborg said that the 
United States was very satisfied with the work of the Committee in 
formulating principles, and in providing for independent verification 
by the Agency. He urged that the Agency should make full use of 
national systems in carrying out safeguards. Chairman Seaborg em- 
phasized U.S. desire for these principles and for their constructive 
refinement : 342 

We believe, on the basis of our direct experience with IAEA safeguards, that 
they are not intrusive and will not interfere with the economical operation of 
plants or the security of proprietary information. At the same time, we strongly 
favor the continuing evolution of the IAEA safeguards system to take full 
advantage of all technical advances permitting improved efficiency of safeguards. 


The Soviet Union also supported the work of the Safeguards Com- 
mittee. Professor I. D. Morokhov, 343 commented on the Committee's 
recommendations as follows : 344 

Its recommendations on the content of the agreements concerning the Agency's 
supervision of the nuclear activities of non-nuclear- weapons States will enable 
the Agency effectively to discharge its functions under the Treaty, on the basis 
of a judicious combination of national safeguards systems and independent 
verifications by the Agency. The procedures for the conduct of inspections, desig- 
nation of inspectors and settlement of disputes, which the Committee has worked 
out, take full account of the sovereign rights of States. 

The Committee's recommendations ensure protection of the industrial and 
commercial interests of States by providing for communication to the Agency 
of only the minimum of data on the nuclear activities of a State necessary for 
safeguards purposes and by requiring the Agency to treat as strictly confidential 
such commercial and industrial information of importance to States as may come 
into its possession in connection with safeguards. 

Criticisms of IAEA Safeguards 

Critics have contended it has not been proved that IAEA will be 
able to perform adequately the inspection role assigned to it in the 
Treaty. They challenge the reliability of estimates of the costs to 
sufficiently strengthen the IAEA to fulfill its inspection role and 
they ask what share of the increased burden the United States might 
be asked to underwrite. 

Even with the successful application of inspection procedures by 
the IAEA on declared peaceful nuclear activities, critics contend that 
a nation could still manufacture nuclear weapons in secret. Could a 
nation which desires to produce weapons hide some fissionable ma- 
terial before the inauguration of the safeguards? Or could it secretly 
build separate facilities to produce fissionable material and to fabri- 
cate weapons which could not be detected by the circumscribed visits 
of IAEA inspectors? Could illicit facilities be detected without gen- 
eral inspection of the entire countryside? Has a feasible way been 
found to detect hidden stockpiles of fissionable material ? These ques- 
tions await answers. 

343 "General Conference of the International Atomic Ene^v Agencv holds 14th session 
at Vienna," State Department Bulletin, vol. 63 (October 26, 1970), p. 487. 

"» First Deputy Chairman of the U.S S.R. State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic 
Energy and representative from the U.S. S.R. on the IAEA Board of Governors. 

*" I. D. Morokhov. "Safeguards : Five Views," International Atomic Energy Agency 
Bulletin, vol. 13, No. 3 (1971), pp. 7-9. 


An even bigger potential loophole, critics contend, is the lack of any 
inspection of the nuclear- weapon powers: China, France, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Without auditing 
the use of the fissionable material they produce, much less the stock- 
piles they have produced in the past, is there a way to be sure that they 
are not secretly transferring fissionable material to non-nuclear coun- 
tries ? In the view of some critics, only comprehensive inspection, per- 
haps covering all exports from nuclear to non-nuclear countries, could 
provide assurance against the illicit international transfer of nuclear 
weapons of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. 

One student of the proliferation problem has questioned the whole 
approach of the inspection system and believes that accounting for 
nuclear fuels is an inadequate safeguard. He argues that what is 
needed instead is a method of internationally acquiring, storing, and 
guarding the plutonium produced by civil nuclear reactors. Leonard 
Beaton, writing in Foreign Affairs in 1967, said : 345 

The proposed nonproliferation treaty must be judged primarily for its effect 
on the growing threat of a worldwide diffusion of plutoniiun. If it reinforces 
the false security of the safeguards system by persuading the legalists that no 
country which has signed is ever capable of building nuclear weapons, it will 
do a grave disservice to the cause of nonproliferation. It could provide the 
cover under which the plutonium silently spreads, as it is now spreading to 
Italy and India. Like a fine row of Georgian houses condemned to come down, 
everything would be gradually let go. When the houses are finally bulldozed 
away they have usually become so ramshackle that no one minds. Equally, under 
the placid rule of safeguards as they are now understood, the plutonium will 
spread for and wide. When the collapse comes, no one will remember how easy 
it might have been to hold a narrow ring. 

Finally, critics point out, any nation can withdraw upon 3 
months' notice. A nation could sign the Treaty but proceed secretly 
as far as possible with all the plans for making nuclear weapons and, 
whenever it felt ready, merely notify the other parties and the Secur- 
ity Council of the United Nations that it was withdrawing. 

Some Congressional Doubts 

Although the Senate assented to the Treaty, and thus to the antici- 
pated role of the International Agency in safeguards, there have l>een 
some congressional doubts. For example, the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs during hearings in 19P>S heard pointed criticism and 
a warning from a leading member of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy who questioned the enforceability of Article III. the ability 
of the International Agency to carry out the safeguards function, and 
the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the nego- 
tiations. Representative Craig Hosmer said, in part. : 346 

. . . ACDA now comes up with the NPT article III which it claims provides 
an enforcing mechanism in the form of inspection. This is a sad delusion made 
a tragic one because it is self-induced by ACDA whose spokesman . . . actually 
believe article III lias real teeth, when in truth and in fact, it has false teeth 
for tlie fo'lowing reasons: 

A. Article TII only calls upon signatories to "undertake to accept safeguards 
as set. forth in an agreement to I>e negotiated and included with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency" and (hat such negotiations commence within ISO days 
after the treaty goes into effect. This is no more than an "agreement to make 
an agreement." No legal system recognizes as valid or enforceable any such 
ambiguous present, promise to come to a future unspecified agreement. Article 

n4r ' l>r>nnrd Ronton. "Nurlenr Fu<>1 for-All," Foreign Affairs, vol. 45 (July, 19R7). p. fifiO. 
849 U.S. Conpross. House, Cnmmlttpp on Forolpn Aff.iirs, Hearings, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Aet Amendments, 196S, 90th Conp.. 2d Scss., 1968, p. 9fi. 


III is just as blank as if it remained without words. The words it contains mean 
nothing. The treaty remains without any provisions for enforcement whatever. 
B. In any event, to speak of IAEA safeguards as something which exist and 
can be relied upon to enforce this treaty is ridiculous to the point of absurdity. 
Anyone familiar with the primitive capabilities either technological or financial, 
of IAEA in the safeguards area knows this. I personally verified it myself only 
last September at IAEA headquarters. To assert or imply that IAEA safeguards 
are something which can be relied upon for the heavy purpose of policing this 
treaty is misleading and unconscionable. It will take years for IAEA to achieve 
even a minimum inspection capability. . . . IAEA inspection is simply a facade 
like a Hollywood movie setting, there is a front with no structure behind it. 
As a matter of fact, IAEA has fewer inspectors than this committee has mem- 
bers . . . for all of Europe they have five inspectors. . . . 

Costs of Safeguards 

Questions were raised during negotiations of the Treaty whether the 
IAEA could recruit the staff to administer its safeguards responsi- 
bilities. There were also fears that the costs would be enormous. Chair- 
man Seaborg countered these two points >m 1968. He regarded the 
IAEA safeguards staff while then modest in size as nevertheless in bal- 
ance with the worlrtio be done. He also expressed confidence that the 
Agency would be able to recruit the necessary people for its expanded 
function. As for expenses, obviously the costs for administering safe- 
guards would go up. However, these Costs, when pro-rated against the 
cost of nuclear power, would represent no more than a fraction of one 
percent of the cost of electricity produced. A projection of manpower 
and funding, prepared by the AEC's Brookhaven National Labora- 
tory, estimated requirements of IAEA safeguards as increasing from 
775 persons and $29.8 million in 1971 to 2,374 persons and $143 million 
by the year 1990. Comparing these costs with the estimated value of 
nuclear generated electricity produced an estimated cost increase of 
0.16 mills per kilowatt-hour for 1971, which would drop to 0.02 mills 
per kilowatt-hour by 1990. 347 

• More recently, in 1970 ? Brookhaven revised its estimates for man- 
power and financial requirements for IAEA safeguards. 438 Table VI 
lists the latest BNL estimates of manpower requirements and the 
future costs of implementing IAEA safeguards. It assumes that power 
reactors and nuclear fuel facilities in 17 non- weapons countries — which 
would include all of the European nations except France and the 
United Kingdom — will be safeguarded under the Treaty. 

A summary of the number of nuclear facilities in non- weapons states 
to be safeguarded by IAEA is given in Table VII. Little change in 
the number of conversion, fabrication, and reprocessing facilities is . 
expected, but by. 1980 the number of power reactors should increase, 
and likewise the number of Countries safeguarded. 

ljhe present safeguards staff of the IAEA numbers about 60. Brook- 
Raven estimates this must, increase to 275 if the Treaty is to be fully 
implemented by 1^73. This growth of almost 500 percent in less than 
3 ydars would probably fee difficult for IAEA to attain. If so, the 
Agency initially may ha^e to accept a lower level of safeguards. 
" : . ^i number of conditions ap'pears necessary to achieve effective safe- 
gfudrcls at acceptable eodts; These iriclude : (1) standarization of the 
existing systems of control and management, (2) adoption of a uni- 

'««-ibtti.,p. 154, • ••:>.. >-th '•:■.'■!■■.'•• ' ,• ;■' ' ..'■..'' ':':.' 

848 L. Green, H. Kouts, and W. Marcuse, IAEA Costs and Manpower RequlreYnetita tinder. 
VPT (Upton, •'N'.'Y.;: Technical Support Organization, Broofchaven National , laboratory, 
September 1970, report No. BNL 50263), 34 pp. . - -,■ .'•■•',' V 



form national control system, and (3) adaptation of the IAEA safe- 
guards system to the new circumstances arising from the Treaty 

[Dollar amounts in millions] 




Operating cost 

Equipment cost 




Secretary or clerk 










Source: L. Green, H. Kouts, and W. Marcuse, "IAEA Costs and Manpower Requirements Under NPT" op. cit, p. 15. 




Number of countries 

Power reactor sites 

Fuel conversion and fabrication plants (natural and low energy U). 

Reprocessing plants 

Research reactors (low power) 

Critical facilities 

Plutonium fabrication plants 





















■2 small plants for special fuels. 
Loc. cit. 

Financing Safeguards Under the Treaty 

Financing was discussed by the U.S. delegation at the 14th session of 
the IAEA General Conference in September 1970. AEC Chairman 
Seaborg said that the United States attached great importance to the 
principle of financing Agency safeguards costs under the Agency's 
regular budget, which would spread the costs among all members. 
Nonetheless, the United States recognized that there was room for 
difference of opinion as to the relative weight to be given to factors 
used to determine the participation of each Agency member in meeting 
these costs, and the United States would play an "active and construc- 
tive role" in the discussion of the matter. 360 

Putting the costs of safeguards into the IAEA's regular budget 
offered the advantage of lower national outlays by the nuclear power 
countries, for the safeguards costs would be shared by nations not yet 
using nuclear power. The developing countries were quick to protest. 
At the summer 1970 session of the Safeguards Committee, a spirited 
debate on financing took place. The developing countries objected to 
the idea that costs of safeguards should be shared by all members. 361 
Delegates from nations with small or no nuclear programs argued that 
those members who were using nuclear power should bear the costs of 
safeguards. On their part, the nuclear nations argued that all member 
states should pay in proportion to their contributions to the IAEA 

848 George C. Delcolgne and G. Rubinstein, "Nonnrollferatlon and Control : Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy," Bulletin, of the Atomic Scientist*, vol. 27 (February 1971), p. 5. 

860 "General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency holds 14th Session at 
Vienna," op. cit., p. 487. 

161 Myron B. Kratzer. "A New Era for the International Safeguards," Nuclear Netca, 
vol. 14 (February 1971), p. 42. 


budget. Those IAEA members who had not signed the Treaty, pri- 
marily France and India, expressed concern lest money be diverted 
from other Agency activities to pay for safeguards in which they had 
no interest. 362 

The Safeguards Committee recommended one of two approaches to 
financing safeguards. 353 

(a) An agreement with a member of the Agency should provide 
that each party thereto shall bear the expenses it incurs in imple- 
menting its responsibilities thereunder. However, if the state or 
persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a 
result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall re- 
imburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to 
do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional 
measuring or sampling which inspectors may request; or 

(b) An agreement with a party not a member of the Agency 
should . . . provide that the party shall reimburse fully to the 
Agency the safeguards expenses the Agency incurs. However, if 
the party or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary ex- 
penses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency 
shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in 
advance to do so. 


Some members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have ques- 
tioned costs of IAEA safeguards. Representative Craig Hosmer esti- 
mated that if the Agency had undertaken inspection of peaceful 
nuclear activities in 1968 it would have needed a total of 245 inspec- 
tors at a cost of $17 million. Based on five full-time inspectors for each 
1,000 megawatts of installed nuclear capacity, plus one and one-half 
full time mspectors for every two power plants, and estimating a world 
total of 4,000 power reactors by the year 1990, he forecast that some 
16,725 IAEA mspectors would be needed for safeguards at an annual 
cost of $1.1 billion. 354 He asked whether such an international burden 
would be tolerable. 

More recently, in its annual report for 1970, the Joint Committee said 
it was mindful of the importance of safeguards, but was looking very 
cautiously at the growing IAEA safeguards program and what could 
develop into a need for increased funding to support the numbers of 
personnel which may be necessary. 855 

Physical Security of Nuclear Materials 

IAEA safeguards under the Treaty have only one purpose : to detect 
the diversion of nuclear fuel materials from authorized purposes. 
Physical security measures to prevent thefts have no place in the 
Treaty. It is assumed that governments will maintain appropriate 
physical security and will deal with theft. But is this a tenable assump- 

•"Thls point was made by Frank Barnaby, Director of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, in "Safeguards — With or Without Strings?", New Scientist and 
Science Journal, vol. 49 (February 25. 1971), p. 432. 

868 INFCIRC/153, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 

tu U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agree- 
ments for Cooperation — 1967-68, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 1968, p. 74. 

858 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Activity and Accomplishments 
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy During the Second Session of the 91st Congress, 
op. cit., p. 44324. 


tion ? Can a system not concerned with prevention of theft or catching 
and punishing thieves, accurately be called "safeguards" ? 

There may be a tendency for international safeguards to become the 
glamour segment of the overall anti-proliferation effort. Representa- 
tive Hosmer addressed this issue : 356 

Safeguards people, their systems and analyses, methodologies, black boxes, game 
theories, non-destructive test paraphernalia preventing diversion. This may be a 
very dangerous assumption in the real world, populated by very fallible people, 
some of whom are very certain to be just no damn good. 

In any event, the world political community probably ought to be doing a lot 
more than it is now. . . . 

Deterrence can be made more certain by boosting the illicit diverter's risk of 
getting caught, thereby both incurring punishment and losing the profits of his 

If, under our safeguards system of international public opinion, when a diver- 
sion is discovered, the alarm sounds, whistles blow, sirens scream, the United 
Nations is notified, and it all strikes fear and terror in the hearts of the general 
public, that is one thing. Quite another and far better thing is if it scares the hell 
out of the criminal because he knows that the jig is up. 

Every increase in the likelihood of a quick and positive identification and appre- 
hension of a nuclear criminal plays a key role in fortifying the deterrent equation. 
So also does every increase in the degree of certainty with which the stolen item 
can be recovered. 

Physical security of nuclear fuel materials appears not to be a con- 
cern of the IAEA. Mr. Hosmer raised the issue whether the Agency 
should be involved with physical security by establishing guidelines 
for police training, indoctrination, and equipment for this highly 
specialized responsibility. He would have the major nuclear nations 
actively assist other countries in developing a worldwide network of 
nuclear police systems. 

Providing an ultimate answer to this question is another task for 
U. S. diplomacy in this nuclear age. 

Nonprollferation and Euratom 

Had the Soviet Union succeeded in having IAEA safeguards apply 
to all peaceful nuclear activities, IAEA would have had to take over 
the safeguards already established by Euratom. The United States, 
however, favored a continued safeguards function for Euratom. The 
diplomatic situation on this issue was outlined for the House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs early in 1968 by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which was 
deeply involved in negotiation of the Nonproliferation Treaty. 357 

As late ns August 19G7 the provisions for non-proliferation remained 
blank. As Mr. Fisher explained the situation : "* 

We bad no safeguards article primarily bcause we couldn't agree with the 
Soviets on a safeguards article that was acceptable to our NATO allies. The prob- 
lem of negotiating a safeguards article with our NATO allies was as important 
in our minds as negotiating one with the Soviet Union. 

The principal issue was the relative role of Euratom and the IAEA on safe- 
guards and on the other side of the coin whether or not the nuclear weapons states 
accepted any safeguards on their own peaceful nuclear activities. They have been 
unwilling to do so on the ground that it doesn't relate to the purposes of the 

aw Keynote remarks of Coneressmnn CraJe TTosmcr hoforc the Symposium on Imple- 
menting Nuclear Safejruards, Kansas State University, October 25. 1071. In Conqrexaional 
Record (October 26. 1071). p. TT9002 (Dully edition). 

857 Statemenl of Adrian S. Basher, In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign AfT.-iirs, 
Hearings, ASmt Control and Disarmament Art Amendments, 1968, op. cit., pp. 59-91. 

"8 Ibid., p. 60. 


As for Euratom, he underscored the concern of its member 
nations : ** 

Our Euratom friends were very concerned that Euratom safeguards not dis- 
appear, the Euratom structure not disappear, as a result of any IAEA safeguards 
agreement. They opposed, for example, a provision which on its face would seem 
the simplest, which said that this treaty shall be safeguarded by the IAEA ; that 
is, IAEA safeguards shall be applicable to non-nuclear activities. 

Our allies opposed that, and they opposed it with good reason. They opposed 
it because they didn't want a duplicative set of safeguards, because if there were 
such, the Euratom safeguards themselves might disappear as unnecessary. 

U.S. policy, Mr. Fisher went on to say, was that we did not wish to be 
a party to any attempt to undermine the structure of Euratom in terms 
of national programs. mo 


Euratom members have been disturbed over the Nonproliferation 
Treaty. 891 One concern has been expressed that Euratom's inspection 
system, which has been a major factor in binding the members to- 
gether, would lose substance if it is subordinated to the inspection sys- 
tem of the IAEA. Other observers had hoped that were Euratom to be 
given an inspection role under the Treaty it would give the organiza- 
tion a needed boost. As finally adopted, the Treaty does not recognize 
Euratom by name, but does permit nations or groups of nations to 
enter into inspection arrangements with the IAEA. This provision has 
been interpreted as permitting the IAEA to enter an agreement with 
Euratom giving Euratom's inspection system some role. 

Another concern of members of Euratom is that if IAEA safeguards 
were applied, it would result in a discriminatory control system within 
the Euratom community, and that it would hinder the creation of a 
European nuclear industry. Because France as a nuclear weapons 
power would not be subject to inspection under the Treaty, other Eura- 
tom members feared this exemption might result in a displacement of 
nuclear research and industry from the controlled members to France, 
or that the Treaty would impede joint nuclear activities involving 
France and other states. ; 

A State Department memorandum prepared in January 1969 for 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explained that the safeguards 
article was incorporated in the final drafts of the Treaty only after 
consultation by the United States with its Euratom allies and with 
the Commission of the European Communities. The three Euratom 
members who had signed the Treaty did not consider that there was 
any incompatibility between the goals of nonproliferation and Eura- 
tom. It was their position that the safeguards provided in the Treaty' 
would be the subject of agreements to be concluded with the IAEA 
and that to avoid the possibility of incompatibilities with the provi- 
sions of the Euratom treaty, safeguards must be defined so that the 
rights and obligations of the member states and the Community remain 
intact. The Euratom members which had signed the Nonproliferation 

858 Ibid., p. 61. 

880 Loc. clt. 

an Much of the following discussion of the impact of NPT uDon Euratom draws heavily 
SES. a „ rep c rt 0f E1 r? n C - Co i lip , r - Analyst in U.S. Foreign Policy, of the then Legislative 
Reference Service Library of Congress, entitled "Effects of -the Nonproliferation Treaty 
£«j£,f r £ at i i0 M al In |*ltution8.*' It is reprinted in U.S., Congress, Senate. Committee on 
462^475 Relations ' Heartn 08> Nonproliferation Treaty, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, pp. 


Treaty expected that the Commission of the European Communities 
would enter into negotiations with the IAEA. To emphasize their 
desire to preserve Euratom safeguards, they expressed their intention 
not to ratify the Treaty before such negotiations has produced an 
agreement. 362 


The most recent development affecting Euratom safeguards under 
the Treaty is the reported agreement in principle between Euratom 
and the International Agency for IAEA inspection of nuclear activities 
in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and West Germany, 
but not in France. European Economic Community sources say the 
five will drop their insistence that tighter Euratom inspections be 
allowed in France as a prerequisite to their approval of IAEA inspec- 
tion of their facilities. Thus by giving in to the French, who had agreed 
only to Euratom inspection of French facilities for nuclear materials 
from non-French sources, the way could be cleared for ratification of 
the Treaty by Euratom members. 363 

Conclusions and Current Issues 

The development of international safeguards is an evolving inter- 
action between nuclear technology and American diplomacy. The 
United States has consistently supported international safeguards 
administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. U.S. sup- 
port of the Nonproliferation Treaty has reaffirmed the importance 
that this Nation attaches to effective performance of safeguards — a 
technological activity growing out of the discovery of nuclear fission. 
As a gesture to persuade other nations that the inspection provisions 
of the Treaty do not impose an unacceptable interference with na- 
tional sovereignty, the United States has volunteered to place its civil 
nuclear industry under IAEA safeguards, and the United States has 
already voluntarily placed several nuclear facilities under these safe- 

Another task for U.S. diplomacy will be to assure a satisfactory 
outcome of the agreement reached between the IAEA and Euratom 
for continuation of the Euratom safeguards system in cooperation 
with IAEA safeguards. These safeguards arrangements between two 
international agencies will be important for the future of Euratom. 
A success would add reason for future support to this declining orga- 
nization. Also, success could present an interesting issue for U.S. diplo- 
macy should the Soviet Union propose a similar arrangement for na- 
tions within its bloc. 

So far the IAEA safeguards system has proven tolerable to na- 
tions exposed to it under the "trilateral" nuclear assistance agree- 
ments between the United States, individual other nations, and the 
Agency. Can IAEA experience, derived from safeguarding compara- 
livelv small amounts of nuclear materials in special curcumstances, 
provide an adequate base for the routine safeguarding of large quan- 
tities? The amounts of nuclear fuel materials now used for civil nu- 
clear power are modest, as is the amount of plutonium being produced 

382 Memorandum relating to minority and individual views on the Nonproliferation 
Treat v. In U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nonprolijera- 
tin» Treaty, op. dt., pp. 310-311. 

*» Nucleonics Week, vol. 12 (September 30, 1971), p. 8. 


as a byproduct of commercial nuclear power in Europe and the 
United States. Yet if present estimates for growth of nuclear power 
are correct, within the decade there will be a marked increase in 
both the number of nuclear power plants and supporting facilities 
to be safeguarded and the amounts of material in process, transit, and 
inventory, factors which would be expected to increase the tempta- 
tion and opportunities for attempted diversions. U.S. foreign policy 
toward commercial nuclear energy in Europe can be expected to have 
some influence on the nature and pace of this future growth, and upon 
the attitude of the governments involved toward the IAEA and the 
safeguards system. 

Specific issues of importance in U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's 
and the 1980's appear to include the following : 

(1) A point-of -no-return decisian: At this time, in 1972, nuclear 
power, while growing rapidly, is still not a major component of electric- 
ity supply in either the United States or Europe. If the risks to world 
peace from potential diversion of nuclear materials cannot adequate- 
ly be controlled by safeguards, there may still be time to deemphasize 
nuclear power despite the economic loss of much of the past national 
investments in bringing nuclear power to its present state. Within 
a .few years, however, the nations of the world will pass a point of 
no return beyond which a decision to abandon or limit nuclear power 
will no longer be a njanageable policy alternative. At issue for U.S. 
foreign policy is a final decisive international risk-versus-benefit 
analysis for nuclear power in terms of dangers to* world peace from 
diversion of materials to use in clandestine weapons. 

(2) U.S. support for IAEA safeguards : The present demonstra- 
tion of IAEA safeguards would not have been possible without U.S. 
support and cooperation. But what of preparing the IAEA to apply 
its safeguards systems to commercial nuclear power throughout the 
world ? For U.S. diplomacy there are interacting foreign and domes- 
tic considerations. On the one hand, strong past U.S. support would 
suggest that future U.S. support should be expanded so that the 
Agency can prepare for the anticipated rapid, worldwide growth in 
the use of nuclear power. On the other hand, domestic demands for 
funds and changing attitudes toward foreign aid seem likely to make 
such expansion difficult. In these circumstances, it would seem that 
U.S. diplomacy has a two-pronged responsibility for the future of 
this international control of a potentially dangerous technological 
product. First, it will have to help assure conditions for the IAEA 
adequately to perform its safeguards function. Second, it will have 
to help generate the domestic understanding and commitment needed 
to assure adequate U.S. support. 

Another related function for U.S. diplomacy is likely to be that of 
working to determine the future shape, scale, and balance of the 
IAEA activities. If only the safeguards function expands, then bit by 
bit other Agency functions may atrophy so that ultimately the IAEA 
may become primarily a safeguards agency. This condition may or 
may not be m the ultimate U.S. interest. IAEA concentration on 
safeguards should improve the management and effectiveness of this 
function. However, the Nonproliferation Treaty offered non- weapons 
states the promise of benefits from nuclear energy. Could this promise 
be adequately fulfilled by an international agency whose technical 


assistance and related functions have been stunted by asymmetrical 
preoccupation with safeguards? "" 

U.S. diplomacy inevitably will have a major responsibility for work- 
ing out answers to these issues. 

(3) Voluntary safeguards in the United States: Two Presidents 
have committed the United States voluntarily to place its nuclear in- 
dustries under IAEA safeguards as an inducement to persuade non- 
weapons nations to sign and ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty. At 
the moment, the ratification process is incomplete and the United 
States has not been called upon to honor this offer. However, it may 
be timely to consider foreign and domestic policy implications of the 
offer, such as : 

The acceptable scale of IAEA inspections ; 

The degree of reliability desired ; 

Whether the function of IAEA safeguards will be independ- 
ently to detect unauthorized diversions, or to assure that national 
safeguards systems are adequate to do so and to test them occa- 
sionally ; 

Necessary limitations upon IAEA use of inspectors who are 
nationals of nations whose foreign and domestic policies are in 
conflict with those of the country to be inspected; and 

Available measures to protect trade secrets of the host coun- 
try's nuclear industry while at the same time providing adequate 
access by IAEA inspectors to nuclear materials in process and 
in inventory. 

(4) The -physical security issues: The IAEA safeguards system is 
limited in purpose to detecting diversion of nuclear materials. It does 
not extend to security and other measures to protect the materials 
against attempted diversions. To what extent, if any, should U.S. 
foreign policy attempt to extend the IAEA safeguards function into 
physical protection and security of nuclear materials and to apprehen- 
sion of would-be diverters? 

(5) Increased U.S. assistance in nuclear energy: A premise of the 
Nonprol iteration Treaty is that the nuclear weapons states will share 
with the non- weapons states the benefits of nuclear energy to induce 
them to agree to international safeguards. This commitment has im- 
plications for foreign and domestic U.S. policy for nuclear energy. 
To what extent is the United States prepared to shape its develop- 
ment of nuclear power technology to meet the needs of the non- weapons 
states? Are present forms and channels of U.S. nuclear technological 
assistance sufficient for purposes of the Treaty, or need they be broad- 
ened and expanded? Should the U.S. develop those nuclear power 
technologies which can use natural uranium or thorium as fuel and 
thus avoid the requirements for enrichment and safeguards? These are 
some of the questions that combine elements of nuclear technology, 
domestic energy policy, and diplomacy which will have to be answered 
during the 1970's. 

XII. Some Issues Recapitulated 

How the discovery of nuclear fission came to influence American 
diplomacy and foreign policy has been examined in this case study. 
Clearly these interactions are of interest to students of the relations 
among science, technology, and American diplomacy. But why should 
the Congress and the public be interested in the past and future impli- 
cations of nuclear energy for diplomacy in the face of all the other 
matters clamoring for attention '. 

Two primary reasons support such interest. First, after several 
false alarms in Europe — or perhaps they were preliminary warnings 
unrecognized — it is now becoming evident that the nations of the 
world are facing a growing gap between demand for and supply of 
fuels for energy. The United States and other nations, including those 
of the European Economic Community and the Soviet bloc, expect 
that nuclear energy will supply a large part of the electricity reo x uired 
in the future, perhaps as much as half by the 1900's. U.S. diplomacy 
and foreign policy should prepare now to take this anticipated energy 
gap into account, especially since this Nation is expected to import 
greatly increasing amounts of oil and natural gas in the decades 
ahead. Thus considerations of foreign policy may become an input 
into formation of domestic policy to develop nuclear power further 
as a means of reducing the U.S. need to import fuels, thereby easing 
international tensions and competition for scarce resources. Second. 
European experience with international safeguards with its feature 
of international inspection could provide a working demonstration of 
inspection for future arms control and disarmament. Realization of 
this benefit alone would, for many observers, be well worth the U.S. 
effort thus far devoted to fostering nuclear power in Europe. 

The United States, by deliberate foreign policy decisions, has chosen 
to foster commercial nuclear power in Europe. While it is not clear 
in the literature what quantitative effects U.S. policies and programs 
have had, they did contribute to the creation of one global and two 
regional international organizations for nuclear power, and to the 
establishment of commercial nuclear industries in technological nations 
of Europe, primarily France, Italy, and West Germany. Yet U.S. 
support has not led to a unified European nuclear industry, which 
is splintered among; competing national industries. So the grand hope 
of the European Economic Community for a truly European nuclear 
energy industry remains unrealized. This shortfall from the goals 
of A Target for Euratom has benefited the U.S. nuclear industry, 
which by itself is today appreciably larger and stronger than any 
one of the European nuclear industries. 

Commercial nuclear power in Europe is beginning to lessen Euro- 
pean dependence upon imported fuels. x\ssumin<r that European prog- 
ress with the demonstration and deployment of the breeder reactor 
will further reduce this dependence upon uncertain sources of fuels, 



such as those of the Middle East or the Soviet Union, Europe should be 
less vulnerable to energy blackmail. 

Granted the historical validity of the reasons for U.S. foreign 
policy toward commercial nuclear power in Europe, what of the 
future? Are new issues emerging that are of sufficient urgency to 
compete successfully for public and legislative attention ? 

No straightforward answer is at hand. It is easier to say what 
may be theoretically possible in the world of physical sciences than 
it is to predict the directions that men and their institutions may take. 
Nonetheless, there are several probable future interactions between 
nuclear power and U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy. These inter- 
actions can be categorized under the headings of nuclear power for 
U.S. foreign policy, and foreign policy for U.S. nuclear power. 

Nuclear Power for U.S. Foreign Policy 

Likely issues having to do with nuclear power as an element of 
U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's include : 3<54 


From World War II to Sputnik U.S. world technological leadership 
went unchallenged and was sustained in large part, by advances in 
nuclear science and technology. Rather than seek to monopolize 
this leadership, the United States offered and supplied technological 
assistance to many countries, especially in Furone, to develop their 
own use of nuclear power. During the late 1960's, U.S. world leadership 
was challenged by other nations. Looking to the 1970's and to an era 
of greater peaceful rather than military competition, there are several 
fundamental issues involving nuclear energy: To what extent should 
U.S. foreign policv and diplomacy continue to foster commercial use 
of nuclear power abroad? Can such a policy help enough with future 
U.S. technological leadership to be worth the effort., or would the 
required financial and other resources be more profitably dedicated 
to some other venture? Would the benefits for U.S. technological 
leadership be more than offset by economic losses through competition 
from other countries receiving U.S. technological assistance? Most 
important of all, are there any significant risks and dangers from the 
standpoint of U.S. national security in continued U.S. support of 
foreign nuclear power development? 


Assuming that U.S. foreign policv objectives continue to call for a 
European community stirmg enough to withstand pressures from 
other blocs of nations, and taking into account the si ill increasing 
demand of European economies for energy, can development of 

aw There Is one .'isixi-t of national and International development of nuclear power 

which has nol I ii ii ti'ii in this ense-study, hut that should he mentioned. Tf is the 

expanding role <>f multinational cornoratlons In tin- nuclear Industry. Recently major 
companies "f the U.S. nuclear Industry have been entering Into arrangements with their 
counterparts In Europe and elsewhere that may presage the penetration <>f powerful corporations Into the world's nuclear market. Sucb ;i development could 
pose problems of national and foreign policy. Multinational corporations In the nuclear 
field could raise issues of uncontrolled export "r transfer of technology, or Questions of 
control over movement of nuclear materials and associated safeguards, or the ability of 
some government effectively to regulate use of nuclear power In the face of the resources 
ami pressure from such powerful organizations. 


nuclear power significantly reduce Europe's dependence upon un- 
certain imports? To what extent should U.S. diplomacy and foreign 
policy reflect an objective of reducing a potential trap between demand 
and supply for energy in Europe? In particular, do present arrange- 
ments for U.S. technical assistance for nuclear power need updating? 
What future balance is desirable between a U.S. foreign policy 
objective of assuring European nations of a reliable, accessible supply 
of enriched uranium from the United States and a domestic energy 
policy which might prefer to limit U.S. foreign supply, commitments 
and thus reduce the need to expand U.S. enrichment capacity I 


It is safe to predict that U.S. foreign policy will continue to empha- 
size the fostering of world peace by international measures to reduce 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly into the hands of less 
stable nations or other organizations. Questions arising out of this 
policy posture include : 

To what extent should the United States support the expansion 
of the safeguards function of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency ? 

How much is it in the U.S. interest for the IAEA to focus 
upon safeguards in comparison with its other technical assistance 
functions ? 

In what way and within what limitations, if any. should the 
United States fulfill its commitment to place its nuclear industry 
voluntarily under IAEA safeguards? 

To what extent should U.S. foreign policy attempt to extend 
the safeguards concept to include physical security of nuclear 
materials, prevention of their theft, and apprehension of thieves? 
To what extent should U.S. diplomacy support fulfillment by 
the nuclear weapons nations of their commitments under the 
Nonprolifcration Treaty to share benefits of nuclear tcchnology 
with non-nuclear weapons states? 


U.S. foreign policy supports arms control and disarmament. One 
critical issue has been that of international inspection to assure the 
reliability of control. Commercial use of nuclear power in Europe of- 
fers useful experience with international inspection. To what extent 
can this experience be used by the United States in its advocacy of 
arms control ? Would support of IAEA or of Euratom safeguards be 
more useful in this context ? Would U.S. support of Euratom safe- 
guards encourage counterpart safeguards through a regional bloc of 
nations within the Soviet orbit? 


Assuming that economic losses due to competition from foreign 
countries whose nuclear power development has been assisted by the 
United States can be avoided, to what extent can further encourage- 
ment of commercial nuclear power in Europe, and elsewhere overseas. 

96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 20 


benefit the U.S. position in world trade \ Can export of nuclear power 
products and services provide the United States with foreign income 
comparable to that, for example, of aviation exports '. 


The President's energy message of June 1^71 clearly anticipated a 
growing role for nuclear power in the United States. On the other 
hand, nuclear power has been under continuing attack in the United 
States during recent years by those critical of its environmental ef- 
fects and fearful of the potential dangers of its radioactive wastes. 
What effect this criticism will have upon the future of nuclear power 
in the United States remains to be seen. Pending the outcome of this 
controversy, there may be the question of how far U.S. diplomacy 
should go in further encouraging the use of nuclear power abroad 
while it is being challenged at home. 

Foreign Policy for Nuclear Power 

If nuclear power can be used as an clement in U.S. foreign policy, 
then conversely U.S. foreign policy may be turned to the benefit of 
the domestic nuclear industry. Several issues in this category of for- 
eign policy benefits for the U.S. nuclear industry include: 



To date, the largest export market for the U.S. nuclear industry 
has been in Europe. However, as the United Kingdom joins the Euro- 
pean Economic Community and Euratom, there is the possibility that 
this market may wish to favor its own internal nuclear industries. 
What diplomatic measures and foreign policy decisions, if any. would 
be appropriate to preserve access of the U.S. nuclear industry to the 
nuclear market of the European Economic Community \ 



The long-term future of nuclear power will require the commercial 
use of the breeder reactor. The nuclear industries of the United States 
and Europe are seeking to complete the development and demonstra- 
tion of breeder technology. The U.S. nuclear industry has chosen to 
concentrate its efforts on the liquid metal fast breeder reactor, one of 
several technological approaches. This decision lias provoked the cril i- 
cism that too much is being risked on the success of one approach. 
To what extent should U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy seek to en- 
courage European governments and nuclear industries to develop and 
demons! rate alternal ives to the I \S. approach \ To what extent could 
diplomatic and foreign policy measures reduce the barriers to the flow 
of technical information on breeder technologies from European nu- 
clear industries, keeping in mind that trade secrecy is often applied in 
Europe at an earlier stage of industrial development than in the 
United States? 

289 , 



Several technological problems for nuclear power technology re- 
main to be solved before large-scale commercial use of nuclear power 
is likely to occur, namely, improvements in technology for reactor 
safety, for perpetual storage of radioactive wastes, and for better ways 
to dissipate or use waste heat from nuclear power plants. To what ex- 
tent should U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy seek to encourage Eu- 
ropean nations, individually or through the Common Market, to per- 
form research and development on these problems which would be of 
benefit to the U.S. nuclear industry ? 


The ability of the U.S. nuclear industry, and for that matter of 
other technologically intensive U.S. industries, to compete in foreign 
markets will be affected by the setting of international standards and 
perhaps international regulations. To what extent should U.S. for- 
eign policy and diplomacy seek to assure a voice for the United States 
in the setting and application of international standards for the de- 
sign, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants? Should this 
concept be encouraged or discouraged ? If international standard set- 
ting for nuclear power is to be encouraged, what should be the respec- 
tive roles of the Government and the U.S. nuclear industry in their 
establishment ? 


Past U.S. policy determinations have judged as advantageous the 
strong position of the United States as the principal supplier of en- 
riched uranium or enrichment services in the free world market. To 
what extent should U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy seek to preserve 
this position? To what extent should the U.S. attempt to prevent, 
limit, or control the development and use of alternative enrichment 
technologies that might threaten U.S. facilities with technological 
obsolescence, or increase the possibilities of proliferation of foreign 
capabilities to produce nuclear weapons materials ? 


Atomic energy — The energy released by a nuclear reaction or by radioactive 
decay*. (See radioactive, fission, fusion, nuclear reactors, i 

Atomic number— The number of protons in the nucleus of an atom, and also its 
positive charge. Each chemical element has its characteristic atomic 
number, and the atomic numbers of the known elements form a complete 
series from 1 for hydrogen to 103 for the man-made element lawrencium. 

Atomic reactor — See nuclear reactor. 

Atomic weapon — An explosive weapon in which the energy is produced by nuclear 
fission or fusion. 

Atomic weight — The mass of an element relative to other elements. The atomic 
weight of an element is approximately equal to the total number of 
protons and neutrons in its nucleus. 

Boiling water reactor — A nuclear reactor in which water, used as both coolant 
and moderator, is allowed to boil in the reactor core. The resulting steam 
can be used directly to drive a turbine. 

Breeder reactor — A nuclear reactor so designed that it converts more uranium- 
238 or thorium into useful nuclear fuel than the uraniumr-235 or Plu- 
tonium which it uses. The new fissionable materials are created by 
capture in the fertile materials of neutrons from the fission process. 
There are three types of breeder reactors : the liquid metal, fast breeder 
(LMFBR) : the gas cooled fast breeder (GCBR) ; and the molten-salt 
breeder i MSBR). 

Breeder ratio — The ratio of the number of fissionable atoms produced in a 
breeder reactor to the number of fissionable atoms consumed in the 

Byproduct material — Any artificial radioactive material obtained during the 
production or use of source material or fissionable material. It includes 
fission products and radioisotopes produced in nuclear reactors, but not 
radioactive materials occuring in nature or those made with accelerators 
such as cyclotrons. 

Chain reaction — A nuclear reaction that stimulates its own repetition. In a fission 
chain reaction, a fissionable nucleus absorbs a neutron and fissions, 
releasing additional neutrons. These in turn can be absorbed by other 
fissionable nuclei, releasing still more neutrons. A fission chain reaction is 
self-sustaining when the number of neutrons released equals or exceeds 
the number of neutrons lost by absorption in nonfissionable material or 
by escape from the system. 

Containment The provision of a gastight shell or other enclosure around a 
nuclear reactor to confine fission products otherwise might be 
released to the atmosphere in the event of an accident. 

Conversion ratio The ratio of the number of atoms of new fissionable material 
produced in a converter reactor to the original number of atoms of 
fussionable fuel consumed. 

Converter reactor -A nuclear reactor that produces some fissionable material, 
but less than it consumes. 

Coolant A substance circulated through a nuclear reactor to remove or transfer 
heat. Common coolants are water, air. carbon dioxide, liquid sodium, 
and helium. 

Core- The central portion of a nuclear reactor containing the fuel elements 
and usually t lie moderator. 

Decay hea< The heat produced by the decay of radioactive nuclides. 

Decay, radioactive The spontaneous transformation of one nuclide into a 
different nuclide, or into a different energy state of the same nuclide. 

Depleted uranium— Uranium having less uranium-235 than the 0.71 percent 
found in natural uranium. 



Deuterium — An isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains one neutron and 
one proton, and is therefore about twice as heavy as the nucleus of 
normal hydrogen, which is only a single proton. It occurs in nature as 
1 atom to 6500 atoms of normal hydrogen and is not radioactive. 
Energy — The capability of doing work. 

Enriched uranium — Uranium in which the amount of uranium-235 present has 
been artificially increased above that found in nature. Enriched uranium 
for civil nuclear power is generally enriched to about 3 to 6 percent ; 
enriched uranium for weapons is above 00 percent. 

Fast breeder reactor — A nuclear reactor that operates with neutrons at the 
fast speed of their initial emission from the fission process, and that 
produces more fissionable material than it consumes. 

Fast reactor — A nuclear reactor in which the fission chain reaction is sustained 
primarily by fast neutrons rather than by thermal or intermediate 

Feed materials — Refined uranium or thorium metal or their pure compounds 
in a form suitable for use in nuclear reactor fuel elements or as feed for 
uranium enrichment processes. 

Fertile material — A material, not itself fissionable by thermal neutrons, which 
can be converted into a fissionable material by irradiation in a nuclear 
reactor. The two basic fertile materials are uranium-238 and thorium- 
232. When these fertile materials capture neutrons, they become fission- 
able plutonium-230 and uranium-233. respectively. 

Fission — The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two approximately equal parts 
(which are radioactive nuclei of lighter elements), accompanied by the 
release of a relatively large amount of energy and generally one or more 
neutrons. Fission can occur spontaneously, but usually is caused by 
nuclear absorption of neutrons or other particles. 

Fissile material — "While sometimes used as a synonym for fissionable material, 
this term has also acquired a more restricted meaning, namely, any 
material fissionable by neutrons of all energies. 

Fission produces — The nuclei formed by the fission of heavy elements, plus 
nuclides formed by the fission fragments' radioactive decay. 

Fissionable material — Any material fissionable by slow neutrons. The three basic 
ones are uranium-235. plutonium-239 and uranium-233. 

Fuel cycle — The series of steps involved in supplying fuel for nuclear power 
reactors. It includes mining, refining, fabrication of fuel elements, their 
use in a nuclear reactor, chemical processing to recover remaining 
fissionable material, reenrichment of the fuel, and refabrication into new 
fuel elements. 

Fuel element — A rod. tube, plate or other shape or form into which nuclear 
fuel is fabricated for use in a reactor. 

Fuel reprocessing — The processing of reactor fuel to recover the unused, residual 
fissionable materials. 

Fusion — The formation of a heavier nucleus from two lighter ones, such as 
hydrogen isotopes, with the attendant release of energy. 

Gas centrifuge process — A method of enrichment in which heavier uranium 
adorns are partially separated from lighter ones by centrifugal force. 

Gaseous diffusion process — A method of uranium enrichment based on the fact 
that gas atoms or mo^cules with different masses will diffuse through 
a porous barrier, or membrane, at different rates. 

Isotope — One of two or more atoms with the same atomic number but with 
different atomic weights. Isotopes usually have very nearly the same 
chemical properties, but somewhat different physical properties. 

Licensed material — Source material, special nuclear material, or byproduct 
material received, possessed, used or transferred under a general or 
special license issued by the Atomic Energy Commission. 

Magnetohydrodymmics (MHD) — A process for converting energy of very hot. 
electrically conducting gases into electricity by the movement of streams 
of such gases in a magnetic field. The process in theory offers a sub- 
stantial improvement in thermal efficiency over conventional steam- 
turbine-generator systems. 

Maximum credible accident — The most serious reactor accident that can reason- 
ably be imagined from any adverse combination of equipment malfunc- 
tion, operating errors, and other foreseeable causes. 

Megawatt — One million watts, one thousand kilowatts. 


Megawatt-day per ton— A unit that expresses the burnup of nuclear fuel in a 
reactor; specifically the number of megawatt-days of heat output per 
metric ton of fuel in the reactor. 

Metric ton — loot) kiln-nuns (2205 pounds). 

Moderator— A material, .such as water, heavy water, or graphite, used in a 
nuclear reactor to slow down high-velocity neutrons emitted by fission- 
ing atoms, thus increasing the likelihood of capture to cause further 

Natural uranium— Uranium as found in nature, containing 0.7% uranium-23o, 

99.39! of uranium-238 and a trace of uranium-234. It is also called 

normal uranium. 
Normal uranium — See natural uranium. 
Nuclear power plant — Any device, machine, or assembly that converts nuclear 

energy into some form of useful power, such as mechanical or electrical 


Nuclear reactor — A device in which a fission chain reaction can be initiated, 
maintained, and controlled. Its essential component is a core with fission- 
able fuel. It usually has a moderator, reflector, shielding coolant and 
control mechanisms. It is the basic machine of nuclear power. 

Nuclide— A general term applicable to all atomic forms of the elements. It is 
not a synonym for "isotope." which properly has a more limited defini- 
tion. Whereas isotopes are the various forms of a single element, undid, s 
comprise all the isotopic forms of all the elements. 

Plutonium — A heavy, radioactive, man-made element of atomic number t>4. Its 
most important isotope is fissionable plutonium-239, produced by neu- 
tron irradiation of uranium-238. It is used for reactor fuel and in 

Pressurized water reactor — A power reactor in which heat is transferred from 
the core to a heat exchanger by water kept under high pressure to pre- 
vent it from boiling. Steam is generated in a secondary circuit. 

Pu-239 — The isotope of plutonium of weight 239. 

Radiation — The emission and propagation of energy through matter or space 
by electromagnetic waves, or by particles. Nuclear radiation is that 
emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear reactions. 

Radiation standards — Exposure standards, permissible concentrations, rules for 
safe handling, regulations for transportation, regulations for industrial 
control of radiation and control of radiation exposure by legislative 

Radioactive contamination — Deposition of radioactive material in any place 
where it may harm persons, spoil experiments, or make products or 
equipment unsuitable or unsafe. The presence of unwanted radioactive 

Radioactivity — The spontaneous decay or disintegration of an unstable atomic 
nucleus, usually accompanied by emission of ionizing radiation. 

Source material— As defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, any material. 
e\c pt special nuclear material, which contains 0.05% or more of ura- 
nium, thorium, or any combination of the two. 

Special nuclear material — As defined in the Atomic Energy Act o r 1954, this 
term refers to plutonium-239, uranium-238, enriched uranium, or any 
material artificially enriched in any of these substances. 

Toll enrichment A business arrangement whereby privately owned uranium 
is enriched in uranium-235 content in government facilities upon pay- 
iin m of a service charge. 

Tritium A radioactive isotope of hydrogen. It is man-made and is heavier 
than deuterium. 

U-235, U-238 — Uranium of atomic weights 235 and 238, respectively. 

Uranium— A radioactive element with atomic number 92 and, as found in 
natural ore-;, an average atomic weight of approximately 238. The two 
principle natural isotopes of uranium are uranium-235 (0.7% of natural 
uranium), which is fissionable, and uranium-238 (99.3% of natural 
ii'-;. uimn > . w liich is Perl ile. 

Uranium hexafluoride — A volatile compound of uranium and fluorine. In ira^i ous 
form, this is the process material Cor the gaseous diffusion and gas 
centrifuge methods of enrichment. 

Wastes, radioactive Equipment and materials, from nuclear operations, which 
are radioactive and for which there is no further use. Wastes are gen- 
erally classified as high-level (having radioactivity concentrations of 
hundr< ds to thousands of curies per gallon or cubic foot), low level (in 
the range of 1 microcurie per gallon or cubic foot), or intermediate. 

Chapter 5 — The Political Legacy of the 
International Geophysical Year 



I. Introduction 297 

II. Background of the IGY (1957-58) 300 

Antecedents of the IGY 300 

The First International Polar Year (1882-83) 301 

The Second International Polar Year (1932-33) 301 

Origin and Evolution of the IGY 301 

Impetus for a Third International Polar Year 302 

The Scientific Response 304 

The Political Response 305 

Organization and Funding of the IGY 305 

International Organization and Funding 306 

U.S. Organization and Funding 309 

III. The Scientific Program 313 

The Scientific Rationale 313 

Organization of the Program 314 

Implementation of the Program 316 

IGY Reporters 317 

Data Centers 317 

World Days and Alerts 318 

Publication of Results 318 

"Gemutlichkeit" 319 

Political Constraints on the Program 320 

The Two Chinas 320 

Soviet Missiles 321 

Arctic Flights 321 

Radioactive Fallout 322 

Antarctic Bases 322 

Mapping 322 

The "Stolen" Satellite Rocket 322 

Censorship 323 

IV. The Scientific Results 324 

Summary of Scientific Findings of the IGY 324 

Aurora and Airglow 324 

Cosmic Rays 324 

Geomagnetism 325 

Glaciology 325 

Gravity 325 

Ionospheric Physics 325 

Longitudes and Latitudes 325 

Meteorology 326 

Nuclear Radiation 326 

Oceanography , 326 

Seismology 326 

Solar Activity 327 

Upper Atmosphere 327 

Appraisal of Findings 327 

Continuation of IGY Programs 329 




V. The Political Impacts 331 

General Impacts on the United States 331 

Specific Impacts on the United States 332 

Federal Support of Basic Science 334 

The Space Program 33